AIDA64 Extreme

 
Version  AIDA64 v5.80.4000
Benchmark Module  4.3.712-x64
Homepage  http://www.aida64.com/
Report Type  Quick Report [ TRIAL VERSION ]
Computer  RAZER (Razer™)
Generator  Deathadder™
Operating System  Microsoft Windows 10 Pro 10.0.14393.693 (Win10 RS1)
Date  2017-01-16
Time  09:05


Summary

 
Computer:
Computer Type  ACPI x64-based PC (Mobile)
Operating System  Microsoft Windows 10 Pro
OS Service Pack  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
Internet Explorer  11.576.14393.0
Edge  38.14393.0.0
DirectX  DirectX 12.0
Computer Name  RAZER (Razer™)
User Name  Deathadder™
Logon Domain  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
Date / Time  2017-01-16 / 09:06
 
Motherboard:
CPU Type  Mobile DualCore Intel Core i5-3317U, 2400 MHz (24 x 100)
Motherboard Name  Asus K46CM Series Notebook
Motherboard Chipset  Intel Panther Point HM76, Intel Ivy Bridge
System Memory  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
DIMM1: Samsung M471B5273CH0-CK0  4 GB DDR3-1600 DDR3 SDRAM (11-11-11-28 @ 800 MHz) (10-10-10-27 @ 761 MHz) (9-9-9-24 @ 685 MHz) (8-8-8-22 @ 609 MHz) (7-7-7-19 @ 533 MHz) (6-6-6-16 @ 457 MHz) (5-5-5-14 @ 380 MHz)
DIMM3: Samsung M471B5273CHYH9Ls  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
BIOS Type  AMI (05/17/2013)
 
Display:
Video Adapter  Intel(R) HD Graphics 4000 (2112 MB)
Video Adapter  Intel(R) HD Graphics 4000 (2112 MB)
Video Adapter  Intel(R) HD Graphics 4000 (2112 MB)
Video Adapter  NVIDIA GeForce GT 635M (2 GB)
3D Accelerator  Intel HD Graphics 4000
Monitor  CMN N140BGE-L42 [14" LCD]
 
Multimedia:
Audio Adapter  Intel Panther Point HDMI @ Intel Panther Point PCH - High Definition Audio Controller [C-1]
Audio Adapter  Realtek ALC270 @ Intel Panther Point PCH - High Definition Audio Controller [C-1]
 
Storage:
IDE Controller  Intel(R) 7 Series Chipset Family SATA AHCI Controller
IDE Controller  Realtek PCIE CardReader
Storage Controller  Microsoft Storage Spaces Controller
Disk Drive  Kingston DataTraveler 3.0 USB Device (14 GB, USB)
Disk Drive  KINGSTON SMSR150S3256G (119 GB)
Disk Drive  Samsung SSD 850 EVO 250GB (250 GB, SATA-III)
Disk Drive  SanDisk SSD U100 24GB (24 GB, SATA-III)
SMART Hard Disks Status  OK
 
Partitions:
C: (NTFS)  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
D: (NTFS)  157.2 GB (70.8 GB free)
Total Size  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
 
Input:
Keyboard  PC/AT Enhanced PS/2 Keyboard (101/102-Key)
Keyboard  Razer DeathAdder 3.5G
Mouse  ASUS Touchpad
Mouse  Razer DeathAdder 3.5G
 
Network:
Primary IP Address  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
Primary MAC Address  4C-0F-6E-E4-9C-FA
Network Adapter  Microsoft Wi-Fi Direct Virtual Adapter
Network Adapter  Qualcomm Atheros AR9285 Wireless Network Adapter (192. [ TRIAL VERSION ])
Network Adapter  Realtek PCIe GBE Family Controller
Network Adapter  VMware Virtual Ethernet Adapter for VMnet1 (192. [ TRIAL VERSION ])
Network Adapter  VMware Virtual Ethernet Adapter for VMnet8 (192. [ TRIAL VERSION ])
 
Peripherals:
Printer  \\10.26.0.7\BigOffice- RICOH Aficio MP 6001
Printer  \\10.26.0.7\TONG VU HP LJ300-400 color M351-M451
Printer  Adobe PDF
Printer  Fax
Printer  Microsoft Print to PDF
Printer  Microsoft XPS Document Writer
Printer  Send To OneNote 2016
USB2 Controller  Intel Panther Point PCH - USB 2.0 EHCI Controller #1 [C-1]
USB2 Controller  Intel Panther Point PCH - USB 2.0 EHCI Controller #2 [C-1]
USB3 Controller  Intel Panther Point PCH - USB 3.0 xHCI Controller [C-1]
USB Device  Generic USB Hub
USB Device  Generic USB Hub
USB Device  Razer DeathAdder 3.5G
USB Device  USB 2.0 UVC HD Webcam
USB Device  USB Composite Device
USB Device  USB Mass Storage Device
Battery  Microsoft AC Adapter
Battery  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant Control Method Battery
 
DMI:
DMI BIOS Vendor  American Megatrends Inc.
DMI BIOS Version  K46CM.317
DMI System Manufacturer  ASUSTeK COMPUTER INC.
DMI System Product  K46CM
DMI System Version  1.0
DMI System Serial Number  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
DMI System UUID  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
DMI Motherboard Manufacturer  ASUSTeK COMPUTER INC.
DMI Motherboard Product  K46CM
DMI Motherboard Version  1.0
DMI Motherboard Serial Number  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
DMI Chassis Manufacturer  ASUSTeK COMPUTER INC.
DMI Chassis Version  1.0
DMI Chassis Serial Number  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
DMI Chassis Asset Tag  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
DMI Chassis Type  Notebook


Computer Name

 
Type  Class  Computer Name
Computer Comment  Logical  Razer™
NetBIOS Name  Logical  RAZER
DNS Host Name  Logical  RAZER
DNS Domain Name  Logical  
Fully Qualified DNS Name  Logical  RAZER
NetBIOS Name  Physical  RAZER
DNS Host Name  Physical  RAZER
DNS Domain Name  Physical  
Fully Qualified DNS Name  Physical  RAZER


DMI

 
[ BIOS ]
 
BIOS Properties:
Vendor  American Megatrends Inc.
Version  K46CM.317
Release Date  05/17/2013
Size  6 MB
System BIOS Version  4.6
Boot Devices  Floppy Disk, Hard Disk, CD-ROM
Capabilities  Flash BIOS, Shadow BIOS, Selectable Boot, EDD, BBS, Smart Battery
Supported Standards  DMI, ACPI, UEFI
Expansion Capabilities  PCI, USB
Virtual Machine  No
 
BIOS Manufacturer:
Company Name  American Megatrends Inc.
Product Information  http://www.ami.com/amibios
BIOS Upgrades  http://www.aida64.com/bios-updates
 
[ System ]
 
System Properties:
Manufacturer  ASUSTeK COMPUTER INC.
Product  K46CM
Version  1.0
Serial Number  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
SKU#  ASUS-NotebookSKU
Family  K
Universal Unique ID  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
Wake-Up Type  Power Switch
 
[ Motherboard ]
 
Motherboard Properties:
Manufacturer  ASUSTeK COMPUTER INC.
Product  K46CM
Version  1.0
Serial Number  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
Asset Tag  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
Asset Tag  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
Asset Tag  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
 
Motherboard Manufacturer:
Company Name  ASUSTeK Computer Inc.
Product Information  http://www.asus.com/Motherboards
BIOS Download  http://support.asus.com/download/download.aspx?SLanguage=en-us
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
BIOS Upgrades  http://www.aida64.com/bios-updates
 
[ Chassis ]
 
Chassis Properties:
Manufacturer  ASUSTeK COMPUTER INC.
Version  1.0
Serial Number  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
Asset Tag  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
Chassis Type  Notebook
Boot-Up State  Safe
Power Supply State  Safe
Thermal State  Safe
Security Status  None
 
[ Processors / Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3317U CPU @ 1.70GHz ]
 
Processor Properties:
Manufacturer  Intel(R) Corporation
Version  Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3317U CPU @ 1.70GHz
Asset Tag  Fill By OEM
Part Number  Fill By OEM
External Clock  100 MHz
Maximum Clock  3800 MHz
Current Clock  1700 MHz
Type  Central Processor
Voltage  5.7 V
Status  Enabled
Upgrade  Socket rPGA988B
Socket Designation  SOCKET 0
HTT / CMP Units  2 / 2
Capabilities  64-bit
 
CPU Manufacturer:
Company Name  Intel Corporation
Product Information  http://ark.intel.com/search.aspx?q=Intel%20Core%20i5-3317U
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Caches / CPU Internal L2 ]
 
Cache Properties:
Type  Unified
Status  Enabled
Operational Mode  Write-Through
Associativity  8-way Set-Associative
Maximum Size  512 KB
Installed Size  512 KB
Error Correction  Multi-bit ECC
Socket Designation  CPU Internal L2
 
[ Caches / CPU Internal L1 ]
 
Cache Properties:
Type  Data
Status  Enabled
Operational Mode  Write-Through
Associativity  8-way Set-Associative
Maximum Size  128 KB
Installed Size  128 KB
Error Correction  Parity
Socket Designation  CPU Internal L1
 
[ Caches / CPU Internal L3 ]
 
Cache Properties:
Type  Unified
Status  Enabled
Operational Mode  Write-Back
Associativity  12-way Set-Associative
Maximum Size  3072 KB
Installed Size  3072 KB
Error Correction  Multi-bit ECC
Socket Designation  CPU Internal L3
 
[ Memory Arrays / System Memory ]
 
Memory Array Properties:
Location  Motherboard
Memory Array Function  System Memory
Error Correction  None
Max. Memory Capacity  32 GB
Memory Devices  4
 
[ Memory Devices / ChannelA-DIMM0 ]
 
Memory Device Properties:
Form Factor  SODIMM
Type  DDR3
Type Detail  Synchronous
Size  4 GB
Max. Clock Speed  1600 MHz
Current Clock Speed  1600 MHz
Total Width  64-bit
Data Width  64-bit
Ranks  2
Device Locator  ChannelA-DIMM0
Bank Locator  BANK 0
Manufacturer  Samsung
Serial Number  94C716C7
Asset Tag  9876543210
Part Number  M471B5273CH0-CK0
 
[ Memory Devices / ChannelA-DIMM1 ]
 
Memory Device Properties:
Form Factor  DIMM
Device Locator  ChannelA-DIMM1
Bank Locator  BANK 1
Manufacturer  [Empty]
Serial Number  [Empty]
Asset Tag  9876543210
Part Number  [Empty]
 
[ Memory Devices / ChannelB-DIMM0 ]
 
Memory Device Properties:
Form Factor  SODIMM
Type  DDR3
Type Detail  Synchronous
Size  4 GB
Max. Clock Speed  1600 MHz
Current Clock Speed  1600 MHz
Total Width  64-bit
Data Width  64-bit
Ranks  2
Device Locator  ChannelB-DIMM0
Bank Locator  BANK 2
Manufacturer  Samsung
Serial Number  AC45EC1D
Asset Tag  9876543210
Part Number  M471B5273CHYH9Ls
 
[ Memory Devices / ChannelB-DIMM1 ]
 
Memory Device Properties:
Form Factor  DIMM
Device Locator  ChannelB-DIMM1
Bank Locator  BANK 3
Manufacturer  [Empty]
Serial Number  [Empty]
Asset Tag  9876543210
Part Number  [Empty]
 
[ On-Board Devices / VGA ]
 
On-Board Device Properties:
Description  VGA
Type  Video
Status  Enabled
 
[ On-Board Devices / GLAN ]
 
On-Board Device Properties:
Description  GLAN
Type  Ethernet
Status  Enabled
 
[ On-Board Devices / WLAN ]
 
On-Board Device Properties:
Description  WLAN
Type  Ethernet
Status  Enabled
 
[ On-Board Devices / Audio CODEC ]
 
On-Board Device Properties:
Description  Audio CODEC
Type  Sound
Status  Enabled
 
[ On-Board Devices / SATA Controller ]
 
On-Board Device Properties:
Description  SATA Controller
Type  SATA Controller
Status  Enabled
 
[ On-Board Devices / USB 2.0 Controller ]
 
On-Board Device Properties:
Description  USB 2.0 Controller
Status  Enabled
 
[ On-Board Devices / USB 3.0 Controller ]
 
On-Board Device Properties:
Description  USB 3.0 Controller
Status  Enabled
 
[ On-Board Devices / SMBus Controller ]
 
On-Board Device Properties:
Description  SMBus Controller
Status  Enabled
 
[ On-Board Devices / Card Reader ]
 
On-Board Device Properties:
Description  Card Reader
Status  Enabled
 
[ On-Board Devices / Cmos Camera ]
 
On-Board Device Properties:
Description  Cmos Camera
Status  Enabled
 
[ On-Board Devices / Bluetooth ]
 
On-Board Device Properties:
Description  Bluetooth
Status  Enabled
 
[ Intel vPro ]
 
Intel vPro Properties:
ME Firmware Version  8.1.0.1248
PCH PCI Bus / Device / Function  0 / 31 / 0
PCH PCI Device ID  8086-1E59
Wired NIC PCI Bus / Device / Function  0 / 25 / 0
Wired NIC PCI Device ID  8086-FFFF
AMT  Not Supported
Anti-Theft  Supported, Disabled
Anti-Theft PBA for Recovery  Supported
Anti-Theft WWAN  Not Supported
BIOS TXT  Supported
BIOS VT-d  Supported
BIOS VT-x  Supported
CPU VT-x  Supported, Enabled
CPU TXT  Not Supported
KVM  Not Supported
Local Wakeup Timer  Not Supported
Management Engine  Enabled
Small Business Advantage  Not Supported
Standard Manageability  Not Supported
 
[ Miscellaneous ]
 
Miscellaneous:
OEM String  0qKYm5ZcdKS-P
OEM String  BTjnE9jCyTkJN
OEM String  GB6ACWVc2EsU7
System Configuration Option  DSN:2SM1SNGA046425 F
System Configuration Option  DSN:6BBC929A5803
System Configuration Option  DSN:3085A929CBB6
System Configuration Option  SMI:00B2CA


Overclock

 
CPU Properties:
CPU Type  Mobile DualCore Intel Core i5-3317U
CPU Alias  Ivy Bridge-MB
CPU Stepping  E1/L1/N0/P0
Engineering Sample  No
CPUID CPU Name  Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3317U CPU @ 1.70GHz
CPUID Revision  000306A9h
CPU VID  0.9207 V
 
CPU Speed:
CPU Clock  2394.4 MHz (original: [ TRIAL VERSION ] MHz, overclock: 41%)
CPU Multiplier  24x
CPU FSB  99.8 MHz (original: 100 MHz)
North Bridge Clock  2394.4 MHz
Memory Bus  798.1 MHz
DRAM:FSB Ratio  24:3
 
CPU Cache:
L1 Code Cache  32 KB per core
L1 Data Cache  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
L2 Cache  256 KB per core (On-Die, ECC, Full-Speed)
L3 Cache  3 MB (On-Die, ECC, Full-Speed)
 
Motherboard Properties:
Motherboard ID  <DMI>
Motherboard Name  Asus K46CM Series Notebook
 
Chipset Properties:
Motherboard Chipset  Intel Panther Point HM76, Intel Ivy Bridge
Memory Timings  11-11-11-28 (CL-RCD-RP-RAS)
Command Rate (CR)  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
DIMM1: Samsung M471B5273CH0-CK0  4 GB DDR3-1600 DDR3 SDRAM (11-11-11-28 @ 800 MHz) (10-10-10-27 @ 761 MHz) (9-9-9-24 @ 685 MHz) (8-8-8-22 @ 609 MHz) (7-7-7-19 @ 533 MHz) (6-6-6-16 @ 457 MHz) (5-5-5-14 @ 380 MHz)
DIMM3: Samsung M471B5273CHYH9Ls  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
 
BIOS Properties:
System BIOS Date  05/17/2013
Video BIOS Date  Unknown
DMI BIOS Version  K46CM.317
 
Graphics Processor Properties:
Video Adapter  Intel Ivy Bridge-MB - Integrated Graphics Controller (MB GT2)
GPU Code Name  Ivy Bridge-MB GT2 (Integrated 8086 / 0166, Rev 09)
GPU Clock  349 MHz (original: [ TRIAL VERSION ] MHz)


Power Management

 
Power Management Properties:
Current Power Source  AC Line
Battery Status  100 % (High Level)
Full Battery Lifetime  Unknown
Remaining Battery Lifetime  Unknown
 
Battery Properties:
Device Name  K56--30
Manufacturer  ASUSTeK
Unique ID  ASUSTeKK56--30
Battery Type  Rechargeable Li-Ion
Designed Capacity  42980 mWh
Fully Charged Capacity  17248 mWh
Current Capacity  17290 mWh (100 %)
Battery Voltage  16.086 V
Wear Level  59 %
Power State  AC Line


Portable Computer

 
Centrino (Carmel) Platform Compliancy:
CPU: Intel Pentium M (Banias/Dothan)  No (Mobile Intel Core i5-3317U)
Chipset: Intel i855GM/PM  No (Intel Panther Point HM76, Intel Ivy Bridge)
WLAN: Intel PRO/Wireless  No
System: Centrino Compliant  No
 
Centrino (Sonoma) Platform Compliancy:
CPU: Intel Pentium M (Dothan)  No (Mobile Intel Core i5-3317U)
Chipset: Intel i915GM/PM  No (Intel Panther Point HM76, Intel Ivy Bridge)
WLAN: Intel PRO/Wireless 2200/2915  No
System: Centrino Compliant  No
 
Centrino (Napa) Platform Compliancy:
CPU: Intel Core (Yonah) / Core 2 (Merom)  No (Mobile Intel Core i5-3317U)
Chipset: Intel i945GM/PM  No (Intel Panther Point HM76, Intel Ivy Bridge)
WLAN: Intel PRO/Wireless 3945/3965  No
System: Centrino Compliant  No
 
Centrino (Santa Rosa) Platform Compliancy:
CPU: Intel Core 2 (Merom/Penryn)  No (Mobile Intel Core i5-3317U)
Chipset: Intel GM965/PM965  No (Intel Panther Point HM76, Intel Ivy Bridge)
WLAN: Intel Wireless WiFi Link 4965  No
System: Centrino Compliant  No
 
Centrino 2 (Montevina) Platform Compliancy:
CPU: Intel Core 2 (Penryn)  No (Mobile Intel Core i5-3317U)
Chipset: Mobile Intel 4 Series  No (Intel Panther Point HM76, Intel Ivy Bridge)
WLAN: Intel WiFi Link 5000 Series  No
System: Centrino 2 Compliant  No
 
Centrino (Calpella) Platform Compliancy:
CPU: Intel Core i3/i5/i7 (Arrandale/Clarksfield)  No (Mobile Intel Core i5-3317U)
Chipset: Mobile Intel 5 Series  No (Intel Panther Point HM76, Intel Ivy Bridge)
WLAN: Intel Centrino Advanced-N / Ultimate-N / Wireless-N  No
System: Centrino Compliant  No
 
Centrino (Huron River) Platform Compliancy:
CPU: Intel Core i3/i5/i7 (Sandy Bridge-MB)  No (Mobile Intel Core i5-3317U)
Chipset: Mobile Intel 6 Series  No (Intel Panther Point HM76, Intel Ivy Bridge)
WLAN: Intel Centrino Advanced-N / Ultimate-N / Wireless-N  No
System: Centrino Compliant  No
 
Centrino (Chief River) Platform Compliancy:
CPU: Intel Core i3/i5/i7 (Ivy Bridge-MB)  Yes (Mobile Intel Core i5-3317U)
Chipset: Mobile Intel 7 Series  Yes (Intel Panther Point HM76, Intel Ivy Bridge)
WLAN: Intel Centrino Advanced-N / Ultimate-N / Wireless-N  No
System: Centrino Compliant  No
 
Centrino (Shark Bay-MB) Platform Compliancy:
CPU: Intel Core i3/i5/i7 (Haswell-MB)  No (Mobile Intel Core i5-3317U)
Chipset: Mobile Intel 8/9 Series  No (Intel Panther Point HM76, Intel Ivy Bridge)
WLAN: Intel Centrino Advanced-N / Ultimate-N / Wireless-N  No
System: Centrino Compliant  No


Sensor

 
Sensor Properties:
Sensor Type  CPU, HDD, Asus NB ACPI, PCH, SNB
 
Temperatures:
CPU  52 °C (126 °F)
CPU Package  53 °C (127 °F)
CPU IA Cores  53 °C (127 °F)
CPU GT Cores  53 °C (127 °F)
CPU #1 / Core #1  52 °C (126 °F)
CPU #1 / Core #2  53 °C (127 °F)
PCH Diode  60 °C (140 °F)
Samsung SSD 850 EVO 250GB  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
 
Cooling Fans:
CPU  2700 RPM
 
Voltage Values:
CPU Core  0.921 V
Battery  16.086 V
GPU Core  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
 
Power Values:
CPU Package  8.45 W
CPU IA Cores  5.02 W
CPU GT Cores  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
CPU Uncore  3.39 W
Battery Charge Rate  AC Line


CPU

 
CPU Properties:
CPU Type  Mobile DualCore Intel Core i5-3317U, 2400 MHz (24 x 100)
CPU Alias  Ivy Bridge-MB
CPU Stepping  E1/L1/N0/P0
Instruction Set  x86, x86-64, MMX, SSE, SSE2, SSE3, SSSE3, SSE4.1, SSE4.2, AVX, AES
Original Clock  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
Min / Max CPU Multiplier  8x / 17x
Engineering Sample  No
L1 Code Cache  32 KB per core
L1 Data Cache  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
L2 Cache  256 KB per core (On-Die, ECC, Full-Speed)
L3 Cache  3 MB (On-Die, ECC, Full-Speed)
 
CPU Physical Info:
Package Type  1023/1224 Ball BGA
Package Size  31 mm x 24 mm
Process Technology  22 nm, CMOS, Cu, High-K + Metal Gate
Typical Power  17 W
 
CPU Manufacturer:
Company Name  Intel Corporation
Product Information  http://ark.intel.com/search.aspx?q=Intel%20Core%20i5-3317U
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
Multi CPU:
CPU #1  Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3317U CPU @ 1.70GHz, 1696 MHz
CPU #2  Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3317U CPU @ 1.70GHz, 1696 MHz
CPU #3  Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3317U CPU @ 1.70GHz, 1696 MHz
CPU #4  Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3317U CPU @ 1.70GHz, 1696 MHz
 
CPU Utilization:
CPU #1 / Core #1 / HTT Unit #1  33%
CPU #1 / Core #1 / HTT Unit #2  0%
CPU #1 / Core #2 / HTT Unit #1  66%
CPU #1 / Core #2 / HTT Unit #2  0%


CPUID

 
CPUID Properties:
CPUID Manufacturer  GenuineIntel
CPUID CPU Name  Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3317U CPU @ 1.70GHz
CPUID Revision  000306A9h
IA Brand ID  00h (Unknown)
Platform ID  2Ah / MC 10h (BGA1023/BGA1224)
Microcode Update Revision  1Bh
HTT / CMP Units  2 / 2
Tjmax Temperature  105 °C (221 °F)
CPU Thermal Design Power  17 W
CPU IA Cores Thermal Design Current  112 A
CPU GT Cores Thermal Design Current  46 A
CPU Max Power Limit  Unlimited Power / Unlimited Time
CPU Power Limit 1 (Long Duration)  17 W / 28.00 sec (Unlocked)
CPU Power Limit 2 (Short Duration)  22 W / Unlimited Time (Unlocked)
Max Turbo Boost Multipliers  1C: 26x, 2C: 24x
 
Instruction Set:
64-bit x86 Extension (AMD64, Intel64)  Supported
AMD 3DNow!  Not Supported
AMD 3DNow! Professional  Not Supported
AMD 3DNowPrefetch  Not Supported
AMD Enhanced 3DNow!  Not Supported
AMD Extended MMX  Not Supported
AMD FMA4  Not Supported
AMD MisAligned SSE  Not Supported
AMD SSE4A  Not Supported
AMD XOP  Not Supported
Cyrix Extended MMX  Not Supported
Enhanced REP MOVSB/STOSB  Supported
Float-16 Conversion Instructions  Supported, Enabled
IA-64  Not Supported
IA AES Extensions  Supported
IA AVX  Supported, Enabled
IA AVX2  Not Supported
IA AVX-512 (AVX512F)  Not Supported
IA AVX-512 52-bit Integer Instructions (AVX512IFMA52)  Not Supported
IA AVX-512 Byte and Word Instructions (AVX512BW)  Not Supported
IA AVX-512 Conflict Detection Instructions (AVX512CD)  Not Supported
IA AVX-512 Doubleword and Quadword Instructions (AVX512DQ)  Not Supported
IA AVX-512 Exponential and Reciprocal Instructions (AVX512ER)  Not Supported
IA AVX-512 FMAPS (AVX512_4FMAPS)  Not Supported
IA AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions (AVX512_4VNNIW)  Not Supported
IA AVX-512 Prefetch Instructions (AVX512PF)  Not Supported
IA AVX-512 Vector Bit Manipulation Instructions (AVX512VBMI)  Not Supported
IA AVX-512 Vector Length Extensions (AVX512VL)  Not Supported
IA BMI1  Not Supported
IA BMI2  Not Supported
IA FMA  Not Supported
IA MMX  Supported
IA SHA Extensions  Not Supported
IA SSE  Supported
IA SSE2  Supported
IA SSE3  Supported
IA Supplemental SSE3  Supported
IA SSE4.1  Supported
IA SSE4.2  Supported
VIA Alternate Instruction Set  Not Supported
ADCX / ADOX Instruction  Not Supported
CLFLUSH Instruction  Supported
CLFLUSHOPT Instruction  Not Supported
CLWB Instruction  Not Supported
CMPXCHG8B Instruction  Supported
CMPXCHG16B Instruction  Supported
Conditional Move Instruction  Supported
INVPCID Instruction  Not Supported
LAHF / SAHF Instruction  Supported
LZCNT Instruction  Not Supported
MONITOR / MWAIT Instruction  Supported
MONITORX / MWAITX Instruction  Not Supported
MOVBE Instruction  Not Supported
PCLMULQDQ Instruction  Supported
PCOMMIT Instruction  Not Supported
POPCNT Instruction  Supported
PREFETCHWT1 Instruction  Not Supported
RDFSBASE / RDGSBASE / WRFSBASE / WRGSBASE Instruction  Supported
RDRAND Instruction  Supported
RDSEED Instruction  Not Supported
RDTSCP Instruction  Supported
SKINIT / STGI Instruction  Not Supported
SYSCALL / SYSRET Instruction  Not Supported
SYSENTER / SYSEXIT Instruction  Supported
Trailing Bit Manipulation Instructions  Not Supported
VIA FEMMS Instruction  Not Supported
 
Security Features:
Advanced Cryptography Engine (ACE)  Not Supported
Advanced Cryptography Engine 2 (ACE2)  Not Supported
Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET)  Not Supported
Data Execution Prevention (DEP, NX, EDB)  Supported
Hardware Random Number Generator (RNG)  Not Supported
Hardware Random Number Generator 2 (RNG2)  Not Supported
Memory Protection Extensions (MPX)  Not Supported
PadLock Hash Engine (PHE)  Not Supported
PadLock Hash Engine 2 (PHE2)  Not Supported
PadLock Montgomery Multiplier (PMM)  Not Supported
PadLock Montgomery Multiplier 2 (PMM2)  Not Supported
Processor Serial Number (PSN)  Not Supported
Protection Keys for User-Mode Pages (PKU)  Not Supported
Read Processor ID (RDPID)  Not Supported
Safer Mode Extensions (SMX)  Not Supported
Secure Memory Encryption (SME)  Not Supported
SGX Launch Configuration (SGX_LC)  Not Supported
Software Guard Extensions (SGX)  Not Supported
Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP)  Not Supported
Supervisor Mode Execution Protection (SMEP)  Supported
User-Mode Instruction Prevention (UMIP)  Not Supported
 
Power Management Features:
APM Power Reporting  Not Supported
Application Power Management (APM)  Not Supported
Automatic Clock Control  Supported
Configurable TDP (cTDP)  Not Supported
Connected Standby  Not Supported
Core C6 State (CC6)  Not Supported
Digital Thermometer  Supported
Dynamic FSB Frequency Switching  Not Supported
Enhanced Halt State (C1E)  Supported, Enabled
Enhanced SpeedStep Technology (EIST, ESS)  Supported, Enabled
Frequency ID Control  Not Supported
Hardware P-State Control  Not Supported
Hardware Thermal Control (HTC)  Not Supported
LongRun  Not Supported
LongRun Table Interface  Not Supported
Overstress  Not Supported
Package C6 State (PC6)  Not Supported
Parallax  Not Supported
PowerSaver 1.0  Not Supported
PowerSaver 2.0  Not Supported
PowerSaver 3.0  Not Supported
Processor Duty Cycle Control  Supported
Running Average Power Limit (RAPL)  Not Supported
Software Thermal Control  Not Supported
SpeedShift (SST, HWP)  Not Supported
Temperature Sensing Diode  Not Supported
Thermal Monitor 1  Supported
Thermal Monitor 2  Supported
Thermal Monitor 3  Not Supported
Thermal Monitoring  Not Supported
Thermal Trip  Not Supported
Voltage ID Control  Not Supported
 
Virtualization Features:
Extended Page Table (EPT)  Supported
Hypervisor  Not Present
INVEPT Instruction  Supported
INVVPID Instruction  Supported
Nested Paging (NPT, RVI)  Not Supported
Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV)  Not Supported
Secure Virtual Machine (SVM, Pacifica)  Not Supported
Virtual Machine Extensions (VMX, Vanderpool)  Supported
Virtual Processor ID (VPID)  Supported
 
CPUID Features:
1 GB Page Size  Not Supported
36-bit Page Size Extension  Supported
64-bit DS Area  Supported
Adaptive Overclocking  Not Supported
Address Region Registers (ARR)  Not Supported
Code and Data Prioritization Technology (CDP)  Not Supported
Core Performance Boost (CPB)  Not Supported
Core Performance Counters  Not Supported
CPL Qualified Debug Store  Supported
Data Breakpoint Extension  Not Supported
Debug Trace Store  Supported
Debugging Extension  Supported
Deprecated FPU CS and FPU DS  Not Supported
Direct Cache Access  Not Supported
Dynamic Acceleration Technology (IDA)  Not Supported
Dynamic Configurable TDP (DcTDP)  Not Supported
Extended APIC Register Space  Not Supported
Fast Save & Restore  Supported
Hardware Lock Elision (HLE)  Not Supported
Hybrid Boost  Not Supported
Hyper-Threading Technology (HTT)  Supported, Enabled
Instruction Based Sampling  Not Supported
Invariant Time Stamp Counter  Supported
L1 Context ID  Not Supported
L2I Performance Counters  Not Supported
Lightweight Profiling  Not Supported
Local APIC On Chip  Supported
Machine Check Architecture (MCA)  Supported
Machine Check Exception (MCE)  Supported
Memory Configuration Registers (MCR)  Not Supported
Memory Type Range Registers (MTRR)  Supported
Model Specific Registers (MSR)  Supported
NB Performance Counters  Not Supported
Page Attribute Table (PAT)  Supported
Page Global Extension  Supported
Page Size Extension (PSE)  Supported
Pending Break Event (PBE)  Supported
Performance Time Stamp Counter (PTSC)  Not Supported
Physical Address Extension (PAE)  Supported
Platform Quality of Service Enforcement (PQE)  Not Supported
Platform Quality of Service Monitoring (PQM)  Not Supported
Process Context Identifiers (PCID)  Supported
Processor Feedback Interface  Not Supported
Processor Trace (PT)  Not Supported
Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM)  Not Supported
Self-Snoop  Supported
Time Stamp Counter (TSC)  Supported
Time Stamp Counter Adjust  Not Supported
Turbo Boost  Supported, Enabled
Virtual Mode Extension  Supported
Watchdog Timer  Not Supported
x2APIC  Supported, Disabled
XGETBV / XSETBV OS Enabled  Supported
XSAVE / XRSTOR / XSETBV / XGETBV Extended States  Supported
XSAVEOPT  Supported
 
CPUID Registers (CPU #1):
CPUID 00000000  0000000D-756E6547-6C65746E-49656E69 [GenuineIntel]
CPUID 00000001  000306A9-00100800-7FBAE3BF-BFEBFBFF
CPUID 00000002  76035A01-00F0B2FF-00000000-00CA0000
CPUID 00000003  00000000-00000000-00000000-00000000
CPUID 00000004  1C004121-01C0003F-0000003F-00000000 [SL 00]
CPUID 00000004  1C004122-01C0003F-0000003F-00000000 [SL 01]
CPUID 00000004  1C004143-01C0003F-000001FF-00000000 [SL 02]
CPUID 00000004  1C03C163-02C0003F-00000FFF-00000006 [SL 03]
CPUID 00000005  00000040-00000040-00000003-00021120
CPUID 00000006  00000077-00000002-00000009-00000000
CPUID 00000007  00000000-00000281-00000000-00000000
CPUID 00000008  00000000-00000000-00000000-00000000
CPUID 00000009  00000000-00000000-00000000-00000000
CPUID 0000000A  07300403-00000000-00000000-00000603
CPUID 0000000B  00000001-00000002-00000100-00000000 [SL 00]
CPUID 0000000B  00000004-00000004-00000201-00000000 [SL 01]
CPUID 0000000C  00000000-00000000-00000000-00000000
CPUID 0000000D  00000007-00000340-00000340-00000000 [SL 00]
CPUID 0000000D  00000001-00000000-00000000-00000000 [SL 01]
CPUID 0000000D  00000100-00000240-00000000-00000000 [SL 02]
CPUID 80000000  80000008-00000000-00000000-00000000
CPUID 80000001  00000000-00000000-00000001-28100000
CPUID 80000002  20202020-49202020-6C65746E-20295228 [ Intel(R) ]
CPUID 80000003  65726F43-294D5428-2D356920-37313333 [Core(TM) i5-3317]
CPUID 80000004  50432055-20402055-30372E31-007A4847 [U CPU @ 1.70GHz]
CPUID 80000005  00000000-00000000-00000000-00000000
CPUID 80000006  00000000-00000000-01006040-00000000
CPUID 80000007  00000000-00000000-00000000-00000100
CPUID 80000008  00003024-00000000-00000000-00000000
 
CPUID Registers (CPU #2 Virtual):
CPUID 00000000  0000000D-756E6547-6C65746E-49656E69 [GenuineIntel]
CPUID 00000001  000306A9-01100800-7FBAE3BF-BFEBFBFF
CPUID 00000002  76035A01-00F0B2FF-00000000-00CA0000
CPUID 00000003  00000000-00000000-00000000-00000000
CPUID 00000004  1C004121-01C0003F-0000003F-00000000 [SL 00]
CPUID 00000004  1C004122-01C0003F-0000003F-00000000 [SL 01]
CPUID 00000004  1C004143-01C0003F-000001FF-00000000 [SL 02]
CPUID 00000004  1C03C163-02C0003F-00000FFF-00000006 [SL 03]
CPUID 00000005  00000040-00000040-00000003-00021120
CPUID 00000006  00000077-00000002-00000009-00000000
CPUID 00000007  00000000-00000281-00000000-00000000
CPUID 00000008  00000000-00000000-00000000-00000000
CPUID 00000009  00000000-00000000-00000000-00000000
CPUID 0000000A  07300403-00000000-00000000-00000603
CPUID 0000000B  00000001-00000002-00000100-00000001 [SL 00]
CPUID 0000000B  00000004-00000004-00000201-00000001 [SL 01]
CPUID 0000000C  00000000-00000000-00000000-00000000
CPUID 0000000D  00000007-00000340-00000340-00000000 [SL 00]
CPUID 0000000D  00000001-00000000-00000000-00000000 [SL 01]
CPUID 0000000D  00000100-00000240-00000000-00000000 [SL 02]
CPUID 80000000  80000008-00000000-00000000-00000000
CPUID 80000001  00000000-00000000-00000001-28100000
CPUID 80000002  20202020-49202020-6C65746E-20295228 [ Intel(R) ]
CPUID 80000003  65726F43-294D5428-2D356920-37313333 [Core(TM) i5-3317]
CPUID 80000004  50432055-20402055-30372E31-007A4847 [U CPU @ 1.70GHz]
CPUID 80000005  00000000-00000000-00000000-00000000
CPUID 80000006  00000000-00000000-01006040-00000000
CPUID 80000007  00000000-00000000-00000000-00000100
CPUID 80000008  00003024-00000000-00000000-00000000
 
CPUID Registers (CPU #3):
CPUID 00000000  0000000D-756E6547-6C65746E-49656E69 [GenuineIntel]
CPUID 00000001  000306A9-02100800-7FBAE3BF-BFEBFBFF
CPUID 00000002  76035A01-00F0B2FF-00000000-00CA0000
CPUID 00000003  00000000-00000000-00000000-00000000
CPUID 00000004  1C004121-01C0003F-0000003F-00000000 [SL 00]
CPUID 00000004  1C004122-01C0003F-0000003F-00000000 [SL 01]
CPUID 00000004  1C004143-01C0003F-000001FF-00000000 [SL 02]
CPUID 00000004  1C03C163-02C0003F-00000FFF-00000006 [SL 03]
CPUID 00000005  00000040-00000040-00000003-00021120
CPUID 00000006  00000077-00000002-00000009-00000000
CPUID 00000007  00000000-00000281-00000000-00000000
CPUID 00000008  00000000-00000000-00000000-00000000
CPUID 00000009  00000000-00000000-00000000-00000000
CPUID 0000000A  07300403-00000000-00000000-00000603
CPUID 0000000B  00000001-00000002-00000100-00000002 [SL 00]
CPUID 0000000B  00000004-00000004-00000201-00000002 [SL 01]
CPUID 0000000C  00000000-00000000-00000000-00000000
CPUID 0000000D  00000007-00000340-00000340-00000000 [SL 00]
CPUID 0000000D  00000001-00000000-00000000-00000000 [SL 01]
CPUID 0000000D  00000100-00000240-00000000-00000000 [SL 02]
CPUID 80000000  80000008-00000000-00000000-00000000
CPUID 80000001  00000000-00000000-00000001-28100000
CPUID 80000002  20202020-49202020-6C65746E-20295228 [ Intel(R) ]
CPUID 80000003  65726F43-294D5428-2D356920-37313333 [Core(TM) i5-3317]
CPUID 80000004  50432055-20402055-30372E31-007A4847 [U CPU @ 1.70GHz]
CPUID 80000005  00000000-00000000-00000000-00000000
CPUID 80000006  00000000-00000000-01006040-00000000
CPUID 80000007  00000000-00000000-00000000-00000100
CPUID 80000008  00003024-00000000-00000000-00000000
 
CPUID Registers (CPU #4 Virtual):
CPUID 00000000  0000000D-756E6547-6C65746E-49656E69 [GenuineIntel]
CPUID 00000001  000306A9-03100800-7FBAE3BF-BFEBFBFF
CPUID 00000002  76035A01-00F0B2FF-00000000-00CA0000
CPUID 00000003  00000000-00000000-00000000-00000000
CPUID 00000004  1C004121-01C0003F-0000003F-00000000 [SL 00]
CPUID 00000004  1C004122-01C0003F-0000003F-00000000 [SL 01]
CPUID 00000004  1C004143-01C0003F-000001FF-00000000 [SL 02]
CPUID 00000004  1C03C163-02C0003F-00000FFF-00000006 [SL 03]
CPUID 00000005  00000040-00000040-00000003-00021120
CPUID 00000006  00000077-00000002-00000009-00000000
CPUID 00000007  00000000-00000281-00000000-00000000
CPUID 00000008  00000000-00000000-00000000-00000000
CPUID 00000009  00000000-00000000-00000000-00000000
CPUID 0000000A  07300403-00000000-00000000-00000603
CPUID 0000000B  00000001-00000002-00000100-00000003 [SL 00]
CPUID 0000000B  00000004-00000004-00000201-00000003 [SL 01]
CPUID 0000000C  00000000-00000000-00000000-00000000
CPUID 0000000D  00000007-00000340-00000340-00000000 [SL 00]
CPUID 0000000D  00000001-00000000-00000000-00000000 [SL 01]
CPUID 0000000D  00000100-00000240-00000000-00000000 [SL 02]
CPUID 80000000  80000008-00000000-00000000-00000000
CPUID 80000001  00000000-00000000-00000001-28100000
CPUID 80000002  20202020-49202020-6C65746E-20295228 [ Intel(R) ]
CPUID 80000003  65726F43-294D5428-2D356920-37313333 [Core(TM) i5-3317]
CPUID 80000004  50432055-20402055-30372E31-007A4847 [U CPU @ 1.70GHz]
CPUID 80000005  00000000-00000000-00000000-00000000
CPUID 80000006  00000000-00000000-01006040-00000000
CPUID 80000007  00000000-00000000-00000000-00000100
CPUID 80000008  00003024-00000000-00000000-00000000
 
MSR Registers:
MSR 00000017  0010-0000-0000-0000 [PlatID = 4]
MSR 0000001B  0000-0000-FEE0-0900
MSR 00000035  0000-0000-0002-0004
MSR 0000008B  0000-001B-0000-0000
MSR 000000CE  0008-0813-E001-1100 [eD = 0]
MSR 000000E7  0000-01CF-FA62-6262 [S200]
MSR 000000E7  0000-01D0-000D-42D4 [S200]
MSR 000000E7  0000-01D0-052C-7D1D
MSR 000000E8  0000-025E-957C-45E7 [S200]
MSR 000000E8  0000-025E-9CC4-BAB3 [S200]
MSR 000000E8  0000-025E-A3E8-1F28
MSR 00000194  0000-0000-0010-0000
MSR 00000198  0000-1D76-0000-1800
MSR 00000198  0000-1D9F-0000-1800 [S200]
MSR 00000198  0000-1D9F-0000-1800 [S200]
MSR 00000199  0000-0000-0000-1A00
MSR 0000019A  0000-0000-0000-0000
MSR 0000019B  0000-0000-0000-0010
MSR 0000019C  0000-0000-8835-0000 [S200]
MSR 0000019C  0000-0000-8836-0000
MSR 0000019C  0000-0000-8836-0000 [S200]
MSR 0000019D  0000-0000-0000-0000
MSR 000001A0  0000-0000-0085-0089
MSR 000001A2  0000-0000-0D69-1200
MSR 000001A4  0000-0000-0000-0000
MSR 000001AA  0000-0000-0040-0000
MSR 000001AC  < FAILED >
MSR 000001AD  0000-0000-1818-181A
MSR 000001B0  0000-0000-0000-0000
MSR 000001B1  0000-0000-8833-0800
MSR 000001B2  0000-0000-0000-0000
MSR 000001FC  0000-0000-0014-005F
MSR 00000300  < FAILED >
MSR 0000030A  0000-026F-5639-BA3D [S200]
MSR 0000030A  0000-026F-5AE5-BE87 [S200]
MSR 0000030A  0000-026F-6068-4AE4
MSR 0000030B  0000-01DF-BCFB-B8F1 [S200]
MSR 0000030B  0000-01DF-C109-2C06 [S200]
MSR 0000030B  0000-01DF-C4C5-05E4
MSR 00000480  00DA-0400-0000-0010
MSR 00000481  0000-007F-0000-0016
MSR 00000482  FFF9-FFFE-0401-E172
MSR 00000483  007F-FFFF-0003-6DFF
MSR 00000484  0000-FFFF-0000-11FF
MSR 00000485  0000-0000-1004-01E5
MSR 00000486  0000-0000-8000-0021
MSR 00000487  0000-0000-FFFF-FFFF
MSR 00000488  0000-0000-0000-2000
MSR 00000489  0000-0000-0017-27FF
MSR 0000048A  0000-0000-0000-002A
MSR 0000048B  0000-08FF-0000-0000
MSR 0000048C  0000-0F01-0611-4141
MSR 0000048D  0000-007F-0000-0016
MSR 0000048E  FFF9-FFFE-0400-6172
MSR 0000048F  007F-FFFF-0003-6DFB
MSR 00000490  0000-FFFF-0000-11FB
MSR 00000601  1814-1494-8000-0380
MSR 00000602  1814-1494-8000-0170
MSR 00000603  0000-0000-804C-4C4C
MSR 00000604  0000-0000-8064-6464
MSR 00000606  0000-0000-000A-1003
MSR 0000060A  0000-0000-0000-883B
MSR 0000060B  0000-0000-0000-8850
MSR 0000060C  0000-0000-0000-8857
MSR 0000060D  0000-01F2-3AEE-EA2B
MSR 00000610  0000-80B0-00DC-8088
MSR 00000611  0000-0000-7A96-7897 [S200]
MSR 00000611  0000-0000-7A97-FA6F [S200]
MSR 00000611  0000-0000-7A99-800C
MSR 00000613  < FAILED >
MSR 00000614  0000-0000-0000-0088
MSR 00000618  < FAILED >
MSR 00000619  < FAILED >
MSR 0000061B  < FAILED >
MSR 0000061C  < FAILED >
MSR 00000638  0000-0000-0000-0000
MSR 00000639  0000-0000-4489-385E [S200]
MSR 00000639  0000-0000-448A-580D [S200]
MSR 00000639  0000-0000-448B-59C7
MSR 0000063A  0000-0000-0000-0000
MSR 0000063B  < FAILED >
MSR 00000640  0000-0000-0000-0000
MSR 00000641  0000-0000-026E-BC84 [S200]
MSR 00000641  0000-0000-026E-BE44 [S200]
MSR 00000641  0000-0000-026E-BF85
MSR 00000642  0000-0000-0000-0018
MSR 00000648  0000-0000-0000-0011
MSR 00000649  0000-0000-0008-0070
MSR 0000064A  0000-0000-0000-0000
MSR 0000064B  0000-0000-0000-0000
MSR 0000064C  0000-0000-0000-0010


Motherboard

 
Motherboard Properties:
Motherboard ID  <DMI>
Motherboard Name  Asus K46CM Series Notebook
 
Front Side Bus Properties:
Bus Type  BCLK
Real Clock  100 MHz
Effective Clock  100 MHz
 
Memory Bus Properties:
Bus Type  Dual DDR3 SDRAM
Bus Width  128-bit
DRAM:FSB Ratio  24:3
Real Clock  800 MHz (DDR)
Effective Clock  1600 MHz
Bandwidth  [ TRIAL VERSION ] MB/s
 
Chipset Bus Properties:
Bus Type  Intel Direct Media Interface v2.0
 
Motherboard Manufacturer:
Company Name  ASUSTeK Computer Inc.
Product Information  http://www.asus.com/Motherboards
BIOS Download  http://support.asus.com/download/download.aspx?SLanguage=en-us
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
BIOS Upgrades  http://www.aida64.com/bios-updates


Memory

 
Physical Memory:
Total  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
Used  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
Free  3525 MB
Utilization  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
 
Virtual Memory:
Total  9357 MB
Used  5067 MB
Free  4289 MB
Utilization  54 %
 
Paging File:
Paging File  C:\pagefile.sys
Current Size  1280 MB
Current / Peak Usage  45 MB / 52 MB
Utilization  4 %
 
Physical Address Extension (PAE):
Supported by Operating System  Yes
Supported by CPU  Yes
Active  Yes


SPD

 
[ DIMM1: Samsung M471B5273CH0-CK0 ]
 
Memory Module Properties:
Module Name  Samsung M471B5273CH0-CK0
Serial Number  94C716C7h (3340158868)
Manufacture Date  Week 48 / 2012
Module Size  4 GB (2 ranks, 8 banks)
Module Type  SO-DIMM
Memory Type  DDR3 SDRAM
Memory Speed  DDR3-1600 (800 MHz)
Module Width  64 bit
Module Voltage  1.5 V
Error Detection Method  None
Refresh Rate  Normal (7.8 us)
DRAM Manufacturer  Samsung
 
Memory Timings:
@ 800 MHz  11-11-11-28 (CL-RCD-RP-RAS) / 39-128-5-12-6-6-24 (RC-RFC-RRD-WR-WTR-RTP-FAW)
@ 761 MHz  10-10-10-27 (CL-RCD-RP-RAS) / 37-122-5-12-6-6-23 (RC-RFC-RRD-WR-WTR-RTP-FAW)
@ 685 MHz  9-9-9-24 (CL-RCD-RP-RAS) / 33-110-5-11-6-6-21 (RC-RFC-RRD-WR-WTR-RTP-FAW)
@ 609 MHz  8-8-8-22 (CL-RCD-RP-RAS) / 30-98-4-10-5-5-19 (RC-RFC-RRD-WR-WTR-RTP-FAW)
@ 533 MHz  7-7-7-19 (CL-RCD-RP-RAS) / 26-86-4-8-4-4-16 (RC-RFC-RRD-WR-WTR-RTP-FAW)
@ 457 MHz  6-6-6-16 (CL-RCD-RP-RAS) / 22-74-3-7-4-4-14 (RC-RFC-RRD-WR-WTR-RTP-FAW)
@ 380 MHz  5-5-5-14 (CL-RCD-RP-RAS) / 19-61-3-6-3-3-12 (RC-RFC-RRD-WR-WTR-RTP-FAW)
 
Memory Module Features:
Auto Self Refresh (ASR)  Not Supported
DLL-Off Mode  Supported
Extended Temperature Range  Supported
Extended Temperature 1X Refresh Rate  Not Supported
Module Thermal Sensor  Not Supported
On-Die Thermal Sensor Readout (ODTS)  Not Supported
Partial Array Self Refresh (PASR)  Not Supported
RZQ/6  Supported
RZQ/7  Supported
 
Memory Module Manufacturer:
Company Name  Samsung
Product Information  http://www.samsung.com/global/business/semiconductor
 
[ DIMM3: [ TRIAL VERSION ] ]
 
Memory Module Properties:
Module Name  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
Serial Number  AC45EC1Dh (502023596)
Manufacture Date  Week 2 / 2016
Module Size  4 GB (2 ranks, 8 banks)
Module Type  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
Memory Type  DDR3 SDRAM
Memory Speed  DDR3-1600 (800 MHz)
Module Width  64 bit
Module Voltage  1.5 V
Error Detection Method  None
Refresh Rate  Normal (7.8 us)
DRAM Manufacturer  Samsung
 
Memory Timings:
@ 800 MHz  11-11-11-28 (CL-RCD-RP-RAS) / 39-128-5-12-6-6-24 (RC-RFC-RRD-WR-WTR-RTP-FAW)
@ 761 MHz  10-10-10-27 (CL-RCD-RP-RAS) / 37-122-5-12-6-6-23 (RC-RFC-RRD-WR-WTR-RTP-FAW)
@ 685 MHz  9-9-9-24 (CL-RCD-RP-RAS) / 33-110-5-11-6-6-21 (RC-RFC-RRD-WR-WTR-RTP-FAW)
@ 609 MHz  8-8-8-22 (CL-RCD-RP-RAS) / 30-98-4-10-5-5-19 (RC-RFC-RRD-WR-WTR-RTP-FAW)
@ 533 MHz  7-7-7-19 (CL-RCD-RP-RAS) / 26-86-4-8-4-4-16 (RC-RFC-RRD-WR-WTR-RTP-FAW)
@ 457 MHz  6-6-6-16 (CL-RCD-RP-RAS) / 22-74-3-7-4-4-14 (RC-RFC-RRD-WR-WTR-RTP-FAW)
 
Memory Module Features:
Auto Self Refresh (ASR)  Supported
DLL-Off Mode  Supported
Extended Temperature Range  Supported
Extended Temperature 1X Refresh Rate  Not Supported
Module Thermal Sensor  Not Supported
On-Die Thermal Sensor Readout (ODTS)  Not Supported
Partial Array Self Refresh (PASR)  Not Supported
RZQ/6  Supported
RZQ/7  Supported
 
Memory Module Manufacturer:
Company Name  Samsung
Product Information  http://www.samsung.com/global/business/semiconductor


Chipset

 
[ North Bridge: Intel Ivy Bridge-MB IMC ]
 
North Bridge Properties:
North Bridge  Intel Ivy Bridge-MB IMC
Intel Platform  Chief River
Supported Memory Types  DDR3-1066, DDR3-1333, DDR3-1600, DDR3-1866 SDRAM
Maximum Memory Amount  16 GB
Revision  09
Process Technology  22 nm
VT-d  Supported
Extended APIC (x2APIC)  Supported
 
Memory Controller:
Type  Dual Channel (128-bit)
Active Mode  Dual Channel (128-bit)
 
Memory Timings:
CAS Latency (CL)  11T
RAS To CAS Delay (tRCD)  11T
RAS Precharge (tRP)  11T
RAS Active Time (tRAS)  28T
Row Refresh Cycle Time (tRFC)  128T
Command Rate (CR)  1T
RAS To RAS Delay (tRRD)  5T
Write Recovery Time (tWR)  12T
Read To Read Delay (tRTR)  Same Rank: 4T, Different Rank: 1T, Different DIMM: 3T
Read To Write Delay (tRTW)  Same Rank: 3T, Different Rank: 5T, Different DIMM: 5T
Write To Read Delay (tWTR)  6T, Different Rank: 1T, Different DIMM: 1T
Write To Write Delay (tWTW)  Same Rank: 4T, Different Rank: 3T, Different DIMM: 3T
Read To Precharge Delay (tRTP)  6T
Four Activate Window Delay (tFAW)  24T
Write CAS Latency (tWCL)  8T
CKE Min. Pulse Width (tCKE)  4T
Refresh Period (tREF)  6240T
Round Trip Latency (tRTL)  DIMM1: 39T, DIMM2: 32T, DIMM3: 40T, DIMM4: 32T
I/O Latency (tIOL)  DIMM1: 2T, DIMM2: 0T, DIMM3: 3T, DIMM4: 0T
Burst Length (BL)  8
 
Error Correction:
ECC  Not Supported
ChipKill ECC  Not Supported
RAID  Not Supported
ECC Scrubbing  Not Supported
 
Memory Slots:
DRAM Slot #1  4 GB (DDR3-1600 DDR3 SDRAM)
DRAM Slot #2  4 GB (DDR3-1600 DDR3 SDRAM)
 
Integrated Graphics Controller:
Graphics Controller Type  Intel HD Graphics 4000
Graphics Controller Status  Enabled
Graphics Frame Buffer Size  64 MB
 
PCI Express Controller:
PCI-E 2.0 x16 port #2  In Use @ x16
 
Chipset Manufacturer:
Company Name  Intel Corporation
Product Information  http://www.intel.com/products/chipsets
Driver Download  http://support.intel.com/support/chipsets
BIOS Upgrades  http://www.aida64.com/bios-updates
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ South Bridge: [ TRIAL VERSION ] ]
 
South Bridge Properties:
South Bridge  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
Intel Platform  Chief River
Revision / Stepping  04 / C1
Package Type  989 Pin FC-BGA
Package Size  25 mm x 25 mm
Process Technology  65 nm
Die Size  [ TRIAL VERSION ] mm2
Core Voltage  1.05 V
TDP  4.1 W
 
High Definition Audio:
Codec Name  Realtek ALC270
Codec ID  10EC0270h / 1043100Dh
Codec Revision  1001h
Codec Type  Audio
 
High Definition Audio:
Codec Name  Intel Panther Point HDMI
Codec ID  80862806h / 80860101h
Codec Revision  1000h
Codec Type  Audio
 
PCI Express Controller:
PCI-E 2.0 x1 port #1  Empty
PCI-E 2.0 x1 port #2  In Use @ x1 (Atheros AR9285 802.11b/g/n Wireless Network Adapter)
PCI-E 2.0 x1 port #4  In Use @ x1 (Realtek RTL8168/8111 PCI-E Gigabit Ethernet Adapter, Realtek RTS5289 PCI-E Card Reader)
 
Chipset Manufacturer:
Company Name  Intel Corporation
Product Information  http://www.intel.com/products/chipsets
Driver Download  http://support.intel.com/support/chipsets
BIOS Upgrades  http://www.aida64.com/bios-updates
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates


BIOS

 
BIOS Properties:
BIOS Type  AMI
BIOS Version  K46CM.317
UEFI Boot  Yes
System BIOS Date  05/17/2013
Video BIOS Date  Unknown
 
BIOS Manufacturer:
Company Name  American Megatrends Inc.
Product Information  http://www.ami.com/amibios
BIOS Upgrades  http://www.aida64.com/bios-updates


ACPI

 
[ APIC: Multiple APIC Description Table ]
 
ACPI Table Properties:
ACPI Signature  APIC
Table Description  Multiple APIC Description Table
Memory Address  CA86C1F8h
Table Length  114 bytes
OEM ID  _ASUS_
OEM Table ID  Notebook
OEM Revision  01072009h
Creator ID  AMI
Creator Revision  00010013h
Local APIC Address  FEE00000h
 
Processor Local APIC:
ACPI Processor ID  01h
APIC ID  00h
Status  Enabled
 
Processor Local APIC:
ACPI Processor ID  02h
APIC ID  02h
Status  Enabled
 
Processor Local APIC:
ACPI Processor ID  03h
APIC ID  01h
Status  Enabled
 
Processor Local APIC:
ACPI Processor ID  04h
APIC ID  03h
Status  Enabled
 
I/O APIC:
I/O APIC ID  02h
I/O APIC Address  FEC00000h
Global System Interrupt Base  00000000h
 
Interrupt Source Override:
Bus  ISA
Source  IRQ0
Global System Interrupt  00000002h
Polarity  Conforms to the specifications of the bus
Trigger Mode  Conforms to the specifications of the bus
 
Interrupt Source Override:
Bus  ISA
Source  IRQ9
Global System Interrupt  00000009h
Polarity  Active High
Trigger Mode  Level-Triggered
 
Local APIC NMI:
ACPI Processor ID  FFh
Local ACPI LINT#  01h
Polarity  Active High
Trigger Mode  Edge-Triggered
 
[ BGRT: Boot Graphics Resource Table ]
 
ACPI Table Properties:
ACPI Signature  BGRT
Table Description  Boot Graphics Resource Table
Memory Address  CA8702C8h
Table Length  56 bytes
OEM ID  _ASUS_
OEM Table ID  Notebook
OEM Revision  01072009h
Creator ID  ASUS
Creator Revision  00010013h
 
[ DSDT: Differentiated System Description Table ]
 
ACPI Table Properties:
ACPI Signature  DSDT
Table Description  Differentiated System Description Table
Memory Address  CA8591C0h
Table Length  77608 bytes
OEM ID  _ASUS_
OEM Table ID  Notebook
OEM Revision  00000013h
Creator ID  INTL
Creator Revision  20091112h
 
nVIDIA SLI:
SLI Certification  Not Present
PCI 0-0-0-0 (Direct I/O)  8086-0154 (Intel)
PCI 0-0-0-0 (HAL)  8086-0154 (Intel)
 
Lucid Virtu:
Virtu Certification  Not Present
 
[ ECDT: Embedded Controller Boot Resources Table ]
 
ACPI Table Properties:
ACPI Signature  ECDT
Table Description  Embedded Controller Boot Resources Table
Memory Address  CA86C2B8h
Table Length  193 bytes
OEM ID  _ASUS_
OEM Table ID  Notebook
OEM Revision  01072009h
Creator ID  AMI.
Creator Revision  00000005h
 
[ FACP: Fixed ACPI Description Table ]
 
ACPI Table Properties:
ACPI Signature  FACP
Table Description  Fixed ACPI Description Table
Memory Address  CA859138h
Table Length  132 bytes
OEM ID  _ASUS_
OEM Table ID  Notebook
OEM Revision  01072009h
Creator ID  AMI
Creator Revision  00010013h
FACS Address  CA886040h
DSDT Address  CA8591C0h
SMI Command Port  000000B2h
PM Timer  00000408h
 
[ FACP: Fixed ACPI Description Table ]
 
ACPI Table Properties:
ACPI Signature  FACP
Table Description  Fixed ACPI Description Table
Memory Address  00000000-CA86C0E8h
Table Length  268 bytes
OEM ID  _ASUS_
OEM Table ID  Notebook
OEM Revision  01072009h
Creator ID  AMI
Creator Revision  00010013h
FACS Address  CA886080h / 00000000-00000000h
DSDT Address  CA8591C0h / 00000000-CA8591C0h
SMI Command Port  000000B2h
PM Timer  00000408h
 
[ FACS: Firmware ACPI Control Structure ]
 
ACPI Table Properties:
ACPI Signature  FACS
Table Description  Firmware ACPI Control Structure
Memory Address  CA886040h
Table Length  64 bytes
Hardware Signature  00000000h
Waking Vector  00000000h
Global Lock  00000000h
 
[ FBPT: Firmware Basic Boot Performance Table ]
 
ACPI Table Properties:
ACPI Signature  FBPT
Table Description  Firmware Basic Boot Performance Table
Memory Address  00000000-CA0F2038h
Table Length  56 bytes
 
[ FPDT: Firmware Performance Data Table ]
 
ACPI Table Properties:
ACPI Signature  FPDT
Table Description  Firmware Performance Data Table
Memory Address  CA86C270h
Table Length  68 bytes
OEM ID  _ASUS_
OEM Table ID  Notebook
OEM Revision  01072009h
Creator ID  AMI
Creator Revision  00010013h
FBPT Address  00000000-CA0F2038h
S3PT Address  00000000-CA0F2018h
 
[ HPET: IA-PC High Precision Event Timer Table ]
 
ACPI Table Properties:
ACPI Signature  HPET
Table Description  IA-PC High Precision Event Timer Table
Memory Address  CA86E460h
Table Length  56 bytes
OEM ID  _ASUS_
OEM Table ID  Notebook
OEM Revision  01072009h
Creator ID  AMI.
Creator Revision  00000005h
HPET Address  00000000-FED00000h
Vendor ID  8086h
Revision  01h
Number of Timers  8
Counter Size  64-bit
Minimum Clock Ticks  14318
Page Protection  No Guarantee
OEM Attribute  0h
LegacyReplacement IRQ Routing  Supported
 
[ MCFG: Memory Mapped Configuration Space Base Address Description Table ]
 
ACPI Table Properties:
ACPI Signature  MCFG
Table Description  Memory Mapped Configuration Space Base Address Description Table
Memory Address  CA86C380h
Table Length  60 bytes
OEM ID  _ASUS_
OEM Table ID  Notebook
OEM Revision  01072009h
Creator ID  MSFT
Creator Revision  00000097h
Config Space Address  00000000-F8000000h
PCI Segment  0000h
Start Bus Number  00h
End Bus Number  3Fh
 
[ MSDM: Microsoft Data Management Table ]
 
ACPI Table Properties:
ACPI Signature  MSDM
Table Description  Microsoft Data Management Table
Memory Address  CA608E18h
Table Length  85 bytes
OEM ID  _ASUS_
OEM Table ID  Notebook
OEM Revision  00000000h
Creator ID  ASUS
Creator Revision  00000001h
SLS Version  1
SLS Data Type  1
SLS Data Length  29
SLS Data  RRN36-F6JK6-7CYW3-88DQR-X2BX2
 
[ RSD PTR: Root System Description Pointer ]
 
ACPI Table Properties:
ACPI Signature  RSD PTR
Table Description  Root System Description Pointer
Memory Address  000F0000h
Table Length  36 bytes
OEM ID  _ASUS_
RSDP Revision  2 (ACPI 2.0+)
RSDT Address  CA859028h
XSDT Address  00000000-CA859090h
 
[ RSDT: Root System Description Table ]
 
ACPI Table Properties:
ACPI Signature  RSDT
Table Description  Root System Description Table
Memory Address  CA859028h
Table Length  100 bytes
OEM ID  _ASUS_
OEM Table ID  Notebook
OEM Revision  01072009h
Creator ID  MSFT
Creator Revision  00010013h
RSDT Entry #0  CA859138h (FACP)
RSDT Entry #1  CA86C1F8h (APIC)
RSDT Entry #2  CA86C270h (FPDT)
RSDT Entry #3  CA86C2B8h (ECDT)
RSDT Entry #4  CA86C380h (MCFG)
RSDT Entry #5  CA86C3C0h (SSDT)
RSDT Entry #6  CA86CE00h (SSDT)
RSDT Entry #7  CA86DAA8h (SSDT)
RSDT Entry #8  CA86DB40h (SSDT)
RSDT Entry #9  CA86E460h (HPET)
RSDT Entry #10  CA86E498h (SSDT)
RSDT Entry #11  CA86EB08h (SSDT)
RSDT Entry #12  CA86EFA8h (SSDT)
RSDT Entry #13  CA86F830h (SSDT)
RSDT Entry #14  CA8702C8h (BGRT)
RSDT Entry #15  CA608E18h (MSDM)
 
[ S3PT: S3 Performance Table ]
 
ACPI Table Properties:
ACPI Signature  S3PT
Table Description  S3 Performance Table
Memory Address  00000000-CA0F2018h
Table Length  32 bytes
 
[ SSDT: Secondary System Description Table ]
 
ACPI Table Properties:
ACPI Signature  SSDT
Table Description  Secondary System Description Table
Memory Address  CA86C3C0h
Table Length  2620 bytes
OEM ID  DptfTa
OEM Table ID  DptfTab
OEM Revision  00001000h
Creator ID  INTL
Creator Revision  20091112h
 
[ SSDT: Secondary System Description Table ]
 
ACPI Table Properties:
ACPI Signature  SSDT
Table Description  Secondary System Description Table
Memory Address  CA86CE00h
Table Length  3237 bytes
OEM ID  SADptf
OEM Table ID  SADptf_
OEM Revision  00001000h
Creator ID  INTL
Creator Revision  20091112h
 
[ SSDT: Secondary System Description Table ]
 
ACPI Table Properties:
ACPI Signature  SSDT
Table Description  Secondary System Description Table
Memory Address  CA86DAA8h
Table Length  152 bytes
OEM ID  PchDpt
OEM Table ID  PchDptf
OEM Revision  00001000h
Creator ID  INTL
Creator Revision  20091112h
 
[ SSDT: Secondary System Description Table ]
 
ACPI Table Properties:
ACPI Signature  SSDT
Table Description  Secondary System Description Table
Memory Address  CA86DB40h
Table Length  2332 bytes
OEM ID  CfgTDP
OEM Table ID  CfgTDP_
OEM Revision  00001000h
Creator ID  INTL
Creator Revision  20091112h
 
[ SSDT: Secondary System Description Table ]
 
ACPI Table Properties:
ACPI Signature  SSDT
Table Description  Secondary System Description Table
Memory Address  CA86E498h
Table Length  1646 bytes
OEM ID  AhciR1
OEM Table ID  AhciTab1
OEM Revision  00001000h
Creator ID  INTL
Creator Revision  20091112h
 
[ SSDT: Secondary System Description Table ]
 
ACPI Table Properties:
ACPI Signature  SSDT
Table Description  Secondary System Description Table
Memory Address  CA86EB08h
Table Length  1182 bytes
OEM ID  AhciR2
OEM Table ID  AhciTab2
OEM Revision  00001000h
Creator ID  INTL
Creator Revision  20091112h
 
[ SSDT: Secondary System Description Table ]
 
ACPI Table Properties:
ACPI Signature  SSDT
Table Description  Secondary System Description Table
Memory Address  CA86EFA8h
Table Length  2182 bytes
OEM ID  PmRef
OEM Table ID  Cpu0Ist
OEM Revision  00003000h
Creator ID  INTL
Creator Revision  20051117h
 
[ SSDT: Secondary System Description Table ]
 
ACPI Table Properties:
ACPI Signature  SSDT
Table Description  Secondary System Description Table
Memory Address  CA86F830h
Table Length  2706 bytes
OEM ID  PmRef
OEM Table ID  CpuPm
OEM Revision  00003000h
Creator ID  INTL
Creator Revision  20051117h
 
[ XSDT: Extended System Description Table ]
 
ACPI Table Properties:
ACPI Signature  XSDT
Table Description  Extended System Description Table
Memory Address  00000000-CA859090h
Table Length  164 bytes
OEM ID  _ASUS_
OEM Table ID  Notebook
OEM Revision  01072009h
Creator ID  AMI
Creator Revision  00010013h
XSDT Entry #0  00000000-CA86C0E8h (FACP)
XSDT Entry #1  00000000-CA86C1F8h (APIC)
XSDT Entry #2  00000000-CA86C270h (FPDT)
XSDT Entry #3  00000000-CA86C2B8h (ECDT)
XSDT Entry #4  00000000-CA86C380h (MCFG)
XSDT Entry #5  00000000-CA86C3C0h (SSDT)
XSDT Entry #6  00000000-CA86CE00h (SSDT)
XSDT Entry #7  00000000-CA86DAA8h (SSDT)
XSDT Entry #8  00000000-CA86DB40h (SSDT)
XSDT Entry #9  00000000-CA86E460h (HPET)
XSDT Entry #10  00000000-CA86E498h (SSDT)
XSDT Entry #11  00000000-CA86EB08h (SSDT)
XSDT Entry #12  00000000-CA86EFA8h (SSDT)
XSDT Entry #13  00000000-CA86F830h (SSDT)
XSDT Entry #14  00000000-CA8702C8h (BGRT)
XSDT Entry #15  00000000-CA608E18h (MSDM)


Operating System

 
Operating System Properties:
OS Name  Microsoft Windows 10 Pro
OS Language  English (United States)
OS Installer Language  English (United States)
OS Kernel Type  Multiprocessor Free (64-bit)
OS Version  10.0.14393.693 (Win10 RS1)
OS Service Pack  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
OS Installation Date  10/22/2016
OS Root  C:\Windows
 
License Information:
Registered Owner  Windows User
Registered Organization  
Product ID  00330-80000-00000-AA459
Product Key  VK7JG- [ TRIAL VERSION ]
Product Activation (WPA)  Not Required
 
Current Session:
Computer Name  RAZER
User Name  Deathadder™
Logon Domain  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
UpTime  5825 sec (0 days, 1 hours, 37 min, 5 sec)
 
Components Version:
Common Controls  6.16
Internet Explorer Updates  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
Windows Mail  10.0.14393.0 (rs1_release.160715-1616)
Windows Media Player  12.0.14393.0 (rs1_release.160715-1616)
Windows Messenger  -
MSN Messenger  -
Internet Information Services (IIS)  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
.NET Framework  4.6.1586.0 built by: NETFXREL2
Novell Client  -
DirectX  DirectX 12.0
OpenGL  10.0.14393.0 (rs1_release.160715-1616)
ASPI  -
 
Operating System Features:
Debug Version  No
DBCS Version  No
Domain Controller  No
Security Present  No
Network Present  Yes
Remote Session  No
Safe Mode  No
Slow Processor  No
Terminal Services  Yes


Processes

 
Process Name  Process File Name  Type  Used Memory  Used Swap
acrotray.exe  C:\Program Files (x86)\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\AcroTray.exe  32-bit  7128 KB  1 KB
AGSService.exe  C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\Adobe\AdobeGCClient\AGSService.exe  32-bit  7996 KB  1 KB
aida64.exe  C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe  32-bit  82124 KB  68 KB
AppleMobileDeviceService.exe  C:\Program Files\Common Files\Apple\Mobile Device Support\AppleMobileDeviceService.exe  64-bit  10348 KB  3 KB
ApplicationFrameHost.exe  C:\Windows\system32\ApplicationFrameHost.exe  64-bit  23932 KB  10 KB
armsvc.exe  C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\Adobe\ARM\1.0\armsvc.exe  32-bit  5792 KB  1 KB
AsusTPCenter.exe  C:\Program Files (x86)\ASUS\ASUS Smart Gesture\AsTPCenter\x64\AsusTPCenter.exe  64-bit  3524 KB  3 KB
AsusTPHelper.exe  C:\Program Files (x86)\ASUS\ASUS Smart Gesture\AsTPCenter\x64\AsusTPHelper.exe  64-bit  560 KB  1 KB
AsusTPLoader.exe  C:\Program Files (x86)\ASUS\ASUS Smart Gesture\AsTPCenter\x64\AsusTPLoader.exe  64-bit  1220 KB  2 KB
audiodg.exe  C:\Windows\system32\AUDIODG.EXE  64-bit  11548 KB  7 KB
avp.exe  C:\Program Files (x86)\Kaspersky Lab\Kaspersky Endpoint Security 10 for Windows SP1\avp.exe  32-bit  84792 KB  261 KB
avp.exe  C:\Program Files (x86)\Kaspersky Lab\Kaspersky Endpoint Security 10 for Windows SP1\avp.exe  32-bit  14740 KB  9 KB
avpsus.exe  C:\Program Files (x86)\Kaspersky Lab\Kaspersky Endpoint Security 10 for Windows SP1\avpsus.exe  32-bit  26288 KB  15 KB
Calculator.exe  C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.WindowsCalculator_10.1612.3341.0_x64__8wekyb3d8bbwe\Calculator.exe  64-bit  31008 KB  15 KB
chrome.exe  C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe  64-bit  172 MB  149 KB
chrome.exe  C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe  64-bit  284 MB  266 KB
chrome.exe  C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe  64-bit  42888 KB  29 KB
chrome.exe  C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe  64-bit  109 MB  113 KB
chrome.exe  C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe  64-bit  172 MB  145 KB
chrome.exe  C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe  64-bit  79176 KB  68 KB
chrome.exe  C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe  64-bit  7900 KB  1 KB
chrome.exe  C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe  64-bit  130 MB  81 KB
chrome.exe  C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe  64-bit  7124 KB  1 KB
chrome.exe  C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe  64-bit  108 MB  100 KB
chrome.exe  C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe  64-bit  73200 KB  66 KB
chrome.exe  C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe  64-bit  33296 KB  37 KB
chrome.exe  C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe  64-bit  148 MB  173 KB
chrome.exe  C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe  64-bit  25104 KB  25 KB
chrome.exe  C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe  64-bit  41688 KB  51 KB
chrome.exe  C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe  64-bit  21516 KB  23 KB
chrome.exe  C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe  64-bit  62064 KB  57 KB
CompatTelRunner.exe  C:\Windows\system32\compattelrunner.exe  64-bit  25668 KB  14 KB
conhost.exe  C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe  64-bit  5928 KB  1 KB
csrss.exe    64-bit  9548 KB  2 KB
csrss.exe    64-bit  4084 KB  1 KB
dllhost.exe  C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe  64-bit  8776 KB  1 KB
DptfParticipantProcessorService.exe  C:\Windows\system32\DptfParticipantProcessorService.exe  64-bit  4060 KB  0 KB
DptfPolicyConfigTDPService.exe  C:\Windows\system32\DptfPolicyConfigTDPService.exe  64-bit  4104 KB  0 KB
dwm.exe  C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe  64-bit  49192 KB  42 KB
esif_assist_64.exe  C:\Windows\TEMP\DPTF\esif_assist_64.exe  64-bit  4804 KB  1 KB
esif_uf.exe  C:\Windows\SysWoW64\esif_uf.exe  64-bit  6388 KB  1 KB
explorer.exe  C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE  64-bit  116 MB  61 KB
fontdrvhost.exe  C:\Windows\system32\fontdrvhost.exe  32-bit  2684 KB  0 KB
IDMan.exe  C:\Program Files (x86)\Internet Download Manager\IDMan.exe  32-bit  45420 KB  13 KB
IEMonitor.exe  C:\Program Files (x86)\Internet Download Manager\IEMonitor.exe  32-bit  8952 KB  1 KB
igfxCUIService.exe  C:\Windows\system32\igfxCUIService.exe  64-bit  7760 KB  1 KB
igfxEM.exe  C:\Windows\system32\igfxEM.exe  64-bit  10896 KB  7 KB
igfxHK.exe  C:\Windows\system32\igfxHK.exe  64-bit  7876 KB  5 KB
lsass.exe  C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe  64-bit  15352 KB  6 KB
mDNSResponder.exe  C:\Program Files\Bonjour\mDNSResponder.exe  64-bit  6380 KB  2 KB
Memory Compression    64-bit  139 MB  0 KB
MSASCuiL.exe  C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\MSASCuiL.exe  64-bit  10740 KB  2 KB
NVDisplay.Container.exe  C:\Program Files\NVIDIA Corporation\Display.NvContainer\NVDisplay.Container.exe  64-bit  8912 KB  2 KB
nvxdsync.exe  C:\Program Files\NVIDIA Corporation\Display\nvxdsync.exe  64-bit  21796 KB  9 KB
OfficeClickToRun.exe  C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe  64-bit  34664 KB  36 KB
OneDrive.exe  C:\Users\Deathadder™\AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\OneDrive.exe  32-bit  86096 KB  62 KB
ONENOTEM.EXE  C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\ONENOTEM.EXE  64-bit  2764 KB  5 KB
OriginWebHelperService.exe  D:\Origin\OriginWebHelperService.exe  32-bit  17772 KB  5 KB
PresentationFontCache.exe  C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\Framework64\v3.0\WPF\PresentationFontCache.exe  64-bit  15820 KB  25 KB
RuntimeBroker.exe  C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe  64-bit  43636 KB  14 KB
RzSurroundVADStreamingService.exe  C:\ProgramData\Razer\Synapse\Devices\Razer Surround\Driver\RzSurroundVADStreamingService.exe  64-bit  14028 KB  6 KB
Samsung Magician.exe  C:\Program Files (x86)\Samsung\Samsung Magician\Samsung Magician.exe  32-bit  8660 KB  19 KB
SamsungRapidSvc.exe  C:\Windows\system32\RAPID\SamsungRapidSvc.exe  64-bit  2596 KB  0 KB
SearchFilterHost.exe  C:\Windows\system32\SearchFilterHost.exe  64-bit  6052 KB  1 KB
SearchIndexer.exe  C:\Windows\system32\SearchIndexer.exe  64-bit  35300 KB  30 KB
SearchProtocolHost.exe  C:\Windows\system32\SearchProtocolHost.exe  64-bit  11384 KB  2 KB
SearchUI.exe  C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\SearchUI.exe  64-bit  119 MB  71 KB
services.exe    64-bit  7020 KB  3 KB
SettingSyncHost.exe  C:\Windows\system32\SettingSyncHost.exe  64-bit  16260 KB  9 KB
ShellExperienceHost.exe  C:\Windows\SystemApps\ShellExperienceHost_cw5n1h2txyewy\ShellExperienceHost.exe  64-bit  115 MB  72 KB
sihost.exe  C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exe  64-bit  21932 KB  5 KB
Skype.exe  C:\Program Files (x86)\Skype\Phone\Skype.exe  32-bit  131 MB  127 KB
smss.exe    64-bit  1040 KB  0 KB
splwow64.exe  C:\Windows\splwow64.exe  64-bit  7572 KB  1 KB
spoolsv.exe  C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe  64-bit  17144 KB  9 KB
sppsvc.exe    64-bit  13720 KB  3 KB
svchost.exe  C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe  64-bit  57052 KB  29 KB
svchost.exe  C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe  64-bit  24828 KB  17 KB
svchost.exe  C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe  64-bit  22632 KB  7 KB
svchost.exe  C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe  64-bit  26308 KB  15 KB
svchost.exe  C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe  64-bit  27196 KB  41 KB
svchost.exe  C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe  64-bit  14800 KB  5 KB
svchost.exe  C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe  64-bit  19488 KB  8 KB
svchost.exe  C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe  64-bit  9172 KB  2 KB
svchost.exe  C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe  64-bit  11324 KB  3 KB
svchost.exe  C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe  64-bit  6264 KB  1 KB
svchost.exe  C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe  64-bit  24380 KB  9 KB
svchost.exe  C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe  64-bit  4444 KB  1 KB
svchost.exe  C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe  64-bit  4604 KB  1 KB
svchost.exe  C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe  64-bit  7672 KB  2 KB
svchost.exe  C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe  64-bit  20720 KB  8 KB
svchost.exe  C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe  64-bit  8860 KB  2 KB
svchost.exe  C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe  64-bit  10848 KB  5 KB
svchost.exe  C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe  64-bit  6700 KB  2 KB
svchost.exe  C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe  64-bit  18984 KB  5 KB
svchost.exe  C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe  64-bit  20356 KB  7 KB
System Idle Process      4 KB  0 KB
System    64-bit  208 KB  0 KB
SystemSettings.exe  C:\Windows\ImmersiveControlPanel\SystemSettings.exe  64-bit  40848 KB  15 KB
SystemSettingsBroker.exe  C:\Windows\System32\SystemSettingsBroker.exe  64-bit  19764 KB  4 KB
taskhostw.exe  C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exe  64-bit  18392 KB  7 KB
TeamViewer_Service.exe  C:\Program Files (x86)\TeamViewer\TeamViewer_Service.exe  32-bit  15952 KB  5 KB
UniKeyNT.exe  D:\OneDrive\Software\Unikey 8.1 x64\UniKeyNT.exe  64-bit  9376 KB  2 KB
vmnat.exe  C:\Windows\SysWoW64\vmnat.exe  32-bit  6364 KB  1 KB
vmnetdhcp.exe  C:\Windows\SysWoW64\vmnetdhcp.exe  32-bit  4316 KB  7 KB
vmware-authd.exe  C:\Program Files (x86)\VMware\VMware Player\vmware-authd.exe  32-bit  10288 KB  4 KB
vmware-usbarbitrator64.exe  C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\VMware\USB\vmware-usbarbitrator64.exe  64-bit  8764 KB  2 KB
wininit.exe    64-bit  4404 KB  1 KB
winlogon.exe  C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exe  64-bit  9616 KB  2 KB
WmiPrvSE.exe  C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe  64-bit  24004 KB  12 KB
WmiPrvSE.exe  C:\Windows\sysWOW64\wbem\wmiprvse.exe  64-bit  9436 KB  3 KB
WmiPrvSE.exe  C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe  32-bit  8252 KB  2 KB
WUDFHost.exe  C:\Windows\System32\WUDFHost.exe  64-bit  7052 KB  1 KB


System Drivers

 
Driver Name  Driver Description  File Name  Version  Type  State
1394ohci  1394 OHCI Compliant Host Controller  1394ohci.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
3ware  3ware  3ware.sys  5.1.0.51  Kernel Driver  Stopped
ACPI  Microsoft ACPI Driver  ACPI.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
AcpiDev  ACPI Devices driver  AcpiDev.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
acpiex  Microsoft ACPIEx Driver  acpiex.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
acpipagr  ACPI Processor Aggregator Driver  acpipagr.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
AcpiPmi  ACPI Power Meter Driver  acpipmi.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
acpitime  ACPI Wake Alarm Driver  acpitime.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
ADP80XX  ADP80XX  ADP80XX.SYS  1.3.0.10769  Kernel Driver  Stopped
AFD  Ancillary Function Driver for Winsock  afd.sys  10.0.14393.351  Kernel Driver  Running
ahcache  Application Compatibility Cache  ahcache.sys  10.0.14393.351  Kernel Driver  Running
AIDA64Driver  FinalWire AIDA64 Kernel Driver  kerneld.x64    Kernel Driver  Running
AmdK8  AMD K8 Processor Driver  amdk8.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
AmdPPM  AMD Processor Driver  amdppm.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
amdsata  amdsata  amdsata.sys  1.1.3.277  Kernel Driver  Stopped
amdsbs  amdsbs  amdsbs.sys  3.7.1540.43  Kernel Driver  Stopped
amdxata  amdxata  amdxata.sys  1.1.3.277  Kernel Driver  Stopped
AppID  AppID Driver  appid.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
applockerfltr  Smartlocker Filter Driver  applockerfltr.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
AppvStrm  AppvStrm  AppvStrm.sys  10.0.14393.206  File System Driver  Stopped
AppvVemgr  AppvVemgr  AppvVemgr.sys  10.0.14393.0  File System Driver  Stopped
AppvVfs  AppvVfs  AppvVfs.sys  10.0.14393.0  File System Driver  Stopped
arcsas  Adaptec SAS/SATA-II RAID Storport's Miniport Driver  arcsas.sys  7.5.0.32048  Kernel Driver  Stopped
AsyncMac  RAS Asynchronous Media Driver  asyncmac.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
atapi  IDE Channel  atapi.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
athr  Qualcomm Atheros Extensible Wireless LAN device driver  athw10x.sys  10.0.0.341  Kernel Driver  Running
ATP  ASUS Input Device  AsusTP.sys  1.0.0.262  Kernel Driver  Running
b06bdrv  QLogic Network Adapter VBD  bxvbda.sys  7.12.31.105  Kernel Driver  Stopped
BasicDisplay  BasicDisplay  BasicDisplay.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
BasicRender  BasicRender  BasicRender.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
bcmfn  bcmfn Service  bcmfn.sys  6.3.9477.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
bcmfn2  bcmfn2 Service  bcmfn2.sys  6.3.9391.6  Kernel Driver  Stopped
Beep  Beep      Kernel Driver  Running
bowser  Browser Support Driver  bowser.sys  10.0.14393.447  File System Driver  Running
BthAvrcpTg  Bluetooth Audio/Video Remote Control HID  BthAvrcpTg.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
BthHFEnum  Bluetooth Hands-Free Audio and Call Control HID Enumerator  bthhfenum.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
bthhfhid  Bluetooth Hands-Free Call Control HID  BthHFHid.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
BTHMODEM  Bluetooth Modem Communications Driver  bthmodem.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
buttonconverter  Service for Portable Device Control devices  buttonconverter.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
CapImg  HID driver for CapImg touch screen  capimg.sys  10.0.14393.320  Kernel Driver  Stopped
cdfs  CD/DVD File System Reader  cdfs.sys  10.0.14393.0  File System Driver  Stopped
cdrom  CD-ROM Driver  cdrom.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
cht4iscsi  cht4iscsi  cht4sx64.sys  6.1.14.200  Kernel Driver  Stopped
cht4vbd  Chelsio Virtual Bus Driver  cht4vx64.sys  6.1.14.200  Kernel Driver  Stopped
circlass  Consumer IR Devices  circlass.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
CLFS  Common Log (CLFS)  CLFS.sys  10.0.14393.576  Kernel Driver  Running
clreg  Virtual Registry for Containers  registry.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
CmBatt  Microsoft ACPI Control Method Battery Driver  CmBatt.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
CNG  CNG  cng.sys  10.0.14393.693  Kernel Driver  Running
cnghwassist  CNG Hardware Assist algorithm provider  cnghwassist.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
CompositeBus  Composite Bus Enumerator Driver  CompositeBus.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
condrv  Console Driver  condrv.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
CSC  Offline Files Driver  csc.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
dam  Desktop Activity Moderator Driver  dam.sys  10.0.14393.351  Kernel Driver  Stopped
Dfsc  DFS Namespace Client Driver  dfsc.sys  10.0.14393.321  File System Driver  Running
disk  Disk Driver  disk.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
dmvsc  dmvsc  dmvsc.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
dpK00701  U.are.U® Fingerprint Reader Upper Driver  dpK00701.sys    Kernel Driver  Stopped
dptf_acpi  dptf_acpi  dptf_acpi.sys  8.1.10603.192  Kernel Driver  Stopped
dptf_cpu  dptf_cpu  dptf_cpu.sys  8.1.10603.192  Kernel Driver  Stopped
DptfDevDram  DptfDevDram  DptfDevDram.sys  6.0.7.1084  Kernel Driver  Running
DptfDevFan  DptfDevFan  DptfDevFan.sys  6.0.7.1084  Kernel Driver  Running
DptfDevGen  DptfDevGen  DptfDevGen.sys  6.0.7.1084  Kernel Driver  Running
DptfDevProc  DptfDevProc  DptfDevProc.sys  6.0.7.1084  Kernel Driver  Running
DptfManager  DptfManager  DptfManager.sys  6.0.7.1084  Kernel Driver  Running
drmkaud  Microsoft Trusted Audio Drivers  drmkaud.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
DXGKrnl  LDDM Graphics Subsystem  dxgkrnl.sys  10.0.14393.576  Kernel Driver  Running
ebdrv  QLogic 10 Gigabit Ethernet Adapter VBD  evbda.sys  7.13.65.105  Kernel Driver  Stopped
EhStorClass  Enhanced Storage Filter Driver  EhStorClass.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
EhStorTcgDrv  Microsoft driver for storage devices supporting IEEE 1667 and TCG protocols  EhStorTcgDrv.sys  10.0.14393.187  Kernel Driver  Stopped
ErrDev  Microsoft Hardware Error Device Driver  errdev.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
esif_lf  esif_lf  esif_lf.sys  8.1.10603.192  Kernel Driver  Stopped
exfat  exFAT File System Driver      File System Driver  Stopped
fastfat  FAT12/16/32 File System Driver      File System Driver  Running
fdc  Floppy Disk Controller Driver  fdc.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
FileCrypt  FileCrypt  filecrypt.sys  10.0.14393.0  File System Driver  Running
FileInfo  File Information FS MiniFilter  fileinfo.sys  10.0.14393.0  File System Driver  Running
Filetrace  Filetrace  filetrace.sys  10.0.14393.0  File System Driver  Stopped
flpydisk  Floppy Disk Driver  flpydisk.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
FltMgr  FltMgr  fltmgr.sys  10.0.14393.0  File System Driver  Running
FsDepends  File System Dependency Minifilter  FsDepends.sys  10.0.14393.0  File System Driver  Stopped
fvevol  BitLocker Drive Encryption Filter Driver  fvevol.sys  10.0.14393.206  Kernel Driver  Running
gencounter  Microsoft Hyper-V Generation Counter  vmgencounter.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
genericusbfn  Generic USB Function Class  genericusbfn.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
ggflt  SOMC USB Flash Driver Filter  ggflt.sys  3.1.0.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
ggsomc  SOMC USB Flash Driver  ggsomc.sys  3.1.0.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
GPIOClx0101  Microsoft GPIO Class Extension Driver  msgpioclx.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
GpuEnergyDrv  GPU Energy Driver  gpuenergydrv.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
hcmon  VMware hcmon  hcmon.sys  8.11.1.0  Kernel Driver  Running
HdAudAddService  Microsoft 1.1 UAA Function Driver for High Definition Audio Service  HdAudio.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
HDAudBus  Microsoft UAA Bus Driver for High Definition Audio  HDAudBus.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
HidBatt  HID UPS Battery Driver  HidBatt.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
HidBth  Microsoft Bluetooth HID Miniport  hidbth.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
hidi2c  Microsoft I2C HID Miniport Driver  hidi2c.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
hidinterrupt  Common Driver for HID Buttons implemented with interrupts  hidinterrupt.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
HidIr  Microsoft Infrared HID Driver  hidir.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
HIDSwitch  ASUS Wireless Radio Control  AsHIDSwitch64.sys  1.0.0.5  Kernel Driver  Running
HidUsb  Microsoft HID Class Driver  hidusb.sys  10.0.14393.82  Kernel Driver  Running
HpSAMD  HpSAMD  HpSAMD.sys  8.0.4.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
HTTP  HTTP Service  HTTP.sys  10.0.14393.351  Kernel Driver  Running
hvservice  Hypervisor/Virtual Machine Support Driver  hvservice.sys  10.0.14393.82  Kernel Driver  Stopped
hwpolicy  Hardware Policy Driver  hwpolicy.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
hyperkbd  hyperkbd  hyperkbd.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
i8042prt  PS/2 Keyboard and Mouse Port Driver  i8042prt.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
iagpio  Intel Serial IO GPIO Controller Driver  iagpio.sys  604.10146.3023.12819  Kernel Driver  Stopped
iai2c  Intel(R) Serial IO I2C Host Controller  iai2c.sys  604.10146.2643.2818  Kernel Driver  Stopped
iaLPSS2i_GPIO2  Intel(R) Serial IO GPIO Driver v2  iaLPSS2i_GPIO2.sys  30.63.1610.8  Kernel Driver  Stopped
iaLPSS2i_I2C  Intel(R) Serial IO I2C Driver v2  iaLPSS2i_I2C.sys  30.63.1610.8  Kernel Driver  Stopped
iaLPSSi_GPIO  Intel(R) Serial IO GPIO Controller Driver  iaLPSSi_GPIO.sys  1.1.250.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
iaLPSSi_I2C  Intel(R) Serial IO I2C Controller Driver  iaLPSSi_I2C.sys  1.1.253.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
iaStorA  iaStorA  iaStorA.sys  11.7.0.1013  Kernel Driver  Running
iaStorAV  Intel(R) SATA RAID Controller Windows  iaStorAV.sys  13.2.0.1022  Kernel Driver  Stopped
iaStorV  Intel RAID Controller Windows 7  iaStorV.sys  8.6.2.1019  Kernel Driver  Stopped
ibbus  Mellanox InfiniBand Bus/AL (Filter Driver)  ibbus.sys  5.1.11548.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
IDMWFP  IDMWFP  idmwfp.sys  6.26.8.69  Kernel Driver  Running
igfx  igfx  igdkmd64.sys  10.18.10.4358  Kernel Driver  Running
IndirectKmd  Indirect Displays Kernel-Mode Driver  IndirectKmd.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
intaud_WaveExtensible  Intel WiDi Audio Device  intelaud.sys  4.5.71.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
IntcDAud  Intel(R) Display Audio  IntcDAud.sys  6.16.0.3154  Kernel Driver  Running
intelide  intelide  intelide.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
intelpep  Intel(R) Power Engine Plug-in Driver  intelpep.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
intelppm  Intel Processor Driver  intelppm.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
iorate  iorate  iorate.sys  10.0.14393.447  Kernel Driver  Running
IpFilterDriver  IP Traffic Filter Driver  ipfltdrv.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
IPMIDRV  IPMIDRV  IPMIDrv.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
IPNAT  IP Network Address Translator  ipnat.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
irda  irda  irda.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
IRENUM  IR Bus Enumerator  irenum.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
isapnp  isapnp  isapnp.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
iScsiPrt  iScsiPort Driver  msiscsi.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
ISODrive  ISO DVD/CD-ROM Device Driver  ISODrv64.sys  3.1.3.579  File System Driver  Running
iwdbus  IWD Bus Enumerator  iwdbus.sys  4.5.71.0  Kernel Driver  Running
kbdclass  Keyboard Class Driver  kbdclass.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
kbdhid  Keyboard HID Driver  kbdhid.sys  10.0.14393.206  Kernel Driver  Running
kdnic  Microsoft Kernel Debug Network Miniport (NDIS 6.20)  kdnic.sys  6.1.0.0  Kernel Driver  Running
KL1  KL1  kl1.sys  6.8.0.54  Kernel Driver  Running
klelam  klelam  klelam.sys  1.0.0.167  Kernel Driver  Stopped
klflt  Kaspersky Lab Kernel DLL  klflt.sys  1.2.0.42  Kernel Driver  Stopped
KLFLTDEV  Kaspersky Lab KLFltDev  klfltdev.sys  8.12.0.89  Kernel Driver  Running
KLIF  Kaspersky Lab Driver  klif.sys  8.12.4.109  File System Driver  Running
KLIM6  Kaspersky Anti-Virus NDIS 6 Filter  klim6.sys  11.0.0.12  Kernel Driver  Running
klwfp  klwfp  klwfp.sys  1.7.0.34  Kernel Driver  Running
kneps  kneps  kneps.sys  5.2.2.18  Kernel Driver  Running
KSecDD  KSecDD  ksecdd.sys  10.0.14393.187  Kernel Driver  Running
KSecPkg  KSecPkg  ksecpkg.sys  10.0.14393.82  Kernel Driver  Running
ksthunk  Kernel Streaming Thunks  ksthunk.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
lltdio  Link-Layer Topology Discovery Mapper I/O Driver  lltdio.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
LSI_SAS  LSI_SAS  lsi_sas.sys  1.34.3.83  Kernel Driver  Stopped
LSI_SAS2i  LSI_SAS2i  lsi_sas2i.sys  2.0.79.80  Kernel Driver  Stopped
LSI_SAS3i  LSI_SAS3i  lsi_sas3i.sys  2.51.12.80  Kernel Driver  Stopped
LSI_SSS  LSI_SSS  lsi_sss.sys  2.10.61.81  Kernel Driver  Stopped
luafv  UAC File Virtualization  luafv.sys  10.0.14393.0  File System Driver  Running
megasas  megasas  megasas.sys  6.706.6.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
megasas2i  megasas2i  MegaSas2i.sys  6.711.10.11  Kernel Driver  Stopped
megasr  megasr  megasr.sys  15.2.2013.129  Kernel Driver  Stopped
MEIx64  Intel(R) Management Engine Interface   TeeDriverW8x64.sys  11.0.0.1157  Kernel Driver  Running
mlx4_bus  Mellanox ConnectX Bus Enumerator  mlx4_bus.sys  5.1.11548.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
MMCSS  Multimedia Class Scheduler  mmcss.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
Modem  Modem  modem.sys  10.0.14393.479  Kernel Driver  Stopped
monitor  Microsoft Monitor Class Function Driver Service  monitor.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
mouclass  Mouse Class Driver  mouclass.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
mouhid  Mouse HID Driver  mouhid.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
mountmgr  Mount Point Manager  mountmgr.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
mpsdrv  Windows Firewall Authorization Driver  mpsdrv.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
MRxDAV  WebDav Client Redirector Driver  mrxdav.sys  10.0.14393.321  File System Driver  Stopped
mrxsmb  SMB MiniRedirector Wrapper and Engine  mrxsmb.sys  10.0.14393.187  File System Driver  Running
mrxsmb10  SMB 1.x MiniRedirector  mrxsmb10.sys  10.0.14393.479  File System Driver  Running
mrxsmb20  SMB 2.0 MiniRedirector  mrxsmb20.sys  10.0.14393.479  File System Driver  Running
MsBridge  Microsoft MAC Bridge  bridge.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
Msfs  Msfs      File System Driver  Running
msgpiowin32  Common Driver for Buttons, DockMode and Laptop/Slate Indicator  msgpiowin32.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
mshidkmdf  Pass-through HID to KMDF Filter Driver  mshidkmdf.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
mshidumdf  Pass-through HID to UMDF Driver  mshidumdf.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
msisadrv  msisadrv  msisadrv.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
MSKSSRV  Microsoft Streaming Service Proxy  MSKSSRV.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
MsLldp  Microsoft Link-Layer Discovery Protocol  mslldp.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
MSPCLOCK  Microsoft Streaming Clock Proxy  MSPCLOCK.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
MSPQM  Microsoft Streaming Quality Manager Proxy  MSPQM.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
MsRPC  MsRPC      Kernel Driver  Stopped
MsSecFlt  Microsoft Security Events Component Minifilter  mssecflt.sys  10.0.14393.0  File System Driver  Stopped
mssmbios  Microsoft System Management BIOS Driver  mssmbios.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
MSTEE  Microsoft Streaming Tee/Sink-to-Sink Converter  MSTEE.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
MTConfig  Microsoft Input Configuration Driver  MTConfig.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
Mup  Mup  mup.sys  10.0.14393.0  File System Driver  Running
mvumis  mvumis  mvumis.sys  1.0.5.1016  Kernel Driver  Stopped
NativeWifiP  NativeWiFi Filter  nwifi.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
ndfltr  NetworkDirect Service  ndfltr.sys  5.1.11548.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
NDIS  NDIS System Driver  ndis.sys  10.0.14393.321  Kernel Driver  Running
NdisCap  Microsoft NDIS Capture  ndiscap.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
NdisImPlatform  Microsoft Network Adapter Multiplexor Protocol  NdisImPlatform.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
NdisTapi  Remote Access NDIS TAPI Driver  ndistapi.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
Ndisuio  NDIS Usermode I/O Protocol  ndisuio.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
NdisVirtualBus  Microsoft Virtual Network Adapter Enumerator  NdisVirtualBus.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
NdisWan  Remote Access NDIS WAN Driver  ndiswan.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
ndiswanlegacy  Remote Access LEGACY NDIS WAN Driver  ndiswan.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
ndproxy  @%SystemRoot%\system32\drivers\todo.sys,-101;NDIS Proxy  NDProxy.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
Ndu  Windows Network Data Usage Monitoring Driver  Ndu.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
NetAdapterCx  Network Adapter Wdf Class Extension Library  NetAdapterCx.sys    Kernel Driver  Stopped
NetBIOS  NetBIOS Interface  netbios.sys  10.0.14393.0  File System Driver  Running
NetBT  NetBT  netbt.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
Npfs  Npfs      File System Driver  Running
npsvctrig  Named pipe service trigger provider  npsvctrig.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
nsiproxy  NSI Proxy Service Driver  nsiproxy.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
NTFS  NTFS      File System Driver  Running
Null  Null      Kernel Driver  Running
nvlddmkm  nvlddmkm  nvlddmkm.sys  21.21.13.7633  Kernel Driver  Running
nvpciflt  nvpciflt  nvpciflt.sys  21.21.13.7633  Kernel Driver  Running
nvraid  nvraid  nvraid.sys  10.6.0.23  Kernel Driver  Stopped
nvstor  nvstor  nvstor.sys  10.6.0.23  Kernel Driver  Stopped
nvvad_WaveExtensible  NVIDIA Virtual Audio Device (Wave Extensible) (WDM)  nvvad64v.sys  3.30.2.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
Parport  Parallel port driver  parport.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
partmgr  Partition driver  partmgr.sys  10.0.14393.479  Kernel Driver  Running
pci  PCI Bus Driver  pci.sys  10.0.14393.594  Kernel Driver  Running
pciide  pciide  pciide.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
pcmcia  pcmcia  pcmcia.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
pcw  Performance Counters for Windows Driver  pcw.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
pdc  pdc  pdc.sys  10.0.14393.103  Kernel Driver  Running
PEAUTH  PEAUTH  peauth.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
percsas2i  percsas2i  percsas2i.sys  6.805.3.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
percsas3i  percsas3i  percsas3i.sys  6.603.6.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
PptpMiniport  WAN Miniport (PPTP)  raspptp.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
Processor  Processor Driver  processr.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
Psched  QoS Packet Scheduler  pacer.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
QWAVEdrv  QWAVE driver  qwavedrv.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
RasAcd  Remote Access Auto Connection Driver  rasacd.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
RasAgileVpn  WAN Miniport (IKEv2)  AgileVpn.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
Rasl2tp  WAN Miniport (L2TP)  rasl2tp.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
RasPppoe  Remote Access PPPOE Driver  raspppoe.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
RasSstp  WAN Miniport (SSTP)  rassstp.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
rdbss  Redirected Buffering Sub System  rdbss.sys  10.0.14393.479  File System Driver  Running
rdpbus  Remote Desktop Device Redirector Bus Driver  rdpbus.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
RDPDR  Remote Desktop Device Redirector Driver  rdpdr.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
RdpVideoMiniport  Remote Desktop Video Miniport Driver  rdpvideominiport.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
rdyboost  ReadyBoost  rdyboost.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
ReFSv1  ReFSv1      File System Driver  Stopped
RSBASTOR  Realtek PCIE CardReader Driver - BA  RtsBaStor.sys  6.3.9600.27053  Kernel Driver  Running
rspndr  Link-Layer Topology Discovery Responder  rspndr.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
rt640x64  Realtek RT640 NT Driver  rt640x64.sys  9.1.404.2015  Kernel Driver  Running
rzdaendpt  Razer DeathAdder end point  rzdaendpt.sys  1.0.38.0  Kernel Driver  Running
rzendpt  rzendpt  rzendpt.sys  1.0.38.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
rzpmgrk  rzpmgrk  rzpmgrk.sys  1.0.2.7482  Kernel Driver  Running
rzpnk  rzpnk  rzpnk.sys  1.0.12.7465  Kernel Driver  Running
RZSURROUNDVADService  Razer Surround Audio Service  RzSurroundVAD.sys  6.1.7600.16385  Kernel Driver  Running
rzudd  Razer Mouse Driver  rzudd.sys  1.0.38.0  Kernel Driver  Running
rzvkeyboard  Razer Virtual Keyboard Driver  rzvkeyboard.sys  1.0.38.0  Kernel Driver  Running
s3cap  s3cap  vms3cap.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
SamsungRapidDiskFltr  SAMSUNG RAPID Mode Disk Filter Driver  SamsungRapidDiskFltr.sys  1.0.1.96  Kernel Driver  Running
SamsungRapidFSFltr  SamsungRapidFSFltr  SamsungRapidFSFltr.sys  1.0.1.96  File System Driver  Running
sbp2port  SBP-2 Transport/Protocol Bus Driver  sbp2port.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
scfilter  Smart card PnP Class Filter Driver  scfilter.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
scmbus  Microsoft Storage Class Memory Bus Driver  scmbus.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
scmdisk0101  Microsoft NVDIMM-N disk driver  scmdisk0101.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
sdbus  sdbus  sdbus.sys  10.0.14393.321  Kernel Driver  Stopped
sdstor  SD Storage Port Driver  sdstor.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
SerCx  Serial UART Support Library  SerCx.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
SerCx2  Serial UART Support Library  SerCx2.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
Serenum  Serenum Filter Driver  serenum.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
Serial  Serial port driver  serial.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
sermouse  Serial Mouse Driver  sermouse.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
sfloppy  High-Capacity Floppy Disk Drive  sfloppy.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
SiSRaid2  SiSRaid2  SiSRaid2.sys  5.1.1039.2600  Kernel Driver  Stopped
SiSRaid4  SiSRaid4  sisraid4.sys  5.1.1039.3600  Kernel Driver  Stopped
spaceport  Storage Spaces Driver  spaceport.sys  10.0.14393.351  Kernel Driver  Running
SpbCx  Simple Peripheral Bus Support Library  SpbCx.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
srv  Server SMB 1.xxx Driver  srv.sys  10.0.14393.187  File System Driver  Running
srv2  Server SMB 2.xxx Driver  srv2.sys  10.0.14393.479  File System Driver  Running
srvnet  srvnet  srvnet.sys  10.0.14393.187  File System Driver  Running
stexstor  stexstor  stexstor.sys  5.1.0.10  Kernel Driver  Stopped
storahci  Microsoft Standard SATA AHCI Driver  storahci.sys  10.0.14393.206  Kernel Driver  Stopped
storflt  Microsoft Hyper-V Storage Accelerator  vmstorfl.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
stornvme  Microsoft Standard NVM Express Driver  stornvme.sys  10.0.14393.206  Kernel Driver  Stopped
storqosflt  Storage QoS Filter Driver  storqosflt.sys  10.0.14393.0  File System Driver  Running
storufs  Microsoft Universal Flash Storage (UFS) Driver  storufs.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
storvsc  storvsc  storvsc.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
swenum  Software Bus Driver  swenum.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
Synth3dVsc  Synth3dVsc  Synth3dVsc.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
Tcpip  TCP/IP Protocol Driver  tcpip.sys  10.0.14393.351  Kernel Driver  Running
Tcpip6  @todo.dll,-100;Microsoft IPv6 Protocol Driver  tcpip.sys  10.0.14393.351  Kernel Driver  Stopped
tcpipreg  TCP/IP Registry Compatibility  tcpipreg.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
tdx  NetIO Legacy TDI Support Driver  tdx.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
terminpt  Microsoft Remote Desktop Input Driver  terminpt.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
TPM  TPM  tpm.sys  10.0.14393.479  Kernel Driver  Stopped
tsusbflt  Remote Desktop USB Hub Class Filter Driver  TsUsbFlt.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
TsUsbGD  Remote Desktop Generic USB Device  TsUsbGD.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
tsusbhub  Remote Desktop USB Hub  tsusbhub.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
tunnel  Microsoft Tunnel Miniport Adapter Driver  tunnel.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
TurboB  Turbo Boost UI Monitor driver  TurboB.sys  2.6.2.0  Kernel Driver  Running
UASPStor  USB Attached SCSI (UAS) Driver  uaspstor.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
UcmCx0101  USB Connector Manager KMDF Class Extension  UcmCx.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
UcmTcpciCx0101  UCM-TCPCI KMDF Class Extension  UcmTcpciCx.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
UcmUcsi  USB Connector Manager UCSI Client  UcmUcsi.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
Ucx01000  USB Host Support Library  ucx01000.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
UdeCx  USB Device Emulation Support Library  udecx.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
udfs  udfs  udfs.sys  10.0.14393.0  File System Driver  Stopped
UEFI  Microsoft UEFI Driver  UEFI.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
UevAgentDriver  UevAgentDriver  UevAgentDriver.sys  10.0.14393.0  File System Driver  Stopped
Ufx01000  USB Function Class Extension  ufx01000.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
UfxChipidea  USB Chipidea Controller  UfxChipidea.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
ufxsynopsys  USB Synopsys Controller  ufxsynopsys.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
umbus  UMBus Enumerator Driver  umbus.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
UmPass  Microsoft UMPass Driver  umpass.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
UrsChipidea  Chipidea USB Role-Switch Driver  urschipidea.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
UrsCx01000  USB Role-Switch Support Library  urscx01000.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
UrsSynopsys  Synopsys USB Role-Switch Driver  urssynopsys.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
usbccgp  Microsoft USB Generic Parent Driver  usbccgp.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
usbcir  eHome Infrared Receiver (USBCIR)  usbcir.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
usbdpfp  U.are.U® Fingerprint Reader Class Driver  usbdpfp.sys    Kernel Driver  Stopped
usbehci  Microsoft USB 2.0 Enhanced Host Controller Miniport Driver  usbehci.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
usbhub  Microsoft USB Standard Hub Driver  usbhub.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
USBHUB3  SuperSpeed Hub  UsbHub3.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
usbohci  Microsoft USB Open Host Controller Miniport Driver  usbohci.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
usbprint  Microsoft USB PRINTER Class  usbprint.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
usbser  Microsoft USB Serial Driver  usbser.sys  6.1.7600.16385  Kernel Driver  Stopped
USBSTOR  USB Mass Storage Driver  USBSTOR.SYS  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
usbuhci  Microsoft USB Universal Host Controller Miniport Driver  usbuhci.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
usbvideo  USB Video Device (WDM)  usbvideo.sys  10.0.14393.82  Kernel Driver  Running
USBXHCI  USB xHCI Compliant Host Controller  USBXHCI.SYS  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
vdrvroot  Microsoft Virtual Drive Enumerator  vdrvroot.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
VerifierExt  VerifierExt  VerifierExt.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
vhdmp  vhdmp  vhdmp.sys  10.0.14393.594  Kernel Driver  Stopped
vhf  Virtual HID Framework (VHF) Driver  vhf.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
vmbus  Virtual Machine Bus  vmbus.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
VMBusHID  VMBusHID  VMBusHID.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
vmci  VMware VMCI Bus Driver  vmci.sys  9.8.6.0  Kernel Driver  Running
vmgid  Microsoft Hyper-V Guest Infrastructure Driver  vmgid.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
VMnetAdapter  VMware Virtual Ethernet Adapter Driver  vmnetadapter.sys  4.2.7.0  Kernel Driver  Running
VMnetBridge  VMware Bridge Protocol  vmnetbridge.sys  4.2.7.0  Kernel Driver  Running
VMnetUserif  VMware Virtual Ethernet Userif for VMnet  vmnetuserif.sys  4.2.8.0  Kernel Driver  Running
vmusb  VMware USB Client Driver  vmusb.sys  4.2.0.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
vmx86  VMware vmx86  vmx86.sys  12.5.1.0  Kernel Driver  Running
volmgr  Volume Manager Driver  volmgr.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
volmgrx  Dynamic Volume Manager  volmgrx.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
volsnap  Volume Shadow Copy driver  volsnap.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
volume  Volume driver  volume.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
vpci  Microsoft Hyper-V Virtual PCI Bus  vpci.sys  10.0.14393.206  Kernel Driver  Stopped
vsmraid  vsmraid  vsmraid.sys  7.0.9600.6352  Kernel Driver  Stopped
vsock  vSockets Virtual Machine Communication Interface Sockets driver  vsock.sys  9.8.8.0  Kernel Driver  Running
VSTXRAID  VIA StorX Storage RAID Controller Windows Driver  vstxraid.sys  8.0.9200.8110  Kernel Driver  Stopped
vwifibus  Virtual Wireless Bus Driver  vwifibus.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
vwififlt  Virtual WiFi Filter Driver  vwififlt.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
vwifimp  Virtual WiFi Miniport Service  vwifimp.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
WacomPen  Wacom Serial Pen HID Driver  wacompen.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
wanarp  Remote Access IP ARP Driver  wanarp.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
wanarpv6  Remote Access IPv6 ARP Driver  wanarp.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
wcifs  Windows Container Isolation  wcifs.sys  10.0.14393.206  File System Driver  Running
wcnfs  Windows Container Name Virtualization  wcnfs.sys  10.0.14393.0  File System Driver  Running
WdBoot  Windows Defender Boot Driver  WdBoot.sys  4.10.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
Wdf01000  Kernel Mode Driver Frameworks service  Wdf01000.sys  1.19.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
WdFilter  Windows Defender Mini-Filter Driver  WdFilter.sys  4.10.14393.0  File System Driver  Stopped
wdiwifi  WDI Driver Framework  wdiwifi.sys  10.0.14393.206  Kernel Driver  Stopped
WdNisDrv  Windows Defender Network Inspection System Driver  WdNisDrv.sys  4.10.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
WFPLWFS  Microsoft Windows Filtering Platform  wfplwfs.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
WIMMount  WIMMount  wimmount.sys  10.0.14393.0  File System Driver  Stopped
WindowsTrustedRT  Windows Trusted Execution Environment Class Extension  WindowsTrustedRT.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
WindowsTrustedRTProxy  Microsoft Windows Trusted Runtime Secure Service  WindowsTrustedRTProxy.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
WinMad  WinMad Service  winmad.sys  5.1.11548.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
WINUSB  WinUsb Driver  WinUSB.SYS  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
WinVerbs  WinVerbs Service  winverbs.sys  5.1.11548.0  Kernel Driver  Stopped
WmiAcpi  Microsoft Windows Management Interface for ACPI  wmiacpi.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
Wof  Windows Overlay File System Filter Driver      File System Driver  Running
WpdUpFltr  WPD Upper Class Filter Driver  WpdUpFltr.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
ws2ifsl  Windows Socket 2.0 Non-IFS Service Provider Support Environment  ws2ifsl.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
WudfPf  User Mode Driver Frameworks Platform Driver  WudfPf.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
WUDFRd  WUDFRd  WUDFRd.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
WUDFWpdFs  WUDFWpdFs  WUDFRd.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
WUDFWpdMtp  WUDFWpdMtp  WUDFRd.sys  10.0.14393.0  Kernel Driver  Running
xboxgip  Xbox Game Input Protocol Driver  xboxgip.sys  10.0.14393.479  Kernel Driver  Stopped
xinputhid  XINPUT HID Filter Driver  xinputhid.sys  10.0.14393.103  Kernel Driver  Stopped


Services

 
Service Name  Service Description  File Name  Version  Type  State  Account
AdobeARMservice  Adobe Acrobat Update Service  armsvc.exe  1.824.20.5020  Own Process  Running  LocalSystem
AdobeUpdateService  AdobeUpdateService  AdobeUpdateService.exe  3.9.1.335  Own Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
AGSService  Adobe Genuine Software Integrity Service  AGSService.exe  3.4.0.378  Own Process  Running  LocalSystem
AJRouter  AllJoyn Router Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
ALG  Application Layer Gateway Service  alg.exe  10.0.14393.0  Own Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
AppIDSvc  Application Identity  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT Authority\LocalService
Appinfo  Application Information  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
Apple Mobile Device Service  Apple Mobile Device Service  AppleMobileDeviceService.exe  17.374.70.8  Own Process  Running  LocalSystem
AppMgmt  Application Management  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
AppReadiness  App Readiness  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
AppVClient  Microsoft App-V Client  AppVClient.exe  10.0.14393.594  Own Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
AppXSvc  AppX Deployment Service (AppXSVC)  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
AudioEndpointBuilder  Windows Audio Endpoint Builder  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
Audiosrv  Windows Audio  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Own Process  Running  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
AVP  Kaspersky Endpoint Security Service  avp.exe  10.2.5.3201  Own Process  Running  LocalSystem
avpsus  Kaspersky Seamless Update Service  avpsus.exe  10.2.5.3201  Own Process  Running  LocalSystem
AxInstSV  ActiveX Installer (AxInstSV)  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
BDESVC  BitLocker Drive Encryption Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  localSystem
BFE  Base Filtering Engine  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
BITS  Background Intelligent Transfer Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
Bonjour Service  Bonjour Service  mDNSResponder.exe  3.1.0.1  Own Process  Running  LocalSystem
BrokerInfrastructure  Background Tasks Infrastructure Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
Browser  Computer Browser  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
BthHFSrv  Bluetooth Handsfree Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
bthserv  Bluetooth Support Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
CDPSvc  Connected Devices Platform Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
CDPUserSvc_6775c  CDPUserSvc_6775c  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Unknown  Stopped  
CertPropSvc  Certificate Propagation  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
ClickToRunSvc  Microsoft Office Click-to-Run Service  OfficeClickToRun.exe  16.0.7571.1326  Own Process  Running  LocalSystem
ClipSVC  Client License Service (ClipSVC)  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
COMSysApp  COM+ System Application  dllhost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Own Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
CoreMessagingRegistrar  CoreMessaging  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
cphs  Intel(R) Content Protection HECI Service  IntelCpHeciSvc.exe  9.0.20.9000  Own Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
CryptSvc  Cryptographic Services  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  NT Authority\NetworkService
CscService  Offline Files  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
DcomLaunch  DCOM Server Process Launcher  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
DcpSvc  DataCollectionPublishingService  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
defragsvc  Optimize drives  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Own Process  Stopped  localSystem
DeviceAssociationService  Device Association Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
DeviceInstall  Device Install Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
DevQueryBroker  DevQuery Background Discovery Broker  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
Dhcp  DHCP Client  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  NT Authority\LocalService
diagnosticshub.standardcollector.service  Microsoft (R) Diagnostics Hub Standard Collector Service  DiagnosticsHub.StandardCollector.Service.exe  11.0.14393.0  Own Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
DiagTrack  Connected User Experiences and Telemetry  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Own Process  Running  LocalSystem
DmEnrollmentSvc  Device Management Enrollment Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Own Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
dmwappushservice  dmwappushsvc  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
Dnscache  DNS Client  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  NT AUTHORITY\NetworkService
DoSvc  Delivery Optimization  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
dot3svc  Wired AutoConfig  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  localSystem
DPS  Diagnostic Policy Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
DptfParticipantProcessorService  Intel(R) Dynamic Platform and Thermal Framework Processor Participant Service Application  DptfParticipantProcessorService.exe  6.0.7.1084  Own Process  Running  LocalSystem
DptfPolicyConfigTDPService  Intel(R) Dynamic Platform and Thermal Framework Config TDP Service Application  DptfPolicyConfigTDPService.exe  6.0.7.1084  Own Process  Running  LocalSystem
DsmSvc  Device Setup Manager  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
DsSvc  Data Sharing Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
EapHost  Extensible Authentication Protocol  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  localSystem
EFS  Encrypting File System (EFS)  lsass.exe  10.0.14393.187  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
embeddedmode  Embedded Mode  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
EntAppSvc  Enterprise App Management Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
esifsvc  ESIF Upper Framework Service  esif_uf.exe  8.1.10603.192  Own Process  Running  LocalSystem
EventLog  Windows Event Log  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
EventSystem  COM+ Event System  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
Fax  Fax  fxssvc.exe  10.0.14393.0  Own Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\NetworkService
fdPHost  Function Discovery Provider Host  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
FDResPub  Function Discovery Resource Publication  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
fhsvc  File History Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
FontCache  Windows Font Cache Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
FontCache3.0.0.0  Windows Presentation Foundation Font Cache 3.0.0.0  PresentationFontCache.exe  3.0.6920.8763  Own Process  Running  NT Authority\LocalService
FrameServer  Windows Camera Frame Server  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
gpsvc  Group Policy Client  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
gupdate  Google Update Service (gupdate)  GoogleUpdate.exe  1.3.28.15  Own Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
gupdatem  Google Update Service (gupdatem)  GoogleUpdate.exe  1.3.28.15  Own Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
hidserv  Human Interface Device Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
HomeGroupListener  HomeGroup Listener  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
HomeGroupProvider  HomeGroup Provider  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
HvHost  HV Host Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
icssvc  Windows Mobile Hotspot Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT Authority\LocalService
igfxCUIService1.0.0.0  Intel(R) HD Graphics Control Panel Service  igfxCUIService.exe  6.15.10.4358  Own Process  Running  LocalSystem
IKEEXT  IKE and AuthIP IPsec Keying Modules  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
iphlpsvc  IP Helper  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
iPod Service  iPod Service  iPodService.exe  12.5.1.21  Own Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
irmon  Infrared monitor service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
KeyIso  CNG Key Isolation  lsass.exe  10.0.14393.187  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
KtmRm  KtmRm for Distributed Transaction Coordinator  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\NetworkService
LanmanServer  Server  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
LanmanWorkstation  Workstation  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  NT AUTHORITY\NetworkService
lfsvc  Geolocation Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
LicenseManager  Windows License Manager Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT Authority\LocalService
lltdsvc  Link-Layer Topology Discovery Mapper  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
lmhosts  TCP/IP NetBIOS Helper  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
LSM  Local Session Manager  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
MapsBroker  Downloaded Maps Manager  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Own Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\NetworkService
MessagingService_6775c  MessagingService_6775c  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Unknown  Stopped  
MozillaMaintenance  Mozilla Maintenance Service  maintenanceservice.exe  50.1.0.6186  Own Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
MpsSvc  Windows Firewall  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  NT Authority\LocalService
MSDTC  Distributed Transaction Coordinator  msdtc.exe  2001.12.10941.16384  Own Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\NetworkService
MSiSCSI  Microsoft iSCSI Initiator Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
msiserver  Windows Installer  msiexec.exe  5.0.14393.0  Own Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
NcaSvc  Network Connectivity Assistant  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
NcbService  Network Connection Broker  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
NcdAutoSetup  Network Connected Devices Auto-Setup  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
Net Driver HPZ12  Net Driver HPZ12  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Own Process  Running  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
Netlogon  Netlogon  lsass.exe  10.0.14393.187  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
Netman  Network Connections  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
netprofm  Network List Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
NetSetupSvc  Network Setup Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
NetTcpPortSharing  Net.Tcp Port Sharing Service  SMSvcHost.exe  4.6.1586.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
NgcCtnrSvc  Microsoft Passport Container  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
NgcSvc  Microsoft Passport  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
NlaSvc  Network Location Awareness  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  NT AUTHORITY\NetworkService
nsi  Network Store Interface Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  NT Authority\LocalService
NVDisplay.ContainerLocalSystem  NVIDIA Display Container LS  NVDisplay.Container.exe  1.0.0.0  Own Process  Running  LocalSystem
OneSyncSvc_6775c  Sync Host_6775c  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Unknown  Running  
Origin Client Service  Origin Client Service  OriginClientService.exe  10.3.3.1921  Own Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
Origin Web Helper Service  Origin Web Helper Service  OriginWebHelperService.exe  10.3.3.1921  Own Process  Running  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
ose64  Office 64 Source Engine  OSE.EXE  16.0.7571.7063  Own Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
p2pimsvc  Peer Networking Identity Manager  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
p2psvc  Peer Networking Grouping  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
PcaSvc  Program Compatibility Assistant Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
PeerDistSvc  BranchCache  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\NetworkService
PerfHost  Performance Counter DLL Host  perfhost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Own Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
PhoneSvc  Phone Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT Authority\LocalService
PimIndexMaintenanceSvc_6775c  Contact Data_6775c  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Unknown  Running  
pla  Performance Logs & Alerts  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
PlugPlay  Plug and Play  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
Pml Driver HPZ12  Pml Driver HPZ12  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Own Process  Running  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
PNRPAutoReg  PNRP Machine Name Publication Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
PNRPsvc  Peer Name Resolution Protocol  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
PolicyAgent  IPsec Policy Agent  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  NT Authority\NetworkService
Power  Power  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
PrintNotify  Printer Extensions and Notifications  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
ProfSvc  User Profile Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
QWAVE  Quality Windows Audio Video Experience  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
RasAuto  Remote Access Auto Connection Manager  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  localSystem
RasMan  Remote Access Connection Manager  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  localSystem
Razer Game Scanner Service  Razer Game Scanner  GameScannerService.exe  1.0.6.2835  Own Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
RemoteAccess  Routing and Remote Access  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  localSystem
RemoteRegistry  Remote Registry  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
RetailDemo  Retail Demo Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
RmSvc  Radio Management Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
RpcEptMapper  RPC Endpoint Mapper  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  NT AUTHORITY\NetworkService
RpcLocator  Remote Procedure Call (RPC) Locator  locator.exe  10.0.14393.0  Own Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\NetworkService
RpcSs  Remote Procedure Call (RPC)  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  NT AUTHORITY\NetworkService
RzSurroundVADStreamingService  RzSurroundVADStreamingService  RzSurroundVADStreamingService.exe  1.1.62.0  Own Process  Running  LocalSystem
SamSs  Security Accounts Manager  lsass.exe  10.0.14393.187  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
SamsungRapidSvc  Samsung RAPID Mode Service  SamsungRapidSvc.exe  1.0.1.96  Own Process  Running  LocalSystem
SCardSvr  Smart Card  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
ScDeviceEnum  Smart Card Device Enumeration Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
Schedule  Task Scheduler  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
SCPolicySvc  Smart Card Removal Policy  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
SDRSVC  Windows Backup  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Own Process  Stopped  localSystem
seclogon  Secondary Logon  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
SENS  System Event Notification Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
Sense  Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection Service  MsSense.exe    Own Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
SensorDataService  Sensor Data Service  SensorDataService.exe  10.0.14393.187  Own Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
SensorService  Sensor Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
SensrSvc  Sensor Monitoring Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
SessionEnv  Remote Desktop Configuration  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  localSystem
SharedAccess  Internet Connection Sharing (ICS)  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
ShellHWDetection  Shell Hardware Detection  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
shpamsvc  Shared PC Account Manager  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
SkypeUpdate  Skype Updater  Updater.exe  7.0.0.441  Own Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
smphost  Microsoft Storage Spaces SMP  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Own Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\NetworkService
SmsRouter  Microsoft Windows SMS Router Service.  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  localSystem
SNMPTRAP  SNMP Trap  snmptrap.exe  10.0.14393.0  Own Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
Spooler  Print Spooler  spoolsv.exe  10.0.14393.351  Own Process  Running  LocalSystem
sppsvc  Software Protection  sppsvc.exe  10.0.14393.351  Own Process  Running  NT AUTHORITY\NetworkService
SSDPSRV  SSDP Discovery  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
SstpSvc  Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  NT Authority\LocalService
StateRepository  State Repository Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
Steam Client Service  Steam Client Service  SteamService.exe  3.75.32.7  Own Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
stisvc  Windows Image Acquisition (WIA)  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Own Process  Running  NT Authority\LocalService
StorSvc  Storage Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
svsvc  Spot Verifier  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
swprv  Microsoft Software Shadow Copy Provider  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Own Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
SysMain  Superfetch  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
SystemEventsBroker  System Events Broker  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
TabletInputService  Touch Keyboard and Handwriting Panel Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
TapiSrv  Telephony  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\NetworkService
TeamViewer  TeamViewer 12  TeamViewer_Service.exe  12.1.6829.0  Own Process  Running  LocalSystem
TermService  Remote Desktop Services  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT Authority\NetworkService
Themes  Themes  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
TieringEngineService  Storage Tiers Management  TieringEngineService.exe  10.0.14393.0  Own Process  Stopped  localSystem
tiledatamodelsvc  Tile Data model server  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
TimeBrokerSvc  Time Broker  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
TrkWks  Distributed Link Tracking Client  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
TrustedInstaller  Windows Modules Installer  TrustedInstaller.exe  10.0.14393.479  Own Process  Stopped  localSystem
TurboBoost  Intel(R) Turbo Boost Technology Monitor 2.6  TurboBoost.exe  2.6.2.0  Own Process  Stopped  NT Authority\LocalService
tzautoupdate  Auto Time Zone Updater  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
UevAgentService  User Experience Virtualization Service  AgentService.exe  10.0.14393.0  Own Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
UI0Detect  Interactive Services Detection  UI0Detect.exe  10.0.14393.0  Own Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
UmRdpService  Remote Desktop Services UserMode Port Redirector  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  localSystem
UnistoreSvc_6775c  User Data Storage_6775c  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Unknown  Running  
upnphost  UPnP Device Host  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
UserDataSvc_6775c  User Data Access_6775c  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Unknown  Running  
UserManager  User Manager  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
UsoSvc  Update Orchestrator Service for Windows Update  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
VaultSvc  Credential Manager  lsass.exe  10.0.14393.187  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
vds  Virtual Disk  vds.exe  10.0.14393.0  Own Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
VMAuthdService  VMware Authorization Service  vmware-authd.exe  12.5.1.12906  Own Process  Running  LocalSystem
vmicguestinterface  Hyper-V Guest Service Interface  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
vmicheartbeat  Hyper-V Heartbeat Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
vmickvpexchange  Hyper-V Data Exchange Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
vmicrdv  Hyper-V Remote Desktop Virtualization Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
vmicshutdown  Hyper-V Guest Shutdown Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
vmictimesync  Hyper-V Time Synchronization Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
vmicvmsession  Hyper-V PowerShell Direct Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
vmicvss  Hyper-V Volume Shadow Copy Requestor  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
VMnetDHCP  VMware DHCP Service  vmnetdhcp.exe  12.5.1.12906  Own Process  Running  LocalSystem
VMUSBArbService  VMware USB Arbitration Service  vmware-usbarbitrator64.exe  15.2.0.0  Own Process  Running  LocalSystem
VMware NAT Service  VMware NAT Service  vmnat.exe  12.5.1.12906  Own Process  Running  LocalSystem
VSS  Volume Shadow Copy  vssvc.exe  10.0.14393.0  Own Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
W32Time  Windows Time  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
WalletService  WalletService  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
wbengine  Block Level Backup Engine Service  wbengine.exe  10.0.14393.0  Own Process  Stopped  localSystem
WbioSrvc  Windows Biometric Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
Wcmsvc  Windows Connection Manager  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Own Process  Running  NT Authority\LocalService
wcncsvc  Windows Connect Now - Config Registrar  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
WdiServiceHost  Diagnostic Service Host  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
WdiSystemHost  Diagnostic System Host  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
WdNisSvc  Windows Defender Network Inspection Service  NisSrv.exe    Own Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
WebClient  WebClient  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
Wecsvc  Windows Event Collector  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\NetworkService
WEPHOSTSVC  Windows Encryption Provider Host Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
wercplsupport  Problem Reports and Solutions Control Panel Support  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  localSystem
WerSvc  Windows Error Reporting Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Own Process  Stopped  localSystem
WiaRpc  Still Image Acquisition Events  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
WinDefend  Windows Defender Service  MsMpEng.exe    Own Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
WinHttpAutoProxySvc  WinHTTP Web Proxy Auto-Discovery Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
Winmgmt  Windows Management Instrumentation  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  localSystem
WinRM  Windows Remote Management (WS-Management)  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\NetworkService
wisvc  Windows Insider Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
WlanSvc  WLAN AutoConfig  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Own Process  Running  LocalSystem
wlidsvc  Microsoft Account Sign-in Assistant  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
wmiApSrv  WMI Performance Adapter  WmiApSrv.exe  10.0.14393.0  Own Process  Stopped  localSystem
WMPNetworkSvc  Windows Media Player Network Sharing Service  wmpnetwk.exe    Own Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\NetworkService
workfolderssvc  Work Folders  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
WPDBusEnum  Portable Device Enumerator Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
WpnService  Windows Push Notifications System Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
WpnUserService_6775c  Windows Push Notifications User Service_6775c  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Unknown  Stopped  
wscsvc  Security Center  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
WSearch  Windows Search  SearchIndexer.exe  7.0.14393.206  Own Process  Running  LocalSystem
wuauserv  Windows Update  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
wudfsvc  Windows Driver Foundation - User-mode Driver Framework  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Running  LocalSystem
WwanSvc  WWAN AutoConfig  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  NT Authority\LocalService
XblAuthManager  Xbox Live Auth Manager  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
XblGameSave  Xbox Live Game Save  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem
XboxNetApiSvc  Xbox Live Networking Service  svchost.exe  10.0.14393.0  Share Process  Stopped  LocalSystem


AX Files

 
AX File  Version  Description
bdaplgin.ax  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft BDA Device Control Plug-in for MPEG2 based networks.
g711codc.ax  10.0.14393.0  Intel G711 CODEC
iac25_32.ax  2.0.5.53  Indeo® audio software
ir41_32.ax  10.0.14393.0  IR41_32 WRAPPER DLL
ivfsrc.ax  5.10.2.51  Intel Indeo® video IVF Source Filter 5.10
ksproxy.ax  10.0.14393.0  WDM Streaming ActiveMovie Proxy
kstvtune.ax  10.0.14393.0  WDM Streaming TvTuner
kswdmcap.ax  10.0.14393.0  WDM Streaming Video Capture
ksxbar.ax  10.0.14393.0  WDM Streaming Crossbar
mpeg2data.ax  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft MPEG-2 Section and Table Acquisition Module
mpg2splt.ax  10.0.14393.0  DirectShow MPEG-2 Splitter.
msdvbnp.ax  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Network Provider for MPEG2 based networks.
msnp.ax  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Network Provider for MPEG2 based networks.
psisrndr.ax  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Transport Information Filter for MPEG2 based networks.
vbicodec.ax  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft VBI Codec
vbisurf.ax  10.0.14393.0  VBI Surface Allocator Filter
vidcap.ax  10.0.14393.0  Video Capture Interface Server
wstpager.ax  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Teletext Server


DLL Files

 
DLL File  Version  Description
aadtb.dll  10.0.14393.693  AAD Token Broker Helper Library
abovelockapphost.dll  10.0.14393.206  AboveLockAppHost
accessibilitycpl.dll  10.0.14393.0  Ease of access control panel
accountaccessor.dll  10.0.14393.0  Sync data model to access accounts
accountsrt.dll  10.0.14393.0  Accounts RT utilities for mail, contacts, calendar
acctres.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Internet Account Manager Resources
acledit.dll  10.0.14393.0  Access Control List Editor
aclui.dll  10.0.14393.693  Security Descriptor Editor
acppage.dll  10.0.14393.0  Compatibility Tab Shell Extension Library
actioncenter.dll  10.0.14393.0  Security and Maintenance
actioncentercpl.dll  10.0.14393.447  Security and Maintenance Control Panel
activationclient.dll  10.0.14393.0  Activation Client
activationmanager.dll  10.0.14393.479  Activation Manager
activeds.dll  10.0.14393.0  ADs Router Layer DLL
activesyncprovider.dll  10.0.14393.0  The engine that syncs ActiveSync accounts
actxprxy.dll  10.0.14393.479  ActiveX Interface Marshaling Library
addressparser.dll  10.0.14393.187  ADDRESSPARSER
admtmpl.dll  10.0.14393.0  Administrative Templates Extension
adprovider.dll  10.0.14393.0  adprovider DLL
adrclient.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Access Denied Remediation Client
adsldp.dll  10.0.14393.0  ADs LDAP Provider DLL
adsldpc.dll  10.0.14393.0  ADs LDAP Provider C DLL
adsmsext.dll  10.0.14393.321  ADs LDAP Provider DLL
adsnt.dll  10.0.14393.0  ADs Windows NT Provider DLL
adtschema.dll  10.0.14393.0  Security Audit Schema DLL
advapi32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Advanced Windows 32 Base API
advapi32res.dll  10.0.14393.0  Advanced Windows 32 Base API
advpack.dll  11.0.14393.0  ADVPACK
aeevts.dll  10.0.14393.0  Application Experience Event Resources
amsi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Anti-Malware Scan Interface
amstream.dll  10.0.14393.0  DirectShow Runtime.
apds.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Help Data Services Module
aphostclient.dll  10.0.14393.0  Accounts Host Service RPC Client
appcapture.dll  10.0.14393.479  Windows Runtime AppCapture DLL
appcontracts.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows AppContracts API Server
appextension.dll  10.0.14393.0  AppExtension API
apphelp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Application Compatibility Client Library
apphlpdm.dll  10.0.14393.0  Application Compatibility Help Module
appidapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Application Identity APIs Dll
appidpolicyengineapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  AppId Policy Engine API Module
applockercsp.dll  10.0.14393.0  AppLockerCSP
appmanagementconfiguration.dll  10.0.14393.0  Application Management Configuration
appmgmts.dll  10.0.14393.0  Software installation Service
appmgr.dll  10.0.14393.0  Software Installation Snapin Extenstion
appointmentactivation.dll  10.0.14393.187  DLL for AppointmentActivation
appointmentapis.dll  10.0.14393.321  DLL for CalendarRT
apprepapi.dll  10.0.14393.479  Application Reputation APIs Dll
apprepsync.dll  10.0.14393.479  AppRepSync Task
appvclientps.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Application Virtualization Client API Proxy Stub
appventsubsystems32.dll  10.0.14393.594  Client Virtualization Subsystems
appvsentinel.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Application Virtualization Client Sentinel DLL
appvterminator.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Application Virtualization Terminator
appxalluserstore.dll  10.0.14393.0  AppX All User Store DLL
appxapplicabilityengine.dll  10.0.14393.0  AppX Applicability Engine
appxdeploymentclient.dll  10.0.14393.576  AppX Deployment Client DLL
appxpackaging.dll  10.0.14393.321  Native Code Appx Packaging Library
appxsip.dll  10.0.14393.0  Appx Subject Interface Package
asferror.dll  12.0.14393.0  ASF Error Definitions
aspnet_counters.dll  4.6.1586.0  Microsoft ASP.NET Performance Counter Shim DLL
asycfilt.dll  10.0.14393.447  ASYCFILT.DLL
atl.dll  3.5.2284.0  ATL Module for Windows XP (Unicode)
atl100.dll  10.0.40219.325  ATL Module for Windows
atl110.dll  11.0.60610.1  ATL Module for Windows
atl71.dll  7.10.3077.0  ATL Module for Windows (Unicode)
atlthunk.dll  10.0.14393.0  atlthunk.dll
atmfd.dll  5.1.2.250  Windows NT OpenType/Type 1 Font Driver
atmlib.dll  5.1.2.250  Windows NT OpenType/Type 1 API Library.
audiodev.dll  10.0.14393.0  Portable Media Devices Shell Extension
audioeng.dll  10.0.14393.0  Audio Engine
audiokse.dll  10.0.14393.594  Audio Ks Endpoint
audioses.dll  10.0.14393.447  Audio Session
auditnativesnapin.dll  10.0.14393.0  Audit Policy Group Policy Editor Extension
auditpolcore.dll  10.0.14393.0  Audit Policy Program
auditpolicygpinterop.dll  10.0.14393.0  Audit Policy GP Module
auditpolmsg.dll  10.0.14393.0  Audit Policy MMC SnapIn Messages
authbroker.dll  10.0.14393.321  Web Authentication WinRT API
authbrokerui.dll  10.0.14393.0  AuthBroker UI
authext.dll  10.0.14393.447  Authentication Extensions
authfwcfg.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Firewall with Advanced Security Configuration Helper
authfwgp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Firewall with Advanced Security Group Policy Editor Extension
authfwsnapin.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft.WindowsFirewall.SnapIn
authfwwizfwk.dll  10.0.14393.0  Wizard Framework
authui.dll  10.0.14393.447  Windows Authentication UI
authz.dll  10.0.14393.0  Authorization Framework
autoplay.dll  10.0.14393.351  AutoPlay Control Panel
avicap32.dll  10.0.14393.0  AVI Capture window class
avifil32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft AVI File support library
avrt.dll  10.0.14393.0  Multimedia Realtime Runtime
azroles.dll  10.0.14393.0  azroles Module
azroleui.dll  10.0.14393.0  Authorization Manager
azsqlext.dll  10.0.14393.0  AzMan Sql Audit Extended Stored Procedures Dll
azuresettingsyncprovider.dll  10.0.14393.693  Azure Setting Sync Provider
backgroundmediapolicy.dll  10.0.14393.206  <d> Background Media Policy DLL
basecsp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Base Smart Card Crypto Provider
batmeter.dll  10.0.14393.0  Battery Meter Helper DLL
bcastdvr.proxy.dll  10.0.14393.0  Broadcast DVR Proxy
bcastdvrhelper.dll  10.0.14393.479  Windows Runtime BcastDVRHelper DLL
bcd.dll  10.0.14393.0  BCD DLL
bcp47langs.dll  10.0.14393.0  BCP47 Language Classes
bcrypt.dll  10.0.14393.576  Windows Cryptographic Primitives Library
bcryptprimitives.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Cryptographic Primitives Library
bidispl.dll  10.0.14393.0  Bidispl DLL
bingmaps.dll  10.0.14393.479  Bing Map Control
bingonlineservices.dll  10.0.14393.187  Bing online services
biocredprov.dll  10.0.14393.0  WinBio Credential Provider
bitsperf.dll  7.8.14393.0  Perfmon Counter Access
bitsproxy.dll  7.8.14393.0  Background Intelligent Transfer Service Proxy
biwinrt.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows Background Broker Infrastructure
bluetoothapis.dll  10.0.14393.351  Bluetooth Usermode Api host
bootvid.dll  10.0.14393.0  VGA Boot Driver
browcli.dll  10.0.14393.0  Browser Service Client DLL
browsersettingsync.dll  10.0.14393.0  Browser Setting Synchronization
browseui.dll  10.0.14393.0  Shell Browser UI Library
bthtelemetry.dll  10.0.14393.0  Bluetooth Telemetry Agent
btpanui.dll  10.0.14393.0  Bluetooth PAN User Interface
bwcontexthandler.dll  1.0.0.1  ContextH Application
c_g18030.dll  10.0.14393.103  GB18030 DBCS-Unicode Conversion DLL
c_gsm7.dll  10.0.14393.103  GSM 7bit Code Page Translation DLL for SMS
c_is2022.dll  10.0.14393.103  ISO-2022 Code Page Translation DLL
c_iscii.dll  10.0.14393.0  ISCII Code Page Translation DLL
cabapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Mobile Cabinet Library
cabinet.dll  5.0.1.1  Microsoft® Cabinet File API
cabview.dll  10.0.14393.0  Cabinet File Viewer Shell Extension
callbuttons.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Runtime CallButtonsServer DLL
callbuttons.proxystub.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Runtime CallButtonsServer ProxyStub DLL
callhistoryclient.dll  10.0.14393.0  Client DLL for accessing CallHistory information
cameracaptureui.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Windows® Operating System
capauthz.dll  10.0.14393.0  Capability Authorization APIs
capiprovider.dll  10.0.14393.0  capiprovider DLL
capisp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Sysprep cleanup dll for CAPI
castingshellext.dll  10.0.14393.0  Casting Shell Extensions
catsrv.dll  2001.12.10941.16384  COM+ Configuration Catalog Server
catsrvps.dll  2001.12.10941.16384  COM+ Configuration Catalog Server Proxy/Stub
catsrvut.dll  2001.12.10941.16384  COM+ Configuration Catalog Server Utilities
cca.dll  10.0.14393.0  CCA DirectShow Filter.
cdosys.dll  6.6.14393.0  Microsoft CDO for Windows Library
cdp.dll  10.0.14393.576  Microsoft (R) CDP Client API
cdprt.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft (R) CDP Client WinRT API
cemapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  CEMAPI
certca.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Active Directory Certificate Services CA
certcli.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Active Directory Certificate Services Client
certcredprovider.dll  10.0.14393.0  Cert Credential Provider
certenc.dll  10.0.14393.0  Active Directory Certificate Services Encoding
certenroll.dll  10.0.14393.321  Microsoft® Active Directory Certificate Services Enrollment Client
certenrollui.dll  10.0.14393.0  X509 Certificate Enrollment UI
certmgr.dll  10.0.14393.0  Certificates snap-in
certpkicmdlet.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® PKI Client Cmdlets
certpoleng.dll  10.0.14393.0  Certificate Policy Engine
cewmdm.dll  12.0.14393.0  Windows CE WMDM Service Provider
cfgbkend.dll  10.0.14393.0  Configuration Backend Interface
cfgmgr32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Configuration Manager DLL
cfmifs.dll  10.0.14393.0  FmIfs Engine
cfmifsproxy.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® FmIfs Proxy Library
chakra.dll  11.0.14393.693  Microsoft ® Chakra (Private)
chakradiag.dll  11.0.14393.51  Microsoft ® Chakra Diagnostics (Private)
chakrathunk.dll  10.0.14393.51  chakrathunk.dll
chartv.dll  10.0.14393.447  Chart View
chatapis.dll  10.0.14393.321  DLL for ChatRT
chxreadingstringime.dll  10.0.14393.0  CHxReadingStringIME
cic.dll  10.0.14393.0  CIC - MMC controls for Taskpad
clb.dll  10.0.14393.0  Column List Box
clbcatq.dll  2001.12.10941.16384  COM+ Configuration Catalog
clfsw32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Common Log Marshalling Win32 DLL
cliconfg.dll  10.0.14393.0  SQL Client Configuration Utility DLL
clipboardserver.dll  10.0.14393.206  Modern Clipboard API Server
clipc.dll  10.0.14393.0  Client Licensing Platform Client
cloudbackupsettings.dll  10.0.14393.594  Cloud Backup Setting Provider
cloudexperiencehostcommon.dll  10.0.14393.321  CloudExperienceHostCommon
cloudexperiencehostuser.dll  10.0.14393.103  CloudExperienceHost User Operations
clrhost.dll  10.0.14393.0  In Proc server for managed servers in the Windows Runtime
clusapi.dll  10.0.14393.206  Cluster API Library
cmcfg32.dll  7.2.14393.0  Microsoft Connection Manager Configuration Dll
cmdext.dll  10.0.14393.0  cmd.exe Extension DLL
cmdial32.dll  7.2.14393.0  Microsoft Connection Manager
cmifw.dll  10.0.14393.351  Windows Firewall rule configuration plug-in
cmlua.dll  7.2.14393.0  Connection Manager Admin API Helper
cmpbk32.dll  7.2.14393.0  Microsoft Connection Manager Phonebook
cmstplua.dll  7.2.14393.0  Connection Manager Admin API Helper for Setup
cmutil.dll  7.2.14393.0  Microsoft Connection Manager Utility Lib
cngcredui.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft CNG CredUI Provider
cngprovider.dll  10.0.14393.0  cngprovider DLL
cnvfat.dll  10.0.14393.0  FAT File System Conversion Utility DLL
colbact.dll  2001.12.10941.16384  COM+
colorcnv.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Media Color Conversion
colorui.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Color Control Panel
combase.dll  10.0.14393.576  Microsoft COM for Windows
comcat.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Component Category Manager Library
comctl32.dll  5.82.14393.447  User Experience Controls Library
comdlg32.dll  10.0.14393.479  Common Dialogs DLL
coml2.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft COM for Windows
commpro.dll    
comms.dll    
compobj.dll  3.10.0.103  Windows Win16 Application Launcher
comppkgsup.dll  10.0.14393.0  Component Package Support DLL
compstui.dll  10.0.14393.0  Common Property Sheet User Interface DLL
comrepl.dll  2001.12.10941.16384  COM+
comres.dll  2001.12.10941.16384  COM+ Resources
comsnap.dll  2001.12.10941.16384  COM+ Explorer MMC Snapin
comsvcs.dll  2001.12.10941.16384  COM+ Services
comuid.dll  2001.12.10941.16384  COM+ Explorer UI
concrt140.dll  14.0.23919.0  Microsoft® Concurrency Runtime Library
configmanager2.dll  10.0.14393.0  ConfigManager
configureexpandedstorage.dll  10.0.14393.321  ConfigureExpandedStorage
connect.dll  10.0.14393.0  Get Connected Wizards
connectedaccountstate.dll  10.0.14393.0  ConnectedAccountState.dll
console.dll  10.0.14393.0  Control Panel Console Applet
contactactivation.dll  10.0.14393.187  DLL for ContactActivation
contactapis.dll  10.0.14393.321  DLL for ContactsRT
container.dll  10.0.14393.82  Windows Containers
coredpus.dll  10.0.14393.0  coredpus
coremessaging.dll  10.0.14393.576  Microsoft CoreMessaging Dll
coremmres.dll  10.0.14393.0  General Core Multimedia Resources
coreuicomponents.dll    
cortana.persona.dll  10.0.14393.0  Cortana.Persona
cortanamapihelper.dll  10.0.14393.0  CortanaMapiHelper
cortanamapihelper.proxystub.dll  10.0.14393.0  CortanaMapiHelper.ProxyStub
cpfilters.dll  10.0.14393.351   PTFilter & Encypter/Decrypter Tagger Filters.
credentialmigrationhandler.dll  10.0.14393.0  Credential Migration Handler
credprovdatamodel.dll  10.0.14393.206  Cred Prov Data Model
credprovhost.dll  10.0.14393.206  Credential Provider Framework Host
credprovs.dll  10.0.14393.321  Credential Providers
credprovslegacy.dll  10.0.14393.206  Credential Providers Legacy
credssp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Credential Delegation Security Package
credui.dll  10.0.14393.0  Credential Manager User Interface
crtdll.dll  4.0.1183.1  Microsoft C Runtime Library
crypt32.dll  10.0.14393.351  Crypto API32
cryptbase.dll  10.0.14393.0  Base cryptographic API DLL
cryptdlg.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Common Certificate Dialogs
cryptdll.dll  10.0.14393.0  Cryptography Manager
cryptext.dll  10.0.14393.0  Crypto Shell Extensions
cryptnet.dll  10.0.14393.0  Crypto Network Related API
cryptngc.dll  10.0.14393.479  Microsoft Passport API
cryptowinrt.dll  10.0.14393.206  Crypto WinRT Library
cryptsp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Cryptographic Service Provider API
crypttpmeksvc.dll  10.0.14393.0  Cryptographic TPM Endorsement Key Services
cryptui.dll  10.0.14393.594  Microsoft Trust UI Provider
cryptuiwizard.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Trust UI Provider
cryptxml.dll  10.0.14393.0  XML DigSig API
cscapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Offline Files Win32 API
cscdll.dll  10.0.14393.0  Offline Files Temporary Shim
cscobj.dll  10.0.14393.0  In-proc COM object used by clients of CSC API
ctl3d32.dll  2.31.0.0  Ctl3D 3D Windows Controls
d2d1.dll  10.0.14393.693  Microsoft D2D Library
d3d10.dll  10.0.14393.0  Direct3D 10 Runtime
d3d10_1.dll  10.0.14393.0  Direct3D 10.1 Runtime
d3d10_1core.dll  10.0.14393.0  Direct3D 10.1 Runtime
d3d10core.dll  10.0.14393.0  Direct3D 10 Runtime
d3d10level9.dll  10.0.14393.0  Direct3D 10 to Direct3D9 Translation Runtime
d3d10warp.dll  10.0.14393.576  Direct3D 10 Rasterizer
d3d11.dll  10.0.14393.479  Direct3D 11 Runtime
d3d12.dll  10.0.14393.594  Direct3D 12 Runtime
d3d8.dll  10.0.14393.447  Microsoft Direct3D
d3d8thk.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Direct3D OS Thunk Layer
d3d9.dll  10.0.14393.447  Direct3D 9 Runtime
d3dcompiler_33.dll  9.18.904.15  Microsoft Direct3D
d3dcompiler_34.dll  9.19.949.46  Microsoft Direct3D
d3dcompiler_35.dll  9.19.949.1104  Microsoft Direct3D
d3dcompiler_36.dll  9.19.949.2111  Microsoft Direct3D
d3dcompiler_37.dll  9.22.949.2248  Microsoft Direct3D
d3dcompiler_38.dll  9.23.949.2378  Microsoft Direct3D
d3dcompiler_39.dll  9.24.949.2307  Microsoft Direct3D
d3dcompiler_40.dll  9.24.950.2656  Direct3D HLSL Compiler
d3dcompiler_41.dll  9.26.952.2844  Direct3D HLSL Compiler
d3dcompiler_42.dll  9.27.952.3022  Direct3D HLSL Compiler
d3dcompiler_43.dll  9.29.952.3111  Direct3D HLSL Compiler
d3dcompiler_47.dll  10.0.14393.693  Direct3D HLSL Compiler
d3dcsx_42.dll  9.27.952.3022  Direct3D 10.1 Extensions
d3dcsx_43.dll  9.29.952.3111  Direct3D 10.1 Extensions
d3dim.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Direct3D
d3dim700.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Direct3D
d3dramp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Direct3D
d3dx10.dll  9.16.843.0  Microsoft Direct3D
d3dx10_33.dll  9.18.904.21  Microsoft Direct3D
d3dx10_34.dll  9.19.949.46  Microsoft Direct3D
d3dx10_35.dll  9.19.949.1104  Microsoft Direct3D
d3dx10_36.dll  9.19.949.2009  Microsoft Direct3D
d3dx10_37.dll  9.19.949.2187  Microsoft Direct3D
d3dx10_38.dll  9.23.949.2378  Microsoft Direct3D
d3dx10_39.dll  9.24.949.2307  Microsoft Direct3D
d3dx10_40.dll  9.24.950.2656  Direct3D 10.1 Extensions
d3dx10_41.dll  9.26.952.2844  Direct3D 10.1 Extensions
d3dx10_42.dll  9.27.952.3001  Direct3D 10.1 Extensions
d3dx10_43.dll  9.29.952.3111  Direct3D 10.1 Extensions
d3dx11_42.dll  9.27.952.3022  Direct3D 10.1 Extensions
d3dx11_43.dll  9.29.952.3111  Direct3D 10.1 Extensions
d3dx9_24.dll  9.5.132.0  Microsoft® DirectX for Windows®
d3dx9_25.dll  9.6.168.0  Microsoft® DirectX for Windows®
d3dx9_26.dll  9.7.239.0  Microsoft® DirectX for Windows®
d3dx9_27.dll  9.8.299.0  Microsoft® DirectX for Windows®
d3dx9_28.dll  9.10.455.0  Microsoft® DirectX for Windows®
d3dx9_29.dll  9.11.519.0  Microsoft® DirectX for Windows®
d3dx9_30.dll  9.12.589.0  Microsoft® DirectX for Windows®
d3dx9_31.dll  9.15.779.0  Microsoft® DirectX for Windows®
d3dx9_32.dll  9.16.843.0  Microsoft® DirectX for Windows®
d3dx9_33.dll  9.18.904.15  Microsoft® DirectX for Windows®
d3dx9_34.dll  9.19.949.46  Microsoft® DirectX for Windows®
d3dx9_35.dll  9.19.949.1104  Microsoft® DirectX for Windows®
d3dx9_36.dll  9.19.949.2111  Microsoft® DirectX for Windows®
d3dx9_37.dll  9.22.949.2248  Microsoft® DirectX for Windows®
d3dx9_38.dll  9.23.949.2378  Microsoft® DirectX for Windows®
d3dx9_39.dll  9.24.949.2307  Microsoft® DirectX for Windows®
d3dx9_40.dll  9.24.950.2656  Direct3D 9 Extensions
d3dx9_41.dll  9.26.952.2844  Direct3D 9 Extensions
d3dx9_42.dll  9.27.952.3001  Direct3D 9 Extensions
d3dx9_43.dll  9.29.952.3111  Direct3D 9 Extensions
d3dxof.dll  10.0.14393.0  DirectX Files DLL
dabapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Desktop Activity Broker API
dafprintprovider.dll  10.0.14393.0  DAF Print Provider DLL
daotpcredentialprovider.dll  10.0.14393.0  DirectAccess One-Time Password Credential Provider
dataclen.dll  10.0.14393.0  Disk Space Cleaner for Windows
dataexchange.dll  10.0.14393.206  Data exchange
davclnt.dll  10.0.14393.0  Web DAV Client DLL
davhlpr.dll  10.0.14393.0  DAV Helper DLL
davsyncprovider.dll  10.0.14393.0  DAV sync engine for contacts, calendar
daxexec.dll  10.0.14393.351  daxexec
dbgcore.dll  10.0.14321.1024  Windows Core Debugging Helpers
dbgeng.dll  10.0.14321.1024  Windows Symbolic Debugger Engine
dbghelp.dll  10.0.14321.1024  Windows Image Helper
dbgmodel.dll  10.0.14321.1024  Windows Debugger Data Model
dbnetlib.dll  10.0.14393.0  Winsock Oriented Net DLL for SQL Clients
dbnmpntw.dll  10.0.14393.0  Named Pipes Net DLL for SQL Clients
dciman32.dll  10.0.14393.0  DCI Manager
dcomp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft DirectComposition Library
ddaclsys.dll  10.0.14393.0  SysPrep module for Resetting Data Drive ACL
ddoiproxy.dll  10.0.14393.0  DDOI Interface Proxy
ddores.dll  10.0.14393.0  Device Category information and resources
ddraw.dll  10.0.14393.447  Microsoft DirectDraw
ddrawex.dll  10.0.14393.0  Direct Draw Ex
defaultdevicemanager.dll  10.0.14393.0  Default Device Manager
defaultprinterprovider.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Windows Default Printer Provider
delegatorprovider.dll  10.0.14393.103  WMI PassThru Provider for Storage Management
deskadp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Advanced display adapter properties
deskmon.dll  10.0.14393.0  Advanced display monitor properties
devdispitemprovider.dll  10.0.14393.0  DeviceItem inproc devquery subsystem
devenum.dll  10.0.14393.206  Device enumeration.
deviceaccess.dll  10.0.14393.0  Device Broker And Policy COM Server
deviceassociation.dll  10.0.14393.82  Device Association Client DLL
devicecenter.dll  10.0.14393.0  Device Center
devicecredential.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Companion Authenticator Client
devicedisplaystatusmanager.dll  10.0.14393.0  Device Display Status Manager
deviceflows.datamodel.dll  10.0.14393.479  DeviceFlows DataModel
devicengccredprov.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Companion Authenticator Credential Provider
devicepairing.dll  10.0.14393.479  Shell extensions for Device Pairing
devicepairingfolder.dll  10.0.14393.0  Device Pairing Folder
devicepairingproxy.dll  10.0.14393.0  Device Pairing Proxy Dll
devicesetupstatusprovider.dll  10.0.14393.0  Device Setup Status Provider Dll
deviceuxres.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Device User Experience Resource File
devmgr.dll  10.0.14393.0  Device Manager MMC Snapin
devobj.dll  10.0.14393.0  Device Information Set DLL
devrtl.dll  10.0.14393.0  Device Management Run Time Library
dfscli.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows NT Distributed File System Client DLL
dfshim.dll  10.0.14393.0  ClickOnce Application Deployment Support Library
dfsshlex.dll  10.0.14393.0  Distributed File System shell extension
dhcpcmonitor.dll  10.0.14393.0  DHCP Client Monitor Dll
dhcpcore.dll  10.0.14393.0  DHCP Client Service
dhcpcore6.dll  10.0.14393.351  DHCPv6 Client
dhcpcsvc.dll  10.0.14393.0  DHCP Client Service
dhcpcsvc6.dll  10.0.14393.0  DHCPv6 Client
dhcpsapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  DHCP Server API Stub DLL
dialclient.dll  10.0.14393.321  DIAL DLL
dictationmanager.dll  10.0.0.1  Dictation Manager
difxapi.dll  2.1.0.0  Driver Install Frameworks for API library module
dimsjob.dll  10.0.14393.0  DIMS Job DLL
dimsroam.dll  10.0.14393.0  Key Roaming DIMS Provider DLL
dinput.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft DirectInput
dinput8.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft DirectInput
direct2ddesktop.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Direct2D Desktop Components
directdb.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Direct Database API
directmanipulation.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Direct Manipulation Component
dismapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  DISM API Framework
dispex.dll  5.812.10240.16384  Microsoft ® DispEx
display.dll  10.0.14393.0  Display Control Panel
displaymanager.dll  10.0.14393.479  DisplayManager
dlnashext.dll  10.0.14393.206  DLNA Namespace DLL
dmband.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft DirectMusic Band
dmcfgutils.dll  10.0.14393.0  dmcfgutils
dmcmnutils.dll  10.0.14393.0  dmcmnutils
dmcommandlineutils.dll  10.0.14393.0  dmcommandlineutils
dmcompos.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft DirectMusic Composer
dmdlgs.dll  10.0.14393.0  Disk Management Snap-in Dialogs
dmdskmgr.dll  10.0.14393.0  Disk Management Snap-in Support Library
dmdskres.dll  10.0.14393.0  Disk Management Snap-in Resources
dmdskres2.dll  10.0.14393.0  Disk Management Snap-in Resources
dmenrollengine.dll  10.0.14393.479  Enroll Engine DLL
dmime.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft DirectMusic Interactive Engine
dmintf.dll  10.0.14393.0  Disk Management DCOM Interface Stub
dmiso8601utils.dll  10.0.14393.0  dmiso8601utils
dmloader.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft DirectMusic Loader
dmocx.dll  10.0.14393.0  TreeView OCX
dmoleaututils.dll  10.0.14393.0  dmoleaututils
dmprocessxmlfiltered.dll  10.0.14393.0  dmprocessxmlfiltered
dmpushproxy.dll  10.0.14393.0  dmpushproxy
dmscript.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft DirectMusic Scripting
dmstyle.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft DirectMusic Style Engline
dmsynth.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft DirectMusic Software Synthesizer
dmusic.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft DirectMusic Core Services
dmutil.dll  10.0.14393.0  Logical Disk Manager Utility Library
dmvdsitf.dll  10.0.14393.0  Disk Management Snap-in Support Library
dmxmlhelputils.dll  10.0.14393.0  dmxmlhelputils
dnsapi.dll  10.0.14393.206  DNS Client API DLL
dnscmmc.dll  10.0.14393.0  DNS Client MMC Snap-in DLL
dnssd.dll  3.1.0.1  Bonjour Client Library
dnssdx.dll  3.1.0.1  Bonjour COM Component Library
docprop.dll  10.0.14393.0  OLE DocFile Property Page
dolbydecmft.dll  10.0.14393.351  Media Foundation Dolby Digital Decoders
dot3api.dll  10.0.14393.0  802.3 Autoconfiguration API
dot3cfg.dll  10.0.14393.0  802.3 Netsh Helper
dot3dlg.dll  10.0.14393.0  802.3 UI Helper
dot3gpclnt.dll  10.0.14393.0  802.3 Group Policy Client
dot3gpui.dll  10.0.14393.0  802.3 Network Policy Management Snap-in
dot3hc.dll  10.0.14393.0  Dot3 Helper Class
dot3msm.dll  10.0.14393.0  802.3 Media Specific Module
dot3ui.dll  10.0.14393.0  802.3 Advanced UI
dpapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Data Protection API
dpapiprovider.dll  10.0.14393.0  dpapiprovider DLL
dpd00701x64.dll  4.0.0.143  U.are.U® 4000 Reader Filter Driver
dpdevctlx64.dll  4.0.0.143  Enumerate and control fingerprint readers
dpdevdatx64.dll  4.0.0.143  Process fingerprint raw data
dpi00701x64.dll  4.0.0.143  U.are.U® 4000 & 4000B Data Filter Driver
dplayx.dll  10.0.14393.0  DirectPlay Stub
dpmodemx.dll  10.0.14393.0  DirectPlay Stub
dpnaddr.dll  10.0.14393.0  DirectPlay Stub
dpnathlp.dll  10.0.14393.0  DirectPlay Stub
dpnet.dll  10.0.14393.0  DirectPlay Stub
dpnhpast.dll  10.0.14393.0  DirectPlay Stub
dpnhupnp.dll  10.0.14393.0  DirectPlay Stub
dpnlobby.dll  10.0.14393.0  DirectPlay Stub
dpwsockx.dll  10.0.14393.0  DirectPlay Stub
dpx.dll  5.0.1.1  Microsoft(R) Delta Package Expander
drprov.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Remote Desktop Session Host Server Network Provider
drt.dll  10.0.14393.0  Distributed Routing Table
drtprov.dll  10.0.14393.0  Distributed Routing Table Providers
drttransport.dll  10.0.14393.0  Distributed Routing Table Transport Provider
drvstore.dll  10.0.14393.351  Driver Store API
dsauth.dll  10.0.14393.0  DS Authorization for Services
dsccoreconfprov.dll  6.2.9200.16384  DSC
dsclient.dll  10.0.14393.0  Data Sharing Service Client DLL
dsdmo.dll  10.0.14393.0  DirectSound Effects
dskquota.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Shell Disk Quota Support DLL
dskquoui.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Shell Disk Quota UI DLL
dsound.dll  10.0.14393.0  DirectSound
dsparse.dll  10.0.14393.0  Active Directory Domain Services API
dsprop.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Active Directory Property Pages
dsquery.dll  10.0.14393.0  Directory Service Find
dsreg.dll  10.0.14393.321  AD/AAD User Device Registration
dsrole.dll  10.0.14393.0  DS Setup Client DLL
dssec.dll  10.0.14393.0  Directory Service Security UI
dssenh.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Enhanced DSS and Diffie-Hellman Cryptographic Provider
dsui.dll  10.0.14393.0  Device Setup UI Pages
dsuiext.dll  10.0.14393.0  Directory Service Common UI
dswave.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft DirectMusic Wave
dtsh.dll  10.0.14393.0  Detection and Sharing Status API
dui70.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows DirectUI Engine
duser.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows DirectUser Engine
dwmapi.dll  10.0.14393.206  Microsoft Desktop Window Manager API
dwmcore.dll  10.0.14393.479  Microsoft DWM Core Library
dwrite.dll  10.0.14393.351  Microsoft DirectX Typography Services
dxdiagn.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft DirectX Diagnostic Tool
dxgi.dll  10.0.14393.479  DirectX Graphics Infrastructure
dxmasf.dll  12.0.14393.82  Microsoft Windows Media Component Removal File.
dxptasksync.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Windows DXP Sync.
dxtmsft.dll  11.0.14393.0  DirectX Media -- Image DirectX Transforms
dxtrans.dll  11.0.14393.447  DirectX Media -- DirectX Transform Core
dxva2.dll  10.0.14393.0  DirectX Video Acceleration 2.0 DLL
eapp3hst.dll  10.0.14393.187  Microsoft ThirdPartyEapDispatcher
eappcfg.dll  10.0.14393.187  Eap Peer Config
eappgnui.dll  10.0.14393.187  EAP Generic UI
eapphost.dll  10.0.14393.187  Microsoft EAPHost Peer service
eappprxy.dll  10.0.14393.187  Microsoft EAPHost Peer Client DLL
eapprovp.dll  10.0.14393.0  EAP extension DLL
eapsimextdesktop.dll  10.0.14393.0  EAP SIM EXT config dll
easwrt.dll  10.0.14393.0  Exchange ActiveSync Windows Runtime DLL
edgehtml.dll  11.0.14393.693  Microsoft Edge Web Platform
editbuffertesthook.dll  10.0.14393.576  "EditBufferTestHook.DYNLINK"
edpauditapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  EDP Audit API
edputil.dll  10.0.14393.0  EDP util
efsadu.dll  10.0.14393.0  File Encryption Utility
efsext.dll  10.0.14393.447  EFSEXT.DLL
efsutil.dll  10.0.14393.0  EFS Utility Library
efswrt.dll  10.0.14393.479  Storage Protection Windows Runtime DLL
ehstorapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Enhanced Storage API
ehstorpwdmgr.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Enhanced Storage Password Manager
els.dll  10.0.14393.0  Event Viewer Snapin
elscore.dll  10.0.14393.0  Els Core Platform DLL
elshyph.dll  10.0.14393.0  ELS Hyphenation Service
elslad.dll  10.0.14393.0  ELS Language Detection
elstrans.dll  10.0.14393.0  ELS Transliteration Service
emailapis.dll  10.0.14393.321  DLL for EmailRT
embeddedmodesvcapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Embedded Mode Service Client DLL
encapi.dll  10.0.14393.105  Encoder API
encdec.dll  10.0.14393.0   XDSCodec & Encypter/Decrypter Tagger Filters.
encdump.dll  5.0.1.1  Media Foundation Crash Dump Encryption DLL
enrollmentapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Legacy Phone Enrollment API BackCompat Shim
enterpriseresourcemanager.dll  10.0.14393.0  enterpriseresourcemanager DLL
eqossnap.dll  10.0.14393.0  EQoS Snapin extension
errordetails.dll  10.0.14393.447  Microsoft Windows operating system.
errordetailsupdate.dll  10.0.14393.447  Error Details Update Task
es.dll  2001.12.10941.16384  COM+
esdsip.dll  10.0.14393.0  Crypto SIP provider for signing and verifying .esd Electronic Software Distribution files
esent.dll  10.0.14393.351  Extensible Storage Engine for Microsoft(R) Windows(R)
esentprf.dll  10.0.14393.0  Extensible Storage Engine Performance Monitoring Library for Microsoft(R) Windows(R)
esevss.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft(R) ESENT shadow utilities
etwcoreuicomponentsresources.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft CoreComponents UI ETW manifest Dll
etweseproviderresources.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft ESE ETW
etwrundown.dll  10.0.14393.0  Etw Rundown Helper Library
eventcls.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Volume Shadow Copy Service event class
evr.dll  10.0.14393.187  Enhanced Video Renderer DLL
execmodelclient.dll  10.0.14393.0  ExecModelClient
execmodelproxy.dll  10.0.14393.0  ExecModelProxy
explorerframe.dll  10.0.14393.479  ExplorerFrame
expsrv.dll  6.0.72.9589  Visual Basic for Applications Runtime - Expression Service
exsmime.dll  10.0.14393.187  LExsmime
extrasxmlparser.dll  10.0.14393.187  Extras XML parser used to extract extension information from XML
f3ahvoas.dll  10.0.14393.0  JP Japanese Keyboard Layout for Fujitsu FMV oyayubi-shift keyboard
familysafetyext.dll  10.0.14393.0  FamilySafety ChildAccount Extensions
faultrep.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows User Mode Crash Reporting DLL
fdbth.dll  10.0.14393.0  Function Discovery Bluetooth Provider Dll
fdbthproxy.dll  10.0.14393.0  Bluetooth Provider Proxy Dll
fddevquery.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Windows Device Query Helper
fde.dll  10.0.14393.0  Folder Redirection Snapin Extension
fdeploy.dll  10.0.14393.0  Folder Redirection Group Policy Extension
fdpnp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Pnp Provider Dll
fdprint.dll  10.0.14393.0  Function Discovery Print Provider Dll
fdproxy.dll  10.0.14393.0  Function Discovery Proxy Dll
fdssdp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Function Discovery SSDP Provider Dll
fdwcn.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Connect Now - Config Function Discovery Provider DLL
fdwnet.dll  10.0.14393.0  Function Discovery WNet Provider Dll
fdwsd.dll  10.0.14393.0  Function Discovery WS Discovery Provider Dll
feclient.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows NT File Encryption Client Interfaces
filemgmt.dll  10.0.14393.0  Services and Shared Folders
findnetprinters.dll  10.0.14393.206  Find Network Printers COM Component
fingerprintcredential.dll  10.0.14393.0  WinBio Fingerprint Credential
firewallapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Firewall API
firewallcontrolpanel.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Firewall Control Panel
fltlib.dll  10.0.14393.0  Filter Library
fmifs.dll  10.0.14393.0  FM IFS Utility DLL
fms.dll  10.0.14393.0  Font Management Services
fontext.dll  10.0.14393.447  Windows Font Folder
fontglyphanimator.dll  10.0.14393.0  Font Glyph Animator
fontsub.dll  10.0.14393.0  Font Subsetting DLL
fphc.dll  10.0.14393.0  Filtering Platform Helper Class
framedyn.dll  10.0.14393.0  WMI SDK Provider Framework
framedynos.dll  10.0.14393.0  WMI SDK Provider Framework
frprov.dll  10.0.14393.0  Folder Redirection WMI Provider
fsclient.dll  10.0.14393.447  Frame Server Client DLL
fsutilext.dll  10.0.14393.0  FS Utility Extension DLL
fundisc.dll  10.0.14393.0  Function Discovery Dll
fwbase.dll  10.0.14393.0  Firewall Base DLL
fwcfg.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Firewall Configuration Helper
fwpolicyiomgr.dll  10.0.14393.0  FwPolicyIoMgr DLL
fwpuclnt.dll  10.0.14393.0  FWP/IPsec User-Mode API
fwremotesvr.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Firewall Remote APIs Server
fxsapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Fax API Support DLL
fxscom.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Fax Server COM Client Interface
fxscomex.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Fax Server Extended COM Client Interface
fxsext32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Fax Exchange Command Extension
fxsresm.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Fax Resource DLL
fxsxp32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Fax Transport Provider
gamebarpresencewriter.proxy.dll  10.0.14393.0  GameBar Presence Writer Proxy
gamepanelexternalhook.dll    
gameux.dll  10.0.14393.479  Games Explorer
gameuxlegacygdfs.dll  1.0.0.1  Legacy GDF resource DLL
gamingtcui.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Gaming Internal CallableUI dll
gcdef.dll  10.0.14393.0  Game Controllers Default Sheets
gdi32.dll  10.0.14393.206  GDI Client DLL
gdi32full.dll  10.0.14393.576  GDI Client DLL
gdiplus.dll  10.0.14393.321  Microsoft GDI+
geocommon.dll  10.0.14393.0  Geocommon
geolocation.dll  10.0.14393.351  Geolocation Runtime DLL
getuname.dll  10.0.14393.0  Unicode name Dll for UCE
glmf32.dll  10.0.14393.0  OpenGL Metafiling DLL
globcollationhost.dll  10.0.14393.447  GlobCollationHost
globinputhost.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Globalization Extension API for Input
glu32.dll  10.0.14393.0  OpenGL Utility Library DLL
gmsaclient.dll  10.0.14393.0  "gmsaclient.DYNLINK"
gpapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Group Policy Client API
gpedit.dll  10.0.14393.0  GPEdit
gpprefcl.dll  10.0.14393.0  Group Policy Preference Client
gpprnext.dll  10.0.14393.0  Group Policy Printer Extension
gpscript.dll  10.0.14393.0  Script Client Side Extension
gptext.dll  10.0.14393.0  GPTExt
hbaapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  HBA API data interface dll for HBA_API_Rev_2-18_2002MAR1.doc
hcproviders.dll  10.0.14393.0  Security and Maintenance Providers
hdcphandler.dll  10.0.14393.0  Hdcp Handler DLL
helppaneproxy.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Help Proxy
hevcdecoder.dll  10.0.14393.479  Windows H265 Video Decoder
hgcpl.dll  10.0.14393.447  HomeGroup Control Panel
hhsetup.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® HTML Help
hid.dll  10.0.14393.0  Hid User Library
hidserv.dll  10.0.14393.0  Human Interface Device Service
hlink.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Office 2000 component
hmkd.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows HMAC Key Derivation API
hnetcfg.dll  10.0.14393.0  Home Networking Configuration Manager
hnetmon.dll  10.0.14393.0  Home Networking Monitor DLL
hpcc3120.dll  0.3.1553.12262  HP Settings
hpcdmc32.dll  0.3.1544.69  DMC Component
hpzidr12.dll  12.1.6.51  IEEE-1284.4-1999 Run-time library (kernel)
hpzipr12.dll  12.1.6.51  PML Run-time library
hrtfapo.dll    
httpapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  HTTP Protocol Stack API
htui.dll  10.0.14393.0  Common halftone Color Adjustment Dialogs
ias.dll  10.0.14393.0  Network Policy Server
iasacct.dll  10.0.14393.0  NPS Accounting Provider
iasads.dll  10.0.14393.0  NPS Active Directory Data Store
iasdatastore.dll  10.0.14393.0  NPS Datastore server
iashlpr.dll  10.0.14393.0  NPS Surrogate Component
iasmigplugin.dll  10.0.14393.0  NPS Migration DLL
iasnap.dll  10.0.14393.0  NPS NAP Provider
iaspolcy.dll  10.0.14393.0  NPS Pipeline
iasrad.dll  10.0.14393.0  NPS RADIUS Protocol Component
iasrecst.dll  10.0.14393.0  NPS XML Datastore Access
iassam.dll  10.0.14393.0  NPS NT SAM Provider
iassdo.dll  10.0.14393.0  NPS SDO Component
iassvcs.dll  10.0.14393.0  NPS Services Component
iccvid.dll  1.10.0.12  Cinepak® Codec
icm32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Color Management Module (CMM)
icmp.dll  10.0.14393.0  ICMP DLL
icmui.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Color Matching System User Interface DLL
iconcodecservice.dll  10.0.14393.0  Converts a PNG part of the icon to a legacy bmp icon
icsigd.dll  10.0.14393.0  Internet Gateway Device properties
idctrls.dll  10.0.14393.0  Identity Controls
idndl.dll  10.0.14393.0  Downlevel DLL
idstore.dll  10.0.14393.0  Identity Store
ieadvpack.dll  11.0.14393.0  ADVPACK
ieapfltr.dll  11.0.14393.447  Microsoft SmartScreen Filter
iedkcs32.dll  18.0.14393.206  IEAK branding
ieframe.dll  11.0.14393.576  Internet Browser
iepeers.dll  11.0.14393.447  Internet Explorer Peer Objects
ieproxy.dll  11.0.14393.479  IE ActiveX Interface Marshaling Library
iernonce.dll  11.0.14393.82  Extended RunOnce processing with UI
iertutil.dll  11.0.14393.447  Run time utility for Internet Explorer
iesetup.dll  11.0.14393.82  IOD Version Map
iesysprep.dll  11.0.14393.0  IE Sysprep Provider
ieui.dll  11.0.14393.0  Internet Explorer UI Engine
ifmon.dll  10.0.14393.0  IF Monitor DLL
ifsutil.dll  10.0.14393.0  IFS Utility DLL
ifsutilx.dll  10.0.14393.0  IFS Utility Extension DLL
ig7icd32.dll  10.18.10.4358  OpenGL(R) Driver for Intel(R) Graphics Accelerator
igd10iumd32.dll  10.18.10.4358  User Mode Driver for Intel(R) Graphics Technology
igd10umd32.dll  9.17.10.2867  LDDM User Mode Driver for Intel(R) Graphics Technology
igdail32.dll    
igdbcl32.dll  10.18.10.4358  OpenCL User Mode Driver for Intel(R) Graphics Technology
igdde32.dll    
igdfcl32.dll  10.18.10.4358  OpenCL User Mode Driver for Intel(R) Graphics Technology
igdmd32.dll  10.18.10.4358  Metrics Discovery API for Intel(R) Graphics Accelerator
igdrcl32.dll  10.18.10.4358  OpenCL User Mode Driver for Intel(R) Graphics Technology
igdumd32.dll  9.17.10.2867  LDDM User Mode Driver for Intel(R) Graphics Technology
igdumdim32.dll  10.18.10.4358  User Mode Driver for Intel(R) Graphics Technology
igdusc32.dll  10.18.10.4358  Unified Shader Compiler for Intel(R) Graphics Accelerator
igfx11cmrt32.dll  3.0.0.1284  MDF(CM) Runtime DX11 Dynamic Link Library
igfxcmjit32.dll  3.0.0.1284  MDF(CM) JIT Dynamic Link Library
igfxcmrt32.dll  3.0.0.1284  MDF(CM) Runtime Dynamic Link Library
igfxdv32.dll  8.15.10.2867  igfxdev Module
igfxexps32.dll  6.15.10.4358  igfxext Module
iglhcp32.dll  9.0.20.9000  iglhcp32 Dynamic Link Library
iglhsip32.dll  9.0.20.9000  iglhsip32 Dynamic Link Library
imagehlp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows NT Image Helper
imageres.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Image Resource
imagesp1.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows SP1 Image Resource
imapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Image Mastering API
imapi2.dll  10.0.14393.206  Image Mastering API v2
imapi2fs.dll  10.0.14393.0  Image Mastering File System Imaging API v2
imgutil.dll  11.0.14393.0  IE plugin image decoder support DLL
imm32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Multi-User Windows IMM32 API Client DLL
indexeddbserver.dll  10.0.14393.693  IndexedDb host
inetcomm.dll  10.0.14393.447  Microsoft Internet Messaging API Resources
inetmib1.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft MIB-II subagent
inetres.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Internet Messaging API Resources
inkanalysis.dll  10.0.14393.0  InkAnalysis DLL
inkanalysislegacycom.dll  10.0.14393.0  InkAnalysisLegacyCom DLL
inked.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Tablet PC InkEdit Control
inkobjcore.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Tablet PC Ink Platform Component
input.dll  10.0.14393.447  InputSetting DLL
inputinjectionbroker.dll  10.0.14393.0  Broker for WinRT input injection.
inputlocalemanager.dll  10.0.14393.576  "InputLocaleManager.DYNLINK"
inputservice.dll  10.0.14393.576  Microsoft Text InputService Dll
inputswitch.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Windows Input Switcher
inseng.dll  11.0.14393.0  Install engine
intel_opencl_icd32.dll  1.2.11.0  OpenCL Client DLL
intelopencl32.dll  10.18.10.4358  Intel(R) OpenCL(TM) Common Runtime Driver
iologmsg.dll  10.0.14393.0  IO Logging DLL
ipeloggingdictationhelper.dll  1.0.0.1  IPE Logging Library Helper
iphlpapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  IP Helper API
iprop.dll  10.0.14393.0  OLE PropertySet Implementation
iprtprio.dll  10.0.14393.0  IP Routing Protocol Priority DLL
iprtrmgr.dll  10.0.14393.0  IP Router Manager
ipsecsnp.dll  10.0.14393.0  IP Security Policy Management Snap-in
ipsmsnap.dll  10.0.14393.0  IP Security Monitor Snap-in
ir32_32.dll  10.0.14393.0  IR32_32 WRAPPER DLL
ir32_32original.dll  3.24.15.3  Intel Indeo(R) Video R3.2 32-bit Driver
ir41_32original.dll  4.51.16.3  Intel Indeo® Video 4.5
ir41_qc.dll  10.0.14393.0  IR41_QC WRAPPER DLL
ir41_qcoriginal.dll  4.30.62.2  Intel Indeo® Video Interactive Quick Compressor
ir41_qcx.dll  10.0.14393.0  IR41_QCX WRAPPER DLL
ir41_qcxoriginal.dll  4.30.64.1  Intel Indeo® Video Interactive Quick Compressor
ir50_32.dll  10.0.14393.0  IR50_32 WRAPPER DLL
ir50_32original.dll  5.2562.15.55  Intel Indeo® video 5.10
ir50_qc.dll  10.0.14393.0  IR50_QC WRAPPER DLL
ir50_qcoriginal.dll  5.0.63.48  Intel Indeo® video 5.10 Quick Compressor
ir50_qcx.dll  10.0.14393.0  IR50_QCX WRAPPER DLL
ir50_qcxoriginal.dll  5.0.64.48  Intel Indeo® video 5.10 Quick Compressor
irclass.dll  10.0.14393.0  Infrared Class Coinstaller
iri.dll  10.0.14393.0  iri
iscsicpl.dll  5.2.3790.1830  iSCSI Initiator Control Panel Applet
iscsidsc.dll  10.0.14393.0  iSCSI Discovery api
iscsied.dll  10.0.14393.0  iSCSI Extension DLL
iscsium.dll  10.0.14393.0  iSCSI Discovery api
iscsiwmi.dll  10.0.14393.351  MS iSCSI Initiator WMI Provider
iscsiwmiv2.dll  10.0.14393.0  WMI Provider for iSCSI
itircl.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® InfoTech IR Local DLL
itss.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® InfoTech Storage System Library
iyuv_32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Intel Indeo(R) Video YUV Codec
javascriptcollectionagent.dll  11.0.14393.0  JavaScript Performance Collection Agent
jdns_sd.dll  3.1.0.1  Bonjour support for Java
jmail_autobaup.dll  4.4.0.0  JMail 4.4.0
joinproviderol.dll  10.0.14393.0  Online Join Provider DLL
joinutil.dll  10.0.14393.0  Join Utility DLL
jpmapcontrol.dll  10.0.14393.479  Jupiter Map Control
jscript.dll  5.812.10240.16384  Microsoft ® JScript
jscript9.dll  11.0.14393.576  Microsoft ® JScript
jscript9diag.dll  11.0.14393.576  Microsoft ® JScript Diagnostics
jsproxy.dll  11.0.14393.187  JScript Proxy Auto-Configuration
kbd101.dll  10.0.14393.0  JP Japanese Keyboard Layout for 101
kbd101a.dll  10.0.14393.0  KO Hangeul Keyboard Layout for 101 (Type A)
kbd101b.dll  10.0.14393.0  KO Hangeul Keyboard Layout for 101(Type B)
kbd101c.dll  10.0.14393.0  KO Hangeul Keyboard Layout for 101(Type C)
kbd103.dll  10.0.14393.0  KO Hangeul Keyboard Layout for 103
kbd106.dll  10.0.14393.0  JP Japanese Keyboard Layout for 106
kbd106n.dll  10.0.14393.0  JP Japanese Keyboard Layout for 106
kbda1.dll  10.0.14393.0  Arabic_English_101 Keyboard Layout
kbda2.dll  10.0.14393.0  Arabic_2 Keyboard Layout
kbda3.dll  10.0.14393.0  Arabic_French_102 Keyboard Layout
kbdal.dll  10.0.14393.0  Albania Keyboard Layout
kbdarme.dll  10.0.14393.0  Eastern Armenian Keyboard Layout
kbdarmph.dll  10.0.14393.0  Armenian Phonetic Keyboard Layout
kbdarmty.dll  10.0.14393.0  Armenian Typewriter Keyboard Layout
kbdarmw.dll  10.0.14393.0  Western Armenian Keyboard Layout
kbdax2.dll  10.0.14393.0  JP Japanese Keyboard Layout for AX2
kbdaze.dll  10.0.14393.0  Azerbaijan_Cyrillic Keyboard Layout
kbdazel.dll  10.0.14393.0  Azeri-Latin Keyboard Layout
kbdazst.dll  10.0.14393.0  Azerbaijani (Standard) Keyboard Layout
kbdbash.dll  10.0.14393.0  Bashkir Keyboard Layout
kbdbe.dll  10.0.14393.0  Belgian Keyboard Layout
kbdbene.dll  10.0.14393.0  Belgian Dutch Keyboard Layout
kbdbgph.dll  10.0.14393.0  Bulgarian Phonetic Keyboard Layout
kbdbgph1.dll  10.0.14393.0  Bulgarian (Phonetic Traditional) Keyboard Layout
kbdbhc.dll  10.0.14393.0  Bosnian (Cyrillic) Keyboard Layout
kbdblr.dll  10.0.14393.0  Belarusian Keyboard Layout
kbdbr.dll  10.0.14393.0  Brazilian Keyboard Layout
kbdbu.dll  10.0.14393.0  Bulgarian (Typewriter) Keyboard Layout
kbdbug.dll  10.0.14393.0  Buginese Keyboard Layout
kbdbulg.dll  10.0.14393.0  Bulgarian Keyboard Layout
kbdca.dll  10.0.14393.0  Canadian Multilingual Keyboard Layout
kbdcan.dll  10.0.14393.0  Canadian Multilingual Standard Keyboard Layout
kbdcher.dll  10.0.14393.0  Cherokee Nation Keyboard Layout
kbdcherp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Cherokee Phonetic Keyboard Layout
kbdcr.dll  10.0.14393.0  Croatian/Slovenian Keyboard Layout
kbdcz.dll  10.0.14393.0  Czech Keyboard Layout
kbdcz1.dll  10.0.14393.0  Czech_101 Keyboard Layout
kbdcz2.dll  10.0.14393.0  Czech_Programmer's Keyboard Layout
kbdda.dll  10.0.14393.0  Danish Keyboard Layout
kbddiv1.dll  10.0.14393.0  Divehi Phonetic Keyboard Layout
kbddiv2.dll  10.0.14393.0  Divehi Typewriter Keyboard Layout
kbddv.dll  10.0.14393.0  Dvorak US English Keyboard Layout
kbddzo.dll  10.0.14393.0  Dzongkha Keyboard Layout
kbdes.dll  10.0.14393.0  Spanish Alernate Keyboard Layout
kbdest.dll  10.0.14393.0  Estonia Keyboard Layout
kbdfa.dll  10.0.14393.0  Persian Keyboard Layout
kbdfar.dll  10.0.14393.0  Persian Standard Keyboard Layout
kbdfc.dll  10.0.14393.0  Canadian French Keyboard Layout
kbdfi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Finnish Keyboard Layout
kbdfi1.dll  10.0.14393.0  Finnish-Swedish with Sami Keyboard Layout
kbdfo.dll  10.0.14393.0  Fćroese Keyboard Layout
kbdfr.dll  10.0.14393.0  French Keyboard Layout
kbdfthrk.dll  10.0.14393.0  Futhark Keyboard Layout
kbdgae.dll  10.0.14393.0  Scottish Gaelic (United Kingdom) Keyboard Layout
kbdgeo.dll  10.0.14393.0  Georgian Keyboard Layout
kbdgeoer.dll  10.0.14393.0  Georgian (Ergonomic) Keyboard Layout
kbdgeome.dll  10.0.14393.0  Georgian (MES) Keyboard Layout
kbdgeooa.dll  10.0.14393.0  Georgian (Old Alphabets) Keyboard Layout
kbdgeoqw.dll  10.0.14393.0  Georgian (QWERTY) Keyboard Layout
kbdgkl.dll  10.0.14393.0  Greek_Latin Keyboard Layout
kbdgn.dll  10.0.14393.0  Guarani Keyboard Layout
kbdgr.dll  10.0.14393.0  German Keyboard Layout
kbdgr1.dll  10.0.14393.0  German_IBM Keyboard Layout
kbdgrlnd.dll  10.0.14393.0  Greenlandic Keyboard Layout
kbdgthc.dll  10.0.14393.0  Gothic Keyboard Layout
kbdhau.dll  10.0.14393.0  Hausa Keyboard Layout
kbdhaw.dll  10.0.14393.0  Hawaiian Keyboard Layout
kbdhe.dll  10.0.14393.0  Greek Keyboard Layout
kbdhe220.dll  10.0.14393.0  Greek IBM 220 Keyboard Layout
kbdhe319.dll  10.0.14393.0  Greek IBM 319 Keyboard Layout
kbdheb.dll  10.0.14393.0  KBDHEB Keyboard Layout
kbdhebl3.dll  10.0.14393.0  Hebrew Standard Keyboard Layout
kbdhela2.dll  10.0.14393.0  Greek IBM 220 Latin Keyboard Layout
kbdhela3.dll  10.0.14393.0  Greek IBM 319 Latin Keyboard Layout
kbdhept.dll  10.0.14393.0  Greek_Polytonic Keyboard Layout
kbdhu.dll  10.0.14393.0  Hungarian Keyboard Layout
kbdhu1.dll  10.0.14393.0  Hungarian 101-key Keyboard Layout
kbdibm02.dll  10.0.14393.0  JP Japanese Keyboard Layout for IBM 5576-002/003
kbdibo.dll  10.0.14393.0  Igbo Keyboard Layout
kbdic.dll  10.0.14393.0  Icelandic Keyboard Layout
kbdinasa.dll  10.0.14393.0  Assamese (Inscript) Keyboard Layout
kbdinbe1.dll  10.0.14393.0  Bengali - Inscript (Legacy) Keyboard Layout
kbdinbe2.dll  10.0.14393.0  Bengali (Inscript) Keyboard Layout
kbdinben.dll  10.0.14393.0  Bengali Keyboard Layout
kbdindev.dll  10.0.14393.0  Devanagari Keyboard Layout
kbdinen.dll  10.0.14393.0  English (India) Keyboard Layout
kbdinguj.dll  10.0.14393.0  Gujarati Keyboard Layout
kbdinhin.dll  10.0.14393.0  Hindi Keyboard Layout
kbdinkan.dll  10.0.14393.0  Kannada Keyboard Layout
kbdinmal.dll  10.0.14393.0  Malayalam Keyboard Layout Keyboard Layout
kbdinmar.dll  10.0.14393.0  Marathi Keyboard Layout
kbdinori.dll  10.0.14393.0  Odia Keyboard Layout
kbdinpun.dll  10.0.14393.0  Punjabi/Gurmukhi Keyboard Layout
kbdintam.dll  10.0.14393.0  Tamil Keyboard Layout
kbdintel.dll  10.0.14393.0  Telugu Keyboard Layout
kbdinuk2.dll  10.0.14393.0  Inuktitut Naqittaut Keyboard Layout
kbdir.dll  10.0.14393.0  Irish Keyboard Layout
kbdit.dll  10.0.14393.0  Italian Keyboard Layout
kbdit142.dll  10.0.14393.0  Italian 142 Keyboard Layout
kbdiulat.dll  10.0.14393.0  Inuktitut Latin Keyboard Layout
kbdjav.dll  10.0.14393.0  Javanese Keyboard Layout
kbdjpn.dll  10.0.14393.0  JP Japanese Keyboard Layout Stub driver
kbdkaz.dll  10.0.14393.0  Kazak_Cyrillic Keyboard Layout
kbdkhmr.dll  10.0.14393.0  Cambodian Standard Keyboard Layout
kbdkni.dll  10.0.14393.0  Khmer (NIDA) Keyboard Layout
kbdkor.dll  10.0.14393.0  KO Hangeul Keyboard Layout Stub driver
kbdkurd.dll  10.0.14393.0  Central Kurdish Keyboard Layout
kbdkyr.dll  10.0.14393.0  Kyrgyz Keyboard Layout
kbdla.dll  10.0.14393.0  Latin-American Spanish Keyboard Layout
kbdlao.dll  10.0.14393.0  Lao Standard Keyboard Layout
kbdlisub.dll  10.0.14393.0  Lisu Basic Keyboard Layout
kbdlisus.dll  10.0.14393.0  Lisu Standard Keyboard Layout
kbdlk41a.dll  10.0.14393.0  DEC LK411-AJ Keyboard Layout
kbdlt.dll  10.0.14393.0  Lithuania Keyboard Layout
kbdlt1.dll  10.0.14393.0  Lithuanian Keyboard Layout
kbdlt2.dll  10.0.14393.0  Lithuanian Standard Keyboard Layout
kbdlv.dll  10.0.14393.0  Latvia Keyboard Layout
kbdlv1.dll  10.0.14393.0  Latvia-QWERTY Keyboard Layout
kbdlvst.dll  10.0.14393.0  Latvian (Standard) Keyboard Layout
kbdmac.dll  10.0.14393.0  Macedonian (FYROM) Keyboard Layout
kbdmacst.dll  10.0.14393.0  Macedonian (FYROM) - Standard Keyboard Layout
kbdmaori.dll  10.0.14393.0  Maori Keyboard Layout
kbdmlt47.dll  10.0.14393.0  Maltese 47-key Keyboard Layout
kbdmlt48.dll  10.0.14393.0  Maltese 48-key Keyboard Layout
kbdmon.dll  10.0.14393.0  Mongolian Keyboard Layout
kbdmonmo.dll  10.0.14393.0  Mongolian (Mongolian Script) Keyboard Layout
kbdmonst.dll  10.0.14393.0  Traditional Mongolian (Standard) Keyboard Layout
kbdmyan.dll  10.0.14393.0  Myanmar Keyboard Layout
kbdne.dll  10.0.14393.0  Dutch Keyboard Layout
kbdnec.dll  10.0.14393.0  JP Japanese Keyboard Layout for (NEC PC-9800)
kbdnec95.dll  10.0.14393.0  JP Japanese Keyboard Layout for (NEC PC-9800 Windows 95)
kbdnecat.dll  10.0.14393.0  JP Japanese Keyboard Layout for (NEC PC-9800 on PC98-NX)
kbdnecnt.dll  10.0.14393.0  JP Japanese NEC PC-9800 Keyboard Layout
kbdnepr.dll  10.0.14393.0  Nepali Keyboard Layout
kbdnko.dll  10.0.14393.0  N'Ko Keyboard Layout
kbdno.dll  10.0.14393.0  Norwegian Keyboard Layout
kbdno1.dll  10.0.14393.0  Norwegian with Sami Keyboard Layout
kbdnso.dll  10.0.14393.0  Sesotho sa Leboa Keyboard Layout
kbdntl.dll  10.0.14393.0  New Tai Leu Keyboard Layout
kbdogham.dll  10.0.14393.0  Ogham Keyboard Layout
kbdolch.dll  10.0.14393.0  Ol Chiki Keyboard Layout
kbdoldit.dll  10.0.14393.0  Old Italic Keyboard Layout
kbdosm.dll  10.0.14393.0  Osmanya Keyboard Layout
kbdpash.dll  10.0.14393.0  Pashto (Afghanistan) Keyboard Layout
kbdphags.dll  10.0.14393.0  Phags-pa Keyboard Layout
kbdpl.dll  10.0.14393.0  Polish Keyboard Layout
kbdpl1.dll  10.0.14393.0  Polish Programmer's Keyboard Layout
kbdpo.dll  10.0.14393.0  Portuguese Keyboard Layout
kbdro.dll  10.0.14393.0  Romanian (Legacy) Keyboard Layout
kbdropr.dll  10.0.14393.0  Romanian (Programmers) Keyboard Layout
kbdrost.dll  10.0.14393.0  Romanian (Standard) Keyboard Layout
kbdru.dll  10.0.14393.0  Russian Keyboard Layout
kbdru1.dll  10.0.14393.0  Russia(Typewriter) Keyboard Layout
kbdrum.dll  10.0.14393.0  Russian - Mnemonic Keyboard Layout
kbdsf.dll  10.0.14393.0  Swiss French Keyboard Layout
kbdsg.dll  10.0.14393.0  Swiss German Keyboard Layout
kbdsl.dll  10.0.14393.0  Slovak Keyboard Layout
kbdsl1.dll  10.0.14393.0  Slovak(QWERTY) Keyboard Layout
kbdsmsfi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Sami Extended Finland-Sweden Keyboard Layout
kbdsmsno.dll  10.0.14393.0  Sami Extended Norway Keyboard Layout
kbdsn1.dll  10.0.14393.0  Sinhala Keyboard Layout
kbdsora.dll  10.0.14393.0  Sora Keyboard Layout
kbdsorex.dll  10.0.14393.0  Sorbian Extended Keyboard Layout
kbdsors1.dll  10.0.14393.0  Sorbian Standard Keyboard Layout
kbdsorst.dll  10.0.14393.0  Sorbian Standard (Legacy) Keyboard Layout
kbdsp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Spanish Keyboard Layout
kbdsw.dll  10.0.14393.0  Swedish Keyboard Layout
kbdsw09.dll  10.0.14393.0  Sinhala - Wij 9 Keyboard Layout
kbdsyr1.dll  10.0.14393.0  Syriac Standard Keyboard Layout
kbdsyr2.dll  10.0.14393.0  Syriac Phoenetic Keyboard Layout
kbdtaile.dll  10.0.14393.0  Tai Le Keyboard Layout
kbdtajik.dll  10.0.14393.0  Tajik Keyboard Layout
kbdtat.dll  10.0.14393.0  Tatar (Legacy) Keyboard Layout
kbdth0.dll  10.0.14393.0  Thai Kedmanee Keyboard Layout
kbdth1.dll  10.0.14393.0  Thai Pattachote Keyboard Layout
kbdth2.dll  10.0.14393.0  Thai Kedmanee (non-ShiftLock) Keyboard Layout
kbdth3.dll  10.0.14393.0  Thai Pattachote (non-ShiftLock) Keyboard Layout
kbdtifi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Tifinagh (Basic) Keyboard Layout
kbdtifi2.dll  10.0.14393.0  Tifinagh (Extended) Keyboard Layout
kbdtiprc.dll  10.0.14393.0  Tibetan (PRC) Keyboard Layout
kbdtiprd.dll  10.0.14393.0  Tibetan (PRC) - Updated Keyboard Layout
kbdtt102.dll  10.0.14393.0  Tatar Keyboard Layout
kbdtuf.dll  10.0.14393.0  Turkish F Keyboard Layout
kbdtuq.dll  10.0.14393.0  Turkish Q Keyboard Layout
kbdturme.dll  10.0.14393.0  Turkmen Keyboard Layout
kbdtzm.dll  10.0.14393.0  Central Atlas Tamazight Keyboard Layout
kbdughr.dll  10.0.14393.0  Uyghur (Legacy) Keyboard Layout
kbdughr1.dll  10.0.14393.0  Uyghur Keyboard Layout
kbduk.dll  10.0.14393.0  United Kingdom Keyboard Layout
kbdukx.dll  10.0.14393.0  United Kingdom Extended Keyboard Layout
kbdur.dll  10.0.14393.0  Ukrainian Keyboard Layout
kbdur1.dll  10.0.14393.0  Ukrainian (Enhanced) Keyboard Layout
kbdurdu.dll  10.0.14393.0  Urdu Keyboard Layout
kbdus.dll  10.0.14393.0  United States Keyboard Layout
kbdusa.dll  10.0.14393.0  US IBM Arabic 238_L Keyboard Layout
kbdusl.dll  10.0.14393.0  Dvorak Left-Hand US English Keyboard Layout
kbdusr.dll  10.0.14393.0  Dvorak Right-Hand US English Keyboard Layout
kbdusx.dll  10.0.14393.0  US Multinational Keyboard Layout
kbduzb.dll  10.0.14393.0  Uzbek_Cyrillic Keyboard Layout
kbdvntc.dll  10.0.14393.0  Vietnamese Keyboard Layout
kbdwol.dll  10.0.14393.0  Wolof Keyboard Layout
kbdyak.dll  10.0.14393.0  Sakha - Russia Keyboard Layout
kbdyba.dll  10.0.14393.0  Yoruba Keyboard Layout
kbdycc.dll  10.0.14393.0  Serbian (Cyrillic) Keyboard Layout
kbdycl.dll  10.0.14393.0  Serbian (Latin) Keyboard Layout
kerbclientshared.dll  10.0.14393.0  Kerberos Client Shared Functionality
kerberos.dll  10.0.14393.594  Kerberos Security Package
kernel.appcore.dll  10.0.14393.0  AppModel API Host
kernel32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows NT BASE API Client DLL
kernelbase.dll  10.0.14393.479  Windows NT BASE API Client DLL
keyiso.dll  10.0.14393.0  CNG Key Isolation Service
keymgr.dll  10.0.14393.0  Stored User Names and Passwords
ksuser.dll  10.0.14393.0  User CSA Library
ktmw32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows KTM Win32 Client DLL
l2gpstore.dll  10.0.14393.0  Policy Storage dll
l2nacp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Onex Credential Provider
l2sechc.dll  10.0.14393.0  Layer 2 Security Diagnostics Helper Classes
laprxy.dll  12.0.14393.0  Windows Media Logagent Proxy
licensemanager.dll  10.0.14393.576  LicenseManager
licensemanagerapi.dll  10.0.14393.206  "LicenseManagerApi.DYNLINK"
licensingdiagspp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Licensing Diagnostics SPP Plugin
licmgr10.dll  11.0.14393.0  Microsoft® License Manager DLL
linkinfo.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Volume Tracking
loadperf.dll  10.0.14393.0  Load & Unload Performance Counters
localsec.dll  10.0.14393.0  Local Users and Groups MMC Snapin
locationapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Windows Location API
locationframeworkinternalps.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Geolocation Framework Internal PS
locationframeworkps.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Geolocation Framework PS
lockappbroker.dll  10.0.14393.447  Windows Lock App Broker DLL
loghours.dll  10.0.14393.0  Schedule Dialog
logoncli.dll  10.0.14393.0  Net Logon Client DLL
logoncontroller.dll  10.0.14393.594  Logon UX Controller
lpk.dll  10.0.14393.0  Language Pack
lsmproxy.dll  10.0.14393.0  LSM interfaces proxy Dll
luainstall.dll  10.0.14393.0  Lua manifest install
lz32.dll  5.0.1.1  LZ Expand/Compress API DLL
magnification.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Magnification API
mapconfiguration.dll  10.0.14393.479  MapConfiguration
mapcontrolcore.dll  10.0.14393.479  Map Control Core
mapcontrolstringsres.dll  10.0.14393.187  Map control resource strings
mapgeocoder.dll  10.0.14393.479  Maps Geocoder
mapi32.dll  1.0.2536.0  Extended MAPI 1.0 for Windows NT
mapistub.dll  1.0.2536.0  Extended MAPI 1.0 for Windows NT
maprouter.dll  10.0.14393.479  Maps Router
mapsbtsvc.dll  10.0.14393.479  Maps Background Transfer Service
mbaeapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Mobile Broadband Account Experience API
mbaeapipublic.dll  10.0.14393.206  Mobile Broadband Account API
mbsmsapi.dll  10.0.14393.206  Microsoft Windows Mobile Broadband SMS API
mbussdapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Windows Mobile Broadband USSD API
mccsengineshared.dll  10.0.14393.0  Utilies shared among OneSync engines
mciavi32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Video For Windows MCI driver
mcicda.dll  10.0.14393.0  MCI driver for cdaudio devices
mciqtz32.dll  10.0.14393.0  DirectShow MCI Driver
mciseq.dll  10.0.14393.0  MCI driver for MIDI sequencer
mciwave.dll  10.0.14393.0  MCI driver for waveform audio
mcrecvsrc.dll  10.0.14393.693  Miracast Media Foundation Source DLL
mdminst.dll  10.0.14393.0  Modem Class Installer
mdmregistration.dll  10.0.14393.576  MDM Registration DLL
messagingdatamodel2.dll  10.0.14393.0  MessagingDataModel2
mf.dll  10.0.14393.187  Media Foundation DLL
mf3216.dll  10.0.14393.0  32-bit to 16-bit Metafile Conversion DLL
mfaacenc.dll  10.0.14393.0  Media Foundation AAC Encoder
mfasfsrcsnk.dll  10.0.14393.693  Media Foundation ASF Source and Sink DLL
mfaudiocnv.dll  10.0.14393.479  Media Foundation Audio Converter DLL
mfc100.dll  10.0.40219.325  MFCDLL Shared Library - Retail Version
mfc100chs.dll  10.0.40219.325  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc100cht.dll  10.0.40219.325  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc100deu.dll  10.0.40219.325  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc100enu.dll  10.0.40219.325  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc100esn.dll  10.0.40219.325  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc100fra.dll  10.0.40219.325  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc100ita.dll  10.0.40219.325  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc100jpn.dll  10.0.40219.325  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc100kor.dll  10.0.40219.325  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc100rus.dll  10.0.40219.325  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc100u.dll  10.0.40219.325  MFCDLL Shared Library - Retail Version
mfc110.dll  11.0.60610.1  MFCDLL Shared Library - Retail Version
mfc110chs.dll  11.0.60610.1  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc110cht.dll  11.0.60610.1  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc110deu.dll  11.0.60610.1  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc110enu.dll  11.0.60610.1  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc110esn.dll  11.0.60610.1  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc110fra.dll  11.0.60610.1  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc110ita.dll  11.0.60610.1  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc110jpn.dll  11.0.60610.1  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc110kor.dll  11.0.60610.1  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc110rus.dll  11.0.60610.1  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc110u.dll  11.0.60610.1  MFCDLL Shared Library - Retail Version
mfc120.dll  12.0.21005.1  MFCDLL Shared Library - Retail Version
mfc120chs.dll  12.0.21005.1  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc120cht.dll  12.0.21005.1  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc120deu.dll  12.0.21005.1  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc120enu.dll  12.0.21005.1  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc120esn.dll  12.0.21005.1  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc120fra.dll  12.0.21005.1  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc120ita.dll  12.0.21005.1  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc120jpn.dll  12.0.21005.1  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc120kor.dll  12.0.21005.1  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc120rus.dll  12.0.21005.1  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc120u.dll  12.0.21005.1  MFCDLL Shared Library - Retail Version
mfc140.dll  14.0.23918.0  MFCDLL Shared Library - Retail Version
mfc140chs.dll  14.0.23918.0  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc140cht.dll  14.0.23918.0  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc140deu.dll  14.0.23918.0  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc140enu.dll  14.0.23918.0  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc140esn.dll  14.0.23918.0  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc140fra.dll  14.0.23918.0  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc140ita.dll  14.0.23918.0  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc140jpn.dll  14.0.23918.0  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc140kor.dll  14.0.23918.0  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc140rus.dll  14.0.23918.0  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc140u.dll  14.0.23918.0  MFCDLL Shared Library - Retail Version
mfc40.dll  4.1.0.6140  MFCDLL Shared Library - Retail Version
mfc40u.dll  4.1.0.6140  MFCDLL Shared Library - Retail Version
mfc42.dll  6.6.8063.0  MFCDLL Shared Library - Retail Version
mfc42u.dll  6.6.8063.0  MFCDLL Shared Library - Retail Version
mfc71.dll  7.10.3077.0  MFCDLL Shared Library - Retail Version
mfc71chs.dll  7.10.3077.0  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc71cht.dll  7.10.3077.0  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc71deu.dll  7.10.3077.0  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc71enu.dll  7.10.3077.0  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc71esp.dll  7.10.3077.0  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc71fra.dll  7.10.3077.0  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc71ita.dll  7.10.3077.0  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc71jpn.dll  7.10.3077.0  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc71kor.dll  7.10.3077.0  MFC Language Specific Resources
mfc71u.dll  7.10.3077.0  MFCDLL Shared Library - Retail Version
mfcaptureengine.dll  10.0.14393.0  Media Foundation CaptureEngine DLL
mfcm100.dll  10.0.40219.325  MFC Managed Library - Retail Version
mfcm100u.dll  10.0.40219.325  MFC Managed Library - Retail Version
mfcm110.dll  11.0.60610.1  MFC Managed Library - Retail Version
mfcm110u.dll  11.0.60610.1  MFC Managed Library - Retail Version
mfcm120.dll  12.0.21005.1  MFC Managed Library - Retail Version
mfcm120u.dll  12.0.21005.1  MFC Managed Library - Retail Version
mfcm140.dll  14.0.23918.0  MFC Managed Library - Retail Version
mfcm140u.dll  14.0.23918.0  MFC Managed Library - Retail Version
mfcore.dll  10.0.14393.693  Media Foundation Core DLL
mfcsubs.dll  2001.12.10941.16384  COM+
mfds.dll  10.0.14393.0  Media Foundation Direct Show wrapper DLL
mfdvdec.dll  10.0.14393.0  Media Foundation DV Decoder
mferror.dll  10.0.14393.0  Media Foundation Error DLL
mfh263enc.dll  10.0.14393.0  Media Foundation h263 Encoder
mfh264enc.dll  10.0.14393.0  Media Foundation H264 Encoder
mfh265enc.dll  10.0.14393.0  Media Foundation H265 Encoder
mfksproxy.dll  10.0.14393.351  Dshow MF Bridge DLL DLL
mfmediaengine.dll  10.0.14393.576  Media Foundation Media Engine DLL
mfmjpegdec.dll  10.0.14393.0  Media Foundation MJPEG Decoder
mfmkvsrcsnk.dll  10.0.14393.479  Media Foundation MKV Media Source and Sink DLL
mfmp4srcsnk.dll  10.0.14393.693  Media Foundation MPEG4 Source and Sink DLL
mfmpeg2srcsnk.dll  10.0.14393.693  Media Foundation MPEG2 Source and Sink DLL
mfnetcore.dll  10.0.14393.693  Media Foundation Net Core DLL
mfnetsrc.dll  10.0.14393.693  Media Foundation Net Source DLL
mfperfhelper.dll  10.0.14393.0  MFPerf DLL
mfplat.dll  10.0.14393.479  Media Foundation Platform DLL
mfplay.dll  10.0.14393.479  Media Foundation Playback API DLL
mfps.dll  10.0.14393.105  Media Foundation Proxy DLL
mfreadwrite.dll  10.0.14393.206  Media Foundation ReadWrite DLL
mfsensorgroup.dll  10.0.14393.447  Media Foundation Sensor Group DLL
mfsrcsnk.dll  10.0.14393.82  Media Foundation Source and Sink DLL
mfsvr.dll  10.0.14393.479  Media Foundation Simple Video Renderer DLL
mftranscode.dll  10.0.14393.0  Media Foundation Transcode DLL
mfvdsp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Media Foundation Video DSP Components
mfvfw.dll  10.0.14393.0  MF VFW MFT
mfwmaaec.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Media Audio AEC for Media Foundation
mgmtapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft SNMP Manager API (uses WinSNMP)
mi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Management Infrastructure
mibincodec.dll  10.0.14393.0  Management Infrastructure binary codec component
microsoft.management.infrastructure.native.unmanaged.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft.Management.Infrastructure.Native.Unmanaged.dll
microsoft.uev.appagent.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft.Uev.AppAgent DLL
microsoft.uev.office2010customactions.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft.Uev.Office2010CustomActions DLL
microsoft.uev.office2013customactions.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft.Uev.Office2013CustomActions DLL
microsoftaccountextension.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Account Extension DLL
microsoftaccounttokenprovider.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Account Token Provider
microsoft-windows-mapcontrols.dll  10.0.14393.187  Map Event Resources
microsoft-windows-moshost.dll  10.0.14393.187  MosHost Event Resources
microsoft-windows-mostrace.dll  10.0.14393.187  MOS Event Resources
midimap.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft MIDI Mapper
migisol.dll  10.0.14393.479  Migration System Isolation Layer
miguiresource.dll  10.0.14393.0  MIG wini32 resources
mimefilt.dll  2008.0.14393.0  MIME Filter
mimofcodec.dll  10.0.14393.0  Management Infrastructure mof codec component
minstoreevents.dll  10.0.14393.0  Minstore Event Resource
mintdh.dll  10.0.14393.0  Event Trace Helper Library
miracastreceiver.dll  10.0.14393.206  Miracast Receiver API
mirrordrvcompat.dll  10.0.14393.0  Mirror Driver Compatibility Helper
mispace.dll  10.0.14393.351  Storage Management Provider for Spaces
miutils.dll  10.0.14393.0  Management Infrastructure
mlang.dll  10.0.14393.0  Multi Language Support DLL
mmcbase.dll  10.0.14393.0  MMC Base DLL
mmci.dll  10.0.14393.0  Media class installer
mmcico.dll  10.0.14393.0  Media class co-installer
mmcndmgr.dll  10.0.14393.0  MMC Node Manager DLL
mmcshext.dll  10.0.14393.0  MMC Shell Extension DLL
mmdevapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  MMDevice API
mmres.dll  10.0.14393.0  General Audio Resources
modemui.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Modem Properties
moricons.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows NT Setup Icon Resources Library
mos.dll  10.0.14393.479  mos
moshostclient.dll  10.0.14393.187  MosHostClient
mosresource.dll  10.0.14393.187  Mos resource
mosstorage.dll  10.0.14393.479  MosStorage
mp3dmod.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft MP3 Decoder DMO
mp43decd.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Media MPEG-4 Video Decoder
mp4sdecd.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Media MPEG-4 S Video Decoder
mpg4decd.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Media MPEG-4 Video Decoder
mpr.dll  10.0.14393.0  Multiple Provider Router DLL
mprapi.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows NT MP Router Administration DLL
mprddm.dll  10.0.14393.206  Demand Dial Manager Supervisor
mprdim.dll  10.0.14393.206  Dynamic Interface Manager
mprext.dll  10.0.14393.0  Multiple Provider Router Extension DLL
mprmsg.dll  10.0.14393.0  Multi-Protocol Router Service Messages DLL
mrmcorer.dll  10.0.14393.479  Microsoft Windows MRM
mrmindexer.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Windows MRM
mrt_map.dll  1.0.24120.0  Microsoft .NET Native Error Reporting Helper
mrt100.dll  1.0.24120.0  Microsoft .NET Native Runtime
ms3dthumbnailprovider.dll  10.0.14393.0  3MF Metadata Handler
msaatext.dll  2.0.10413.0  Active Accessibility text support
msac3enc.dll  10.0.14393.206  Microsoft AC-3 Encoder
msacm32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft ACM Audio Filter
msadce.dll  10.0.14393.0  OLE DB Cursor Engine
msadcer.dll  10.0.14393.0  OLE DB Cursor Engine Resources
msadco.dll  10.0.14393.0  Remote Data Services Data Control
msadcor.dll  10.0.14393.0  Remote Data Services Data Control Resources
msadds.dll  10.0.14393.0  OLE DB Data Shape Provider
msaddsr.dll  10.0.14393.0   OLE DB Data Shape Provider Resources
msader15.dll  10.0.14393.0  ActiveX Data Objects Resources
msado15.dll  10.0.14393.0  ActiveX Data Objects
msadomd.dll  10.0.14393.0  ActiveX Data Objects (Multi-Dimensional)
msador15.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft ActiveX Data Objects Recordset
msadox.dll  10.0.14393.0  ActiveX Data Objects Extensions
msadrh15.dll  10.0.14393.0  ActiveX Data Objects Rowset Helper
msafd.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Windows Sockets 2.0 Service Provider
msajapi.dll  10.0.14393.187  AllJoyn API Library
msalacdecoder.dll  10.0.14393.0  Media Foundation ALAC Decoder
msalacencoder.dll  10.0.14393.0  Media Foundation ALAC Encoder
msamrnbdecoder.dll  10.0.14393.0  AMR Narrowband Decoder DLL
msamrnbencoder.dll  10.0.14393.0  AMR Narrowband Encoder DLL
msamrnbsink.dll  10.0.14393.0  AMR Narrowband Sink DLL
msamrnbsource.dll  10.0.14393.0  AMR Narrowband Source DLL
msasn1.dll  10.0.14393.0  ASN.1 Runtime APIs
msauddecmft.dll  10.0.14393.0  Media Foundation Audio Decoders
msaudite.dll  10.0.14393.0  Security Audit Events DLL
msauserext.dll  10.0.14393.0  MSA USER Extension DLL
mscandui.dll  10.0.14393.0  MSCANDUI Server DLL
mscat32.dll  10.0.14393.0  MSCAT32 Forwarder DLL
msclmd.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Class Mini-driver
mscms.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Color Matching System DLL
mscoree.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft .NET Runtime Execution Engine
mscorier.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft .NET Runtime IE resources
mscories.dll  2.0.50727.8745  Microsoft .NET IE SECURITY REGISTRATION
mscpx32r.dll  10.0.14393.0  ODBC Code Page Translator Resources
mscpxl32.dll  10.0.14393.0  ODBC Code Page Translator
msctf.dll  10.0.14393.479  MSCTF Server DLL
msctfmonitor.dll  10.0.14393.0  MsCtfMonitor DLL
msctfp.dll  10.0.14393.0  MSCTFP Server DLL
msctfui.dll  10.0.14393.0  MSCTFUI Server DLL
msctfuimanager.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft UIManager DLL
msdadc.dll  10.0.14393.0  OLE DB Data Conversion Stub
msdadiag.dll  10.0.14393.0  Built-In Diagnostics
msdaenum.dll  10.0.14393.0  OLE DB Root Enumerator Stub
msdaer.dll  10.0.14393.0  OLE DB Error Collection Stub
msdaora.dll  10.0.14393.0  OLE DB Provider for Oracle
msdaorar.dll  10.0.14393.0  OLE DB Provider for Oracle Resources
msdaosp.dll  10.0.14393.0  OLE DB Simple Provider
msdaprsr.dll  10.0.14393.0  OLE DB Persistence Services Resources
msdaprst.dll  10.0.14393.0  OLE DB Persistence Services
msdaps.dll  10.0.14393.0  OLE DB Interface Proxies/Stubs
msdarem.dll  10.0.14393.0  OLE DB Remote Provider
msdaremr.dll  10.0.14393.0  OLE DB Remote Provider Resources
msdart.dll  10.0.14393.0  OLE DB Runtime Routines
msdasc.dll  10.0.14393.0  OLE DB Service Components Stub
msdasql.dll  10.0.14393.0  OLE DB Provider for ODBC Drivers
msdasqlr.dll  10.0.14393.0  OLE DB Provider for ODBC Drivers Resources
msdatl3.dll  10.0.14393.0  OLE DB Implementation Support Routines
msdatt.dll  10.0.14393.0  OLE DB Temporary Table Services
msdaurl.dll  10.0.14393.0  OLE DB RootBinder Stub
msdelta.dll  5.0.1.1  Microsoft Patch Engine
msdfmap.dll  10.0.14393.0  Data Factory Handler
msdmo.dll  10.0.14393.0  DMO Runtime
msdrm.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Rights Management client
msdtcprx.dll  2001.12.10941.16384  Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator OLE Transactions Interface Proxy DLL
msdtcuiu.dll  2001.12.10941.16384  Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator Administrative DLL
msdtcvsp1res.dll  2001.12.10941.16384  Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator Resources for Vista SP1
msexch40.dll  4.0.9756.0  Microsoft Jet Exchange Isam
msexcl40.dll  4.0.9756.0  Microsoft Jet Excel Isam
msfeeds.dll  11.0.14393.321  Microsoft Feeds Manager
msfeedsbs.dll  11.0.14393.0  Microsoft Feeds Background Sync
msflacdecoder.dll  10.0.14393.0  Media Foundation FLAC Decoder
msflacencoder.dll  10.0.14393.0  Media Foundation FLAC Encoder
msftedit.dll  10.0.14393.206  Rich Text Edit Control, v8.5
mshtml.dll  11.0.14393.693  Microsoft (R) HTML Viewer
mshtmldac.dll  11.0.14393.0  DAC for Trident DOM
mshtmled.dll  11.0.14393.447  Microsoft® HTML Editing Component
mshtmler.dll  11.0.14393.0  Microsoft® HTML Editing Component's Resource DLL
msi.dll  5.0.14393.576  Windows Installer
msidcrl40.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Account Dynamic Link Library
msident.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Identity Manager
msidle.dll  10.0.14393.0  User Idle Monitor
msidntld.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Identity Manager
msieftp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Internet Explorer FTP Folder Shell Extension
msihnd.dll  5.0.14393.0  Windows® installer
msiltcfg.dll  5.0.14393.0  Windows Installer Configuration API Stub
msimg32.dll  10.0.14393.0  GDIEXT Client DLL
msimsg.dll  5.0.14393.0  Windows® Installer International Messages
msimtf.dll  10.0.14393.0  Active IMM Server DLL
msisip.dll  5.0.14393.0  MSI Signature SIP Provider
msiwer.dll  5.0.14393.0  MSI Windows Error Reporting
msjet40.dll  4.0.9765.0  Microsoft Jet Engine Library
msjetoledb40.dll  4.0.9756.0  
msjint40.dll  4.0.9765.0  Microsoft Jet Database Engine International DLL
msjro.dll  10.0.14393.0  Jet and Replication Objects
msjter40.dll  4.0.9756.0  Microsoft Jet Database Engine Error DLL
msjtes40.dll  4.0.9756.0  Microsoft Jet Expression Service
mskeyprotcli.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Client Key Protection Provider
mskeyprotect.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Key Protection Provider
msls31.dll  3.10.349.0  Microsoft Line Services library file
msltus40.dll  4.0.9756.0  Microsoft Jet Lotus 1-2-3 Isam
msmpeg2adec.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft DTV-DVD Audio Decoder
msmpeg2enc.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft MPEG-2 Encoder
msmpeg2vdec.dll  10.0.14393.594  Microsoft DTV-DVD Video Decoder
msobjs.dll  10.0.14393.0  System object audit names
msoeacct.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Internet Account Manager
msoert2.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Windows Mail RT Lib
msopusdecoder.dll  10.0.14393.0  Media Foundation Opus Decoder
msorc32r.dll  10.0.14393.0  ODBC Driver for Oracle Resources
msorcl32.dll  10.0.14393.0  ODBC Driver for Oracle
mspatcha.dll  5.0.1.1  Microsoft File Patch Application API
mspatchc.dll  5.0.1.1  Microsoft Patch Creation Engine
mspbde40.dll  4.0.9756.0  Microsoft Jet Paradox Isam
msphotography.dll  10.0.14393.0  MS Photography DLL
msports.dll  10.0.14393.0  Ports Class Installer
msrating.dll  10.0.14393.0  "msrating.DYNLINK"
msrd2x40.dll  4.0.9756.0  Microsoft (R) Red ISAM
msrd3x40.dll  4.0.9756.0  Microsoft (R) Red ISAM
msrdc.dll  10.0.14393.0  Remote Differential Compression COM server
msrdpwebaccess.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Remote Desktop Services Web Access Control
msrepl40.dll  4.0.9756.0  Microsoft Replication Library
msrle32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft RLE Compressor
msscntrs.dll  7.0.14393.0  PKM Perfmon Counter DLL
mssign32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Trust Signing APIs
mssip32.dll  10.0.14393.0  MSSIP32 Forwarder DLL
mssitlb.dll  7.0.14393.0  mssitlb
msspellcheckingfacility.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Spell Checking Facility
mssph.dll  7.0.14393.0  Microsoft Search Protocol Handler
mssphtb.dll  7.0.14393.0  Outlook MSSearch Connector
mssprxy.dll  7.0.14393.0  Microsoft Search Proxy
mssrch.dll  7.0.14393.206  Microsoft Embedded Search
mssvp.dll  7.0.14393.0  MSSearch Vista Platform
mstask.dll  10.0.14393.0  Task Scheduler interface DLL
mstext40.dll  4.0.9756.0  Microsoft Jet Text Isam
mstscax.dll  10.0.14393.693  Remote Desktop Services ActiveX Client
msutb.dll  10.0.14393.0  MSUTB Server DLL
msv1_0.dll  10.0.14393.594  Microsoft Authentication Package v1.0
msvbvm60.dll  6.0.98.15  Visual Basic Virtual Machine
msvcirt.dll  7.0.14393.0  Windows NT IOStreams DLL
msvcp_win.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® C Runtime Library
msvcp100.dll  10.0.40219.325  Microsoft® C Runtime Library
msvcp110.dll  11.0.51106.1  Microsoft® C Runtime Library
msvcp110_win.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® STL110 C++ Runtime Library
msvcp120.dll  12.0.21005.1  Microsoft® C Runtime Library
msvcp120_clr0400.dll  12.0.52512.0  Microsoft® C Runtime Library
msvcp140.dll  14.0.23919.0  Microsoft® C Runtime Library
msvcp60.dll  7.0.14393.0  Windows NT C++ Runtime Library DLL
msvcp71.dll  7.10.3077.0  Microsoft® C++ Runtime Library
msvcr100.dll  10.0.40219.325  Microsoft® C Runtime Library
msvcr100_clr0400.dll  14.6.1586.0  Microsoft® .NET Framework
msvcr110.dll  11.0.51106.1  Microsoft® C Runtime Library
msvcr120.dll  12.0.21005.1  Microsoft® C Runtime Library
msvcr120_clr0400.dll  12.0.52512.0  Microsoft® C Runtime Library
msvcr71.dll  7.10.3052.4  Microsoft® C Runtime Library
msvcrt.dll  7.0.14393.0  Windows NT CRT DLL
msvcrt20.dll  2.12.0.0  Microsoft® C Runtime Library
msvcrt40.dll  10.0.14393.0  VC 4.x CRT DLL (Forwarded to msvcrt.dll)
msvfw32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Video for Windows DLL
msvidc32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Video 1 Compressor
msvidctl.dll  6.5.14393.447  ActiveX control for streaming video
msvideodsp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Video Stabilization MFT
msvp9dec.dll  10.0.14393.693  Windows VP9 Video Decoder
msvproc.dll  10.0.14393.351  Media Foundation Video Processor
msvpxenc.dll  10.0.14393.693  Windows VPX Video Encoder
mswb7.dll  10.0.14393.0  MSWB7 DLL
mswdat10.dll  4.0.9756.0  Microsoft Jet Sort Tables
mswmdm.dll  12.0.14393.0  Windows Media Device Manager Core
mswsock.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Windows Sockets 2.0 Service Provider
mswstr10.dll  4.0.9765.0  Microsoft Jet Sort Library
msxactps.dll  10.0.14393.0  OLE DB Transaction Proxies/Stubs
msxbde40.dll  4.0.9756.0  Microsoft Jet xBASE Isam
msxml3.dll  8.110.14393.0  MSXML 3.0
msxml3r.dll  8.110.14393.0  XML Resources
msxml6.dll  6.30.14393.321  MSXML 6.0
msxml6r.dll  6.30.14393.187  XML Resources
msyuv.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft UYVY Video Decompressor
mtf.dll  10.0.14393.0  "MTF.DYNLINK"
mtxclu.dll  2001.12.10941.16384  Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator Failover Clustering Support DLL
mtxdm.dll  2001.12.10941.16384  COM+
mtxex.dll  2001.12.10941.16384  COM+
mtxlegih.dll  2001.12.10941.16384  COM+
mtxoci.dll  2001.12.10941.16384  Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator Database Support DLL for Oracle
muifontsetup.dll  10.0.14393.0  MUI Callback for font registry settings
mycomput.dll  10.0.14393.0  Computer Management
mydocs.dll  10.0.14393.0  My Documents Folder UI
napcrypt.dll  10.0.14393.0  NAP Cryptographic API helper
napinsp.dll  10.0.14393.0  E-mail Naming Shim Provider
naturallanguage6.dll  10.0.14393.206  Natural Language Development Platform 6
ncaapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Network Connectivity Assistant API
ncdprop.dll  10.0.14393.0  Advanced network device properties
nci.dll  10.0.14393.0  CoInstaller: NET
ncobjapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Windows® Operating System
ncrypt.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows NCrypt Router
ncryptprov.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft KSP
ncryptsslp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft SChannel Provider
nddeapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Network DDE Share Management APIs
ndfapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Network Diagnostic Framework Client API
ndfetw.dll  10.0.14393.0  Network Diagnostic Engine Event Interface
ndfhcdiscovery.dll  10.0.14393.0  Network Diagnostic Framework HC Discovery API
ndishc.dll  10.0.14393.0  NDIS Helper Classes
ndproxystub.dll  10.0.14393.0  Network Diagnostic Engine Proxy/Stub
negoexts.dll  10.0.14393.0  NegoExtender Security Package
netapi32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Net Win32 API DLL
netbios.dll  10.0.14393.0  NetBIOS Interface Library
netcenter.dll  10.0.14393.0  Network Center control panel
netcfgx.dll  10.0.14393.0  Network Configuration Objects
netcorehc.dll  10.0.14393.0  Networking Core Diagnostics Helper Classes
netdiagfx.dll  10.0.14393.0  Network Diagnostic Framework
netevent.dll  10.0.14393.0  Net Event Handler
netfxperf.dll  10.0.14393.0  Extensible Performance Counter Shim
neth.dll  10.0.14393.0  Net Help Messages DLL
netid.dll  10.0.14393.0  System Control Panel Applet; Network ID Page
netiohlp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Netio Helper DLL
netjoin.dll  10.0.14393.0  Domain Join DLL
netlogon.dll  10.0.14393.0  Net Logon Services DLL
netmsg.dll  10.0.14393.0  Net Messages DLL
netplwiz.dll  10.0.14393.0  Map Network Drives/Network Places Wizard
netprofm.dll  10.0.14393.0  Network List Manager
netprovfw.dll  10.0.14393.0  Provisioning Service Framework DLL
netprovisionsp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Provisioning Service Provider DLL
netsetupapi.dll  10.0.14393.447  Network Configuration API
netsetupengine.dll  10.0.14393.447  Network Configuration Engine
netsetupshim.dll  10.0.14393.479  Network Configuration API
netshell.dll  10.0.14393.479  Network Connections Shell
netutils.dll  10.0.14393.0  Net Win32 API Helpers DLL
networkcollectionagent.dll  11.0.14393.206  Network Collection Agent
networkdlllsp.dll  1.0.0.0  Network Tunnel Lab LSP
networkexplorer.dll  10.0.14393.0  Network Explorer
networkhelper.dll  10.0.14393.0  Network utilities for mail, contacts, calendar
networkitemfactory.dll  10.0.14393.0  NetworkItem Factory
newdev.dll  6.0.5054.0  Add Hardware Device Library
ngccredprov.dll  10.0.14393.479  Microsoft Passport Credential Provider
ngckeyenum.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Passport Key Enumeration Manager
ngcksp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Passport Key Storage Provider
ninput.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Pen and Touch Input Component
nlaapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Network Location Awareness 2
nlhtml.dll  2008.0.14393.0  HTML filter
nlmgp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Network List Manager Snapin
nlmproxy.dll  10.0.14393.0  Network List Manager Public Proxy
nlmsprep.dll  10.0.14393.0  Network List Manager Sysprep Module
nlsbres.dll  10.0.14393.0  NLSBuild resource DLL
nlsdata0000.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Neutral Natural Language Server Data and Code
nlsdata0009.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft English Natural Language Server Data and Code
nlsdl.dll  10.0.14393.0  Nls Downlevel DLL
nlslexicons0009.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft English Natural Language Server Data and Code
nmaa.dll  10.0.14393.479  NMAA
nmadirect.dll  10.0.14393.187  Nma Direct
normaliz.dll  10.0.14393.0  Unicode Normalization DLL
notificationobjfactory.dll  10.0.14393.0  Notifications Object Factory
npmproxy.dll  10.0.14393.0  Network List Manager Proxy
npsm.dll  10.0.14393.447  NPSM
npsmdesktopprovider.dll  10.0.14393.0  <d> NPSM Desktop Local Provider DLL
nshhttp.dll  10.0.14393.0  HTTP netsh DLL
nshipsec.dll  10.0.14393.0  Net Shell IP Security helper DLL
nshwfp.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows Filtering Platform Netsh Helper
nsi.dll  10.0.14393.0  NSI User-mode interface DLL
ntasn1.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft ASN.1 API
ntdll.dll  10.0.14393.479  NT Layer DLL
ntdsapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Active Directory Domain Services API
ntlanman.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Lan Manager
ntlanui2.dll  10.0.14393.0  Network object shell UI
ntlmshared.dll  10.0.14393.0  NTLM Shared Functionality
ntmarta.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows NT MARTA provider
ntprint.dll  10.0.14393.0  Spooler Setup DLL
ntshrui.dll  10.0.14393.479  Shell extensions for sharing
ntvdm64.dll  10.0.14393.0  16-bit Emulation on NT64
nvapi.dll  21.21.13.7633  NVIDIA NVAPI Library, Version 376.33
nvaudcap32v.dll  3.30.2.0  NVIDIA Virtual Audio Driver
nvcompiler.dll    
nvcuda.dll  6.14.13.7633  NVIDIA CUDA Driver, Version 376.33
nvcuvid.dll  7.17.13.7633  NVIDIA CUDA Video Decode API, Version 376.33
nvfatbinaryloader.dll  21.21.13.7633  NVIDIA Fatbinary Loader, Version 376.33
nvfbc.dll  6.14.13.7633  NVIDIA Frame Buffer Capture Library, Version
nvifr.dll  6.14.13.7633  NVIDIA In-band Frame Rendering Library, Version
nvoglv32.dll  21.21.13.7633  NVIDIA Compatible OpenGL ICD
nvopencl.dll  6.14.13.7633  NVIDIA CUDA 8.0.0 OpenCL 1.1 Driver, Version 376.33
nvptxjitcompiler.dll  21.21.13.7633  NVIDIA PTX JIT Compiler, Version 376.33
objsel.dll  10.0.14393.0  Object Picker Dialog
occache.dll  11.0.14393.0  Object Control Viewer
ocsetapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Optional Component Setup API
odbc32.dll  10.0.14393.0  ODBC Driver Manager
odbcbcp.dll  10.0.14393.0  BCP for ODBC
odbcconf.dll  10.0.14393.206  ODBC Driver Configuration Program
odbccp32.dll  10.0.14393.0  ODBC Installer
odbccr32.dll  10.0.14393.0  ODBC Cursor Library
odbccu32.dll  10.0.14393.0  ODBC Cursor Library
odbcint.dll  10.0.14393.0  ODBC Resources
odbcji32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft ODBC Desktop Driver Pack 3.5
odbcjt32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft ODBC Desktop Driver Pack 3.5
odbctrac.dll  10.0.14393.0  ODBC Driver Manager Trace
oddbse32.dll  10.0.14393.0  ODBC (3.0) driver for DBase
odexl32.dll  10.0.14393.0  ODBC (3.0) driver for Excel
odfox32.dll  10.0.14393.0  ODBC (3.0) driver for FoxPro
odpdx32.dll  10.0.14393.0  ODBC (3.0) driver for Paradox
odtext32.dll  10.0.14393.0  ODBC (3.0) driver for text files
oemlicense.dll  10.0.14393.0  Client Licensing Platform Client Provisioning
offfilt.dll  2008.0.14393.0  OFFICE Filter
offlinelsa.dll  10.0.14393.82  Windows
offlinesam.dll  10.0.14393.693  Windows
offreg.dll  10.0.14393.321  Offline registry DLL
ole2.dll  3.10.0.103  Windows Win16 Application Launcher
ole2disp.dll  3.10.0.103  Windows Win16 Application Launcher
ole2nls.dll  3.10.0.103  Windows Win16 Application Launcher
ole32.dll  10.0.14393.576  Microsoft OLE for Windows
oleacc.dll  7.2.14393.206  Active Accessibility Core Component
oleacchooks.dll  7.2.14393.0  Active Accessibility Event Hooks Library
oleaccrc.dll  7.2.14393.0  Active Accessibility Resource DLL
oleaut32.dll  10.0.14393.447  OLEAUT32.DLL
olecli32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Object Linking and Embedding Client Library
oledb32.dll  10.0.14393.206  OLE DB Core Services
oledb32r.dll  10.0.14393.0  OLE DB Core Services Resources
oledlg.dll  10.0.14393.0  OLE User Interface Support
oleprn.dll  10.0.14393.0  Oleprn DLL
olepro32.dll  10.0.14393.447  OLEPRO32.DLL
olesvr32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Object Linking and Embedding Server Library
olethk32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft OLE for Windows
omadmapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  omadmapi
ondemandbrokerclient.dll  10.0.14393.0  OnDemandBrokerClient
ondemandconnroutehelper.dll  10.0.14393.0  On Demand Connctiond Route Helper
onecorecommonproxystub.dll  10.0.14393.0  OneCore Common Proxy Stub
onecoreuapcommonproxystub.dll  10.0.14393.0  OneCoreUAP Common Proxy Stub
onedrivesettingsyncprovider.dll  10.0.14393.187  OneDrive Setting Sync
onex.dll  10.0.14393.0  IEEE 802.1X supplicant library
onexui.dll  10.0.14393.0  IEEE 802.1X supplicant UI library
oobefldr.dll  10.0.14393.0  Getting Started
opcservices.dll  10.0.14393.0  Native Code OPC Services Library
opencl.dll  1.2.11.0  OpenCL Client DLL
opengl32.dll  10.0.14393.0  OpenGL Client DLL
ortcengine.dll  6.0.8959.193  Microsoft Skype ORTC Engine
osbaseln.dll  10.0.14393.0  Service Reporting API
osksupport.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft On-Screen Keyboard Support Utilities
osuninst.dll  10.0.14393.0  Uninstall Interface
p2p.dll  10.0.14393.0  Peer-to-Peer Grouping
p2pgraph.dll  10.0.14393.0  Peer-to-Peer Graphing
p2pnetsh.dll  10.0.14393.0  Peer-to-Peer NetSh Helper
packager.dll  10.0.14393.0  Object Packager2
packagestateroaming.dll  10.0.14393.0  Package State Roaming
panmap.dll  10.0.14393.0  PANOSE(tm) Font Mapper
pautoenr.dll  10.0.14393.0  Auto Enrollment DLL
pcacli.dll  10.0.14393.0  Program Compatibility Assistant Client Module
pcaui.dll  10.0.14393.0  Program Compatibility Assistant User Interface Module
pcpksp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Platform Key Storage Provider for Platform Crypto Provider
pcptpm12.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Platform Crypto Provider for Trusted Platform Module 1.2
pcshellcommonproxystub.dll  10.0.14393.0  PCShell Common Proxy Stub
pcwum.dll  10.0.14393.0  Performance Counters for Windows Native DLL
pdh.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows Performance Data Helper DLL
pdhui.dll  10.0.14393.0  PDH UI
peerdist.dll  10.0.14393.0  BranchCache Client Library
peerdistsh.dll  10.0.14393.0  BranchCache Netshell Helper
perfctrs.dll  10.0.14393.0  Performance Counters
perfdisk.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Disk Performance Objects DLL
perfnet.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Network Service Performance Objects DLL
perfos.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows System Performance Objects DLL
perfproc.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows System Process Performance Objects DLL
perfts.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Remote Desktop Services Performance Objects
personax.dll  10.0.14393.0  PersonaX
phonecallhistoryapis.dll  10.0.14393.0  DLL for PhoneCallHistoryRT
phoneom.dll  10.0.14393.0  Phone Object Model
phoneplatformabstraction.dll  10.0.14393.0  Phone Platform Abstraction
phoneutil.dll  10.0.14393.187  Phone utilities
phoneutilres.dll  10.0.14393.187  Resource DLL for Phone utilities
photometadatahandler.dll  10.0.14393.0  Photo Metadata Handler
photowiz.dll  10.0.14393.0  Photo Printing Wizard
pid.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft PID
pidgenx.dll  10.0.14393.67  Pid Generation
pifmgr.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows NT PIF Manager Icon Resources Library
pimindexmaintenanceclient.dll  10.0.14393.0  Client dll for Pim Index Maintenance
pimstore.dll  10.0.14393.0  POOM
pku2u.dll  10.0.14393.0  Pku2u Security Package
pla.dll  10.0.14393.0  Performance Logs & Alerts
playlistfolder.dll  10.0.14393.0  Playlist Folder
playsndsrv.dll  10.0.14393.0  PlaySound Service
playtodevice.dll  10.0.14393.206  PLAYTODEVICE DLL
playtomanager.dll  10.0.14393.479  Microsoft Windows PlayTo Manager
playtomenu.dll  12.0.14393.0  Cast to Device Menu DLL
playtoreceiver.dll  10.0.14393.206  DLNA DMR DLL
playtostatusprovider.dll  10.0.14393.0  PlayTo Status Provider Dll
plce.dll    
plcommpro.dll  2.2.0.180  plcommpr Dynamic Link Library
plcomms.dll  6.0.0.5  plcomms Dynamic Link Library
plrscagent.dll  6.0.0.5  plrscage Application
plrscomm.dll  6.0.0.5  plrscomm Dynamic Link Library
pltcpcomm.dll  6.0.0.5  pltcpcom Dynamic Link Library
pngfilt.dll  11.0.14393.0  IE PNG plugin image decoder
pnrpnsp.dll  10.0.14393.0  PNRP Name Space Provider
policymanager.dll  10.0.14393.479  Policy Manager DLL
polstore.dll  10.0.14393.0  Policy Storage dll
portabledeviceapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Portable Device API Components
portabledeviceclassextension.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Portable Device Class Extension Component
portabledeviceconnectapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Portable Device Connection API Components
portabledevicestatus.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Windows Portable Device Status Provider
portabledevicesyncprovider.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Windows Portable Device Provider.
portabledevicetypes.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Portable Device (Parameter) Types Component
portabledevicewiacompat.dll  10.0.14393.0  PortableDevice WIA Compatibility Driver
posyncservices.dll  10.0.14393.187  Change Tracking
pots.dll  10.0.14393.0  Power Troubleshooter
powercpl.dll  10.0.14393.0  Power Options Control Panel
powrprof.dll  10.0.14393.0  Power Profile Helper DLL
presentationcffrasterizernative_v0300.dll  3.0.6920.8763  WinFX OpenType/CFF Rasterizer
presentationhostproxy.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Presentation Foundation Host Proxy
presentationnative_v0300.dll  3.0.6920.8763  PresentationNative_v0300.dll
prflbmsg.dll  10.0.14393.0  Perflib Event Messages
printconfig.dll  0.3.14393.0  PrintConfig User Interface
printdialogs.dll  10.0.14393.206  Microsoft® Windows® Operating System
printplatformconfig.dll  10.0.14393.0  Legacy Print Platform Adapter
printui.dll  10.0.14393.0  Printer Settings User Interface
prncache.dll  10.0.14393.0  Print UI Cache
prnfldr.dll  10.0.14393.0  prnfldr dll
prnntfy.dll  10.0.14393.0  prnntfy DLL
prntvpt.dll  10.0.14393.0  Print Ticket Services Module
profapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  User Profile Basic API
profext.dll  10.0.14393.0  profext
propsys.dll  7.0.14393.0  Microsoft Property System
provcore.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Wireless Provisioning Core
provsvc.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows HomeGroup
provthrd.dll  10.0.14393.0  WMI Provider Thread & Log Library
proximitycommon.dll  10.0.14393.0  Proximity Common Implementation
proximitycommonpal.dll  10.0.14393.0  Proximity Common PAL
proximityrtapipal.dll  10.0.14393.0  Proximity WinRT API PAL
prvdmofcomp.dll  10.0.14393.0  WMI
psapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Process Status Helper
pshed.dll  10.0.14393.0  Platform Specific Hardware Error Driver
psisdecd.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft SI/PSI parser for MPEG2 based networks.
psmodulediscoveryprovider.dll  10.0.14393.0  WMI
pstorec.dll  10.0.14393.0  Deprecated Protected Storage COM interfaces
puiapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  puiapi DLL
puiobj.dll  10.0.14393.0  PrintUI Objects DLL
pwrshplugin.dll  10.0.14393.206  pwrshplugin.dll
qasf.dll  12.0.14393.0  DirectShow ASF Support
qcap.dll  10.0.14393.0  DirectShow Runtime.
qdv.dll  10.0.14393.0  DirectShow Runtime.
qdvd.dll  10.0.14393.187  DirectShow DVD PlayBack Runtime.
qedit.dll  10.0.14393.0  DirectShow Editing.
qedwipes.dll  10.0.14393.0  DirectShow Editing SMPTE Wipes
quartz.dll  10.0.14393.0  DirectShow Runtime.
query.dll  10.0.14393.0  Content Index Utility DLL
qwave.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows NT
racengn.dll  10.0.14393.0  Reliability analysis metrics calculation engine
racpldlg.dll  10.0.14393.0  Remote Assistance Contact List
radardt.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Windows Resource Exhaustion Detector
radarrs.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Windows Resource Exhaustion Resolver
radcui.dll  10.0.14393.0  RemoteApp and Desktop Connection UI Component
rasadhlp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Remote Access AutoDial Helper
rasapi32.dll  10.0.14393.479  Remote Access API
raschap.dll  10.0.14393.0  Remote Access PPP CHAP
raschapext.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Extension library for raschap
rasctrs.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows NT Remote Access Perfmon Counter dll
rasdiag.dll  10.0.14393.0  RAS Diagnostics Helper Classes
rasdlg.dll  10.0.14393.0  Remote Access Common Dialog API
rasgcw.dll  10.0.14393.0  RAS Wizard Pages
rasman.dll  10.0.14393.0  Remote Access Connection Manager
rasmontr.dll  10.0.14393.0  RAS Monitor DLL
rasplap.dll  10.0.14393.0  RAS PLAP Credential Provider
rasppp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Remote Access PPP
rastapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Remote Access TAPI Compliance Layer
rastls.dll  10.0.14393.0  Remote Access PPP EAP-TLS
rastlsext.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Extension library for rastls
rdpcore.dll  10.0.14393.594  RDP Core DLL
rdpencom.dll  10.0.14393.693  RDPSRAPI COM Objects
rdpendp.dll  10.0.14393.0  RDP Audio Endpoint
rdpsaps.dll  10.0.14393.0  RDP Session Agent Proxy Stub
rdvgocl32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft RemoteFX OpenCL ICD
rdvgogl32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft RemoteFX OpenGL
rdvgu1132.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft RemoteFX Virtual GPU
rdvgumd32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft RemoteFX Virtual GPU
rdvvmtransport.dll  10.0.14393.0  RdvVmTransport EndPoints
reagent.dll  10.0.14393.206  Microsoft Windows Recovery Agent DLL
regapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Registry Configuration APIs
regctrl.dll  10.0.14393.0  RegCtrl
reinfo.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Windows Recovery Info DLL
remoteaudioendpoint.dll  10.0.14393.594  Remote Audio Endpoint
remotenaturallanguage.dll  1.0.0.1  Speech Client Communication To Backend Speech Services Library.
remotepg.dll  10.0.14393.0  Remote Sessions CPL Extension
removedevicecontexthandler.dll  10.0.14393.0  Devices & Printers Remove Device Context Menu Handler
removedeviceelevated.dll  10.0.14393.0  RemoveDeviceElevated Proxy Dll
resampledmo.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Media Resampler
resourcepolicyclient.dll  10.0.14393.0  Resource Policy Client
resutils.dll  10.0.14393.82  Microsoft Cluster Resource Utility DLL
rfxvmt.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft RemoteFX VM Transport
rgb9rast.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Windows® Operating System
riched20.dll  5.31.23.1231  Rich Text Edit Control, v3.1
riched32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Wrapper Dll for Richedit 1.0
rmclient.dll  10.0.14393.0  Resource Manager Client
rnr20.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Socket2 NameSpace DLL
rometadata.dll  4.6.1586.0  Microsoft MetaData Library
rpchttp.dll  10.0.14393.0  RPC HTTP DLL
rpcns4.dll  10.0.14393.0  Remote Procedure Call Name Service Client
rpcnsh.dll  10.0.14393.0  RPC Netshell Helper
rpcrt4.dll  10.0.14393.82  Remote Procedure Call Runtime
rpcrtremote.dll  10.0.14393.0  Remote RPC Extension
rsaenh.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
rscagent.dll    
rscomm.dll    
rscricon.dll  1.10.0.0  Realtek Card Reader Icon Dll
rshx32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Security Shell Extension
rstrtmgr.dll  10.0.14393.0  Restart Manager
rtffilt.dll  2008.0.14393.0  RTF Filter
rtm.dll  10.0.14393.0  Routing Table Manager
rtmcodecs.dll  6.0.8959.193  Microsoft Real Time Media Codec Library
rtmediaframe.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows Runtime MediaFrame DLL
rtmmvrortc.dll  6.0.8959.193  Microsoft Real Time Media ORTC Video Renderer
rtmpal.dll  6.0.8959.193  Microsoft Real Time Media Stack PAL for ORTC
rtmpltfm.dll  6.0.8959.193  Microsoft Real Time Media Stack
rtutils.dll  10.0.14393.0  Routing Utilities
rtworkq.dll  10.0.14393.479  Realtime WorkQueue DLL
rzaudiodll.dll  1.0.38.0  Razer Audio Manager
rzdevicedll.dll  1.0.38.0  Razer RzDeviceDLL Manager
rzdevinfo.dll  1.0.45.6  Razer RzDeviceDLL Manager
rzdisplaydll.dll  1.0.38.0  Razer RzDisplayDLL Manager
rzstats.ipc.dll  1.0.0.5  Razer Analytics IPC
rztouchdll.dll  1.0.38.0  Razer RzTouchDll
rzvad.dll  1.5.4.0  RzVAD
rzvirtualdev.dll  1.0.37.0  Razer RzVirtualDev Manager
samcli.dll  10.0.14393.0  Security Accounts Manager Client DLL
samlib.dll  10.0.14393.82  SAM Library DLL
sas.dll  10.0.14393.0  WinLogon Software SAS Library
sbe.dll  10.0.14393.0  DirectShow Stream Buffer Filter.
sbeio.dll  12.0.14393.0  Stream Buffer IO DLL
sberes.dll  10.0.14393.0  DirectShow Stream Buffer Filter Resouces.
scansetting.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Windows(TM) ScanSettings Profile and Scanning implementation
scarddlg.dll  10.0.14393.0  SCardDlg - Smart Card Common Dialog
scecli.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Security Configuration Editor Client Engine
scesrv.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Security Configuration Editor Engine
schannel.dll  10.0.14393.103  TLS / SSL Security Provider
schedcli.dll  10.0.14393.0  Scheduler Service Client DLL
scksp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Smart Card Key Storage Provider
scripto.dll  6.6.14393.0  Microsoft ScriptO
scrobj.dll  5.812.10240.16384  Windows ® Script Component Runtime
scrptadm.dll  10.0.14393.0  Script Adm Extension
scrrun.dll  5.812.10240.16384  Microsoft ® Script Runtime
sdiageng.dll  10.0.14393.0  Scripted Diagnostics Execution Engine
sdiagprv.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Scripted Diagnostic Provider API
sdohlp.dll  10.0.14393.0  NPS SDO Helper Component
search.protocolhandler.mapi2.dll  7.0.14393.206  Microsoft Search Protocol Handler for MAPI2
searchfolder.dll  10.0.14393.479  SearchFolder
sechost.dll  10.0.14393.0  Host for SCM/SDDL/LSA Lookup APIs
secproc.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Rights Management Desktop Security Processor
secproc_isv.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Rights Management Desktop Security Processor
secproc_ssp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Rights Management Services Server Security Processor
secproc_ssp_isv.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Rights Management Services Server Security Processor (Pre-production)
secur32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Security Support Provider Interface
security.dll  10.0.14393.0  Security Support Provider Interface
sendmail.dll  10.0.14393.479  Send Mail
sensapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  SENS Connectivity API DLL
sensorsapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Sensor API
sensorscpl.dll  10.0.14393.0  Open Location and Other Sensors
sensorsnativeapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Sensors Native API
sensorsnativeapi.v2.dll  10.0.14393.0  Sensors Native API (V2 stack)
sensorsutilsv2.dll  10.0.14393.0  Sensors v2 Utilities DLL
serialui.dll  10.0.14393.0  Serial Port Property Pages
serwvdrv.dll  10.0.14393.0  Unimodem Serial Wave driver
sessenv.dll  10.0.14393.206  Remote Desktop Configuration service
settingmonitor.dll  10.0.14393.0  Setting Synchronization Change Monitor
settingsync.dll  10.0.14393.187  Setting Synchronization
settingsynccore.dll  10.0.14393.693  Setting Synchronization Core
settingsyncpolicy.dll  10.0.14393.82  SettingSync Policy
setupapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Setup API
setupcln.dll  10.0.14393.0  Setup Files Cleanup
sfc.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows File Protection
sfc_os.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows File Protection
shacct.dll  10.0.14393.0  Shell Accounts Classes
shacctprofile.dll  10.0.14393.0  Shell Accounts Profile Classes
sharehost.dll  10.0.14393.576  ShareHost
shcore.dll  10.0.14393.0  SHCORE
shdocvw.dll  10.0.14393.0  Shell Doc Object and Control Library
shell32.dll  10.0.14393.693  Windows Shell Common Dll
shellcommoncommonproxystub.dll  10.0.14393.0  ShellCommon Common Proxy Stub
shellstyle.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Shell Style Resource Dll
shfolder.dll  10.0.14393.0  Shell Folder Service
shgina.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Shell User Logon
shimeng.dll  10.0.14393.0  Shim Engine DLL
shimgvw.dll  10.0.14393.0  Photo Gallery Viewer
shlwapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Shell Light-weight Utility Library
shpafact.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Shell LUA/PA Elevation Factory Dll
shsetup.dll  10.0.14393.0  Shell setup helper
shsvcs.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Shell Services Dll
shunimpl.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Shell Obsolete APIs
shutdownext.dll  10.0.14393.0  Shutdown Graphic User Interface
shwebsvc.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Shell Web Services
signdrv.dll  10.0.14393.0  WMI provider for Signed Drivers
simauth.dll  10.0.14393.0  EAP SIM run-time dll
simcfg.dll  10.0.14393.0  EAP SIM config dll
slc.dll  10.0.14393.67  Software Licensing Client Dll
slcext.dll  10.0.14393.67  Software Licensing Client Extension Dll
slwga.dll  10.0.14393.0  Software Licensing WGA API
smartcardcredentialprovider.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Smartcard Credential Provider
smartscreenps.dll  10.0.14393.0  SmartScreenPS
smbhelperclass.dll  1.0.0.1  SMB (File Sharing) Helper Class for Network Diagnostic Framework
smphost.dll  10.0.14393.82  Storage Management Provider (SMP) host service
sndvolsso.dll  10.0.14393.351  SCA Volume
snmpapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  SNMP Utility Library
socialapis.dll  10.0.14393.0  DLL for SocialRT
softkbd.dll  10.0.14393.0  Soft Keyboard Server and Tip
softpub.dll  10.0.14393.0  Softpub Forwarder DLL
sortserver2003compat.dll  10.0.14393.0  Sort Version Server 2003
sortwindows61.dll  10.0.14393.0  SortWindows61 Dll
sortwindows6compat.dll  10.0.14393.0  Sort Version Windows 6.0
spbcd.dll  10.0.14393.0  BCD Sysprep Plugin
spfileq.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows SPFILEQ
spinf.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows SPINF
spnet.dll  10.0.14393.0  Net Sysprep Plugin
spopk.dll  10.0.14393.0  OPK Sysprep Plugin
spp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Windows Shared Protection Point Library
sppc.dll  10.0.14393.67  Software Licensing Client Dll
sppcext.dll  10.0.14393.206  Software Protection Platform Client Extension Dll
sppinst.dll  10.0.14393.0  SPP CMI Installer Plug-in DLL
sppwmi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Software Protection Platform WMI provider
spwinsat.dll  10.0.14393.0  WinSAT Sysprep Plugin
spwizeng.dll  10.0.14393.0  Setup Wizard Framework
spwizimg.dll  10.0.14393.0  Setup Wizard Framework Resources
spwizres.dll  10.0.14393.0  Setup Wizard Framework Resources
spwmp.dll  12.0.14393.82  Windows Media Player System Preparation DLL
sqlcecompact40.dll  4.0.8275.1  Database Repair Tool (32-bit)
sqlceoledb40.dll  4.0.14393.1  OLEDB Provider (32-bit)
sqlceqp40.dll  4.0.14393.1  Query Processor (32-bit)
sqlcese40.dll  4.0.14393.1  Storage Engine (32-bit)
sqloledb.dll  10.0.14393.0  OLE DB Provider for SQL Server
sqlsrv32.dll  10.0.14393.0  SQL Server ODBC Driver
sqlunirl.dll  2000.80.2039.0  String Function .DLL for SQL Enterprise Components
sqlwid.dll  2000.80.2039.0  Unicode Function .DLL for SQL Enterprise Components
sqlwoa.dll  2000.80.2040.0  Unicode/ANSI Function .DLL for SQL Enterprise Components
sqlxmlx.dll  10.0.14393.0  XML extensions for SQL Server
sqmapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  SQM Client
srchadmin.dll  7.0.14393.0  Indexing Options
srclient.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Windows System Restore Client Library
srm.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® File Server Resource Manager Common Library
srm_ps.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® FSRM internal proxy/stub
srmclient.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® File Server Resource Management Client Extensions
srmlib.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft (R) File Server Resource Management Interop Assembly
srmscan.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® File Server Storage Reports Scan Engine
srmshell.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® File Server Resource Management Shell Extension
srmstormod.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® File Server Resource Management Office Parser
srmtrace.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® File Server Resource Management Tracing Library
srpapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  SRP APIs Dll
srpuxnativesnapin.dll  10.0.14393.0  Application Control Policies Group Policy Editor Extension
srumapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  System Resource Usage Monitor API
srumsvc.dll  10.0.14393.0  System Resource Usage Monitor Service
srvcli.dll  10.0.14393.0  Server Service Client DLL
sscore.dll  10.0.14393.0  Server Service Core DLL
ssdpapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  SSDP Client API DLL
sspicli.dll  10.0.14393.576  Security Support Provider Interface
ssshim.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Componentization Platform Servicing API
startupscan.dll  10.0.14393.0  Startup scan task DLL
staterepository.core.dll  10.0.14393.0  StateRepository Core
stclient.dll  2001.12.10941.16384  COM+ Configuration Catalog Client
sti.dll  10.0.14393.0  Still Image Devices client DLL
stobject.dll  10.0.14393.479  Systray shell service object
storage.dll  3.10.0.103  Windows Win16 Application Launcher
storagecontexthandler.dll  10.0.14393.0  Device Center Storage Context Menu Handler
storagewmi.dll  10.0.14393.206  WMI Provider for Storage Management
storagewmi_passthru.dll  10.0.14393.103  WMI PassThru Provider for Storage Management
storeagent.dll  10.0.14393.693  StoreAgent
storprop.dll  10.0.14393.0  Property Pages for Storage Devices
structuredquery.dll  7.0.14393.0  Structured Query
sud.dll  10.0.14393.447  SUD Control Panel
sxproxy.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Windows System Protection Proxy Library
sxs.dll  10.0.14393.0  Fusion 2.5
sxshared.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Windows SX Shared Library
sxsstore.dll  10.0.14393.0  Sxs Store DLL
synccenter.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Sync Center
synccontroller.dll  10.0.14393.0  SyncController for managing sync of mail, contacts, calendar
synceng.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Briefcase Engine
synchostps.dll  10.0.14393.0  Proxystub for sync host
syncinfrastructure.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Windows Sync Infrastructure.
syncinfrastructureps.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Windows sync infrastructure proxy stub.
syncproxy.dll  10.0.14393.0  SyncProxy for RPC communication about sync of mail, contacts, calendar
syncreg.dll  2007.94.14393.0  Microsoft Synchronization Framework Registration
syncres.dll  10.0.14393.0  ActiveSync Resources
syncsettings.dll  10.0.14393.693  Sync Settings
syncui.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Briefcase
syncutil.dll  10.0.14393.0  Sync utilities for mail, contacts, calendar
syssetup.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows NT System Setup
systemcpl.dll  10.0.14393.351  My System CPL
systemeventsbrokerclient.dll  10.0.14393.0  system Events Broker Client Library
t2embed.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft T2Embed Font Embedding
tapi3.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft TAPI3
tapi32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Windows(TM) Telephony API Client DLL
tapimigplugin.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Windows(TM) TAPI Migration Plugin Dll
tapiperf.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Windows(TM) Telephony Performance Monitor
tapisrv.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Windows(TM) Telephony Server
tapisysprep.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Windows(TM) Telephony Sysprep Work
tapiui.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Windows(TM) Telephony API UI DLL
taskcomp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Task Scheduler Backward Compatibility Plug-in
taskschd.dll  10.0.14393.0  Task Scheduler COM API
taskschdps.dll  10.0.14393.0  Task Scheduler Interfaces Proxy
tbauth.dll  10.0.14393.0  TBAuth protocol handler
tbs.dll  10.0.14393.0  TBS
tcpcomm.dll    
tcpipcfg.dll  10.0.14393.82  Network Configuration Objects
tcpmib.dll  10.0.14393.0  Standard TCP/IP Port Monitor Helper DLL
tcpmonui.dll  10.0.14393.0  Standard TCP/IP Port Monitor UI DLL
tdh.dll  10.0.14393.206  Event Trace Helper Library
tempsignedlicenseexchangetask.dll  10.0.14393.206  TempSignedLicenseExchangeTask Task
termmgr.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft TAPI3 Terminal Manager
tetheringclient.dll  10.0.14393.0  Tethering Client
textinputframework.dll  10.0.14393.576  "TextInputFramework.DYNLINK"
themecpl.dll  10.0.14393.447  Personalization CPL
themeui.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Theme API
threadpoolwinrt.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows WinRT Threadpool
thumbcache.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Thumbnail Cache
timedatemuicallback.dll  10.0.14393.0  Time Date Control UI Language Change plugin
tlscsp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Remote Desktop Services Cryptographic Utility
tokenbinding.dll  10.0.14393.0  Token Binding Protocol
tokenbroker.dll  10.0.14393.206  Token Broker
tokenbrokerui.dll  10.0.14393.0  Token Broker UI
tpmcertresources.dll  10.0.14393.0  TpmCertResources
tpmcompc.dll  10.0.14393.0  Computer Chooser Dialog
tpmcoreprovisioning.dll  10.0.14393.206  TPM Core Provisioning Library
tquery.dll  7.0.14393.206  Microsoft Tripoli Query
traffic.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Traffic Control 1.0 DLL
tsbyuv.dll  10.0.14393.0  Toshiba Video Codec
tsgqec.dll  10.0.14393.0  RD Gateway QEC
tsmf.dll  10.0.14393.206  RDP MF Plugin
tspkg.dll  10.0.14393.447  Web Service Security Package
tsworkspace.dll  10.0.14393.0  RemoteApp and Desktop Connection Component
tvratings.dll  10.0.14393.0  Module for managing TV ratings
twext.dll  10.0.14393.0  Previous Versions property page
twinapi.appcore.dll  10.0.14393.206  twinapi.appcore
twinapi.dll  10.0.14393.447  twinapi
twinui.appcore.dll  10.0.14393.206  TWINUI.APPCORE
twinui.dll  10.0.14393.693  TWINUI
txflog.dll  2001.12.10941.16384  COM+
txfw32.dll  10.0.14393.0  TxF Win32 DLL
typelib.dll  3.10.0.103  Windows Win16 Application Launcher
tzres.dll  10.0.14393.187  Time Zones resource DLL
ucmhc.dll  10.0.14393.0  UCM Helper Class
ucrtbase.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® C Runtime Library
udhisapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  UPnP Device Host ISAPI Extension
uexfat.dll  10.0.14393.0  eXfat Utility DLL
ufat.dll  10.0.14393.0  FAT Utility DLL
uianimation.dll  10.0.14393.447  Windows Animation Manager
uiautomationcore.dll  7.2.14393.479  Microsoft UI Automation Core
uicom.dll  10.0.14393.0  Add/Remove Modems
uireng.dll  10.0.14393.0  UI Recording Engine Library
uiribbon.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Ribbon Framework
uiribbonres.dll  10.0.14393.321  Windows Ribbon Framework Resources
ulib.dll  10.0.14393.0  File Utilities Support DLL
umdmxfrm.dll  10.0.14393.0  Unimodem Tranform Module
unenrollhook.dll  10.0.14393.0  unenrollhook DLL
unimdmat.dll  10.0.14393.0  Unimodem Service Provider AT Mini Driver
uniplat.dll  10.0.14393.0  Unimodem AT Mini Driver Platform Driver for Windows NT
unistore.dll  10.0.14393.0  Unified Store
untfs.dll  10.0.14393.0  NTFS Utility DLL
updatepolicy.dll  10.0.14393.594  Update Policy Reader
upnp.dll  10.0.14393.0  UPnP Control Point API
upnphost.dll  10.0.14393.0  UPnP Device Host
urefs.dll  10.0.14393.206  NTFS Utility DLL
urefsv1.dll  10.0.14393.0  NTFS Utility DLL
ureg.dll  10.0.14393.0  Registry Utility DLL
url.dll  11.0.14393.0  Internet Shortcut Shell Extension DLL
urlmon.dll  11.0.14393.479  OLE32 Extensions for Win32
usbceip.dll  10.0.14393.0  USBCEIP Task
usbcomm.dll    
usbperf.dll  10.0.14393.0  USB Performance Objects DLL
usbstd.dll    
usbui.dll  10.0.14393.0  USB UI Dll
user32.dll  10.0.14393.576  Multi-User Windows USER API Client DLL
useraccountcontrolsettings.dll  10.0.14393.0  UserAccountControlSettings
usercpl.dll  10.0.14393.479  User control panel
userdataaccessres.dll  10.0.14393.187  Resource DLL for the UserDataAccess stack
userdataaccountapis.dll  10.0.14393.321  DLL for UserDataAccountsRT
userdatalanguageutil.dll  10.0.14393.187  Language-related helper functions for user data
userdataplatformhelperutil.dll  10.0.14393.187  Platform Utilities for data access
userdatatimeutil.dll  10.0.14393.206  Time-related helper functions for user data
userdatatypehelperutil.dll  10.0.14393.187  Type Utilities for data access
userdeviceregistration.dll  10.0.14393.321  AAD User Device Registration WinRT
userdeviceregistration.ngc.dll  10.0.14393.321  AD/AAD User Device Registration WinRT
userenv.dll  10.0.14393.0  Userenv
userinitext.dll  10.0.14393.0  UserInit Utility Extension DLL
userlanguageprofilecallback.dll  10.0.14393.0  MUI Callback for User Language profile changed
userlanguagescpl.dll  10.0.14393.0  My Languages Configuration Control Panel
usermgrcli.dll  10.0.14393.0  UserMgr API DLL
usermgrproxy.dll  10.0.14393.321  UserMgrProxy
usoapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Update Session Orchestrator API
usp10.dll  10.0.14393.0  Uniscribe Unicode script processor
ustprov.dll  10.0.14393.0  User State WMI Provider
utildll.dll  10.0.14393.0  WinStation utility support DLL
uudf.dll  10.0.14393.0  UDF Utility DLL
uxinit.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows User Experience Session Initialization Dll
uxlib.dll  10.0.14393.0  Setup Wizard Framework
uxlibres.dll  10.0.14393.0  UXLib Resources
uxtheme.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft UxTheme Library
van.dll  10.0.14393.0  View Available Networks
vault.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows vault Control Panel
vaultcli.dll  10.0.14393.0  Credential Vault Client Library
vbajet32.dll  6.0.1.9431  Visual Basic for Applications Development Environment - Expression Service Loader
vbscript.dll  5.812.10240.16384  Microsoft ® VBScript
vcamp110.dll  11.0.51106.1  Microsoft® C++ AMP Runtime
vcamp120.dll  12.0.21005.1  Microsoft® C++ AMP Runtime
vcamp140.dll  14.0.23918.0  Microsoft® C++ AMP Runtime
vcardparser.dll  10.0.14393.187  Supports the parsing of VCard and ICal formatted data
vccorlib110.dll  11.0.51106.1  Microsoft ® VC WinRT core library
vccorlib120.dll  12.0.21005.1  Microsoft ® VC WinRT core library
vccorlib140.dll  14.0.23919.0  Microsoft ® VC WinRT core library
vcomp100.dll  10.0.40219.325  Microsoft® C/C++ OpenMP Runtime
vcomp110.dll  11.0.51106.1  Microsoft® C/C++ OpenMP Runtime
vcomp120.dll  12.0.21005.1  Microsoft® C/C++ OpenMP Runtime
vcomp140.dll  14.0.23918.0  Microsoft® C/C++ OpenMP Runtime
vcruntime140.dll  14.0.23919.0  Microsoft® C Runtime Library
vdmdbg.dll  10.0.14393.0  VDMDBG.DLL
vds_ps.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Virtual Disk Service proxy/stub
vedatalayerhelpers.dll  10.0.14393.0  Visual Element DataLayer Helpers
veeventdispatcher.dll  10.0.14393.0  Visual Element Event dispatcher
verifier.dll  10.0.14393.0  Standard application verifier provider dll
version.dll  10.0.14393.0  Version Checking and File Installation Libraries
vfwwdm32.dll  10.0.14393.0  VfW MM Driver for WDM Video Capture Devices
vidreszr.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Media Resizer
virtdisk.dll  10.0.14393.0  Virtual Disk API DLL
voiceactivationmanager.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Voice Activation Manager
voiprt.dll  10.0.14393.0  Voip Runtime
vpnikeapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  VPN IKE API's
vscmgrps.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Virtual Smart Card Manager Proxy/Stub
vsocklib.dll  9.8.8.0  VSockets Library
vss_ps.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Volume Shadow Copy Service proxy/stub
vssapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Volume Shadow Copy Requestor/Writer Services API DLL
vsstrace.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Volume Shadow Copy Service Tracing Library
vulkan-1.dll  1.0.26.0  Vulkan Loader
vulkan-1-1-0-26-0.dll  1.0.26.0  Vulkan Loader
w32topl.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows NT Topology Maintenance Tool
wab32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft (R) Contacts DLL
wab32res.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft (R) Contacts DLL
wabsyncprovider.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Windows Contacts Sync Provider
walletbackgroundserviceproxy.dll  10.0.14393.0  Wallet Background Proxy
walletproxy.dll  10.0.14393.0  Wallet proxy
wavemsp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Wave MSP
wbemcomn.dll  10.0.14393.0  WMI
wcmapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Connection Manager Client API
wcnapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Connect Now - API Helper DLL
wcnwiz.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Connect Now Wizards
wdc.dll  10.0.14393.0  Performance Monitor
wdi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Diagnostic Infrastructure
wdigest.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Digest Access
wdscore.dll  10.0.14393.0  Panther Engine Module
webcamui.dll  10.0.14393.187  Microsoft® Windows® Operating System
webcheck.dll  11.0.14393.0  Web Site Monitor
webclnt.dll  10.0.14393.0  Web DAV Service DLL
webio.dll  10.0.14393.206  Web Transfer Protocols API
webservices.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Web Services Runtime
websocket.dll  10.0.14393.0  Web Socket API
wecapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Event Collector Configuration API
wer.dll  10.0.14393.447  Windows Error Reporting DLL
werdiagcontroller.dll  10.0.14393.0  WER Diagnostic Controller
weretw.dll  10.0.14393.447  WERETW.DLL
werui.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Error Reporting UI DLL
wevtapi.dll  10.0.14393.5  Eventing Consumption and Configuration API
wevtfwd.dll  10.0.14393.0  WS-Management Event Forwarding Plug-in
wfapigp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Firewall GPO Helper dll
wfdprov.dll  10.0.14393.82  Private WPS provisioning API DLL for Wi-Fi Direct
wfhc.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Firewall Helper Class
whhelper.dll  10.0.14393.0  Net shell helper DLL for winHttp
wiaaut.dll  10.0.14393.0  WIA Automation Layer
wiadefui.dll  10.0.14393.0  WIA Scanner Default UI
wiadss.dll  10.0.14393.0  WIA TWAIN compatibility layer
wiascanprofiles.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Windows ScanProfiles
wiashext.dll  10.0.14393.0  Imaging Devices Shell Folder UI
wiatrace.dll  10.0.14393.0  WIA Tracing
wifidisplay.dll  10.0.14393.0  Wi-Fi Display DLL
wimgapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Imaging Library
win32u.dll  10.0.14393.51  Win32u
winbio.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Biometrics Client API
winbioext.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Biometrics Client Extension API
winbrand.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Branding Resources
wincorlib.dll  10.0.14393.576  Microsoft Windows ® WinRT core library
wincredprovider.dll  10.0.14393.0  wincredprovider DLL
wincredui.dll  10.0.14393.0  Credential Manager User Internal Interface
windows.accountscontrol.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows Accounts Control
windows.applicationmodel.background.systemeventsbroker.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows Background System Events Broker API Server
windows.applicationmodel.background.timebroker.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Background Time Broker API Server
windows.applicationmodel.core.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows Application Model Core API
windows.applicationmodel.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows ApplicationModel API Server
windows.applicationmodel.lockscreen.dll  10.0.14393.693  Windows Lock Application Framework DLL
windows.applicationmodel.store.dll  10.0.14393.479  Windows Store Runtime DLL
windows.applicationmodel.store.testingframework.dll  10.0.14393.479  Windows Store Testing Framework Runtime DLL
windows.applicationmodel.wallet.dll  10.0.14393.321  Windows ApplicationModel Wallet Runtime DLL
windows.cortana.proxystub.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows.Cortana.ProxyStub
windows.data.pdf.dll  10.0.14393.351  PDF WinRT APIs
windows.devices.alljoyn.dll  10.0.14393.321  Windows.Devices.AllJoyn DLL
windows.devices.background.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows.Devices.Background
windows.devices.background.ps.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows.Devices.Background Interface Proxy
windows.devices.bluetooth.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows.Devices.Bluetooth DLL
windows.devices.custom.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows.Devices.Custom
windows.devices.custom.ps.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows.Devices.Custom Interface Proxy
windows.devices.enumeration.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows.Devices.Enumeration
windows.devices.humaninterfacedevice.dll  10.0.14393.447  Windows.Devices.HumanInterfaceDevice DLL
windows.devices.lights.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Runtime Lights DLL
windows.devices.lowlevel.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows.Devices.LowLevel DLL
windows.devices.midi.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows Runtime MIDI Device server DLL
windows.devices.perception.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows Devices Perception API
windows.devices.picker.dll  10.0.14393.206  Device Picker
windows.devices.pointofservice.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows Runtime PointOfService DLL
windows.devices.portable.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Runtime Portable Devices DLL
windows.devices.printers.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Runtime Devices Printers DLL
windows.devices.printers.extensions.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows.Devices.Printers.Extensions
windows.devices.radios.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows.Devices.Radios DLL
windows.devices.scanners.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows Runtime Devices Scanners DLL
windows.devices.sensors.dll  10.0.14393.321  Windows Runtime Sensors DLL
windows.devices.serialcommunication.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows.Devices.SerialCommunication DLL
windows.devices.smartcards.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows Runtime Smart Card API DLL
windows.devices.usb.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows Runtime Usb DLL
windows.devices.wifi.dll  10.0.14393.351  Windows.Devices.WiFi DLL
windows.devices.wifidirect.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows.Devices.WiFiDirect DLL
windows.energy.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows Energy Runtime DLL
windows.gaming.input.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows Gaming Input API
windows.gaming.preview.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Gaming API Preview
windows.gaming.ui.gamebar.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Gaming UI API GameBar
windows.gaming.xboxlive.storage.dll  10.0.14393.206  Xbox Connected Storage WinRT implementation
windows.globalization.dll  10.0.14393.447  Windows Globalization
windows.globalization.fontgroups.dll  10.0.14393.0  Fonts Mapping API
windows.globalization.phonenumberformatting.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Libphonenumber OSS component
windows.graphics.dll  10.0.14393.0  WinRT Windows Graphics DLL
windows.graphics.printing.3d.dll  10.0.14393.206  Microsoft Windows Printing Support
windows.graphics.printing.dll  10.0.14393.206  Microsoft Windows Printing Support
windows.internal.bluetooth.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows.Internal.Bluetooth DLL
windows.internal.management.dll  10.0.14393.479  Windows Managent Service DLL
windows.internal.ui.logon.proxystub.dll  10.0.14393.594  Logon User Experience Proxy Stub
windows.management.lockdown.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Runtime Lockdown Management DLL
windows.management.workplace.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Runtime MdmPolicy DLL
windows.management.workplace.workplacesettings.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Runtime WorkplaceSettings DLL
windows.media.audio.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows Runtime Window Media Audio server DLL
windows.media.backgroundmediaplayback.dll  10.0.14393.351  Windows Media BackgroundMediaPlayback DLL
windows.media.devices.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Runtime media device server DLL
windows.media.dll  10.0.14393.693  Windows Media Runtime DLL
windows.media.editing.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows Media Editing DLL
windows.media.faceanalysis.dll  10.0.14393.206  Microsoft (R) Face Detection DLL
windows.media.import.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows Photo Import API (WinRT/COM)
windows.media.mediacontrol.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Runtime MediaControl server DLL
windows.media.ocr.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows OCR Runtime DLL
windows.media.playback.backgroundmediaplayer.dll  10.0.14393.351  Windows Media Playback BackgroundMediaPlayer DLL
windows.media.playback.mediaplayer.dll  10.0.14393.351  Windows Media Playback MediaPlayer DLL
windows.media.playback.proxystub.dll  10.0.14393.0  BackgroundMediaPlayer Proxy Stub DLL
windows.media.protection.playready.dll  10.0.14393.576  Microsoft PlayReady Client Framework Dll
windows.media.speech.dll  10.0.14393.351  Windows Speech Runtime DLL
windows.media.speech.uxres.dll  10.0.14393.67  Windows Media Speech UX Resources DLL
windows.media.streaming.dll  10.0.14393.187  DLNA DLL
windows.media.streaming.ps.dll  10.0.14393.0  DLNA Proxy-Stub DLL
windows.networking.backgroundtransfer.backgroundmanagerpolicy.dll  10.0.14393.479  Background Transfer Background Manager Policy DLL
windows.networking.backgroundtransfer.dll  10.0.14393.321  Windows.Networking.BackgroundTransfer DLL
windows.networking.connectivity.dll  10.0.14393.351  Windows Networking Connectivity Runtime DLL
windows.networking.dll  10.0.14393.351  Windows.Networking DLL
windows.networking.hostname.dll  10.0.14393.321  Windows.Networking.HostName DLL
windows.networking.networkoperators.hotspotauthentication.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Windows Hotspot Authentication API
windows.networking.proximity.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Runtime Proximity API DLL
windows.networking.servicediscovery.dnssd.dll  10.0.14393.321  Windows.Networking.ServiceDiscovery.Dnssd DLL
windows.networking.sockets.pushenabledapplication.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows.Networking.Sockets.PushEnabledApplication DLL
windows.networking.xboxlive.proxystub.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows.Networking.XboxLive Proxy Stub Dll
windows.perception.stub.dll    
windows.security.authentication.identity.provider.dll  10.0.14393.206  Secondary Factor Authentication Windows Runtime DLL
windows.security.authentication.onlineid.dll  10.0.14393.447  Windows Runtime OnlineId Authentication DLL
windows.security.authentication.web.core.dll  10.0.14393.0  Token Broker WinRT API
windows.security.credentials.ui.credentialpicker.dll  10.0.14393.0  WinRT Credential Picker Server
windows.security.credentials.ui.userconsentverifier.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows User Consent Verifier API
windows.shell.search.urihandler.dll  10.0.14393.479  Windows Search URI Handler
windows.shell.servicehostbuilder.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows.Shell.ServiceHostBuilder
windows.staterepository.dll  10.0.14393.479  Windows StateRepository API Server
windows.staterepositorybroker.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows StateRepository API Broker
windows.staterepositoryclient.dll  10.0.14393.479  Windows StateRepository API Broker
windows.storage.applicationdata.dll  10.0.14393.693  Windows Application Data API Server
windows.storage.compression.dll  5.0.1.1  WinRT Compression
windows.storage.dll  10.0.14393.479  Microsoft WinRT Storage API
windows.storage.search.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows.Storage.Search
windows.system.diagnostics.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows System Diagnostics DLL
windows.system.launcher.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows.System.Launcher
windows.system.profile.hardwareid.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows System Profile HardwareId DLL
windows.system.profile.platformdiagnosticsandusagedatasettings.dll  10.0.14393.0  Platform Diagnostics and Usage Settings DLL
windows.system.profile.retailinfo.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows.System.Profile.RetailInfo Runtime DLL
windows.system.profile.systemid.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows System Profile SystemId DLL
windows.system.profile.systemmanufacturers.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows.System.Profile.SystemManufacturers
windows.system.remotedesktop.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows System RemoteDesktop Runtime DLL
windows.system.systemmanagement.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Runtime SystemManagement DLL
windows.system.userdeviceassociation.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows System User Device Association API
windows.ui.biofeedback.dll  10.0.14393.693  Bio Feedback User Experience
windows.ui.blockedshutdown.dll  10.0.14393.693  Blocked Shutdown User Experience
windows.ui.core.textinput.dll  10.0.14393.576  Windows.UI.Core.TextInput dll
windows.ui.cred.dll  10.0.14393.693  Credential Prompt User Experience
windows.ui.creddialogcontroller.dll  10.0.14393.594  Credential UX Dialog Controller
windows.ui.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows Runtime UI Foundation DLL
windows.ui.immersive.dll  10.0.14393.479  WINDOWS.UI.IMMERSIVE
windows.ui.input.inking.dll  10.0.14393.206  WinRT Windows Inking DLL
windows.ui.logon.dll  10.0.14393.693  Logon User Experience
windows.ui.search.dll  10.0.14393.479  Windows.UI.Search
windows.ui.xaml.dll  10.0.14393.594  Windows.UI.Xaml dll
windows.ui.xaml.inkcontrols.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows UI XAML InkControls API
windows.ui.xaml.maps.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows UI XAML Maps API
windows.ui.xaml.phone.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows UI XAML Phone API
windows.ui.xaml.resources.dll  10.0.14393.594  Windows.UI.Xaml.Resources dll
windows.ui.xamlhost.dll  10.0.14393.0  XAML Host
windows.web.diagnostics.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows.Web.Diagnostics
windows.web.dll  10.0.14393.321  Web Client DLL
windows.web.http.dll  10.0.14393.321  Windows.Web.Http DLL
windowscodecs.dll  10.0.14393.576  Microsoft Windows Codecs Library
windowscodecsext.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Windows Codecs Extended Library
windowscodecsraw.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Camera Codec Pack
windowslivelogin.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Account Login Helper
winfax.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Fax API Support DLL
winhttp.dll  10.0.14393.351  Windows HTTP Services
winhttpcom.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows COM interface for WinHttp
wininet.dll  11.0.14393.479  Internet Extensions for Win32
wininetlui.dll  10.0.14393.447  Provides legacy UI for wininet
wininitext.dll  10.0.14393.0  WinInit Utility Extension DLL
winipcfile.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Active Directory Rights Management Services File API
winipcsecproc.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Active Directory Rights Management Services Desktop Security Processor
winipsec.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows IPsec SPD Client DLL
winlangdb.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Bcp47 Language Database
winmde.dll  10.0.14393.594  WinMDE DLL
winmm.dll  10.0.14393.0  MCI API DLL
winmmbase.dll  10.0.14393.0  Base Multimedia Extension API DLL
winmsipc.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Active Directory Rights Management Services Client
winmsoirmprotector.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Office file format IRM Protector
winnlsres.dll  10.0.14393.0  NLSBuild resource DLL
winnsi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Network Store Information RPC interface
winopcirmprotector.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Office file format IRM Protector
winrnr.dll  10.0.14393.0  LDAP RnR Provider DLL
winrscmd.dll  10.0.14393.0  remtsvc
winrsmgr.dll  10.0.14393.0  WSMan Shell API
winrssrv.dll  10.0.14393.0  winrssrv
winrttracing.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows Diagnostics Tracing
winsatapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows System Assessment Tool API
winscard.dll  10.0.14393.594  Microsoft Smart Card API
winshfhc.dll  10.0.14393.0  File Risk Estimation
winsku.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows SKU Library
winsockhc.dll  10.0.14393.0  Winsock Network Diagnostic Helper Class
winsqlite3.dll  3.12.2.0  SQLite is a software library that implements a self-contained, serverless, zero-configuration, transactional SQL database engine.
winsrpc.dll  10.0.14393.0  WINS RPC LIBRARY
winsta.dll  10.0.14393.0  Winstation Library
winsync.dll  2007.94.14393.0  Synchronization Framework
winsyncmetastore.dll  2007.94.14393.0  Windows Synchronization Metadata Store
winsyncproviders.dll  2007.94.14393.0  Windows Synchronization Provider Framework
wintrust.dll  10.0.14393.351  Microsoft Trust Verification APIs
wintypes.dll  10.0.14393.576  Windows Base Types DLL
winusb.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows USB Driver User Library
wisp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Pen and Touch Input Component
wkscli.dll  10.0.14393.0  Workstation Service Client DLL
wkspbrokerax.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Workspace Broker ActiveX Control
wksprtps.dll  10.0.14393.0  WorkspaceRuntime ProxyStub DLL
wlanapi.dll  10.0.14393.82  Windows WLAN AutoConfig Client Side API DLL
wlancfg.dll  10.0.14393.206  Wlan Netsh Helper DLL
wlanconn.dll  10.0.14393.0  Dot11 Connection Flows
wlandlg.dll  10.0.14393.0  Wireless Lan Dialog Wizards
wlangpui.dll  10.0.14393.0  Wireless Network Policy Management Snap-in
wlanhlp.dll  10.0.14393.82  Windows Wireless LAN 802.11 Client Side Helper API
wlanmm.dll  10.0.14393.0  Dot11 Media and AdHoc Managers
wlanpref.dll  10.0.14393.0  Wireless Preferred Networks
wlanui.dll  10.0.14393.0  Wireless Profile UI
wlanutil.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Wireless LAN 802.11 Utility DLL
wldap32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Win32 LDAP API DLL
wldp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Lockdown Policy
wlgpclnt.dll  10.0.14393.0  802.11 Group Policy Client
wlidcli.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Account Dynamic Link Library
wlidcredprov.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Account Credential Provider
wlidfdp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Account Function Discovery Provider
wlidnsp.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Account Namespace Provider
wlidprov.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Account Provider
wlidres.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft® Windows Live ID Resource
wls0wndh.dll  10.0.14393.0  Session0 Viewer Window Hook DLL
wmadmod.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Media Audio Decoder
wmadmoe.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Media Audio 10 Encoder/Transcoder
wmasf.dll  12.0.14393.0  Windows Media ASF DLL
wmcodecdspps.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Media CodecDSP Proxy Stub Dll
wmdmlog.dll  12.0.14393.0  Windows Media Device Manager Logger
wmdmps.dll  12.0.14393.0  Windows Media Device Manager Proxy Stub
wmdrmsdk.dll  10.0.14393.0  WMDRM backwards compatibility stub
wmerror.dll  12.0.14393.0  Windows Media Error Definitions (English)
wmi.dll  10.0.14393.0  WMI DC and DP functionality
wmiclnt.dll  10.0.14393.0  WMI Client API
wmidcom.dll  10.0.14393.0  WMI
wmidx.dll  12.0.14393.0  Windows Media Indexer DLL
wmiprop.dll  10.0.14393.0  WDM Provider Dynamic Property Page CoInstaller
wmitomi.dll  10.0.14393.0  CIM Provider Adapter
wmnetmgr.dll  12.0.14393.0  Windows Media Network Plugin Manager DLL
wmp.dll  12.0.14393.447  Windows Media Player
wmpdui.dll  12.0.14393.0  Windows Media Player UI Engine
wmpdxm.dll  12.0.14393.351  Windows Media Player Extension
wmpeffects.dll  12.0.14393.351  Windows Media Player Effects
wmphoto.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Media Photo Codec
wmploc.dll  12.0.14393.82  Windows Media Player Resources
wmpmde.dll  12.0.14393.187  WMPMDE DLL
wmpps.dll  12.0.14393.0  Windows Media Player Proxy Stub Dll
wmpshell.dll  12.0.14393.351  Windows Media Player Launcher
wmsgapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  WinLogon IPC Client
wmspdmod.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Media Audio Voice Decoder
wmspdmoe.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Media Audio Voice Encoder
wmvcore.dll  12.0.14393.0  Windows Media Playback/Authoring DLL
wmvdecod.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Media Video Decoder
wmvdspa.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Media Video DSP Components - Advanced
wmvencod.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Media Video 9 Encoder
wmvsdecd.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Media Screen Decoder
wmvsencd.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Media Screen Encoder
wmvxencd.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Media Video Encoder
wofutil.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Overlay File System Filter user mode API
wordbreakers.dll  10.0.14393.576  "WordBreakers.DYNLINK"
workfoldersres.dll  6.2.9200.16384  Work Folders Resources
wow32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Wow32
wpbcreds.dll  10.0.14393.0  WP 8.1 upgrade support utility
wpc.dll  10.0.14393.0  WPC Settings Library
wpcwebfilter.dll  10.0.14393.321  WpcWebFilter.dll
wpdshext.dll  10.0.14393.0  Portable Devices Shell Extension
wpdshserviceobj.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Portable Device Shell Service Object
wpdsp.dll  10.0.14393.0  WMDM Service Provider for Windows Portable Devices
wpnapps.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows Push Notification Apps
wpportinglibrary.dll  10.0.14393.0  <d> DLL
ws2_32.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows Socket 2.0 32-Bit DLL
ws2help.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Socket 2.0 Helper for Windows NT
wscapi.dll  10.0.14393.479  Windows Security Center API
wscinterop.dll  10.0.14393.479  Windows Health Center WSC Interop
wscisvif.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Security Center ISV API
wsclient.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Store Licensing Client
wscproxystub.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Security Center ISV Proxy Stub
wsdapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Web Services for Devices API DLL
wsdchngr.dll  10.0.14393.0  WSD Challenge Component
wsecedit.dll  10.0.14393.479  Security Configuration UI Module
wshbth.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Sockets Helper DLL
wshcon.dll  5.812.10240.16384  Microsoft ® Windows Script Controller
wshelper.dll  10.0.14393.0  Winsock Net shell helper DLL for winsock
wshext.dll  5.812.10240.16384  Microsoft ® Shell Extension for Windows Script Host
wshhyperv.dll  10.0.14393.0  Hyper-V Winsock2 Helper DLL
wship6.dll  10.0.14393.0  Winsock2 Helper DLL (TL/IPv6)
wshirda.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Sockets Helper DLL
wshqos.dll  10.0.14393.0  QoS Winsock2 Helper DLL
wshrm.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Sockets Helper DLL for PGM
wshtcpip.dll  10.0.14393.0  Winsock2 Helper DLL (TL/IPv4)
wsmagent.dll  10.0.14393.0  WinRM Agent
wsmanmigrationplugin.dll  10.0.14393.0  WinRM Migration Plugin
wsmauto.dll  10.0.14393.0  WSMAN Automation
wsmplpxy.dll  10.0.14393.0  wsmplpxy
wsmres.dll  10.0.14393.0  WSMan Resource DLL
wsmsvc.dll  10.0.14393.479  WSMan Service
wsmwmipl.dll  10.0.14393.0  WSMAN WMI Provider
wsnmp32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft WinSNMP v2.0 Manager API
wsock32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Socket 32-Bit DLL
wsp_fs.dll  10.0.14393.351  Windows Storage Provider for FileShare management
wsp_health.dll  10.0.14393.351  Windows Storage Provider for Health Agent API
wsp_sr.dll  10.0.14393.206  Windows Storage Provider for Storage Replication management
wtsapi32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Remote Desktop Session Host Server SDK APIs
wuapi.dll  10.0.14393.594  Windows Update Client API
wudriver.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Update WUDriver Stub
wups.dll  10.0.14393.0  Windows Update client proxy stub
wvc.dll  1.0.0.1  Windows Visual Components
wwaapi.dll  10.0.14393.206  Microsoft Web Application Host API library
wwaext.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Web Application Host Extension library
wwanapi.dll  10.0.14393.206  Mbnapi
wwapi.dll  10.0.14393.0  WWAN API
x3daudio1_0.dll  9.11.519.0  X3DAudio
x3daudio1_1.dll  9.15.779.0  X3DAudio
x3daudio1_2.dll  9.21.1148.0  X3DAudio
x3daudio1_3.dll  9.22.1284.0  X3DAudio
x3daudio1_4.dll  9.23.1350.0  X3DAudio
x3daudio1_5.dll  9.25.1476.0  X3DAudio
x3daudio1_6.dll  9.26.1590.0  3D Audio Library
x3daudio1_7.dll  9.28.1886.0  3D Audio Library
xactengine2_0.dll  9.11.519.0  XACT Engine API
xactengine2_1.dll  9.12.589.0  XACT Engine API
xactengine2_10.dll  9.21.1148.0  XACT Engine API
xactengine2_2.dll  9.13.644.0  XACT Engine API
xactengine2_3.dll  9.14.701.0  XACT Engine API
xactengine2_4.dll  9.15.779.0  XACT Engine API
xactengine2_5.dll  9.16.857.0  XACT Engine API
xactengine2_6.dll  9.17.892.0  XACT Engine API
xactengine2_7.dll  9.18.944.0  XACT Engine API
xactengine2_8.dll  9.19.1007.0  XACT Engine API
xactengine2_9.dll  9.20.1057.0  XACT Engine API
xactengine3_0.dll  9.22.1284.0  XACT Engine API
xactengine3_1.dll  9.23.1350.0  XACT Engine API
xactengine3_2.dll  9.24.1400.0  XACT Engine API
xactengine3_3.dll  9.25.1476.0  XACT Engine API
xactengine3_4.dll  9.26.1590.0  XACT Engine API
xactengine3_5.dll  9.27.1734.0  XACT Engine API
xactengine3_6.dll  9.28.1886.0  XACT Engine API
xactengine3_7.dll  9.29.1962.0  XACT Engine API
xapofx1_0.dll  9.23.1350.0  XAPOFX
xapofx1_1.dll  9.24.1400.0  XAPOFX
xapofx1_2.dll  9.25.1476.0  XAPOFX
xapofx1_3.dll  9.26.1590.0  Audio Effect Library
xapofx1_4.dll  9.28.1886.0  Audio Effect Library
xapofx1_5.dll  9.29.1962.0  Audio Effect Library
xaudio2_0.dll  9.22.1284.0  XAudio2 Game Audio API
xaudio2_1.dll  9.23.1350.0  XAudio2 Game Audio API
xaudio2_2.dll  9.24.1400.0  XAudio2 Game Audio API
xaudio2_3.dll  9.25.1476.0  XAudio2 Game Audio API
xaudio2_4.dll  9.26.1590.0  XAudio2 Game Audio API
xaudio2_5.dll  9.27.1734.0  XAudio2 Game Audio API
xaudio2_6.dll  9.28.1886.0  XAudio2 Game Audio API
xaudio2_7.dll  9.29.1962.0  XAudio2 Game Audio API
xaudio2_8.dll  10.0.14393.0  XAudio2 Game Audio API
xaudio2_9.dll  10.0.14393.0  XAudio2 Game Audio API
xblauthmanagerproxy.dll  10.0.14393.0  XblAuthManagerProxy
xblauthtokenbrokerext.dll  10.0.14393.0  Xbox Live Token Broker Extension
xblgamesaveproxy.dll  10.0.14393.0  Xbox Live Game Save Service Proxies and Stubs
xinput1_1.dll  9.12.589.0  Microsoft Common Controller API
xinput1_2.dll  9.14.701.0  Microsoft Common Controller API
xinput1_3.dll  9.18.944.0  Microsoft Common Controller API
xinput1_4.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Common Controller API
xinput9_1_0.dll  10.0.14393.0  XNA Common Controller
xinputuap.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft Common Controller API
xmlfilter.dll  2008.0.14393.0  XML Filter
xmllite.dll  10.0.14393.0  Microsoft XmlLite Library
xmlprovi.dll  10.0.14393.0  Network Provisioning Service Client API
xolehlp.dll  2001.12.10941.16384  Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator Helper APIs DLL
xpsdocumenttargetprint.dll  10.0.14393.0  XPS DocumentTargetPrint DLL
xpsfilt.dll  10.0.14393.0  XML Paper Specification Document IFilter
xpsgdiconverter.dll  10.0.14393.0  XPS to GDI Converter
xpsprint.dll  10.0.14393.0  XPS Printing DLL
xpsrasterservice.dll  10.0.14393.0  XPS Rasterization Service Component
xpsservices.dll  10.0.14393.0  Xps Object Model in memory creation and deserialization
xpsshhdr.dll  10.0.14393.0  OPC Shell Metadata Handler
xwizards.dll  10.0.14393.0  Extensible Wizards Manager Module
xwreg.dll  10.0.14393.0  Extensible Wizard Registration Manager Module
xwtpdui.dll  10.0.14393.0  Extensible Wizard Type Plugin for DUI
xwtpw32.dll  10.0.14393.0  Extensible Wizard Type Plugin for Win32
zipcontainer.dll  10.0.14393.0  Zip Container DLL
zipfldr.dll  10.0.14393.479  Compressed (zipped) Folders
zkemkeeper.dll  6.2.5.7  ActiveX Control for ZK Embedded Fingerprint T&A System
zkemsdk.dll    
ztrace_maps.dll  10.0.14393.0  ZTrace Event Resources


Certificates

 
[ Certificate Authorities / COMODO RSA Certification Authority ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA384 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.12)
Serial Number  22 DE 84 FC A2 70 D7 AB 8E F3 49 EB 56 EE 66 27
Validity  5/30/2000 - 5/30/2020
MD5 Hash  1EDAF9AE99CE2920667D0E9A8B3F8C9C
SHA1 Hash  F5AD0BCC1AD56CD150725B1C866C30AD92EF21B0
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  AddTrust External CA Root
Organization  AddTrust AB
Organizational Unit  AddTrust External TTP Network
Country  Sweden
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  COMODO RSA Certification Authority
Organization  COMODO CA Limited
Country  United Kingdom
Locality Name  Salford
State/Province  Greater Manchester
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Certificate Authorities / COMODO RSA Domain Validation Secure Server CA ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA384 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.12)
Serial Number  07 8C 7C A3 DB 6E 8A 14 6C 36 75 D9 EA 6E 2E 2B
Validity  2/12/2014 - 2/12/2029
MD5 Hash  83E10465B722EF33FF0B6F535E8D996B
SHA1 Hash  339CDD57CFD5B141169B615FF31428782D1DA639
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  COMODO RSA Certification Authority
Organization  COMODO CA Limited
Country  United Kingdom
Locality Name  Salford
State/Province  Greater Manchester
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  COMODO RSA Domain Validation Secure Server CA
Organization  COMODO CA Limited
Country  United Kingdom
Locality Name  Salford
State/Province  Greater Manchester
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Certificate Authorities / GeoTrust DV SSL SHA256 CA ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA256 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)
Serial Number  56 D7 90 07 30 A3 93 B4 32 66 19 DD 40 16 63 5E
Validity  6/10/2014 - 6/10/2024
MD5 Hash  DB05EB56850AE6447DB6D256B24FA769
SHA1 Hash  868EB338C9C0D37271D1D3792716079704107A85
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  GeoTrust Primary Certification Authority - G3
Organization  GeoTrust Inc.
Organizational Unit  (c) 2008 GeoTrust Inc. - For authorized use only
Country  United States
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  GeoTrust DV SSL SHA256 CA
Organization  GeoTrust Inc.
Organizational Unit  Domain Validated SSL
Country  United States
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Certificate Authorities / Let's Encrypt Authority X3 ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA256 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)
Serial Number  08 A7 EC 85 0B 6A 73 85 53 01 00 00 42 41 01 0A
Validity  3/17/2016 - 3/17/2021
MD5 Hash  B15409274F54AD8F023D3B85A5ECEC5D
SHA1 Hash  E6A3B45B062D509B3382282D196EFE97D5956CCB
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  DST Root CA X3
Organization  Digital Signature Trust Co.
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  Let's Encrypt Authority X3
Organization  Let's Encrypt
Country  United States
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Certificate Authorities / Microsoft IT SSL SHA2 ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA256 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)
Serial Number  A9 9A 27 07
Validity  12/20/2013 - 12/20/2017
MD5 Hash  8C1214A3C3A222F6F5E9A67E37756254
SHA1 Hash  948E1652586240D453287AB69CAEB8F2F4F02117
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  Baltimore CyberTrust Root
Organization  Baltimore
Organizational Unit  CyberTrust
Country  Ireland
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  Microsoft IT SSL SHA2
Organization  Microsoft Corporation
Organizational Unit  Microsoft IT
Country  United States
Locality Name  Redmond
State/Province  Washington
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Certificate Authorities / Microsoft Secure Server CA 2011 ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA256 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)
Serial Number  04 00 00 00 00 00 18 B7 3F 61
Validity  10/19/2011 - 10/19/2026
MD5 Hash  62455357DD57CB80C32AB295743CCCC0
SHA1 Hash  83DA05A9886F7658BE73ACF0A4930C0F99B92F01
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2011
Organization  Microsoft Corporation
Country  United States
Locality Name  Redmond
State/Province  Washington
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  Microsoft Secure Server CA 2011
Organization  Microsoft Corporation
Country  United States
Locality Name  Redmond
State/Province  Washington
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Certificate Authorities / Microsoft Windows Hardware Compatibility ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  MD5 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.4)
Serial Number  A0 69 FE 8F 9A 3F D1 11 8B 19
Validity  10/1/1997 - 12/31/2002
MD5 Hash  09C254BDE4EA50F26D1497F29C51AF6D
SHA1 Hash  109F1CAED645BB78B3EA2B94C0697C740733031C
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  Microsoft Root Authority
Organizational Unit  Copyright (c) 1997 Microsoft Corp.
Organizational Unit  Microsoft Corporation
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  Microsoft Windows Hardware Compatibility
Organizational Unit  Copyright (c) 1997 Microsoft Corp.
Organizational Unit  Microsoft Windows Hardware Compatibility Intermediate CA
Organizational Unit  Microsoft Corporation
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Certificate Authorities / RapidSSL SHA256 CA - G2 ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA256 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)
Serial Number  C7 94 43 09 3D 82 B8 B8 1C 49 36 D4 40 94 E9 48
Validity  6/10/2014 - 6/10/2024
MD5 Hash  DEDE3594C7937624440DCD229E55F9B7
SHA1 Hash  2E4916B07F3DE90C8DDE2566FD9B9B400D89BBBA
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  GeoTrust Primary Certification Authority - G3
Organization  GeoTrust Inc.
Organizational Unit  (c) 2008 GeoTrust Inc. - For authorized use only
Country  United States
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  RapidSSL SHA256 CA - G2
Organization  GeoTrust Inc.
Country  United States
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Certificate Authorities / RapidSSL SHA256 CA - G3 ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA256 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)
Serial Number  77 3A 02
Validity  8/30/2014 - 5/21/2022
MD5 Hash  23BB075FACFBFB026935B31FB6EE063B
SHA1 Hash  0E34141846E7423D37F20DC0AB06C9BBD843DC24
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  GeoTrust Global CA
Organization  GeoTrust Inc.
Country  United States
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  RapidSSL SHA256 CA - G3
Organization  GeoTrust Inc.
Country  United States
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Certificate Authorities / Root Agency ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  MD5 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.4)
Serial Number  F4 35 5C AA D4 B8 CF 11 8A 64 00 AA 00 6C 37 06
Validity  5/29/1996 - 1/1/2040
MD5 Hash  C0A723F0DA35026B21EDB17597F1D470
SHA1 Hash  FEE449EE0E3965A5246F000E87FDE2A065FD89D4
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  Root Agency
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  Root Agency
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Certificate Authorities / Symantec Class 3 Secure Server CA - G4 ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA256 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)
Serial Number  FF 99 06 93 30 8D 41 40 34 B7 70 38 74 B9 3F 51
Validity  10/31/2013 - 10/31/2023
MD5 Hash  23D5858EBC8986107CB7AC1E17F726C5
SHA1 Hash  FF67367C5CD4DE4AE18BCCE1D70FDABD7C866135
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5
Organization  VeriSign, Inc.
Organizational Unit  VeriSign Trust Network
Organizational Unit  (c) 2006 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only
Country  United States
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  Symantec Class 3 Secure Server CA - G4
Organization  Symantec Corporation
Organizational Unit  Symantec Trust Network
Country  United States
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Certificate Authorities / www.verisign.com/CPS Incorp.by Ref. LIABILITY LTD.(c)97 VeriSign ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA1 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.5)
Serial Number  8F 07 93 3F 23 98 60 92 0F 2F D0 B4 BA EB FC 46
Validity  4/17/1997 - 10/25/2016
MD5 Hash  ACD80EA27BB72CE700DC22724A5F1E92
SHA1 Hash  D559A586669B08F46A30A133F8A9ED3D038E2EA8
 
Issuer Properties:
Organization  VeriSign, Inc.
Organizational Unit  Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority
Country  United States
 
Subject Properties:
Organization  VeriSign Trust Network
Organizational Unit  VeriSign, Inc.
Organizational Unit  VeriSign International Server CA - Class 3
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ My Certificates / APNS certificate ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA1 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.5)
Serial Number  E2 03 61 E2 ED 6C E8 AE EE 03
Validity  11/1/2016 - 11/1/2017
MD5 Hash  7E8B4E88EFBF4911C2484F4A3E047E46
SHA1 Hash  74FA260BD878223DD60C01B7BF5CFBCBF580C280
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  Apple iPhone Device CA
Organization  Apple Inc.
Organizational Unit  Apple iPhone
Country  United States
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  DA24E363-AD67-40C4-9F95-6AD47A78B597
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ My Certificates / c82836b47d874c54 ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  1.2.840.10040.4.3
Serial Number  84 AB 9C 94 0B E5 DE 54 DD DC 03 B7 B1 97 01 DE 7D DB F5 E0
Validity  10/22/2016 - 10/29/2016
MD5 Hash  2E6A3C20BA054FA5907688759F8A4E46
SHA1 Hash  1A96D75C88B9BA490B7EA178DECBC64356473AFA
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  Token Signing Public Key
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  c82836b47d874c54
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / Certum Trusted Network CA ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA1 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.5)
Serial Number  C0 44 04
Validity  10/22/2008 - 12/31/2029
MD5 Hash  D5E98140C51869FC462C8975620FAA78
SHA1 Hash  07E032E020B72C3F192F0628A2593A19A70F069E
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  Certum Trusted Network CA
Organization  Unizeto Technologies S.A.
Organizational Unit  Certum Certification Authority
Country  Poland
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  Certum Trusted Network CA
Organization  Unizeto Technologies S.A.
Organizational Unit  Certum Certification Authority
Country  Poland
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / Certum ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA1 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.5)
Serial Number  20 00 01
Validity  6/11/2002 - 6/11/2027
MD5 Hash  2C8F9F661D1890B147269D8E86828CA9
SHA1 Hash  6252DC40F71143A22FDE9EF7348E064251B18118
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  Certum CA
Organization  Unizeto Sp. z o.o.
Country  Poland
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  Certum CA
Organization  Unizeto Sp. z o.o.
Country  Poland
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / Deutsche Telekom Root CA 2 ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA1 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.5)
Serial Number  26
Validity  7/9/1999 - 7/10/2019
MD5 Hash  74014A91B108C458CE47CDF0DD115308
SHA1 Hash  85A408C09C193E5D51587DCDD61330FD8CDE37BF
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  Deutsche Telekom Root CA 2
Organization  Deutsche Telekom AG
Organizational Unit  T-TeleSec Trust Center
Country  Germany
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  Deutsche Telekom Root CA 2
Organization  Deutsche Telekom AG
Organizational Unit  T-TeleSec Trust Center
Country  Germany
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / DigiCert Baltimore Root ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA1 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.5)
Serial Number  B9 00 00 02
Validity  5/13/2000 - 5/13/2025
MD5 Hash  ACB694A59C17E0D791529BB19706A6E4
SHA1 Hash  D4DE20D05E66FC53FE1A50882C78DB2852CAE474
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  Baltimore CyberTrust Root
Organization  Baltimore
Organizational Unit  CyberTrust
Country  Ireland
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  Baltimore CyberTrust Root
Organization  Baltimore
Organizational Unit  CyberTrust
Country  Ireland
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / DigiCert Global Root ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V1
Signature Algorithm  MD5 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.4)
Serial Number  A5 01
Validity  8/13/1998 - 8/14/2018
MD5 Hash  CA3DD368F1035CD032FAB82B59E85ADB
SHA1 Hash  97817950D81C9670CC34D809CF794431367EF474
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  GTE CyberTrust Global Root
Organization  GTE Corporation
Organizational Unit  GTE CyberTrust Solutions, Inc.
Country  United States
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  GTE CyberTrust Global Root
Organization  GTE Corporation
Organizational Unit  GTE CyberTrust Solutions, Inc.
Country  United States
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / DigiCert ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA1 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.5)
Serial Number  39 30 F0 1B FC 60 E5 8F FE 46 D8 17 E5 E0 E7 0C
Validity  11/10/2006 - 11/10/2031
MD5 Hash  87CE0B7B2A0E4900E158719B37A89372
SHA1 Hash  0563B8630D62D75ABBC8AB1E4BDFB5A899B24D43
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  DigiCert Assured ID Root CA
Organization  DigiCert Inc
Organizational Unit  www.digicert.com
Country  United States
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  DigiCert Assured ID Root CA
Organization  DigiCert Inc
Organizational Unit  www.digicert.com
Country  United States
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / DigiCert ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA1 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.5)
Serial Number  4A C7 91 59 C9 6A 75 A1 B1 46 42 90 56 E0 3B 08
Validity  11/10/2006 - 11/10/2031
MD5 Hash  79E4A9840D7D3A96D7C04FE2434C892E
SHA1 Hash  A8985D3A65E5E5C4B2D7D66D40C6DD2FB19C5436
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  DigiCert Global Root CA
Organization  DigiCert Inc
Organizational Unit  www.digicert.com
Country  United States
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  DigiCert Global Root CA
Organization  DigiCert Inc
Organizational Unit  www.digicert.com
Country  United States
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / DigiCert ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA1 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.5)
Serial Number  77 25 46 AE F2 79 0B 8F 9B 40 0B 6A 26 5C AC 02
Validity  11/10/2006 - 11/10/2031
MD5 Hash  D474DE575C39B2D39C8583C5C065498A
SHA1 Hash  5FB7EE0633E259DBAD0C4C9AE6D38F1A61C7DC25
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA
Organization  DigiCert Inc
Organizational Unit  www.digicert.com
Country  United States
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA
Organization  DigiCert Inc
Organizational Unit  www.digicert.com
Country  United States
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / DST Root CA X3 ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA1 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.5)
Serial Number  6B 40 F8 2E 86 39 30 89 BA 27 A3 D6 80 B0 AF 44
Validity  10/1/2000 - 9/30/2021
MD5 Hash  410352DC0FF7501B16F0028EBA6F45C5
SHA1 Hash  DAC9024F54D8F6DF94935FB1732638CA6AD77C13
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  DST Root CA X3
Organization  Digital Signature Trust Co.
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  DST Root CA X3
Organization  Digital Signature Trust Co.
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / Entrust (2048) ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA1 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.5)
Serial Number  F8 DE 63 38
Validity  12/25/1999 - 7/24/2029
MD5 Hash  EE2931BC327E9AE6E8B5F751B4347190
SHA1 Hash  503006091D97D4F5AE39F7CBE7927D7D652D3431
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  Entrust.net Certification Authority (2048)
Organization  Entrust.net
Organizational Unit  www.entrust.net/CPS_2048 incorp. by ref. (limits liab.)
Organizational Unit  (c) 1999 Entrust.net Limited
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  Entrust.net Certification Authority (2048)
Organization  Entrust.net
Organizational Unit  www.entrust.net/CPS_2048 incorp. by ref. (limits liab.)
Organizational Unit  (c) 1999 Entrust.net Limited
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / Entrust.net ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA256 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)
Serial Number  28 8C 53 4A
Validity  7/8/2009 - 12/8/2030
MD5 Hash  4BE2C99196650CF40E5A9392A00AFEB2
SHA1 Hash  8CF427FD790C3AD166068DE81E57EFBB932272D4
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  Entrust Root Certification Authority - G2
Organization  Entrust, Inc.
Organizational Unit  See www.entrust.net/legal-terms
Organizational Unit  (c) 2009 Entrust, Inc. - for authorized use only
Country  United States
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  Entrust Root Certification Authority - G2
Organization  Entrust, Inc.
Organizational Unit  See www.entrust.net/legal-terms
Organizational Unit  (c) 2009 Entrust, Inc. - for authorized use only
Country  United States
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / Entrust ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA1 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.5)
Serial Number  54 50 6B 45
Validity  11/28/2006 - 11/28/2026
MD5 Hash  D6A5C3ED5DDD3E00C13D87921F1D3FE4
SHA1 Hash  B31EB1B740E36C8402DADC37D44DF5D4674952F9
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  Entrust Root Certification Authority
Organization  Entrust, Inc.
Organizational Unit  www.entrust.net/CPS is incorporated by reference
Organizational Unit  (c) 2006 Entrust, Inc.
Country  United States
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  Entrust Root Certification Authority
Organization  Entrust, Inc.
Organizational Unit  www.entrust.net/CPS is incorporated by reference
Organizational Unit  (c) 2006 Entrust, Inc.
Country  United States
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / GeoTrust Global CA ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA1 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.5)
Serial Number  56 34 02
Validity  5/21/2002 - 5/21/2022
MD5 Hash  F775AB29FB514EB7775EFF053C998EF5
SHA1 Hash  DE28F4A4FFE5B92FA3C503D1A349A7F9962A8212
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  GeoTrust Global CA
Organization  GeoTrust Inc.
Country  United States
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  GeoTrust Global CA
Organization  GeoTrust Inc.
Country  United States
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / GeoTrust Primary Certification Authority - G3 ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA256 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)
Serial Number  1F 0F 18 C3 A9 27 F6 41 4B 79 B2 19 94 6E AC 15
Validity  4/2/2008 - 12/2/2037
MD5 Hash  B5E83436C910445848706D2E83D4B805
SHA1 Hash  039EEDB80BE7A03C6953893B20D2D9323A4C2AFD
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  GeoTrust Primary Certification Authority - G3
Organization  GeoTrust Inc.
Organizational Unit  (c) 2008 GeoTrust Inc. - For authorized use only
Country  United States
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  GeoTrust Primary Certification Authority - G3
Organization  GeoTrust Inc.
Organizational Unit  (c) 2008 GeoTrust Inc. - For authorized use only
Country  United States
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / GeoTrust ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA1 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.5)
Serial Number  CF F4 DE 35
Validity  8/22/1998 - 8/22/2018
MD5 Hash  67CB9DC013248A829BB2171ED11BECD4
SHA1 Hash  D23209AD23D314232174E40D7F9D62139786633A
 
Issuer Properties:
Organization  Equifax
Organizational Unit  Equifax Secure Certificate Authority
Country  United States
 
Subject Properties:
Organization  Equifax
Organizational Unit  Equifax Secure Certificate Authority
Country  United States
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / GeoTrust ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA1 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.5)
Serial Number  A1 C4 FA DA AF 6C 63 3A 15 B6 69 FD 6A B5 AC 18
Validity  11/27/2006 - 7/17/2036
MD5 Hash  0226C3015E08303743A9D07DCF37E6BF
SHA1 Hash  323C118E1BF7B8B65254E2E2100DD6029037F096
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  GeoTrust Primary Certification Authority
Organization  GeoTrust Inc.
Country  United States
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  GeoTrust Primary Certification Authority
Organization  GeoTrust Inc.
Country  United States
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / GlobalSign ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA1 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.5)
Serial Number  94 C3 5A 4B 15 01 00 00 00 00 04
Validity  9/1/1998 - 1/28/2028
MD5 Hash  3E455215095192E1B75D379FB187298A
SHA1 Hash  B1BC968BD4F49D622AA89A81F2150152A41D829C
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  GlobalSign Root CA
Organization  GlobalSign nv-sa
Organizational Unit  Root CA
Country  Belgium
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  GlobalSign Root CA
Organization  GlobalSign nv-sa
Organizational Unit  Root CA
Country  Belgium
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / GlobalSign ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA1 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.5)
Serial Number  0D E6 26 86 0F 01 00 00 00 00 04
Validity  12/15/2006 - 12/15/2021
MD5 Hash  9414777E3E5EFD8F30BD41B0CFE7D030
SHA1 Hash  75E0ABB6138512271C04F85FDDDE38E4B7242EFE
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  GlobalSign
Organization  GlobalSign
Organizational Unit  GlobalSign Root CA - R2
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  GlobalSign
Organization  GlobalSign
Organizational Unit  GlobalSign Root CA - R2
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / GlobalSign ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA256 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)
Serial Number  A2 08 53 58 21 01 00 00 00 00 04
Validity  3/18/2009 - 3/18/2029
MD5 Hash  C5DFB849CA051355EE2DBA1AC33EB028
SHA1 Hash  D69B561148F01C77C54578C10926DF5B856976AD
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  GlobalSign
Organization  GlobalSign
Organizational Unit  GlobalSign Root CA - R3
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  GlobalSign
Organization  GlobalSign
Organizational Unit  GlobalSign Root CA - R3
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Authority ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA1 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.5)
Serial Number  00
Validity  6/30/2004 - 6/30/2034
MD5 Hash  91DE0625ABDAFD32170CBB25172A8467
SHA1 Hash  2796BAE63F1801E277261BA0D77770028F20EEE4
 
Issuer Properties:
Organization  The Go Daddy Group, Inc.
Organizational Unit  Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Authority
Country  United States
 
Subject Properties:
Organization  The Go Daddy Group, Inc.
Organizational Unit  Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Authority
Country  United States
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority – G2 ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA256 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)
Serial Number  00
Validity  9/1/2009 - 1/1/2038
MD5 Hash  803ABC22C1E6FB8D9B3B274A321B9A01
SHA1 Hash  47BEABC922EAE80E78783462A79F45C254FDE68B
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2
Organization  GoDaddy.com, Inc.
Country  United States
Locality Name  Scottsdale
State/Province  Arizona
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2
Organization  GoDaddy.com, Inc.
Country  United States
Locality Name  Scottsdale
State/Province  Arizona
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / Hotspot 2.0 Trust Root CA - 03 ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA256 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)
Serial Number  B7 ED 01 DE 89 09 B9 E0 33 A4 86 F2 70 0F B3 0C
Validity  12/8/2013 - 12/8/2043
MD5 Hash  EB1577B40B3C8BABAE346DD98EAD0780
SHA1 Hash  51501FBFCE69189D609CFAF140C576755DCC1FDF
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  Hotspot 2.0 Trust Root CA - 03
Organization  WFA Hotspot 2.0
Country  United States
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  Hotspot 2.0 Trust Root CA - 03
Organization  WFA Hotspot 2.0
Country  United States
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / Microsoft Authenticode(tm) Root ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  MD5 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.4)
Serial Number  01
Validity  1/1/1995 - 1/1/2000
MD5 Hash  DC6D6FAF897CDD17332FB5BA9035E9CE
SHA1 Hash  7F88CD7223F3C813818C994614A89C99FA3B5247
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  Microsoft Authenticode(tm) Root Authority
Organization  MSFT
Country  United States
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  Microsoft Authenticode(tm) Root Authority
Organization  MSFT
Country  United States
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / Microsoft Root Authority ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  MD5 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.4)
Serial Number  40 DF EC 63 F6 3E D1 11 88 3C 3C 8B 00 C1 00
Validity  1/10/1997 - 12/31/2020
MD5 Hash  2A954ECA79B2874573D92D90BAF99FB6
SHA1 Hash  A43489159A520F0D93D032CCAF37E7FE20A8B419
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  Microsoft Root Authority
Organizational Unit  Copyright (c) 1997 Microsoft Corp.
Organizational Unit  Microsoft Corporation
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  Microsoft Root Authority
Organizational Unit  Copyright (c) 1997 Microsoft Corp.
Organizational Unit  Microsoft Corporation
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2010 ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA256 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)
Serial Number  AA 39 43 6B 58 9B 9A 44 AC 44 BA BF 25 3A CC 28
Validity  6/24/2010 - 6/24/2035
MD5 Hash  A266BB7DCC38A562631361BBF61DD11B
SHA1 Hash  3B1EFD3A66EA28B16697394703A72CA340A05BD5
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2010
Organization  Microsoft Corporation
Country  United States
Locality Name  Redmond
State/Province  Washington
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2010
Organization  Microsoft Corporation
Country  United States
Locality Name  Redmond
State/Province  Washington
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2011 ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA256 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)
Serial Number  44 E1 42 6C D6 69 B5 43 96 B2 9F FC B5 C8 8B 3F
Validity  3/23/2011 - 3/23/2036
MD5 Hash  CE0490D5E56C34A5AE0BE98BE581185D
SHA1 Hash  8F43288AD272F3103B6FB1428485EA3014C0BCFE
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2011
Organization  Microsoft Corporation
Country  United States
Locality Name  Redmond
State/Province  Washington
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2011
Organization  Microsoft Corporation
Country  United States
Locality Name  Redmond
State/Province  Washington
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / Microsoft Root Certificate Authority ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA1 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.5)
Serial Number  65 2E 13 07 F4 58 73 4C AD A5 A0 4A A1 16 AD 79
Validity  5/10/2001 - 5/10/2021
MD5 Hash  E1C07EA0AABBD4B77B84C228117808A7
SHA1 Hash  CDD4EEAE6000AC7F40C3802C171E30148030C072
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  Microsoft Root Certificate Authority
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  Microsoft Root Certificate Authority
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / Microsoft Timestamp Root ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V1
Signature Algorithm  MD5 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.4)
Serial Number  01
Validity  5/13/1997 - 12/31/1999
MD5 Hash  556EBEF54C1D7C0360C43418BC9649C1
SHA1 Hash  245C97DF7514E7CF2DF8BE72AE957B9E04741E85
 
Issuer Properties:
Organization  Microsoft Trust Network
Organizational Unit  Microsoft Corporation
Organizational Unit  Microsoft Time Stamping Service Root
 
Subject Properties:
Organization  Microsoft Trust Network
Organizational Unit  Microsoft Corporation
Organizational Unit  Microsoft Time Stamping Service Root
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / NetLock Arany (Class Gold) Fotanúsítvány ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA256 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)
Serial Number  10 00 E4 2C 41 49
Validity  12/11/2008 - 12/6/2028
MD5 Hash  C5A1B7FF73DDD6D7343218DFFC3CAD88
SHA1 Hash  06083F593F15A104A069A46BA903D006B7970991
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  NetLock Arany (Class Gold) Fotanúsítvány
Organization  NetLock Kft.
Organizational Unit  Tanúsítványkiadók (Certification Services)
Country  Hungary
Locality Name  Budapest
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  NetLock Arany (Class Gold) Fotanúsítvány
Organization  NetLock Kft.
Organizational Unit  Tanúsítványkiadók (Certification Services)
Country  Hungary
Locality Name  Budapest
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / QuoVadis Root Certification Authority ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA1 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.5)
Serial Number  8B 50 B6 3A
Validity  3/20/2001 - 3/18/2021
MD5 Hash  27DE36FE72B70003009DF4F01E6C0424
SHA1 Hash  DE3F40BD5093D39B6C60F6DABC076201008976C9
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  QuoVadis Root Certification Authority
Organization  QuoVadis Limited
Organizational Unit  Root Certification Authority
Country  Bermuda
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  QuoVadis Root Certification Authority
Organization  QuoVadis Limited
Organizational Unit  Root Certification Authority
Country  Bermuda
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / SECOM Trust Systems CO LTD ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA1 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.5)
Serial Number  00
Validity  9/30/2003 - 9/30/2023
MD5 Hash  F1BC636A54E0B527F5CDE71AE34D6E4A
SHA1 Hash  36B12B49F9819ED74C9EBC380FC6568F5DACB2F7
 
Issuer Properties:
Organization  SECOM Trust.net
Organizational Unit  Security Communication RootCA1
Country  Japan
 
Subject Properties:
Organization  SECOM Trust.net
Organizational Unit  Security Communication RootCA1
Country  Japan
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / Starfield Class 2 Certification Authority ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA1 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.5)
Serial Number  00
Validity  6/30/2004 - 6/30/2034
MD5 Hash  324A4BBBC863699BBE749AC6DD1D4624
SHA1 Hash  AD7E1C28B064EF8F6003402014C3D0E3370EB58A
 
Issuer Properties:
Organization  Starfield Technologies, Inc.
Organizational Unit  Starfield Class 2 Certification Authority
Country  United States
 
Subject Properties:
Organization  Starfield Technologies, Inc.
Organizational Unit  Starfield Class 2 Certification Authority
Country  United States
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / Starfield Root Certificate Authority – G2 ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA256 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)
Serial Number  00
Validity  9/1/2009 - 1/1/2038
MD5 Hash  D63981C6527E9669FCFCCA66ED05F296
SHA1 Hash  B51C067CEE2B0C3DF855AB2D92F4FE39D4E70F0E
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G2
Organization  Starfield Technologies, Inc.
Country  United States
Locality Name  Scottsdale
State/Province  Arizona
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G2
Organization  Starfield Technologies, Inc.
Country  United States
Locality Name  Scottsdale
State/Province  Arizona
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / Starfield Technologies Inc. ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA1 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.5)
Serial Number  00
Validity  6/2/2008 - 1/1/2030
MD5 Hash  CF8F3B62A3CACA711BA3E1CB4857351F
SHA1 Hash  5D003860F002ED829DEAA41868F788186D62127F
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority
Organization  Starfield Technologies, Inc.
Organizational Unit  http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/
Country  United States
Locality Name  Scottsdale
State/Province  Arizona
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority
Organization  Starfield Technologies, Inc.
Organizational Unit  http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/
Country  United States
Locality Name  Scottsdale
State/Province  Arizona
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / StartCom Certification Authority ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA1 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.5)
Serial Number  01
Validity  9/18/2006 - 9/18/2036
MD5 Hash  224D8F8AFCF735C2BB5734907B8B2216
SHA1 Hash  3E2BF7F2031B96F38CE6C4D8A85D3E2D58476A0F
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  StartCom Certification Authority
Organization  StartCom Ltd.
Organizational Unit  Secure Digital Certificate Signing
Country  Israel
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  StartCom Certification Authority
Organization  StartCom Ltd.
Organizational Unit  Secure Digital Certificate Signing
Country  Israel
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / Symantec Enterprise Mobile Root for Microsoft ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA256 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)
Serial Number  CE D8 F4 BD A9 29 66 0F 7B 90 BF 9E 2F 55 6B 0F
Validity  3/15/2012 - 3/15/2032
MD5 Hash  71D0A5FF2D59741694BEE37D1E5C860B
SHA1 Hash  92B46C76E13054E104F230517E6E504D43AB10B5
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  Symantec Enterprise Mobile Root for Microsoft
Organization  Symantec Corporation
Country  United States
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  Symantec Enterprise Mobile Root for Microsoft
Organization  Symantec Corporation
Country  United States
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / thawte Primary Root CA - G3 ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA256 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)
Serial Number  FB 90 F7 2F 4B D6 9A B4 B4 EA A7 46 B7 97 01 60
Validity  4/2/2008 - 12/2/2037
MD5 Hash  FB1B5D438A94CD44C676F2434B47E731
SHA1 Hash  F18B538D1BE903B6A6F056435B171589CAF36BF2
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  thawte Primary Root CA - G3
Organization  thawte, Inc.
Organizational Unit  Certification Services Division
Organizational Unit  (c) 2008 thawte, Inc. - For authorized use only
Country  United States
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  thawte Primary Root CA - G3
Organization  thawte, Inc.
Organizational Unit  Certification Services Division
Organizational Unit  (c) 2008 thawte, Inc. - For authorized use only
Country  United States
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / Thawte Timestamping CA ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  MD5 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.4)
Serial Number  00
Validity  1/1/1997 - 1/1/2021
MD5 Hash  7F667A71D3EB6978209A51149D83DA20
SHA1 Hash  BE36A4562FB2EE05DBB3D32323ADF445084ED656
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  Thawte Timestamping CA
Organization  Thawte
Organizational Unit  Thawte Certification
Country  South Africa
Locality Name  Durbanville
State/Province  Western Cape
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  Thawte Timestamping CA
Organization  Thawte
Organizational Unit  Thawte Certification
Country  South Africa
Locality Name  Durbanville
State/Province  Western Cape
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / thawte ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  MD5 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.4)
Serial Number  01
Validity  8/1/1996 - 1/1/2021
MD5 Hash  069F6979166690021B8C8CA2C3076F3A
SHA1 Hash  627F8D7827656399D27D7F9044C9FEB3F33EFA9A
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  Thawte Premium Server CA
Organization  Thawte Consulting cc
Organizational Unit  Certification Services Division
Country  South Africa
Locality Name  Cape Town
State/Province  Western Cape
E-mail Address  premium-server@thawte.com
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  Thawte Premium Server CA
Organization  Thawte Consulting cc
Organizational Unit  Certification Services Division
Country  South Africa
Locality Name  Cape Town
State/Province  Western Cape
E-mail Address  premium-server@thawte.com
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / thawte ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA1 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.5)
Serial Number  6D 2B DB 37 CE 2F F4 49 EC ED D5 20 57 D5 4E 34
Validity  11/17/2006 - 7/17/2036
MD5 Hash  8CCADC0B22CEF5BE72AC411A11A8D812
SHA1 Hash  91C6D6EE3E8AC86384E548C299295C756C817B81
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  thawte Primary Root CA
Organization  thawte, Inc.
Organizational Unit  Certification Services Division
Organizational Unit  (c) 2006 thawte, Inc. - For authorized use only
Country  United States
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  thawte Primary Root CA
Organization  thawte, Inc.
Organizational Unit  Certification Services Division
Organizational Unit  (c) 2006 thawte, Inc. - For authorized use only
Country  United States
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / The USERTrust Network™ ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA1 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.5)
Serial Number  01
Validity  5/30/2000 - 5/30/2020
MD5 Hash  1D3554048578B03F42424DBF20730A3F
SHA1 Hash  02FAF3E291435468607857694DF5E45B68851868
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  AddTrust External CA Root
Organization  AddTrust AB
Organizational Unit  AddTrust External TTP Network
Country  Sweden
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  AddTrust External CA Root
Organization  AddTrust AB
Organizational Unit  AddTrust External TTP Network
Country  Sweden
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / Trustwave ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA1 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.5)
Serial Number  D0 59 18 27 EB F0 7F 42 AD A5 16 08 5C 8E F0 0C
Validity  11/8/2006 - 1/1/2030
MD5 Hash  DC32C3A76D2557C768099DEA2DA9A2D1
SHA1 Hash  8782C6C304353BCFD29692D2593E7D44D934FF11
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  SecureTrust CA
Organization  SecureTrust Corporation
Country  United States
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  SecureTrust CA
Organization  SecureTrust Corporation
Country  United States
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / USERTrust (Code Signing) ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA1 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.5)
Serial Number  1B 5F B3 E0 2D 36 D3 11 B4 24 00 50 8B 0C BE 44
Validity  7/10/1999 - 7/10/2019
MD5 Hash  A7F2E41606411150306B9CE3B49CB0C9
SHA1 Hash  E12DFB4B41D7D9C32B30514BAC1D81D8385E2D46
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  UTN-USERFirst-Object
Organization  The USERTRUST Network
Organizational Unit  http://www.usertrust.com
Country  United States
Locality Name  Salt Lake City
State/Province  UT
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  UTN-USERFirst-Object
Organization  The USERTRUST Network
Organizational Unit  http://www.usertrust.com
Country  United States
Locality Name  Salt Lake City
State/Province  UT
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary CA ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V1
Signature Algorithm  MD2 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.2)
Serial Number  BF BA CC 03 7B CA 38 B6 34 29 D9 10 1D E4 BA 70
Validity  1/29/1996 - 8/2/2028
MD5 Hash  10FC635DF6263E0DF325BE5F79CD6767
SHA1 Hash  742C3192E607E424EB4549542BE1BBC53E6174E2
 
Issuer Properties:
Organization  VeriSign, Inc.
Organizational Unit  Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority
Country  United States
 
Subject Properties:
Organization  VeriSign, Inc.
Organizational Unit  Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority
Country  United States
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / VeriSign Time Stamping CA ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V1
Signature Algorithm  MD5 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.4)
Serial Number  A3 DC 5D 15 5F 73 5D A5 1C 59 82 8C 38 D2 19 4A
Validity  5/12/1997 - 1/8/2004
MD5 Hash  EBB04F1D3A2E372F1DDA6E27D6B680FA
SHA1 Hash  18F7C1FCC3090203FD5BAA2F861A754976C8DD25
 
Issuer Properties:
Organization  VeriSign Trust Network
Organizational Unit  VeriSign, Inc.
Organizational Unit  VeriSign Time Stamping Service Root
Organizational Unit  NO LIABILITY ACCEPTED, (c)97 VeriSign, Inc.
 
Subject Properties:
Organization  VeriSign Trust Network
Organizational Unit  VeriSign, Inc.
Organizational Unit  VeriSign Time Stamping Service Root
Organizational Unit  NO LIABILITY ACCEPTED, (c)97 VeriSign, Inc.
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / VeriSign Universal Root Certification Authority ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA256 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)
Serial Number  1D C5 1A 12 E4 BB 0E 03 21 13 B3 21 64 C4 1A 40
Validity  4/2/2008 - 12/2/2037
MD5 Hash  8EADB501AA4D81E48C1DD1E114009519
SHA1 Hash  3679CA35668772304D30A5FB873B0FA77BB70D54
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  VeriSign Universal Root Certification Authority
Organization  VeriSign, Inc.
Organizational Unit  VeriSign Trust Network
Organizational Unit  (c) 2008 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only
Country  United States
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  VeriSign Universal Root Certification Authority
Organization  VeriSign, Inc.
Organizational Unit  VeriSign Trust Network
Organizational Unit  (c) 2008 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only
Country  United States
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Root Certificates / VeriSign ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  SHA1 RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.5)
Serial Number  4A 3B 6B CC CD 58 21 4A BB E8 7D 26 9E D1 DA 18
Validity  11/8/2006 - 7/17/2036
MD5 Hash  CB17E431673EE209FE455793F30AFA1C
SHA1 Hash  4EB6D578499B1CCF5F581EAD56BE3D9B6744A5E5
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5
Organization  VeriSign, Inc.
Organizational Unit  VeriSign Trust Network
Organizational Unit  (c) 2006 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only
Country  United States
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5
Organization  VeriSign, Inc.
Organizational Unit  VeriSign Trust Network
Organizational Unit  (c) 2006 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only
Country  United States
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Software Publisher Certificates / kes_pers ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  1.3.14.3.2.29
Serial Number  30 1B 31 19 30 17 06 03 55 04 03 1E 10 00 6B 00 65 00 73 00 5F 00 70 00 65 00 72 00 73
Validity  10/22/2016 - 10/22/2016
MD5 Hash  CE2D6BE5B4C3A029C3099D846E330A3A
SHA1 Hash  B99B3653572DDE14F6F62E53EEF48819D61583E5
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  kes_pers
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  kes_pers
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
 
[ Software Publisher Certificates / kes10 ]
 
Certificate Properties:
Version  V3
Signature Algorithm  1.3.14.3.2.29
Serial Number  30 10 31 0E 30 0C 06 03 55 04 03 13 05 6B 65 73 31 30
Validity  10/22/2016 - 10/22/2016
MD5 Hash  C654A6817DCE1297CC22EF5C05050E91
SHA1 Hash  23006CF3FF153771B84B775CD592243394256A8D
 
Issuer Properties:
Common Name  kes10
 
Subject Properties:
Common Name  kes10
 
Public Key Properties:
Public Key Algorithm  RSA (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)


UpTime

 
Current Session:
Last Shutdown Time  1/16/2017 7:29:10 AM
Last Boot Time  1/16/2017 7:29:15 AM
Current Time  1/16/2017 9:06:41 AM
UpTime  5846 sec (0 days, 1 hours, 37 min, 26 sec)
 
UpTime Statistics:
First Boot Time  10/22/2016 7:16:05 PM
First Shutdown Time  10/22/2016 4:53:06 PM
Total UpTime  4013530 sec (46 days, 10 hours, 52 min, 10 sec)
Total DownTime  3397464 sec (39 days, 7 hours, 44 min, 24 sec)
Longest UpTime  48662 sec (0 days, 13 hours, 31 min, 2 sec)
Longest DownTime  49575 sec (0 days, 13 hours, 46 min, 15 sec)
Total Reboots  40
System Availability  54.16%
 
Bluescreen Statistics:
Total Bluescreens  0
 
Information:
Information  The above statistics are based on System Event Log entries


Share

 
Share Name  Type  Remark  Local Path
ADMIN$  Folder  Remote Admin  C:\Windows
C$  Folder  Default share  C:\
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
IPC$  IPC  Remote IPC  


Account Security

 
Account Security Properties:
Computer Role  Primary
Domain Name  RAZER
Primary Domain Controller  Not Specified
Forced Logoff Time  Disabled
Min / Max Password Age  0 / 42 days
Minimum Password Length  0 chars
Password History Length  Disabled
Lockout Threshold  Disabled
Lockout Duration  30 min
Lockout Observation Window  30 min


Logon

 
User  Full Name  Logon Server  Logon Domain
thangduong.dev@gmail.com      MicrosoftAccount
thangduong.dev@gmail.com      MicrosoftAccount


Users

 
[ Administrator ]
 
User Properties:
User Name  Administrator
Full Name  Administrator
Comment  Built-in account for administering the computer/domain
Member Of Groups  Administrators
Logon Count  0
Disk Quota  -
 
User Features:
Logon Script Executed  Yes
Account Disabled  Yes
Locked Out User  No
Home Folder Required  No
Password Required  Yes
Read-Only Password  No
Password Never Expires  Yes
 
[ Deathadder™ ]
 
User Properties:
User Name  Deathadder™
Full Name  Th?ng Duong
Member Of Groups  Administrators
Logon Count  3
Disk Quota  -
 
User Features:
Logon Script Executed  Yes
Account Disabled  No
Locked Out User  No
Home Folder Required  No
Password Required  No
Read-Only Password  No
Password Never Expires  Yes
 
[ DefaultAccount ]
 
User Properties:
User Name  DefaultAccount
Full Name  DefaultAccount
Comment  A user account managed by the system.
Member Of Groups  System Managed Accounts Group
Logon Count  0
Disk Quota  -
 
User Features:
Logon Script Executed  Yes
Account Disabled  Yes
Locked Out User  No
Home Folder Required  No
Password Required  No
Read-Only Password  No
Password Never Expires  Yes
 
[ defaultuser0 ]
 
User Properties:
User Name  defaultuser0
Full Name  defaultuser0
Logon Count  2
Disk Quota  -
 
User Features:
Logon Script Executed  Yes
Account Disabled  Yes
Locked Out User  No
Home Folder Required  No
Password Required  Yes
Read-Only Password  No
Password Never Expires  Yes
 
[ Guest ]
 
User Properties:
User Name  Guest
Full Name  Guest
Comment  Built-in account for guest access to the computer/domain
Member Of Groups  Guests
Logon Count  0
Disk Quota  -
 
User Features:
Logon Script Executed  Yes
Account Disabled  Yes
Locked Out User  No
Home Folder Required  No
Password Required  No
Read-Only Password  Yes
Password Never Expires  Yes


Local Groups

 
[ __vmware__ ]
 
Local Group Properties:
Comment  VMware User Group
 
[ Access Control Assistance Operators ]
 
Local Group Properties:
Comment  Members of this group can remotely query authorization attributes and permissions for resources on this computer.
 
[ Administrators ]
 
Local Group Properties:
Comment  Administrators have complete and unrestricted access to the computer/domain
 
Group Members:
Administrator  
Deathadder™  Th?ng Duong
 
[ Backup Operators ]
 
Local Group Properties:
Comment  Backup Operators can override security restrictions for the sole purpose of backing up or restoring files
 
[ Cryptographic Operators ]
 
Local Group Properties:
Comment  Members are authorized to perform cryptographic operations.
 
[ Distributed COM Users ]
 
Local Group Properties:
Comment  Members are allowed to launch, activate and use Distributed COM objects on this machine.
 
[ Event Log Readers ]
 
Local Group Properties:
Comment  Members of this group can read event logs from local machine
 
[ Guests ]
 
Local Group Properties:
Comment  Guests have the same access as members of the Users group by default, except for the Guest account which is further restricted
 
Group Members:
Guest  
 
[ Hyper-V Administrators ]
 
Local Group Properties:
Comment  Members of this group have complete and unrestricted access to all features of Hyper-V.
 
[ IIS_IUSRS ]
 
Local Group Properties:
Comment  Built-in group used by Internet Information Services.
 
Group Members:
IUSR  
 
[ Network Configuration Operators ]
 
Local Group Properties:
Comment  Members in this group can have some administrative privileges to manage configuration of networking features
 
[ Performance Log Users ]
 
Local Group Properties:
Comment  Members of this group may schedule logging of performance counters, enable trace providers, and collect event traces both locally and via remote access to this computer
 
[ Performance Monitor Users ]
 
Local Group Properties:
Comment  Members of this group can access performance counter data locally and remotely
 
[ Power Users ]
 
Local Group Properties:
Comment  Power Users are included for backwards compatibility and possess limited administrative powers
 
[ Remote Desktop Users ]
 
Local Group Properties:
Comment  Members in this group are granted the right to logon remotely
 
[ Remote Management Users ]
 
Local Group Properties:
Comment  Members of this group can access WMI resources over management protocols (such as WS-Management via the Windows Remote Management service). This applies only to WMI namespaces that grant access to the user.
 
[ Replicator ]
 
Local Group Properties:
Comment  Supports file replication in a domain
 
[ System Managed Accounts Group ]
 
Local Group Properties:
Comment  Members of this group are managed by the system.
 
Group Members:
DefaultAccount  
 
[ Users ]
 
Local Group Properties:
Comment  Users are prevented from making accidental or intentional system-wide changes and can run most applications
 
Group Members:
Authenticated Users  
INTERACTIVE  


Global Groups

 
[ None ]
 
Global Group Properties:
Comment  Ordinary users
 
Group Members:
Administrator  
Deathadder™  Th?ng Duong
DefaultAccount  
defaultuser0  
Guest  


Windows Video

 
[ Intel(R) HD Graphics 4000 ]
 
Video Adapter Properties:
Device Description  Intel(R) HD Graphics 4000
Adapter String  Intel(R) HD Graphics 4000
BIOS String  Intel Video BIOS
Chip Type  Intel(R) HD Graphics Family
DAC Type  Internal
Driver Date  12/21/2015
Driver Version  10.18.10.4358
Driver Provider  Intel Corporation
Memory Size  2112 MB
 
Installed Drivers:
igdumdim64  10.18.10.4358
igd10iumd64  10.18.10.4358
igd10iumd64  10.18.10.4358
igdumdim32  10.18.10.4358
igd10iumd32  10.18.10.4358
igd10iumd32  10.18.10.4358
 
Video Adapter Manufacturer:
Company Name  Intel Corporation
Product Information  http://www.intel.com/products/chipsets
Driver Download  http://support.intel.com/support/graphics
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Intel(R) HD Graphics 4000 ]
 
Video Adapter Properties:
Device Description  Intel(R) HD Graphics 4000
Adapter String  Intel(R) HD Graphics 4000
BIOS String  Intel Video BIOS
Chip Type  Intel(R) HD Graphics Family
DAC Type  Internal
Driver Date  12/21/2015
Driver Version  10.18.10.4358
Driver Provider  Intel Corporation
Memory Size  2112 MB
 
Installed Drivers:
igdumdim64  10.18.10.4358
igd10iumd64  10.18.10.4358
igd10iumd64  10.18.10.4358
igdumdim32  10.18.10.4358
igd10iumd32  10.18.10.4358
igd10iumd32  10.18.10.4358
 
Video Adapter Manufacturer:
Company Name  Intel Corporation
Product Information  http://www.intel.com/products/chipsets
Driver Download  http://support.intel.com/support/graphics
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Intel(R) HD Graphics 4000 ]
 
Video Adapter Properties:
Device Description  Intel(R) HD Graphics 4000
Adapter String  Intel(R) HD Graphics 4000
BIOS String  Intel Video BIOS
Chip Type  Intel(R) HD Graphics Family
DAC Type  Internal
Driver Date  12/21/2015
Driver Version  10.18.10.4358
Driver Provider  Intel Corporation
Memory Size  2112 MB
 
Installed Drivers:
igdumdim64  10.18.10.4358
igd10iumd64  10.18.10.4358
igd10iumd64  10.18.10.4358
igdumdim32  10.18.10.4358
igd10iumd32  10.18.10.4358
igd10iumd32  10.18.10.4358
 
Video Adapter Manufacturer:
Company Name  Intel Corporation
Product Information  http://www.intel.com/products/chipsets
Driver Download  http://support.intel.com/support/graphics
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ NVIDIA GeForce GT 635M ]
 
Video Adapter Properties:
Device Description  NVIDIA GeForce GT 635M
Adapter String  GeForce GT 635M
BIOS String  Version 70.8.ba.0.15
Chip Type  GeForce GT 635M
DAC Type  Integrated RAMDAC
Driver Date  12/11/2016
Driver Version  21.21.13.7633 - nVIDIA ForceWare 376.33
Driver Provider  NVIDIA
Memory Size  2 GB
 
Installed Drivers:
C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\nvami.inf_amd64_11a67240324f74de\nvd3dumx  
C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\nvami.inf_amd64_11a67240324f74de\nvwgf2umx  
C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\nvami.inf_amd64_11a67240324f74de\nvwgf2umx  
C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\nvami.inf_amd64_11a67240324f74de\nvwgf2umx  
C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\nvami.inf_amd64_11a67240324f74de\nvd3dum  
C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\nvami.inf_amd64_11a67240324f74de\nvwgf2um  
C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\nvami.inf_amd64_11a67240324f74de\nvwgf2um  
C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\nvami.inf_amd64_11a67240324f74de\nvwgf2um  
 
Video Adapter Manufacturer:
Company Name  NVIDIA Corporation
Product Information  http://www.nvidia.com/page/products.html
Driver Download  http://www.nvidia.com/content/drivers/drivers.asp
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates


PCI / AGP Video

 
Device Description  Device Type
Intel HD Graphics 4000  Video Adapter
Intel HD Graphics 4000  3D Accelerator


GPU

 
[ Integrated: Intel Ivy Bridge-MB - Integrated Graphics Controller (MB GT2) ]
 
Graphics Processor Properties:
Video Adapter  Intel Ivy Bridge-MB - Integrated Graphics Controller (MB GT2)
GPU Code Name  Ivy Bridge-MB GT2
PCI Device  8086-0166 / 1043-100D (Rev 09)
Process Technology  22 nm
Bus Type  Integrated
GPU Clock  649 MHz (original: 349 MHz)
GPU Clock (Turbo)  349 - 1048 MHz
RAMDAC Clock  350 MHz
Pixel Pipelines  4
TMU Per Pipeline  1
Unified Shaders  64 (v5.0)
DirectX Hardware Support  DirectX v11.1
WDDM Version  WDDM 1.3
 
Architecture:
Architecture  Intel Gen7
Execution Units (EU)  16
L1 Instruction Cache  32 KB
L1 Texture Cache  4 KB
L2 Texture Cache  24 KB
L3 Cache  256 KB
Unified Return Buffer  256 KB
 
Theoretical Peak Performance:
Pixel Fillrate  2596 MPixel/s @ 649 MHz
Texel Fillrate  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
Single-Precision FLOPS  166.1 GFLOPS @ 649 MHz
Double-Precision FLOPS  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
 
Utilization:
Dedicated Memory  13 MB
Dynamic Memory  79 MB
 
Graphics Processor Manufacturer:
Company Name  Intel Corporation
Product Information  http://www.intel.com/products/chipsets
Driver Download  http://support.intel.com/support/graphics
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates


Monitor

 
[ CMN N140BGE-L42 ]
 
Monitor Properties:
Monitor Name  CMN N140BGE-L42
Monitor ID  CMN1472
Manufacturer  N140BGE-L42
Model  CMN
Monitor Type  14" LCD (WXGA)
Manufacture Date  Week 35 / 2011
Serial Number  None
Max. Visible Display Size  309 mm x 174 mm (14.0")
Picture Aspect Ratio  16:9
Maximum Resolution  1366 x 768
Pixel Density  112 ppi
Gamma  2.20
DPMS Mode Support  None
 
Supported Video Modes:
1366 x 768  Pixel Clock: 69.30 MHz


Desktop

 
Desktop Properties:
Device Technology  Raster Display
Resolution  1366 x 768
Color Depth  32-bit
Color Planes  1
Font Resolution  96 dpi
Pixel Width / Height  36 / 36
Pixel Diagonal  51
Vertical Refresh Rate  60 Hz
Desktop Wallpaper  C:\Users\Deathadder™\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Themes\TranscodedWallpaper
 
Desktop Effects:
Combo-Box Animation  Disabled
Drop Shadow Effect  Disabled
Flat Menu Effect  Enabled
Font Smoothing  Enabled
ClearType  Enabled
Full Window Dragging  Disabled
Gradient Window Title Bars  Enabled
Hide Menu Access Keys  Enabled
Hot Tracking Effect  Enabled
Icon Title Wrapping  Enabled
List-Box Smooth Scrolling  Disabled
Menu Animation  Disabled
Menu Fade Effect  Enabled
Minimize/Restore Animation  Disabled
Mouse Cursor Shadow  Disabled
Selection Fade Effect  Disabled
ShowSounds Accessibility Feature  Disabled
ToolTip Animation  Disabled
ToolTip Fade Effect  Enabled
Windows Aero  Enabled
Windows Plus! Extension  Disabled


Multi-Monitor

 
Device ID  Primary  Upper Left Corner  Bottom Right Corner
\\.\DISPLAY1  Yes  (0,0)  (1366,768)


Video Modes

 
Resolution  Color Depth  Refresh Rate
320 x 200  32-bit  60 Hz
320 x 200  32-bit  60 Hz
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
320 x 240  32-bit  60 Hz
320 x 240  32-bit  60 Hz
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
400 x 300  32-bit  60 Hz
400 x 300  32-bit  60 Hz
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
512 x 384  32-bit  60 Hz
512 x 384  32-bit  60 Hz
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
640 x 400  32-bit  60 Hz
640 x 400  32-bit  60 Hz
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
640 x 480  32-bit  60 Hz
640 x 480  32-bit  60 Hz
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
800 x 600  32-bit  60 Hz
800 x 600  32-bit  60 Hz
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
1024 x 768  32-bit  60 Hz
1024 x 768  32-bit  60 Hz
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
1280 x 600  32-bit  60 Hz
1280 x 600  32-bit  60 Hz
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
1280 x 720  32-bit  60 Hz
1280 x 720  32-bit  60 Hz
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
1280 x 768  32-bit  60 Hz
1280 x 768  32-bit  60 Hz
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
1360 x 768  32-bit  60 Hz
1360 x 768  32-bit  60 Hz
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
1366 x 768  32-bit  60 Hz


OpenGL

 
OpenGL Properties:
Vendor  NVIDIA Corporation
Renderer  GeForce GT 635M/PCIe/SSE2
Version  4.5.0 NVIDIA 376.33
Shading Language Version  4.50 NVIDIA
OpenGL DLL  10.0.14393.0(rs1_release.160715-1616)
Multitexture Texture Units  4
Occlusion Query Counter Bits  32
Sub-Pixel Precision  8-bit
Max Viewport Size  16384 x 16384
Max Cube Map Texture Size  16384 x 16384
Max Rectangle Texture Size  16384 x 16384
Max 3D Texture Size  2048 x 2048 x 2048
Max Anisotropy  16
Max Clipping Planes  8
Max Display-List Nesting Level  64
Max Draw Buffers  8
Max Evaluator Order  8
Max General Register Combiners  8
Max Light Sources  8
Max Pixel Map Table Size  65536
Min / Max Program Texel Offset  -8 / 7
Max Texture Array Layers  2048
Max Texture LOD Bias  15
Max Vertex Array Range Element Size  1048575
 
OpenGL Compliancy:
OpenGL 1.1  Yes (100%)
OpenGL 1.2  Yes (100%)
OpenGL 1.3  Yes (100%)
OpenGL 1.4  Yes (100%)
OpenGL 1.5  Yes (100%)
OpenGL 2.0  Yes (100%)
OpenGL 2.1  Yes (100%)
OpenGL 3.0  Yes (100%)
OpenGL 3.1  Yes (100%)
OpenGL 3.2  Yes (100%)
OpenGL 3.3  Yes (100%)
OpenGL 4.0  Yes (100%)
OpenGL 4.1  Yes (100%)
OpenGL 4.2  Yes (100%)
OpenGL 4.3  Yes (100%)
OpenGL 4.4  Yes (100%)
OpenGL 4.5  Yes (100%)
 
Max Stack Depth:
Attribute Stack  16
Client Attribute Stack  16
Modelview Matrix Stack  32
Name Stack  128
Projection Matrix Stack  4
Texture Matrix Stack  10
 
Draw Range Elements:
Max Index Count  1048576
Max Vertex Count  1048576
 
Extended Lighting Parameters:
Max Shininess  128
Max Spot Exponent  128
 
Transform Feedback:
Max Interleaved Components  128
Max Separate Attributes  4
Max Separate Components  4
 
Framebuffer Object:
Max Color Attachments  8
Max Render Buffer Size  16384 x 16384
 
Imaging:
Max Color Matrix Stack Depth  2
Max Convolution Width / Height  11 / 11
 
Vertex Shader:
Max Uniform Vertex Components  4096
Max Varying Floats  124
Max Vertex Texture Image Units  32
Max Combined Texture Image Units  192
 
Geometry Shader:
Max Geometry Texture Units  32
Max Varying Components  124
Max Geometry Varying Components  124
Max Vertex Varying Components  124
Max Geometry Uniform Components  2048
Max Geometry Output Vertices  1024
Max Geometry Total Output Components  1024
 
Fragment Shader:
Max Uniform Fragment Components  4096
 
Vertex Program:
Max Local Parameters  1024
Max Environment Parameters  256
Max Program Matrices  8
Max Program Matrix Stack Depth  1
Max Tracking Matrices  8
Max Tracking Matrix Stack Depth  1
Max Vertex Attributes  16
Max Instructions  65536
Max Native Instructions  65536
Max Temporaries  4096
Max Native Temporaries  4096
Max Parameters  1024
Max Native Parameters  1024
Max Attributes  16
Max Native Attributes  16
Max Address Registers  2
Max Native Address Registers  2
 
Fragment Program:
Max Local Parameters  1024
Max Environment Parameters  256
Max Texture Coordinates  8
Max Texture Image Units  32
Max Instructions  65536
Max Native Instructions  65536
Max Temporaries  4096
Max Native Temporaries  4096
Max Parameters  1024
Max Native Parameters  1024
Max Attributes  16
Max Native Attributes  16
Max Address Registers  1
Max Native Address Registers  1
Max ALU Instructions  65536
Max Native ALU Instructions  65536
Max Texture Instructions  65536
Max Native Texture Instructions  65536
Max Texture Indirections  65536
Max Native Texture Indirections  65536
Max Execution Instructions  16777216
Max Call Stack Depth  32
Max If Statement Depth  64
Max Loop Depth  64
Max Loop Count  16777216
 
OpenGL Extensions:
Total / Supported Extensions  1039 / 347
GL_3DFX_multisample  Not Supported
GL_3DFX_tbuffer  Not Supported
GL_3DFX_texture_compression_FXT1  Not Supported
GL_3DL_direct_texture_access2  Not Supported
GL_3Dlabs_multisample_transparency_id  Not Supported
GL_3Dlabs_multisample_transparency_range  Not Supported
GL_AMD_blend_minmax_factor  Not Supported
GL_AMD_compressed_3DC_texture  Not Supported
GL_AMD_compressed_ATC_texture  Not Supported
GL_AMD_conservative_depth  Not Supported
GL_AMD_debug_output  Not Supported
GL_AMD_depth_clamp_separate  Not Supported
GL_AMD_draw_buffers_blend  Not Supported
GL_AMD_framebuffer_sample_positions  Not Supported
GL_AMD_gcn_shader  Not Supported
GL_AMD_gpu_shader_half_float  Not Supported
GL_AMD_gpu_shader_half_float2  Not Supported
GL_AMD_gpu_shader_int64  Not Supported
GL_AMD_interleaved_elements  Not Supported
GL_AMD_multi_draw_indirect  Supported
GL_AMD_name_gen_delete  Not Supported
GL_AMD_occlusion_query_event  Not Supported
GL_AMD_performance_monitor  Not Supported
GL_AMD_pinned_memory  Not Supported
GL_AMD_program_binary_Z400  Not Supported
GL_AMD_query_buffer_object  Not Supported
GL_AMD_sample_positions  Not Supported
GL_AMD_seamless_cubemap_per_texture  Not Supported
GL_AMD_shader_atomic_counter_ops  Not Supported
GL_AMD_shader_stencil_export  Not Supported
GL_AMD_shader_stencil_value_export  Not Supported
GL_AMD_shader_trace  Not Supported
GL_AMD_shader_trinary_minmax  Not Supported
GL_AMD_sparse_texture  Not Supported
GL_AMD_sparse_texture_pool  Not Supported
GL_AMD_stencil_operation_extended  Not Supported
GL_AMD_texture_compression_dxt6  Not Supported
GL_AMD_texture_compression_dxt7  Not Supported
GL_AMD_texture_cube_map_array  Not Supported
GL_AMD_texture_texture4  Not Supported
GL_AMD_texture_tile_pool  Not Supported
GL_AMD_transform_feedback3_lines_triangles  Not Supported
GL_AMD_transform_feedback4  Not Supported
GL_AMD_vertex_shader_layer  Not Supported
GL_AMD_vertex_shader_tessellator  Not Supported
GL_AMD_vertex_shader_viewport_index  Not Supported
GL_AMDX_debug_output  Not Supported
GL_AMDX_name_gen_delete  Not Supported
GL_AMDX_random_access_target  Not Supported
GL_AMDX_vertex_shader_tessellator  Not Supported
GL_ANDROID_extension_pack_es31a  Not Supported
GL_ANGLE_depth_texture  Not Supported
GL_ANGLE_framebuffer_blit  Not Supported
GL_ANGLE_framebuffer_multisample  Not Supported
GL_ANGLE_instanced_arrays  Not Supported
GL_ANGLE_pack_reverse_row_order  Not Supported
GL_ANGLE_program_binary  Not Supported
GL_ANGLE_texture_compression_dxt1  Not Supported
GL_ANGLE_texture_compression_dxt3  Not Supported
GL_ANGLE_texture_compression_dxt5  Not Supported
GL_ANGLE_texture_usage  Not Supported
GL_ANGLE_translated_shader_source  Not Supported
GL_APPLE_aux_depth_stencil  Not Supported
GL_APPLE_client_storage  Not Supported
GL_APPLE_copy_texture_levels  Not Supported
GL_APPLE_element_array  Not Supported
GL_APPLE_fence  Not Supported
GL_APPLE_float_pixels  Not Supported
GL_APPLE_flush_buffer_range  Not Supported
GL_APPLE_flush_render  Not Supported
GL_APPLE_framebuffer_multisample  Not Supported
GL_APPLE_object_purgeable  Not Supported
GL_APPLE_packed_pixel  Not Supported
GL_APPLE_packed_pixels  Not Supported
GL_APPLE_pixel_buffer  Not Supported
GL_APPLE_rgb_422  Not Supported
GL_APPLE_row_bytes  Not Supported
GL_APPLE_specular_vector  Not Supported
GL_APPLE_sync  Not Supported
GL_APPLE_texture_2D_limited_npot  Not Supported
GL_APPLE_texture_format_BGRA8888  Not Supported
GL_APPLE_texture_max_level  Not Supported
GL_APPLE_texture_range  Not Supported
GL_APPLE_transform_hint  Not Supported
GL_APPLE_vertex_array_object  Not Supported
GL_APPLE_vertex_array_range  Not Supported
GL_APPLE_vertex_point_size  Not Supported
GL_APPLE_vertex_program_evaluators  Not Supported
GL_APPLE_ycbcr_422  Not Supported
GL_ARB_arrays_of_arrays  Supported
GL_ARB_base_instance  Supported
GL_ARB_bindless_texture  Not Supported
GL_ARB_blend_func_extended  Supported
GL_ARB_buffer_storage  Supported
GL_ARB_cl_event  Not Supported
GL_ARB_clear_buffer_object  Supported
GL_ARB_clear_texture  Supported
GL_ARB_clip_control  Supported
GL_ARB_color_buffer_float  Supported
GL_ARB_compatibility  Supported
GL_ARB_compressed_texture_pixel_storage  Supported
GL_ARB_compute_shader  Supported
GL_ARB_compute_variable_group_size  Supported
GL_ARB_conditional_render_inverted  Supported
GL_ARB_conservative_depth  Supported
GL_ARB_context_flush_control  Not Supported
GL_ARB_copy_buffer  Supported
GL_ARB_copy_image  Supported
GL_ARB_cull_distance  Supported
GL_ARB_debug_group  Not Supported
GL_ARB_debug_label  Not Supported
GL_ARB_debug_output  Supported
GL_ARB_debug_output2  Not Supported
GL_ARB_depth_buffer_float  Supported
GL_ARB_depth_clamp  Supported
GL_ARB_depth_texture  Supported
GL_ARB_derivative_control  Supported
GL_ARB_direct_state_access  Supported
GL_ARB_draw_buffers  Supported
GL_ARB_draw_buffers_blend  Supported
GL_ARB_draw_elements_base_vertex  Supported
GL_ARB_draw_indirect  Supported
GL_ARB_draw_instanced  Supported
GL_ARB_enhanced_layouts  Supported
GL_ARB_ES2_compatibility  Supported
GL_ARB_ES3_1_compatibility  Supported
GL_ARB_ES3_2_compatibility  Supported
GL_ARB_ES3_compatibility  Supported
GL_ARB_explicit_attrib_location  Supported
GL_ARB_explicit_uniform_location  Supported
GL_ARB_fragment_coord_conventions  Supported
GL_ARB_fragment_layer_viewport  Supported
GL_ARB_fragment_program  Supported
GL_ARB_fragment_program_shadow  Supported
GL_ARB_fragment_shader  Supported
GL_ARB_fragment_shader_interlock  Not Supported
GL_ARB_framebuffer_no_attachments  Supported
GL_ARB_framebuffer_object  Supported
GL_ARB_framebuffer_sRGB  Supported
GL_ARB_geometry_shader4  Supported
GL_ARB_get_program_binary  Supported
GL_ARB_get_texture_sub_image  Supported
GL_ARB_gl_spirv  Supported
GL_ARB_gpu_shader_fp64  Supported
GL_ARB_gpu_shader_int64  Supported
GL_ARB_gpu_shader5  Supported
GL_ARB_half_float_pixel  Supported
GL_ARB_half_float_vertex  Supported
GL_ARB_imaging  Supported
GL_ARB_indirect_parameters  Supported
GL_ARB_instanced_arrays  Supported
GL_ARB_internalformat_query  Supported
GL_ARB_internalformat_query2  Supported
GL_ARB_invalidate_subdata  Supported
GL_ARB_make_current_read  Not Supported
GL_ARB_map_buffer_alignment  Supported
GL_ARB_map_buffer_range  Supported
GL_ARB_matrix_palette  Not Supported
GL_ARB_multi_bind  Supported
GL_ARB_multi_draw_indirect  Supported
GL_ARB_multisample  Supported
GL_ARB_multitexture  Supported
GL_ARB_occlusion_query  Supported
GL_ARB_occlusion_query2  Supported
GL_ARB_parallel_shader_compile  Supported
GL_ARB_pipeline_statistics_query  Supported
GL_ARB_pixel_buffer_object  Supported
GL_ARB_point_parameters  Supported
GL_ARB_point_sprite  Supported
GL_ARB_post_depth_coverage  Not Supported
GL_ARB_program_interface_query  Supported
GL_ARB_provoking_vertex  Supported
GL_ARB_query_buffer_object  Supported
GL_ARB_robust_buffer_access_behavior  Supported
GL_ARB_robustness  Supported
GL_ARB_robustness_isolation  Not Supported
GL_ARB_sample_locations  Not Supported
GL_ARB_sample_shading  Supported
GL_ARB_sampler_objects  Supported
GL_ARB_seamless_cube_map  Supported
GL_ARB_seamless_cubemap_per_texture  Not Supported
GL_ARB_separate_shader_objects  Supported
GL_ARB_shader_atomic_counter_ops  Supported
GL_ARB_shader_atomic_counters  Supported
GL_ARB_shader_ballot  Not Supported
GL_ARB_shader_bit_encoding  Supported
GL_ARB_shader_clock  Not Supported
GL_ARB_shader_draw_parameters  Supported
GL_ARB_shader_group_vote  Supported
GL_ARB_shader_image_load_store  Supported
GL_ARB_shader_image_size  Supported
GL_ARB_shader_objects  Supported
GL_ARB_shader_precision  Supported
GL_ARB_shader_stencil_export  Not Supported
GL_ARB_shader_storage_buffer_object  Supported
GL_ARB_shader_subroutine  Supported
GL_ARB_shader_texture_image_samples  Supported
GL_ARB_shader_texture_lod  Supported
GL_ARB_shader_viewport_layer_array  Not Supported
GL_ARB_shading_language_100  Supported
GL_ARB_shading_language_120  Not Supported
GL_ARB_shading_language_420pack  Supported
GL_ARB_shading_language_include  Supported
GL_ARB_shading_language_packing  Supported
GL_ARB_shadow  Supported
GL_ARB_shadow_ambient  Not Supported
GL_ARB_sparse_buffer  Supported
GL_ARB_sparse_texture  Supported
GL_ARB_sparse_texture_clamp  Not Supported
GL_ARB_sparse_texture2  Not Supported
GL_ARB_stencil_texturing  Supported
GL_ARB_swap_buffers  Not Supported
GL_ARB_sync  Supported
GL_ARB_tessellation_shader  Supported
GL_ARB_texture_barrier  Supported
GL_ARB_texture_border_clamp  Supported
GL_ARB_texture_buffer_object  Supported
GL_ARB_texture_buffer_object_rgb32  Supported
GL_ARB_texture_buffer_range  Supported
GL_ARB_texture_compression  Supported
GL_ARB_texture_compression_bptc  Supported
GL_ARB_texture_compression_rgtc  Supported
GL_ARB_texture_compression_rtgc  Not Supported
GL_ARB_texture_cube_map  Supported
GL_ARB_texture_cube_map_array  Supported
GL_ARB_texture_env_add  Supported
GL_ARB_texture_env_combine  Supported
GL_ARB_texture_env_crossbar  Supported
GL_ARB_texture_env_dot3  Supported
GL_ARB_texture_filter_minmax  Not Supported
GL_ARB_texture_float  Supported
GL_ARB_texture_gather  Supported
GL_ARB_texture_mirror_clamp_to_edge  Supported
GL_ARB_texture_mirrored_repeat  Supported
GL_ARB_texture_multisample  Supported
GL_ARB_texture_non_power_of_two  Supported
GL_ARB_texture_query_levels  Supported
GL_ARB_texture_query_lod  Supported
GL_ARB_texture_rectangle  Supported
GL_ARB_texture_rg  Supported
GL_ARB_texture_rgb10_a2ui  Supported
GL_ARB_texture_snorm  Not Supported
GL_ARB_texture_stencil8  Supported
GL_ARB_texture_storage  Supported
GL_ARB_texture_storage_multisample  Supported
GL_ARB_texture_swizzle  Supported
GL_ARB_texture_view  Supported
GL_ARB_timer_query  Supported
GL_ARB_transform_feedback_instanced  Supported
GL_ARB_transform_feedback_overflow_query  Supported
GL_ARB_transform_feedback2  Supported
GL_ARB_transform_feedback3  Supported
GL_ARB_transpose_matrix  Supported
GL_ARB_uber_buffers  Not Supported
GL_ARB_uber_mem_image  Not Supported
GL_ARB_uber_vertex_array  Not Supported
GL_ARB_uniform_buffer_object  Supported
GL_ARB_vertex_array_bgra  Supported
GL_ARB_vertex_array_object  Supported
GL_ARB_vertex_attrib_64bit  Supported
GL_ARB_vertex_attrib_binding  Supported
GL_ARB_vertex_blend  Not Supported
GL_ARB_vertex_buffer_object  Supported
GL_ARB_vertex_program  Supported
GL_ARB_vertex_shader  Supported
GL_ARB_vertex_type_10f_11f_11f_rev  Supported
GL_ARB_vertex_type_2_10_10_10_rev  Supported
GL_ARB_viewport_array  Supported
GL_ARB_window_pos  Supported
GL_ARM_mali_program_binary  Not Supported
GL_ARM_mali_shader_binary  Not Supported
GL_ARM_rgba8  Not Supported
GL_ARM_shader_framebuffer_fetch  Not Supported
GL_ARM_shader_framebuffer_fetch_depth_stencil  Not Supported
GL_ATI_array_rev_comps_in_4_bytes  Not Supported
GL_ATI_blend_equation_separate  Not Supported
GL_ATI_blend_weighted_minmax  Not Supported
GL_ATI_draw_buffers  Supported
GL_ATI_element_array  Not Supported
GL_ATI_envmap_bumpmap  Not Supported
GL_ATI_fragment_shader  Not Supported
GL_ATI_lock_texture  Not Supported
GL_ATI_map_object_buffer  Not Supported
GL_ATI_meminfo  Not Supported
GL_ATI_pixel_format_float  Not Supported
GL_ATI_pn_triangles  Not Supported
GL_ATI_point_cull_mode  Not Supported
GL_ATI_separate_stencil  Not Supported
GL_ATI_shader_texture_lod  Not Supported
GL_ATI_text_fragment_shader  Not Supported
GL_ATI_texture_compression_3dc  Not Supported
GL_ATI_texture_env_combine3  Not Supported
GL_ATI_texture_float  Supported
GL_ATI_texture_mirror_once  Supported
GL_ATI_vertex_array_object  Not Supported
GL_ATI_vertex_attrib_array_object  Not Supported
GL_ATI_vertex_blend  Not Supported
GL_ATI_vertex_shader  Not Supported
GL_ATI_vertex_streams  Not Supported
GL_ATIX_pn_triangles  Not Supported
GL_ATIX_texture_env_combine3  Not Supported
GL_ATIX_texture_env_route  Not Supported
GL_ATIX_vertex_shader_output_point_size  Not Supported
GL_Autodesk_facet_normal  Not Supported
GL_Autodesk_valid_back_buffer_hint  Not Supported
GL_CR_bounding_box  Not Supported
GL_CR_cursor_position  Not Supported
GL_CR_head_spu_name  Not Supported
GL_CR_performance_info  Not Supported
GL_CR_print_string  Not Supported
GL_CR_readback_barrier_size  Not Supported
GL_CR_saveframe  Not Supported
GL_CR_server_id_sharing  Not Supported
GL_CR_server_matrix  Not Supported
GL_CR_state_parameter  Not Supported
GL_CR_synchronization  Not Supported
GL_CR_tile_info  Not Supported
GL_CR_tilesort_info  Not Supported
GL_CR_window_size  Not Supported
GL_DIMD_YUV  Not Supported
GL_DMP_shader_binary  Not Supported
GL_EXT_422_pixels  Not Supported
GL_EXT_abgr  Supported
GL_EXT_bgra  Supported
GL_EXT_bindable_uniform  Supported
GL_EXT_blend_color  Supported
GL_EXT_blend_equation_separate  Supported
GL_EXT_blend_func_separate  Supported
GL_EXT_blend_logic_op  Not Supported
GL_EXT_blend_minmax  Supported
GL_EXT_blend_subtract  Supported
GL_EXT_Cg_shader  Supported
GL_EXT_clip_control  Not Supported
GL_EXT_clip_volume_hint  Not Supported
GL_EXT_cmyka  Not Supported
GL_EXT_color_buffer_float  Not Supported
GL_EXT_color_buffer_half_float  Not Supported
GL_EXT_color_matrix  Not Supported
GL_EXT_color_subtable  Not Supported
GL_EXT_color_table  Not Supported
GL_EXT_compiled_vertex_array  Supported
GL_EXT_convolution  Not Supported
GL_EXT_convolution_border_modes  Not Supported
GL_EXT_coordinate_frame  Not Supported
GL_EXT_copy_buffer  Not Supported
GL_EXT_copy_image  Not Supported
GL_EXT_copy_texture  Not Supported
GL_EXT_cull_vertex  Not Supported
GL_EXT_debug_label  Not Supported
GL_EXT_debug_marker  Not Supported
GL_EXT_depth_bounds_test  Supported
GL_EXT_depth_buffer_float  Not Supported
GL_EXT_direct_state_access  Supported
GL_EXT_discard_framebuffer  Not Supported
GL_EXT_disjoint_timer_query  Not Supported
GL_EXT_draw_buffers  Not Supported
GL_EXT_draw_buffers_indexed  Not Supported
GL_EXT_draw_buffers2  Supported
GL_EXT_draw_indirect  Not Supported
GL_EXT_draw_instanced  Supported
GL_EXT_draw_range_elements  Supported
GL_EXT_fog_coord  Supported
GL_EXT_fog_function  Not Supported
GL_EXT_fog_offset  Not Supported
GL_EXT_frag_depth  Not Supported
GL_EXT_fragment_lighting  Not Supported
GL_EXT_framebuffer_blit  Supported
GL_EXT_framebuffer_multisample  Supported
GL_EXT_framebuffer_multisample_blit_scaled  Supported
GL_EXT_framebuffer_object  Supported
GL_EXT_framebuffer_sRGB  Supported
GL_EXT_generate_mipmap  Not Supported
GL_EXT_geometry_point_size  Not Supported
GL_EXT_geometry_shader  Not Supported
GL_EXT_geometry_shader4  Supported
GL_EXT_glx_stereo_tree  Not Supported
GL_EXT_gpu_program_parameters  Supported
GL_EXT_gpu_shader_fp64  Not Supported
GL_EXT_gpu_shader4  Supported
GL_EXT_gpu_shader5  Not Supported
GL_EXT_histogram  Not Supported
GL_EXT_import_sync_object  Supported
GL_EXT_index_array_formats  Not Supported
GL_EXT_index_func  Not Supported
GL_EXT_index_material  Not Supported
GL_EXT_index_texture  Not Supported
GL_EXT_instanced_arrays  Not Supported
GL_EXT_interlace  Not Supported
GL_EXT_light_texture  Not Supported
GL_EXT_map_buffer_range  Not Supported
GL_EXT_misc_attribute  Not Supported
GL_EXT_multi_draw_arrays  Supported
GL_EXT_multisample  Not Supported
GL_EXT_multisampled_render_to_texture  Not Supported
GL_EXT_multiview_draw_buffers  Not Supported
GL_EXT_occlusion_query_boolean  Not Supported
GL_EXT_packed_depth_stencil  Supported
GL_EXT_packed_float  Supported
GL_EXT_packed_pixels  Supported
GL_EXT_packed_pixels_12  Not Supported
GL_EXT_paletted_texture  Not Supported
GL_EXT_pixel_buffer_object  Supported
GL_EXT_pixel_format  Not Supported
GL_EXT_pixel_texture  Not Supported
GL_EXT_pixel_transform  Not Supported
GL_EXT_pixel_transform_color_table  Not Supported
GL_EXT_point_parameters  Supported
GL_EXT_polygon_offset  Not Supported
GL_EXT_polygon_offset_clamp  Supported
GL_EXT_post_depth_coverage  Not Supported
GL_EXT_primitive_bounding_box  Not Supported
GL_EXT_provoking_vertex  Supported
GL_EXT_pvrtc_sRGB  Not Supported
GL_EXT_raster_multisample  Not Supported
GL_EXT_read_format_bgra  Not Supported
GL_EXT_rescale_normal  Supported
GL_EXT_robustness  Not Supported
GL_EXT_scene_marker  Not Supported
GL_EXT_secondary_color  Supported
GL_EXT_separate_shader_objects  Supported
GL_EXT_separate_specular_color  Supported
GL_EXT_shader_atomic_counters  Not Supported
GL_EXT_shader_framebuffer_fetch  Not Supported
GL_EXT_shader_image_load_formatted  Not Supported
GL_EXT_shader_image_load_store  Supported
GL_EXT_shader_implicit_conversions  Not Supported
GL_EXT_shader_integer_mix  Supported
GL_EXT_shader_io_blocks  Not Supported
GL_EXT_shader_pixel_local_storage  Not Supported
GL_EXT_shader_subroutine  Not Supported
GL_EXT_shader_texture_lod  Not Supported
GL_EXT_shadow_funcs  Supported
GL_EXT_shadow_samplers  Not Supported
GL_EXT_shared_texture_palette  Not Supported
GL_EXT_sparse_texture2  Not Supported
GL_EXT_sRGB  Not Supported
GL_EXT_sRGB_write_control  Not Supported
GL_EXT_static_vertex_array  Not Supported
GL_EXT_stencil_clear_tag  Not Supported
GL_EXT_stencil_two_side  Supported
GL_EXT_stencil_wrap  Supported
GL_EXT_subtexture  Not Supported
GL_EXT_swap_control  Not Supported
GL_EXT_tessellation_point_size  Not Supported
GL_EXT_tessellation_shader  Not Supported
GL_EXT_texgen_reflection  Not Supported
GL_EXT_texture  Not Supported
GL_EXT_texture_array  Supported
GL_EXT_texture_border_clamp  Not Supported
GL_EXT_texture_buffer  Not Supported
GL_EXT_texture_buffer_object  Supported
GL_EXT_texture_buffer_object_rgb32  Not Supported
GL_EXT_texture_color_table  Not Supported
GL_EXT_texture_compression_bptc  Not Supported
GL_EXT_texture_compression_dxt1  Supported
GL_EXT_texture_compression_latc  Supported
GL_EXT_texture_compression_rgtc  Supported
GL_EXT_texture_compression_s3tc  Supported
GL_EXT_texture_cube_map  Supported
GL_EXT_texture_cube_map_array  Not Supported
GL_EXT_texture_edge_clamp  Supported
GL_EXT_texture_env  Not Supported
GL_EXT_texture_env_add  Supported
GL_EXT_texture_env_combine  Supported
GL_EXT_texture_env_dot3  Supported
GL_EXT_texture_filter_anisotropic  Supported
GL_EXT_texture_filter_minmax  Not Supported
GL_EXT_texture_format_BGRA8888  Not Supported
GL_EXT_texture_integer  Supported
GL_EXT_texture_lod  Supported
GL_EXT_texture_lod_bias  Supported
GL_EXT_texture_mirror_clamp  Supported
GL_EXT_texture_object  Supported
GL_EXT_texture_perturb_normal  Not Supported
GL_EXT_texture_rectangle  Not Supported
GL_EXT_texture_rg  Not Supported
GL_EXT_texture_shared_exponent  Supported
GL_EXT_texture_snorm  Not Supported
GL_EXT_texture_sRGB  Supported
GL_EXT_texture_sRGB_decode  Supported
GL_EXT_texture_storage  Supported
GL_EXT_texture_swizzle  Supported
GL_EXT_texture_type_2_10_10_10_REV  Not Supported
GL_EXT_texture_view  Not Supported
GL_EXT_texture3D  Supported
GL_EXT_texture4D  Not Supported
GL_EXT_timer_query  Supported
GL_EXT_transform_feedback  Not Supported
GL_EXT_transform_feedback2  Supported
GL_EXT_transform_feedback3  Not Supported
GL_EXT_unpack_subimage  Not Supported
GL_EXT_vertex_array  Supported
GL_EXT_vertex_array_bgra  Supported
GL_EXT_vertex_array_set  Not Supported
GL_EXT_vertex_array_setXXX  Not Supported
GL_EXT_vertex_attrib_64bit  Supported
GL_EXT_vertex_shader  Not Supported
GL_EXT_vertex_weighting  Not Supported
GL_EXT_window_rectangles  Supported
GL_EXT_x11_sync_object  Not Supported
GL_EXTX_framebuffer_mixed_formats  Supported
GL_EXTX_packed_depth_stencil  Not Supported
GL_FGL_lock_texture  Not Supported
GL_FJ_shader_binary_GCCSO  Not Supported
GL_GL2_geometry_shader  Not Supported
GL_GREMEDY_frame_terminator  Not Supported
GL_GREMEDY_string_marker  Not Supported
GL_HP_convolution_border_modes  Not Supported
GL_HP_image_transform  Not Supported
GL_HP_occlusion_test  Not Supported
GL_HP_texture_lighting  Not Supported
GL_I3D_argb  Not Supported
GL_I3D_color_clamp  Not Supported
GL_I3D_interlace_read  Not Supported
GL_IBM_clip_check  Not Supported
GL_IBM_cull_vertex  Not Supported
GL_IBM_load_named_matrix  Not Supported
GL_IBM_multi_draw_arrays  Not Supported
GL_IBM_multimode_draw_arrays  Not Supported
GL_IBM_occlusion_cull  Not Supported
GL_IBM_pixel_filter_hint  Not Supported
GL_IBM_rasterpos_clip  Supported
GL_IBM_rescale_normal  Not Supported
GL_IBM_static_data  Not Supported
GL_IBM_texture_clamp_nodraw  Not Supported
GL_IBM_texture_mirrored_repeat  Supported
GL_IBM_vertex_array_lists  Not Supported
GL_IBM_YCbCr  Not Supported
GL_IMG_multisampled_render_to_texture  Not Supported
GL_IMG_program_binary  Not Supported
GL_IMG_read_format  Not Supported
GL_IMG_sgx_binary  Not Supported
GL_IMG_shader_binary  Not Supported
GL_IMG_texture_compression_pvrtc  Not Supported
GL_IMG_texture_compression_pvrtc2  Not Supported
GL_IMG_texture_env_enhanced_fixed_function  Not Supported
GL_IMG_texture_format_BGRA8888  Not Supported
GL_IMG_user_clip_plane  Not Supported
GL_IMG_vertex_program  Not Supported
GL_INGR_blend_func_separate  Not Supported
GL_INGR_color_clamp  Not Supported
GL_INGR_interlace_read  Not Supported
GL_INGR_multiple_palette  Not Supported
GL_INTEL_compute_shader_lane_shift  Not Supported
GL_INTEL_conservative_rasterization  Not Supported
GL_INTEL_fragment_shader_ordering  Not Supported
GL_INTEL_fragment_shader_span_sharing  Not Supported
GL_INTEL_framebuffer_CMAA  Not Supported
GL_INTEL_image_serialize  Not Supported
GL_INTEL_map_texture  Not Supported
GL_INTEL_multi_rate_fragment_shader  Not Supported
GL_INTEL_parallel_arrays  Not Supported
GL_INTEL_performance_queries  Not Supported
GL_INTEL_performance_query  Not Supported
GL_INTEL_texture_scissor  Not Supported
GL_KHR_blend_equation_advanced  Supported
GL_KHR_blend_equation_advanced_coherent  Not Supported
GL_KHR_context_flush_control  Supported
GL_KHR_debug  Supported
GL_KHR_no_error  Supported
GL_KHR_robust_buffer_access_behavior  Supported
GL_KHR_robustness  Supported
GL_KHR_texture_compression_astc_hdr  Not Supported
GL_KHR_texture_compression_astc_ldr  Not Supported
GL_KHR_vulkan_glsl  Not Supported
GL_KTX_buffer_region  Supported
GL_MESA_pack_invert  Not Supported
GL_MESA_program_debug  Not Supported
GL_MESA_resize_buffers  Not Supported
GL_MESA_texture_array  Not Supported
GL_MESA_texture_signed_rgba  Not Supported
GL_MESA_window_pos  Not Supported
GL_MESA_ycbcr_texture  Not Supported
GL_MESAX_texture_float  Not Supported
GL_MESAX_texture_stack  Not Supported
GL_MTX_fragment_shader  Not Supported
GL_MTX_precision_dpi  Not Supported
GL_NV_3dvision_settings  Not Supported
GL_NV_alpha_test  Not Supported
GL_NV_alpha_to_coverage_dither_control  Supported
GL_NV_bgr  Not Supported
GL_NV_bindless_multi_draw_indirect  Supported
GL_NV_bindless_multi_draw_indirect_count  Supported
GL_NV_bindless_texture  Not Supported
GL_NV_blend_equation_advanced  Supported
GL_NV_blend_equation_advanced_coherent  Not Supported
GL_NV_blend_minmax  Not Supported
GL_NV_blend_square  Supported
GL_NV_centroid_sample  Not Supported
GL_NV_clip_space_w_scaling  Not Supported
GL_NV_command_list  Supported
GL_NV_complex_primitives  Not Supported
GL_NV_compute_program5  Supported
GL_NV_conditional_render  Supported
GL_NV_conservative_raster  Not Supported
GL_NV_conservative_raster_dilate  Not Supported
GL_NV_conservative_raster_pre_snap_triangles  Not Supported
GL_NV_copy_buffer  Not Supported
GL_NV_copy_depth_to_color  Supported
GL_NV_copy_image  Supported
GL_NV_coverage_sample  Not Supported
GL_NV_deep_texture3D  Not Supported
GL_NV_depth_buffer_float  Supported
GL_NV_depth_clamp  Supported
GL_NV_depth_nonlinear  Not Supported
GL_NV_depth_range_unclamped  Not Supported
GL_NV_draw_buffers  Not Supported
GL_NV_draw_instanced  Not Supported
GL_NV_draw_texture  Supported
GL_NV_draw_vulkan_image  Not Supported
GL_NV_EGL_stream_consumer_external  Not Supported
GL_NV_ES1_1_compatibility  Supported
GL_NV_ES3_1_compatibility  Supported
GL_NV_evaluators  Not Supported
GL_NV_explicit_attrib_location  Not Supported
GL_NV_explicit_multisample  Supported
GL_NV_fbo_color_attachments  Not Supported
GL_NV_fence  Supported
GL_NV_fill_rectangle  Not Supported
GL_NV_float_buffer  Supported
GL_NV_fog_distance  Supported
GL_NV_fragdepth  Not Supported
GL_NV_fragment_coverage_to_color  Not Supported
GL_NV_fragment_program  Supported
GL_NV_fragment_program_option  Supported
GL_NV_fragment_program2  Supported
GL_NV_fragment_program4  Not Supported
GL_NV_fragment_shader_interlock  Not Supported
GL_NV_framebuffer_blit  Not Supported
GL_NV_framebuffer_mixed_samples  Not Supported
GL_NV_framebuffer_multisample  Not Supported
GL_NV_framebuffer_multisample_coverage  Supported
GL_NV_framebuffer_multisample_ex  Not Supported
GL_NV_generate_mipmap_sRGB  Not Supported
GL_NV_geometry_program4  Not Supported
GL_NV_geometry_shader_passthrough  Not Supported
GL_NV_geometry_shader4  Supported
GL_NV_gpu_program_fp64  Supported
GL_NV_gpu_program4  Supported
GL_NV_gpu_program4_1  Supported
GL_NV_gpu_program5  Supported
GL_NV_gpu_program5_mem_extended  Supported
GL_NV_gpu_shader5  Supported
GL_NV_half_float  Supported
GL_NV_instanced_arrays  Not Supported
GL_NV_internalformat_sample_query  Supported
GL_NV_light_max_exponent  Supported
GL_NV_multisample_coverage  Supported
GL_NV_multisample_filter_hint  Supported
GL_NV_non_square_matrices  Not Supported
GL_NV_occlusion_query  Supported
GL_NV_pack_subimage  Not Supported
GL_NV_packed_depth_stencil  Supported
GL_NV_packed_float  Not Supported
GL_NV_packed_float_linear  Not Supported
GL_NV_parameter_buffer_object  Supported
GL_NV_parameter_buffer_object2  Supported
GL_NV_path_rendering  Supported
GL_NV_path_rendering_shared_edge  Not Supported
GL_NV_pixel_buffer_object  Not Supported
GL_NV_pixel_data_range  Supported
GL_NV_platform_binary  Not Supported
GL_NV_point_sprite  Supported
GL_NV_present_video  Not Supported
GL_NV_primitive_restart  Supported
GL_NV_read_buffer  Not Supported
GL_NV_read_buffer_front  Not Supported
GL_NV_read_depth  Not Supported
GL_NV_read_depth_stencil  Not Supported
GL_NV_read_stencil  Not Supported
GL_NV_register_combiners  Supported
GL_NV_register_combiners2  Supported
GL_NV_robustness_video_memory_purge  Not Supported
GL_NV_sample_locations  Not Supported
GL_NV_sample_mask_override_coverage  Not Supported
GL_NV_shader_atomic_counters  Supported
GL_NV_shader_atomic_float  Supported
GL_NV_shader_atomic_float64  Not Supported
GL_NV_shader_atomic_fp16_vector  Not Supported
GL_NV_shader_atomic_int64  Not Supported
GL_NV_shader_buffer_load  Supported
GL_NV_shader_buffer_store  Not Supported
GL_NV_shader_storage_buffer_object  Supported
GL_NV_shader_thread_group  Supported
GL_NV_shader_thread_shuffle  Not Supported
GL_NV_shadow_samplers_array  Not Supported
GL_NV_shadow_samplers_cube  Not Supported
GL_NV_sRGB_formats  Not Supported
GL_NV_stereo_view_rendering  Not Supported
GL_NV_tessellation_program5  Not Supported
GL_NV_texgen_emboss  Not Supported
GL_NV_texgen_reflection  Supported
GL_NV_texture_array  Not Supported
GL_NV_texture_barrier  Supported
GL_NV_texture_border_clamp  Not Supported
GL_NV_texture_compression_latc  Not Supported
GL_NV_texture_compression_s3tc  Not Supported
GL_NV_texture_compression_s3tc_update  Not Supported
GL_NV_texture_compression_vtc  Supported
GL_NV_texture_env_combine4  Supported
GL_NV_texture_expand_normal  Not Supported
GL_NV_texture_lod_clamp  Not Supported
GL_NV_texture_multisample  Supported
GL_NV_texture_npot_2D_mipmap  Not Supported
GL_NV_texture_rectangle  Supported
GL_NV_texture_shader  Supported
GL_NV_texture_shader2  Supported
GL_NV_texture_shader3  Supported
GL_NV_timer_query  Not Supported
GL_NV_transform_feedback  Supported
GL_NV_transform_feedback2  Supported
GL_NV_uniform_buffer_unified_memory  Supported
GL_NV_vdpau_interop  Not Supported
GL_NV_vertex_array_range  Supported
GL_NV_vertex_array_range2  Supported
GL_NV_vertex_attrib_64bit  Not Supported
GL_NV_vertex_attrib_integer_64bit  Supported
GL_NV_vertex_buffer_unified_memory  Supported
GL_NV_vertex_program  Supported
GL_NV_vertex_program1_1  Supported
GL_NV_vertex_program2  Supported
GL_NV_vertex_program2_option  Supported
GL_NV_vertex_program3  Supported
GL_NV_vertex_program4  Not Supported
GL_NV_video_capture  Not Supported
GL_NV_viewport_array2  Not Supported
GL_NV_viewport_swizzle  Not Supported
GL_NVX_blend_equation_advanced_multi_draw_buffers  Not Supported
GL_NVX_conditional_render  Supported
GL_NVX_flush_hold  Not Supported
GL_NVX_gpu_memory_info  Supported
GL_NVX_instanced_arrays  Not Supported
GL_NVX_multigpu_info  Supported
GL_NVX_nvenc_interop  Not Supported
GL_NVX_shader_thread_group  Not Supported
GL_NVX_shader_thread_shuffle  Not Supported
GL_NVX_shared_sync_object  Not Supported
GL_NVX_sysmem_buffer  Not Supported
GL_NVX_ycrcb  Not Supported
GL_OES_blend_equation_separate  Not Supported
GL_OES_blend_func_separate  Not Supported
GL_OES_blend_subtract  Not Supported
GL_OES_byte_coordinates  Not Supported
GL_OES_compressed_EAC_R11_signed_texture  Not Supported
GL_OES_compressed_EAC_R11_unsigned_texture  Not Supported
GL_OES_compressed_EAC_RG11_signed_texture  Not Supported
GL_OES_compressed_EAC_RG11_unsigned_texture  Not Supported
GL_OES_compressed_ETC1_RGB8_texture  Not Supported
GL_OES_compressed_ETC2_punchthroughA_RGBA8_texture  Not Supported
GL_OES_compressed_ETC2_punchthroughA_sRGB8_alpha_texture  Not Supported
GL_OES_compressed_ETC2_RGB8_texture  Not Supported
GL_OES_compressed_ETC2_RGBA8_texture  Not Supported
GL_OES_compressed_ETC2_sRGB8_alpha8_texture  Not Supported
GL_OES_compressed_ETC2_sRGB8_texture  Not Supported
GL_OES_compressed_paletted_texture  Not Supported
GL_OES_conditional_query  Not Supported
GL_OES_depth_texture  Not Supported
GL_OES_depth_texture_cube_map  Not Supported
GL_OES_depth24  Not Supported
GL_OES_depth32  Not Supported
GL_OES_draw_texture  Not Supported
GL_OES_EGL_image  Not Supported
GL_OES_EGL_image_external  Not Supported
GL_OES_EGL_sync  Not Supported
GL_OES_element_index_uint  Not Supported
GL_OES_extended_matrix_palette  Not Supported
GL_OES_fbo_render_mipmap  Not Supported
GL_OES_fixed_point  Not Supported
GL_OES_fragment_precision_high  Not Supported
GL_OES_framebuffer_object  Not Supported
GL_OES_get_program_binary  Not Supported
GL_OES_mapbuffer  Not Supported
GL_OES_matrix_get  Not Supported
GL_OES_matrix_palette  Not Supported
GL_OES_packed_depth_stencil  Not Supported
GL_OES_point_size_array  Not Supported
GL_OES_point_sprite  Not Supported
GL_OES_query_matrix  Not Supported
GL_OES_read_format  Not Supported
GL_OES_required_internalformat  Not Supported
GL_OES_rgb8_rgba8  Not Supported
GL_OES_sample_shading  Not Supported
GL_OES_sample_variables  Not Supported
GL_OES_shader_image_atomic  Not Supported
GL_OES_shader_multisample_interpolation  Not Supported
GL_OES_single_precision  Not Supported
GL_OES_standard_derivatives  Not Supported
GL_OES_stencil_wrap  Not Supported
GL_OES_stencil1  Not Supported
GL_OES_stencil4  Not Supported
GL_OES_stencil8  Not Supported
GL_OES_surfaceless_context  Not Supported
GL_OES_texture_3D  Not Supported
GL_OES_texture_compression_astc  Not Supported
GL_OES_texture_cube_map  Not Supported
GL_OES_texture_env_crossbar  Not Supported
GL_OES_texture_float  Not Supported
GL_OES_texture_float_linear  Not Supported
GL_OES_texture_half_float  Not Supported
GL_OES_texture_half_float_linear  Not Supported
GL_OES_texture_mirrored_repeat  Not Supported
GL_OES_texture_npot  Not Supported
GL_OES_texture_stencil8  Not Supported
GL_OES_texture_storage_multisample_2d_array  Not Supported
GL_OES_vertex_array_object  Not Supported
GL_OES_vertex_half_float  Not Supported
GL_OES_vertex_type_10_10_10_2  Not Supported
GL_OML_interlace  Not Supported
GL_OML_resample  Not Supported
GL_OML_subsample  Not Supported
GL_PGI_misc_hints  Not Supported
GL_PGI_vertex_hints  Not Supported
GL_QCOM_alpha_test  Not Supported
GL_QCOM_binning_control  Not Supported
GL_QCOM_driver_control  Not Supported
GL_QCOM_extended_get  Not Supported
GL_QCOM_extended_get2  Not Supported
GL_QCOM_perfmon_global_mode  Not Supported
GL_QCOM_tiled_rendering  Not Supported
GL_QCOM_writeonly_rendering  Not Supported
GL_REND_screen_coordinates  Not Supported
GL_S3_performance_analyzer  Not Supported
GL_S3_s3tc  Supported
GL_SGI_color_matrix  Not Supported
GL_SGI_color_table  Not Supported
GL_SGI_compiled_vertex_array  Not Supported
GL_SGI_cull_vertex  Not Supported
GL_SGI_index_array_formats  Not Supported
GL_SGI_index_func  Not Supported
GL_SGI_index_material  Not Supported
GL_SGI_index_texture  Not Supported
GL_SGI_make_current_read  Not Supported
GL_SGI_texture_add_env  Not Supported
GL_SGI_texture_color_table  Not Supported
GL_SGI_texture_edge_clamp  Not Supported
GL_SGI_texture_lod  Not Supported
GL_SGIS_color_range  Not Supported
GL_SGIS_detail_texture  Not Supported
GL_SGIS_fog_function  Not Supported
GL_SGIS_generate_mipmap  Supported
GL_SGIS_multisample  Not Supported
GL_SGIS_multitexture  Not Supported
GL_SGIS_pixel_texture  Not Supported
GL_SGIS_point_line_texgen  Not Supported
GL_SGIS_sharpen_texture  Not Supported
GL_SGIS_texture_border_clamp  Not Supported
GL_SGIS_texture_color_mask  Not Supported
GL_SGIS_texture_edge_clamp  Not Supported
GL_SGIS_texture_filter4  Not Supported
GL_SGIS_texture_lod  Supported
GL_SGIS_texture_select  Not Supported
GL_SGIS_texture4D  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_async  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_async_histogram  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_async_pixel  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_blend_alpha_minmax  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_clipmap  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_convolution_accuracy  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_depth_pass_instrument  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_depth_texture  Supported
GL_SGIX_flush_raster  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_fog_offset  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_fog_texture  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_fragment_specular_lighting  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_framezoom  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_instruments  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_interlace  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_ir_instrument1  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_list_priority  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_pbuffer  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_pixel_texture  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_pixel_texture_bits  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_reference_plane  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_resample  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_shadow  Supported
GL_SGIX_shadow_ambient  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_sprite  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_subsample  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_tag_sample_buffer  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_texture_add_env  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_texture_coordinate_clamp  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_texture_lod_bias  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_texture_multi_buffer  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_texture_range  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_texture_scale_bias  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_vertex_preclip  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_vertex_preclip_hint  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_ycrcb  Not Supported
GL_SGIX_ycrcb_subsample  Not Supported
GL_SUN_convolution_border_modes  Not Supported
GL_SUN_global_alpha  Not Supported
GL_SUN_mesh_array  Not Supported
GL_SUN_multi_draw_arrays  Not Supported
GL_SUN_read_video_pixels  Not Supported
GL_SUN_slice_accum  Supported
GL_SUN_triangle_list  Not Supported
GL_SUN_vertex  Not Supported
GL_SUNX_constant_data  Not Supported
GL_VIV_shader_binary  Not Supported
GL_WGL_ARB_extensions_string  Not Supported
GL_WGL_EXT_extensions_string  Not Supported
GL_WGL_EXT_swap_control  Not Supported
GL_WIN_phong_shading  Not Supported
GL_WIN_specular_fog  Not Supported
GL_WIN_swap_hint  Supported
GLU_EXT_nurbs_tessellator  Not Supported
GLU_EXT_object_space_tess  Not Supported
GLU_SGI_filter4_parameters  Not Supported
GLX_AMD_gpu_association  Not Supported
GLX_ARB_create_context  Not Supported
GLX_ARB_create_context_profile  Not Supported
GLX_ARB_create_context_robustness  Not Supported
GLX_ARB_fbconfig_float  Not Supported
GLX_ARB_framebuffer_sRGB  Not Supported
GLX_ARB_get_proc_address  Not Supported
GLX_ARB_multisample  Not Supported
GLX_ARB_robustness_application_isolation  Not Supported
GLX_ARB_robustness_share_group_isolation  Not Supported
GLX_ARB_vertex_buffer_object  Not Supported
GLX_EXT_buffer_age  Not Supported
GLX_EXT_create_context_es_profile  Not Supported
GLX_EXT_create_context_es2_profile  Not Supported
GLX_EXT_fbconfig_packed_float  Not Supported
GLX_EXT_framebuffer_sRGB  Not Supported
GLX_EXT_import_context  Not Supported
GLX_EXT_scene_marker  Not Supported
GLX_EXT_swap_control  Not Supported
GLX_EXT_swap_control_tear  Not Supported
GLX_EXT_texture_from_pixmap  Not Supported
GLX_EXT_visual_info  Not Supported
GLX_EXT_visual_rating  Not Supported
GLX_INTEL_swap_event  Not Supported
GLX_MESA_agp_offset  Not Supported
GLX_MESA_copy_sub_buffer  Not Supported
GLX_MESA_multithread_makecurrent  Not Supported
GLX_MESA_pixmap_colormap  Not Supported
GLX_MESA_query_renderer  Not Supported
GLX_MESA_release_buffers  Not Supported
GLX_MESA_set_3dfx_mode  Not Supported
GLX_MESA_swap_control  Not Supported
GLX_NV_copy_image  Not Supported
GLX_NV_delay_before_swap  Not Supported
GLX_NV_float_buffer  Not Supported
GLX_NV_multisample_coverage  Not Supported
GLX_NV_present_video  Not Supported
GLX_NV_swap_group  Not Supported
GLX_NV_video_capture  Not Supported
GLX_NV_video_out  Not Supported
GLX_NV_video_output  Not Supported
GLX_OML_interlace  Not Supported
GLX_OML_swap_method  Not Supported
GLX_OML_sync_control  Not Supported
GLX_SGI_cushion  Not Supported
GLX_SGI_make_current_read  Not Supported
GLX_SGI_swap_control  Not Supported
GLX_SGI_video_sync  Not Supported
GLX_SGIS_blended_overlay  Not Supported
GLX_SGIS_color_range  Not Supported
GLX_SGIS_multisample  Not Supported
GLX_SGIX_dm_buffer  Not Supported
GLX_SGIX_fbconfig  Not Supported
GLX_SGIX_hyperpipe  Not Supported
GLX_SGIX_pbuffer  Not Supported
GLX_SGIX_swap_barrier  Not Supported
GLX_SGIX_swap_group  Not Supported
GLX_SGIX_video_resize  Not Supported
GLX_SGIX_video_source  Not Supported
GLX_SGIX_visual_select_group  Not Supported
GLX_SUN_get_transparent_index  Not Supported
GLX_SUN_video_resize  Not Supported
WGL_3DFX_gamma_control  Not Supported
WGL_3DFX_multisample  Not Supported
WGL_3DL_stereo_control  Not Supported
WGL_AMD_gpu_association  Not Supported
WGL_AMDX_gpu_association  Not Supported
WGL_ARB_buffer_region  Supported
WGL_ARB_context_flush_control  Supported
WGL_ARB_create_context  Supported
WGL_ARB_create_context_profile  Supported
WGL_ARB_create_context_robustness  Supported
WGL_ARB_extensions_string  Supported
WGL_ARB_framebuffer_sRGB  Not Supported
WGL_ARB_make_current_read  Supported
WGL_ARB_multisample  Supported
WGL_ARB_pbuffer  Supported
WGL_ARB_pixel_format  Supported
WGL_ARB_pixel_format_float  Supported
WGL_ARB_render_texture  Supported
WGL_ARB_robustness_application_isolation  Not Supported
WGL_ARB_robustness_share_group_isolation  Not Supported
WGL_ATI_pbuffer_memory_hint  Not Supported
WGL_ATI_pixel_format_float  Supported
WGL_ATI_render_texture_rectangle  Not Supported
WGL_EXT_buffer_region  Not Supported
WGL_EXT_colorspace  Supported
WGL_EXT_create_context_es_profile  Supported
WGL_EXT_create_context_es2_profile  Supported
WGL_EXT_depth_float  Not Supported
WGL_EXT_display_color_table  Not Supported
WGL_EXT_extensions_string  Supported
WGL_EXT_framebuffer_sRGB  Supported
WGL_EXT_framebuffer_sRGBWGL_ARB_create_context  Not Supported
WGL_EXT_gamma_control  Not Supported
WGL_EXT_make_current_read  Not Supported
WGL_EXT_multisample  Not Supported
WGL_EXT_pbuffer  Not Supported
WGL_EXT_pixel_format  Not Supported
WGL_EXT_pixel_format_packed_float  Supported
WGL_EXT_render_texture  Not Supported
WGL_EXT_swap_control  Supported
WGL_EXT_swap_control_tear  Supported
WGL_EXT_swap_interval  Not Supported
WGL_I3D_digital_video_control  Not Supported
WGL_I3D_gamma  Not Supported
WGL_I3D_genlock  Not Supported
WGL_I3D_image_buffer  Not Supported
WGL_I3D_swap_frame_lock  Not Supported
WGL_I3D_swap_frame_usage  Not Supported
WGL_INTEL_cl_sharing  Not Supported
WGL_MTX_video_preview  Not Supported
WGL_NV_bridged_display  Not Supported
WGL_NV_copy_image  Supported
WGL_NV_delay_before_swap  Supported
WGL_NV_DX_interop  Supported
WGL_NV_DX_interop2  Supported
WGL_NV_float_buffer  Supported
WGL_NV_gpu_affinity  Not Supported
WGL_NV_multisample_coverage  Supported
WGL_NV_present_video  Not Supported
WGL_NV_render_depth_texture  Supported
WGL_NV_render_texture_rectangle  Supported
WGL_NV_swap_group  Not Supported
WGL_NV_texture_rectangle  Not Supported
WGL_NV_vertex_array_range  Not Supported
WGL_NV_video_capture  Not Supported
WGL_NV_video_output  Not Supported
WGL_NVX_DX_interop  Supported
WGL_OML_sync_control  Not Supported
WGL_S3_cl_sharingWGL_ARB_create_context_profile  Not Supported
 
Supported Compressed Texture Formats:
RGB DXT1  Supported
RGBA DXT1  Not Supported
RGBA DXT3  Supported
RGBA DXT5  Supported
RGB FXT1  Not Supported
RGBA FXT1  Not Supported
3Dc  Not Supported
 
Video Adapter Manufacturer:
Company Name  NVIDIA Corporation
Product Information  http://www.nvidia.com/page/products.html
Driver Download  http://www.nvidia.com/content/drivers/drivers.asp
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates


GPGPU

 
[ CUDA: GeForce GT 635M ]
 
Device Properties:
Device Name  GeForce GT 635M
PCI Domain / Bus / Device  0 / 1 / 0
Clock Rate  950 MHz
Multiprocessors / Cores  2 / 96
L2 Cache  128 KB
Max Threads Per Multiprocessor  1536
Max Threads Per Block  1024
Max Registers Per Block  32768
Max 32-bit Registers Per Multiprocessor  32768
Max Instructions Per Kernel  512 million
Warp Size  32 threads
Max Block Size  1024 x 1024 x 64
Max Grid Size  65535 x 65535 x 65535
Max 1D Texture Width  65536
Max 2D Texture Size  65536 x 65535
Max 3D Texture Size  2048 x 2048 x 2048
Max 1D Linear Texture Width  134217728
Max 2D Linear Texture Size  65000 x 65000
Max 2D Linear Texture Pitch  1048544 bytes
Max 1D Layered Texture Width  16384
Max 1D Layered Texture Layers  2048
Max Mipmapped 1D Texture Width  16384
Max Mipmapped 2D Texture Size  16384 x 16384
Max Cubemap Texture Size  16384 x 16384
Max Cubemap Layered Texture Size  16384 x 16384
Max Cubemap Layered Texture Layers  2046
Max Texture Array Size  16384 x 16384
Max Texture Array Slices  2048
Max 1D Surface Width  65536
Max 2D Surface Size  65536 x 32768
Max 3D Surface Size  65536 x 32768 x 2048
Max 1D Layered Surface Width  65536
Max 1D Layered Surface Layers  2048
Max 2D Layered Surface Size  65536 x 32768
Max 2D Layered Surface Layers  2048
Compute Mode  Default: Multiple contexts allowed per device
Compute Capability  2.1
CUDA DLL  nvcuda.dll (6.14.13.7633 - nVIDIA ForceWare 376.33)
 
Memory Properties:
Memory Clock  900 MHz
Global Memory Bus Width  128-bit
Total Memory  2 GB
Total Constant Memory  64 KB
Max Shared Memory Per Block  48 KB
Max Shared Memory Per Multiprocessor  48 KB
Max Memory Pitch  2147483647 bytes
Texture Alignment  512 bytes
Texture Pitch Alignment  32 bytes
Surface Alignment  512 bytes
 
Device Features:
32-bit Floating-Point Atomic Addition  Supported
32-bit Integer Atomic Operations  Supported
64-bit Integer Atomic Operations  Supported
Caching Globals in L1 Cache  Supported
Caching Locals in L1 Cache  Supported
Concurrent Kernel Execution  Supported
Concurrent Memory Copy & Execute  Supported
Double-Precision Floating-Point  Supported
ECC  Disabled
Funnel Shift  Not Supported
Half-Precision Floating-Point  Not Supported
Host Memory Mapping  Supported
Integrated Device  No
Managed Memory  Not Supported
Multi-GPU Board  No
Stream Priorities  Not Supported
Surface Functions  Supported
TCC Driver  No
Warp Vote Functions  Supported
__ballot()  Supported
__syncthreads_and()  Supported
__syncthreads_count()  Supported
__syncthreads_or()  Supported
__threadfence_system()  Supported
 
Device Manufacturer:
Company Name  NVIDIA Corporation
Product Information  http://www.nvidia.com/page/products.html
Driver Download  http://www.nvidia.com/content/drivers/drivers.asp
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Direct3D: NVIDIA GeForce GT 635M (GF108) ]
 
Device Properties:
Device Name  NVIDIA GeForce GT 635M
GPU Code Name  GF108
PCI Device  10DE-0DE3 / 1043-100D (Rev A1)
Dedicated Memory  1999 MB
Driver Name  nvd3dum.dll
Driver Version  21.21.13.7633 - nVIDIA ForceWare 376.33
Shader Model  SM 5.0
Max Threads  1024
Multiple UAV Access  8 UAVs
Thread Dispatch  3D
Thread Local Storage  32 KB
 
Device Features:
10-bit Precision Floating-Point  Not Supported
16-bit Precision Floating-Point  Not Supported
Append/Consume Buffers  Supported
Atomic Operations  Supported
Double-Precision Floating-Point  Supported
Gather4  Supported
Indirect Compute Dispatch  Supported
Map On Default Buffers  Supported
 
Device Manufacturer:
Company Name  NVIDIA Corporation
Product Information  http://www.nvidia.com/page/products.html
Driver Download  http://www.nvidia.com/content/drivers/drivers.asp
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Direct3D: Intel(R) HD Graphics 4000 (IVB-MB GT2) ]
 
Device Properties:
Device Name  Intel(R) HD Graphics 4000
GPU Code Name  IVB-MB GT2
PCI Device  8086-0166 / 1043-100D (Rev 09)
Dedicated Memory  32 MB
Shader Model  SM 5.0
Max Threads  1024
Multiple UAV Access  8 UAVs
Thread Dispatch  3D
Thread Local Storage  32 KB
 
Device Features:
10-bit Precision Floating-Point  Not Supported
16-bit Precision Floating-Point  Not Supported
Append/Consume Buffers  Supported
Atomic Operations  Supported
Double-Precision Floating-Point  Supported
Gather4  Supported
Indirect Compute Dispatch  Supported
Map On Default Buffers  Supported
 
Device Manufacturer:
Company Name  Intel Corporation
Product Information  http://www.intel.com/products/chipsets
Driver Download  http://support.intel.com/support/graphics
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ OpenCL: GeForce GT 635M ]
 
OpenCL Properties:
Platform Name  NVIDIA CUDA
Platform Vendor  NVIDIA Corporation
Platform Version  OpenCL 1.2 CUDA 8.0.0
Platform Profile  Full
 
Device Properties:
Device Name  GeForce GT 635M
Device Type  GPU
Device Vendor  NVIDIA Corporation
Device Version  OpenCL 1.1 CUDA
Device Profile  Full
Driver Version  376.33
OpenCL C Version  OpenCL C 1.1
Clock Rate  950 MHz
Compute Units / Cores  2 / 96
Address Space Size  32-bit
Max 2D Image Size  16384 x 16384
Max 3D Image Size  2048 x 2048 x 2048
Max Image Array Size  2048
Max Image Buffer Size  134217728
Max Samplers  16
Max Work-Item Size  1024 x 1024 x 64
Max Work-Group Size  1024
Max Argument Size  4352 bytes
Max Constant Buffer Size  64 KB
Max Constant Arguments  9
Max Printf Buffer Size  1 MB
Native ISA Vector Widths  char1, short1, int1, float1, double1
Preferred Native Vector Widths  char1, short1, int1, long1, float1, double1
Profiling Timer Resolution  1000 ns
CUDA Compute Capability  2.1
Max Registers Per Block  32768
Warp Size  32 threads
Asynchronous Engines  1
PCI Bus / Device  1 / 0
OpenCL DLL  opencl.dll (1.2.11.0)
 
Memory Properties:
Global Memory  2 GB
Global Memory Cache  32 KB (Read/Write, 128-byte line)
Local Memory  48 KB
Max Memory Object Allocation Size  512 MB
Memory Base Address Alignment  4096-bit
Min Data Type Alignment  128 bytes
 
OpenCL Compliancy:
OpenCL 1.1  Yes (100%)
OpenCL 1.2  Yes (100%)
OpenCL 2.0  No (62%)
 
Device Features:
Command-Queue Out Of Order Execution  Enabled
Command-Queue Profiling  Enabled
Compiler Available  Yes
Error Correction  Not Supported
Images  Supported
Kernel Execution  Supported
Linker Available  Yes
Little-Endian Device  Yes
Native Kernel Execution  Not Supported
Sub-Group Independent Forward Progress  Not Supported
SVM Atomics  Not Supported
SVM Coarse Grain Buffer  Not Supported
SVM Fine Grain Buffer  Supported
SVM Fine Grain System  Not Supported
Thread Trace  Not Supported
Unified Memory  No
 
Half-Precision Floating-Point Capabilities:
Correctly Rounded Divide and Sqrt  Not Supported
Denorms  Not Supported
IEEE754-2008 FMA  Not Supported
INF and NaNs  Not Supported
Rounding to Infinity  Not Supported
Rounding to Nearest Even  Not Supported
Rounding to Zero  Not Supported
Software Basic Floating-Point Operations  No
 
Single-Precision Floating-Point Capabilities:
Correctly Rounded Divide and Sqrt  Not Supported
Denorms  Supported
IEEE754-2008 FMA  Supported
INF and NaNs  Supported
Rounding to Infinity  Supported
Rounding to Nearest Even  Supported
Rounding to Zero  Supported
Software Basic Floating-Point Operations  No
 
Double-Precision Floating-Point Capabilities:
Correctly Rounded Divide and Sqrt  Not Supported
Denorms  Supported
IEEE754-2008 FMA  Supported
INF and NaNs  Supported
Rounding to Infinity  Supported
Rounding to Nearest Even  Supported
Rounding to Zero  Supported
Software Basic Floating-Point Operations  No
 
Device Extensions:
Total / Supported Extensions  95 / 15
cl_altera_compiler_mode  Not Supported
cl_altera_device_temperature  Not Supported
cl_altera_live_object_tracking  Not Supported
cl_amd_bus_addressable_memory  Not Supported
cl_amd_c1x_atomics  Not Supported
cl_amd_compile_options  Not Supported
cl_amd_core_id  Not Supported
cl_amd_d3d10_interop  Not Supported
cl_amd_d3d9_interop  Not Supported
cl_amd_device_attribute_query  Not Supported
cl_amd_device_board_name  Not Supported
cl_amd_device_memory_flags  Not Supported
cl_amd_device_persistent_memory  Not Supported
cl_amd_device_profiling_timer_offset  Not Supported
cl_amd_device_topology  Not Supported
cl_amd_event_callback  Not Supported
cl_amd_fp64  Not Supported
cl_amd_hsa  Not Supported
cl_amd_image2d_from_buffer_read_only  Not Supported
cl_amd_media_ops  Not Supported
cl_amd_media_ops2  Not Supported
cl_amd_offline_devices  Not Supported
cl_amd_popcnt  Not Supported
cl_amd_predefined_macros  Not Supported
cl_amd_printf  Not Supported
cl_amd_svm  Not Supported
cl_amd_vec3  Not Supported
cl_apple_contextloggingfunctions  Not Supported
cl_apple_gl_sharing  Not Supported
cl_apple_setmemobjectdestructor  Not Supported
cl_arm_core_id  Not Supported
cl_arm_printf  Not Supported
cl_ext_atomic_counters_32  Not Supported
cl_ext_atomic_counters_64  Not Supported
cl_ext_device_fission  Not Supported
cl_ext_migrate_memobject  Not Supported
cl_intel_accelerator  Not Supported
cl_intel_advanced_motion_estimation  Not Supported
cl_intel_ctz  Not Supported
cl_intel_d3d11_nv12_media_sharing  Not Supported
cl_intel_device_partition_by_names  Not Supported
cl_intel_dx9_media_sharing  Not Supported
cl_intel_exec_by_local_thread  Not Supported
cl_intel_motion_estimation  Not Supported
cl_intel_packed_yuv  Not Supported
cl_intel_printf  Not Supported
cl_intel_required_subgroup_size  Not Supported
cl_intel_simultaneous_sharing  Not Supported
cl_intel_subgroups  Not Supported
cl_intel_thread_local_exec  Not Supported
cl_intel_va_api_media_sharing  Not Supported
cl_intel_visual_analytics  Not Supported
cl_khr_3d_image_writes  Not Supported
cl_khr_byte_addressable_store  Supported
cl_khr_context_abort  Not Supported
cl_khr_d3d10_sharing  Supported
cl_khr_d3d11_sharing  Not Supported
cl_khr_depth_images  Not Supported
cl_khr_dx9_media_sharing  Not Supported
cl_khr_egl_event  Not Supported
cl_khr_egl_image  Not Supported
cl_khr_fp16  Not Supported
cl_khr_fp64  Supported
cl_khr_gl_depth_images  Not Supported
cl_khr_gl_event  Not Supported
cl_khr_gl_msaa_sharing  Not Supported
cl_khr_gl_sharing  Supported
cl_khr_global_int32_base_atomics  Supported
cl_khr_global_int32_extended_atomics  Supported
cl_khr_icd  Supported
cl_khr_il_program  Not Supported
cl_khr_image2d_from_buffer  Not Supported
cl_khr_initialize_memory  Not Supported
cl_khr_int64_base_atomics  Not Supported
cl_khr_int64_extended_atomics  Not Supported
cl_khr_local_int32_base_atomics  Supported
cl_khr_local_int32_extended_atomics  Supported
cl_khr_mipmap_image  Not Supported
cl_khr_mipmap_image_writes  Not Supported
cl_khr_priority_hints  Not Supported
cl_khr_select_fprounding_mode  Not Supported
cl_khr_spir  Not Supported
cl_khr_srgb_image_writes  Not Supported
cl_khr_subgroups  Not Supported
cl_khr_terminate_context  Not Supported
cl_khr_throttle_hints  Not Supported
cl_nv_compiler_options  Supported
cl_nv_copy_opts  Supported
cl_nv_d3d10_sharing  Supported
cl_nv_d3d11_sharing  Supported
cl_nv_d3d9_sharing  Not Supported
cl_nv_device_attribute_query  Supported
cl_nv_pragma_unroll  Supported
cl_qcom_ext_host_ptr  Not Supported
cl_qcom_ion_host_ptr  Not Supported
 
Device Manufacturer:
Company Name  NVIDIA Corporation
Product Information  http://www.nvidia.com/page/products.html
Driver Download  http://www.nvidia.com/content/drivers/drivers.asp
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ OpenCL: Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3317U CPU @ 1.70GHz ]
 
OpenCL Properties:
Platform Name  Intel(R) OpenCL
Platform Vendor  Intel(R) Corporation
Platform Version  OpenCL 1.2
Platform Profile  Full
 
Device Properties:
Device Name  Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3317U CPU @ 1.70GHz
Device Type  CPU
Device Vendor  Intel(R) Corporation
Device Version  OpenCL 1.2 (Build 76427)
Device Profile  Full
Driver Version  3.0.1.10891
OpenCL C Version  OpenCL C 1.2
Clock Rate  1699 MHz
Compute Units  4
Address Space Size  32-bit
Max 2D Image Size  16384 x 16384
Max 3D Image Size  2048 x 2048 x 2048
Max Image Array Size  2048
Max Image Buffer Size  33552384
Max Samplers  480
Max Work-Item Size  1024 x 1024 x 1024
Max Work-Group Size  1024
Max Argument Size  3840 bytes
Max Constant Buffer Size  128 KB
Max Constant Arguments  480
Max Printf Buffer Size  1 MB
Native ISA Vector Widths  char16, short8, int2, float8, double4
Preferred Native Vector Widths  char1, short1, int1, long1, float1, double1
Profiling Timer Resolution  603 ns
OpenCL DLL  opencl.dll (1.2.11.0)
 
Memory Properties:
Global Memory  2047 MB
Global Memory Cache  256 KB (Read/Write, 64-byte line)
Local Memory  32 KB
Max Memory Object Allocation Size  524256 KB
Memory Base Address Alignment  1024-bit
Min Data Type Alignment  128 bytes
 
OpenCL Compliancy:
OpenCL 1.1  Yes (100%)
OpenCL 1.2  Yes (100%)
OpenCL 2.0  No (62%)
 
Device Features:
Command-Queue Out Of Order Execution  Enabled
Command-Queue Profiling  Enabled
Compiler Available  Yes
Error Correction  Not Supported
Images  Supported
Kernel Execution  Supported
Linker Available  Yes
Little-Endian Device  Yes
Native Kernel Execution  Supported
Sub-Group Independent Forward Progress  Not Supported
SVM Atomics  Not Supported
SVM Coarse Grain Buffer  Not Supported
SVM Fine Grain Buffer  Not Supported
SVM Fine Grain System  Not Supported
Thread Trace  Not Supported
Unified Memory  Yes
 
Half-Precision Floating-Point Capabilities:
Correctly Rounded Divide and Sqrt  Not Supported
Denorms  Not Supported
IEEE754-2008 FMA  Not Supported
INF and NaNs  Not Supported
Rounding to Infinity  Not Supported
Rounding to Nearest Even  Not Supported
Rounding to Zero  Not Supported
Software Basic Floating-Point Operations  No
 
Single-Precision Floating-Point Capabilities:
Correctly Rounded Divide and Sqrt  Not Supported
Denorms  Supported
IEEE754-2008 FMA  Not Supported
INF and NaNs  Supported
Rounding to Infinity  Not Supported
Rounding to Nearest Even  Supported
Rounding to Zero  Not Supported
Software Basic Floating-Point Operations  No
 
Double-Precision Floating-Point Capabilities:
Correctly Rounded Divide and Sqrt  Not Supported
Denorms  Supported
IEEE754-2008 FMA  Supported
INF and NaNs  Supported
Rounding to Infinity  Supported
Rounding to Nearest Even  Supported
Rounding to Zero  Supported
Software Basic Floating-Point Operations  No
 
Device Extensions:
Total / Supported Extensions  95 / 14
cl_altera_compiler_mode  Not Supported
cl_altera_device_temperature  Not Supported
cl_altera_live_object_tracking  Not Supported
cl_amd_bus_addressable_memory  Not Supported
cl_amd_c1x_atomics  Not Supported
cl_amd_compile_options  Not Supported
cl_amd_core_id  Not Supported
cl_amd_d3d10_interop  Not Supported
cl_amd_d3d9_interop  Not Supported
cl_amd_device_attribute_query  Not Supported
cl_amd_device_board_name  Not Supported
cl_amd_device_memory_flags  Not Supported
cl_amd_device_persistent_memory  Not Supported
cl_amd_device_profiling_timer_offset  Not Supported
cl_amd_device_topology  Not Supported
cl_amd_event_callback  Not Supported
cl_amd_fp64  Not Supported
cl_amd_hsa  Not Supported
cl_amd_image2d_from_buffer_read_only  Not Supported
cl_amd_media_ops  Not Supported
cl_amd_media_ops2  Not Supported
cl_amd_offline_devices  Not Supported
cl_amd_popcnt  Not Supported
cl_amd_predefined_macros  Not Supported
cl_amd_printf  Not Supported
cl_amd_svm  Not Supported
cl_amd_vec3  Not Supported
cl_apple_contextloggingfunctions  Not Supported
cl_apple_gl_sharing  Not Supported
cl_apple_setmemobjectdestructor  Not Supported
cl_arm_core_id  Not Supported
cl_arm_printf  Not Supported
cl_ext_atomic_counters_32  Not Supported
cl_ext_atomic_counters_64  Not Supported
cl_ext_device_fission  Supported
cl_ext_migrate_memobject  Not Supported
cl_intel_accelerator  Not Supported
cl_intel_advanced_motion_estimation  Not Supported
cl_intel_ctz  Not Supported
cl_intel_d3d11_nv12_media_sharing  Not Supported
cl_intel_device_partition_by_names  Not Supported
cl_intel_dx9_media_sharing  Supported
cl_intel_exec_by_local_thread  Supported
cl_intel_motion_estimation  Not Supported
cl_intel_packed_yuv  Not Supported
cl_intel_printf  Supported
cl_intel_required_subgroup_size  Not Supported
cl_intel_simultaneous_sharing  Not Supported
cl_intel_subgroups  Not Supported
cl_intel_thread_local_exec  Not Supported
cl_intel_va_api_media_sharing  Not Supported
cl_intel_visual_analytics  Not Supported
cl_khr_3d_image_writes  Not Supported
cl_khr_byte_addressable_store  Supported
cl_khr_context_abort  Not Supported
cl_khr_d3d10_sharing  Not Supported
cl_khr_d3d11_sharing  Supported
cl_khr_depth_images  Not Supported
cl_khr_dx9_media_sharing  Supported
cl_khr_egl_event  Not Supported
cl_khr_egl_image  Not Supported
cl_khr_fp16  Not Supported
cl_khr_fp64  Supported
cl_khr_gl_depth_images  Not Supported
cl_khr_gl_event  Not Supported
cl_khr_gl_msaa_sharing  Not Supported
cl_khr_gl_sharing  Supported
cl_khr_global_int32_base_atomics  Supported
cl_khr_global_int32_extended_atomics  Supported
cl_khr_icd  Supported
cl_khr_il_program  Not Supported
cl_khr_image2d_from_buffer  Not Supported
cl_khr_initialize_memory  Not Supported
cl_khr_int64_base_atomics  Not Supported
cl_khr_int64_extended_atomics  Not Supported
cl_khr_local_int32_base_atomics  Supported
cl_khr_local_int32_extended_atomics  Supported
cl_khr_mipmap_image  Not Supported
cl_khr_mipmap_image_writes  Not Supported
cl_khr_priority_hints  Not Supported
cl_khr_select_fprounding_mode  Not Supported
cl_khr_spir  Not Supported
cl_khr_srgb_image_writes  Not Supported
cl_khr_subgroups  Not Supported
cl_khr_terminate_context  Not Supported
cl_khr_throttle_hints  Not Supported
cl_nv_compiler_options  Not Supported
cl_nv_copy_opts  Not Supported
cl_nv_d3d10_sharing  Not Supported
cl_nv_d3d11_sharing  Not Supported
cl_nv_d3d9_sharing  Not Supported
cl_nv_device_attribute_query  Not Supported
cl_nv_pragma_unroll  Not Supported
cl_qcom_ext_host_ptr  Not Supported
cl_qcom_ion_host_ptr  Not Supported
 
Device Manufacturer:
Company Name  Intel Corporation
Product Information  http://www.intel.com/products/chipsets
Driver Download  http://support.intel.com/support/graphics
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ OpenCL: Intel(R) HD Graphics 4000 (IVB-MB GT2) ]
 
OpenCL Properties:
Platform Name  Intel(R) OpenCL
Platform Vendor  Intel(R) Corporation
Platform Version  OpenCL 1.2
Platform Profile  Full
 
Device Properties:
Device Name  Intel(R) HD Graphics 4000
GPU Code Name  IVB-MB GT2
Device Type  GPU
Device Vendor  Intel(R) Corporation
Device Version  OpenCL 1.2
Device Profile  Full
Driver Version  10.18.10.4358
OpenCL C Version  OpenCL C 1.2
Supported Built-In Kernels  block_motion_estimate_intel
Clock Rate  1050 MHz
Compute Units / Cores  16 / 64
Address Space Size  64-bit
Max 2D Image Size  16384 x 16384
Max 3D Image Size  2048 x 2048 x 2048
Max Image Array Size  2048
Max Image Buffer Size  22937600
Max Samplers  16
Max Work-Item Size  512 x 512 x 512
Max Work-Group Size  512
Max Argument Size  1 KB
Max Constant Buffer Size  64 KB
Max Constant Arguments  8
Max Printf Buffer Size  4 MB
Native ISA Vector Widths  char1, short1, int1, float1
Preferred Native Vector Widths  char1, short1, int1, long1, float1
Profiling Timer Resolution  80 ns
OpenCL DLL  opencl.dll (1.2.11.0)
 
Memory Properties:
Global Memory  1400 MB
Global Memory Cache  2048 KB (Read/Write, 64-byte line)
Local Memory  64 KB
Max Memory Object Allocation Size  350 MB
Memory Base Address Alignment  1024-bit
Min Data Type Alignment  128 bytes
Image Row Pitch Alignment  64 pixels
Image Base Address Alignment  4096 pixels
 
OpenCL Compliancy:
OpenCL 1.1  Yes (100%)
OpenCL 1.2  Yes (100%)
OpenCL 2.0  Yes (100%)
 
Device Features:
Command-Queue Out Of Order Execution  Disabled
Command-Queue Profiling  Enabled
Compiler Available  Yes
Error Correction  Not Supported
Images  Supported
Kernel Execution  Supported
Linker Available  Yes
Little-Endian Device  Yes
Native Kernel Execution  Not Supported
Sub-Group Independent Forward Progress  Not Supported
SVM Atomics  Not Supported
SVM Coarse Grain Buffer  Not Supported
SVM Fine Grain Buffer  Not Supported
SVM Fine Grain System  Not Supported
Thread Trace  Not Supported
Unified Memory  Yes
 
Half-Precision Floating-Point Capabilities:
Correctly Rounded Divide and Sqrt  Not Supported
Denorms  Not Supported
IEEE754-2008 FMA  Not Supported
INF and NaNs  Not Supported
Rounding to Infinity  Not Supported
Rounding to Nearest Even  Not Supported
Rounding to Zero  Not Supported
Software Basic Floating-Point Operations  No
 
Single-Precision Floating-Point Capabilities:
Correctly Rounded Divide and Sqrt  Supported
Denorms  Not Supported
IEEE754-2008 FMA  Not Supported
INF and NaNs  Supported
Rounding to Infinity  Supported
Rounding to Nearest Even  Supported
Rounding to Zero  Supported
Software Basic Floating-Point Operations  No
 
Double-Precision Floating-Point Capabilities:
Correctly Rounded Divide and Sqrt  Not Supported
Denorms  Not Supported
IEEE754-2008 FMA  Not Supported
INF and NaNs  Not Supported
Rounding to Infinity  Not Supported
Rounding to Nearest Even  Not Supported
Rounding to Zero  Not Supported
Software Basic Floating-Point Operations  No
 
Device Extensions:
Total / Supported Extensions  95 / 20
cl_altera_compiler_mode  Not Supported
cl_altera_device_temperature  Not Supported
cl_altera_live_object_tracking  Not Supported
cl_amd_bus_addressable_memory  Not Supported
cl_amd_c1x_atomics  Not Supported
cl_amd_compile_options  Not Supported
cl_amd_core_id  Not Supported
cl_amd_d3d10_interop  Not Supported
cl_amd_d3d9_interop  Not Supported
cl_amd_device_attribute_query  Not Supported
cl_amd_device_board_name  Not Supported
cl_amd_device_memory_flags  Not Supported
cl_amd_device_persistent_memory  Not Supported
cl_amd_device_profiling_timer_offset  Not Supported
cl_amd_device_topology  Not Supported
cl_amd_event_callback  Not Supported
cl_amd_fp64  Not Supported
cl_amd_hsa  Not Supported
cl_amd_image2d_from_buffer_read_only  Not Supported
cl_amd_media_ops  Not Supported
cl_amd_media_ops2  Not Supported
cl_amd_offline_devices  Not Supported
cl_amd_popcnt  Not Supported
cl_amd_predefined_macros  Not Supported
cl_amd_printf  Not Supported
cl_amd_svm  Not Supported
cl_amd_vec3  Not Supported
cl_apple_contextloggingfunctions  Not Supported
cl_apple_gl_sharing  Not Supported
cl_apple_setmemobjectdestructor  Not Supported
cl_arm_core_id  Not Supported
cl_arm_printf  Not Supported
cl_ext_atomic_counters_32  Not Supported
cl_ext_atomic_counters_64  Not Supported
cl_ext_device_fission  Not Supported
cl_ext_migrate_memobject  Not Supported
cl_intel_accelerator  Supported
cl_intel_advanced_motion_estimation  Not Supported
cl_intel_ctz  Not Supported
cl_intel_d3d11_nv12_media_sharing  Supported
cl_intel_device_partition_by_names  Not Supported
cl_intel_dx9_media_sharing  Supported
cl_intel_exec_by_local_thread  Not Supported
cl_intel_motion_estimation  Supported
cl_intel_packed_yuv  Not Supported
cl_intel_printf  Not Supported
cl_intel_required_subgroup_size  Not Supported
cl_intel_simultaneous_sharing  Not Supported
cl_intel_subgroups  Not Supported
cl_intel_thread_local_exec  Not Supported
cl_intel_va_api_media_sharing  Not Supported
cl_intel_visual_analytics  Not Supported
cl_khr_3d_image_writes  Supported
cl_khr_byte_addressable_store  Supported
cl_khr_context_abort  Not Supported
cl_khr_d3d10_sharing  Supported
cl_khr_d3d11_sharing  Supported
cl_khr_depth_images  Supported
cl_khr_dx9_media_sharing  Supported
cl_khr_egl_event  Not Supported
cl_khr_egl_image  Not Supported
cl_khr_fp16  Not Supported
cl_khr_fp64  Not Supported
cl_khr_gl_depth_images  Supported
cl_khr_gl_event  Supported
cl_khr_gl_msaa_sharing  Supported
cl_khr_gl_sharing  Supported
cl_khr_global_int32_base_atomics  Supported
cl_khr_global_int32_extended_atomics  Supported
cl_khr_icd  Supported
cl_khr_il_program  Not Supported
cl_khr_image2d_from_buffer  Supported
cl_khr_initialize_memory  Not Supported
cl_khr_int64_base_atomics  Not Supported
cl_khr_int64_extended_atomics  Not Supported
cl_khr_local_int32_base_atomics  Supported
cl_khr_local_int32_extended_atomics  Supported
cl_khr_mipmap_image  Not Supported
cl_khr_mipmap_image_writes  Not Supported
cl_khr_priority_hints  Not Supported
cl_khr_select_fprounding_mode  Not Supported
cl_khr_spir  Not Supported
cl_khr_srgb_image_writes  Not Supported
cl_khr_subgroups  Not Supported
cl_khr_terminate_context  Not Supported
cl_khr_throttle_hints  Not Supported
cl_nv_compiler_options  Not Supported
cl_nv_copy_opts  Not Supported
cl_nv_d3d10_sharing  Not Supported
cl_nv_d3d11_sharing  Not Supported
cl_nv_d3d9_sharing  Not Supported
cl_nv_device_attribute_query  Not Supported
cl_nv_pragma_unroll  Not Supported
cl_qcom_ext_host_ptr  Not Supported
cl_qcom_ion_host_ptr  Not Supported
 
Device Manufacturer:
Company Name  Intel Corporation
Product Information  http://www.intel.com/products/chipsets
Driver Download  http://support.intel.com/support/graphics
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates


Fonts

 
Font Family  Type  Style  Character Set  Char. Size  Char. Weight
@Malgun Gothic Semilight  Swiss  Regular  Baltic  31 x 43  30 %
@Malgun Gothic Semilight  Swiss  Regular  CHINESE_BIG5  31 x 43  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 43  30 %
@Malgun Gothic Semilight  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  31 x 43  30 %
@Malgun Gothic Semilight  Swiss  Regular  Greek  31 x 43  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 43  30 %
@Malgun Gothic Semilight  Swiss  Regular  Hangul  31 x 43  30 %
@Malgun Gothic Semilight  Swiss  Regular  Hebrew  31 x 43  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 43  30 %
@Malgun Gothic Semilight  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  31 x 43  30 %
@Malgun Gothic Semilight  Swiss  Regular  Vietnamese  31 x 43  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 43  30 %
@Malgun Gothic  Swiss  Regular  Hangul  15 x 43  40 %
@Malgun Gothic  Swiss  Regular  Western  15 x 43  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  32 x 43  29 %
@Microsoft JhengHei Light  Swiss  Regular  Greek  32 x 43  29 %
@Microsoft JhengHei Light  Swiss  Regular  Western  32 x 43  29 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  32 x 41  29 %
@Microsoft JhengHei UI Light  Swiss  Regular  Greek  32 x 41  29 %
@Microsoft JhengHei UI Light  Swiss  Regular  Western  32 x 41  29 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 41  40 %
@Microsoft JhengHei UI  Swiss  Regular  Greek  15 x 41  40 %
@Microsoft JhengHei UI  Swiss  Regular  Western  15 x 41  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 43  40 %
@Microsoft JhengHei  Swiss  Regular  Greek  15 x 43  40 %
@Microsoft JhengHei  Swiss  Regular  Western  15 x 43  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 41  29 %
@Microsoft YaHei Light  Swiss  Regular  CHINESE_GB2312  15 x 41  29 %
@Microsoft YaHei Light  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  15 x 41  29 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 41  29 %
@Microsoft YaHei Light  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  15 x 41  29 %
@Microsoft YaHei Light  Swiss  Regular  Western  15 x 41  29 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 42  29 %
@Microsoft YaHei UI Light  Swiss  Regular  CHINESE_GB2312  15 x 42  29 %
@Microsoft YaHei UI Light  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  15 x 42  29 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 42  29 %
@Microsoft YaHei UI Light  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  15 x 42  29 %
@Microsoft YaHei UI Light  Swiss  Regular  Western  15 x 42  29 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 41  40 %
@Microsoft YaHei UI  Swiss  Regular  CHINESE_GB2312  15 x 41  40 %
@Microsoft YaHei UI  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  15 x 41  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 41  40 %
@Microsoft YaHei UI  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  15 x 41  40 %
@Microsoft YaHei UI  Swiss  Regular  Western  15 x 41  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 42  40 %
@Microsoft YaHei  Swiss  Regular  CHINESE_GB2312  15 x 42  40 %
@Microsoft YaHei  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  15 x 42  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 42  40 %
@Microsoft YaHei  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  15 x 42  40 %
@Microsoft YaHei  Swiss  Regular  Western  15 x 42  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 32  40 %
@MingLiU_HKSCS-ExtB  Roman  Regular  Western  16 x 32  40 %
@MingLiU-ExtB  Roman  Regular  CHINESE_BIG5  16 x 32  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 32  40 %
@MS Gothic  Modern  Regular  Baltic  16 x 32  40 %
@MS Gothic  Modern  Regular  Central European  16 x 32  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 32  40 %
@MS Gothic  Modern  Regular  Greek  16 x 32  40 %
@MS Gothic  Modern  Regular  Japanese  16 x 32  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 32  40 %
@MS Gothic  Modern  Regular  Western  16 x 32  40 %
@MS PGothic  Swiss  Regular  Baltic  13 x 32  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  13 x 32  40 %
@MS PGothic  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  13 x 32  40 %
@MS PGothic  Swiss  Regular  Greek  13 x 32  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  13 x 32  40 %
@MS PGothic  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  13 x 32  40 %
@MS PGothic  Swiss  Regular  Western  13 x 32  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  13 x 32  40 %
@MS UI Gothic  Swiss  Regular  Central European  13 x 32  40 %
@MS UI Gothic  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  13 x 32  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  13 x 32  40 %
@MS UI Gothic  Swiss  Regular  Japanese  13 x 32  40 %
@MS UI Gothic  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  13 x 32  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  13 x 32  40 %
@NSimSun  Modern  Regular  CHINESE_GB2312  16 x 32  40 %
@NSimSun  Modern  Regular  Western  16 x 32  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 32  40 %
@PMingLiU-ExtB  Roman  Regular  Western  16 x 32  40 %
@SimSun  Special  Regular  CHINESE_GB2312  16 x 32  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 32  40 %
@SimSun-ExtB  Modern  Regular  CHINESE_GB2312  16 x 32  40 %
@SimSun-ExtB  Modern  Regular  Western  16 x 32  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 41  30 %
@Yu Gothic Light  Swiss  Regular  Central European  31 x 41  30 %
@Yu Gothic Light  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  31 x 41  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 41  30 %
@Yu Gothic Light  Swiss  Regular  Japanese  31 x 41  30 %
@Yu Gothic Light  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  31 x 41  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 41  30 %
@Yu Gothic Medium  Swiss  Regular  Baltic  31 x 41  50 %
@Yu Gothic Medium  Swiss  Regular  Central European  31 x 41  50 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 41  50 %
@Yu Gothic Medium  Swiss  Regular  Greek  31 x 41  50 %
@Yu Gothic Medium  Swiss  Regular  Japanese  31 x 41  50 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 41  50 %
@Yu Gothic Medium  Swiss  Regular  Western  31 x 41  50 %
@Yu Gothic UI Light  Swiss  Regular  Baltic  17 x 43  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 43  30 %
@Yu Gothic UI Light  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  17 x 43  30 %
@Yu Gothic UI Light  Swiss  Regular  Greek  17 x 43  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 43  30 %
@Yu Gothic UI Light  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  17 x 43  30 %
@Yu Gothic UI Light  Swiss  Regular  Western  17 x 43  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  19 x 43  60 %
@Yu Gothic UI Semibold  Swiss  Regular  Central European  19 x 43  60 %
@Yu Gothic UI Semibold  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  19 x 43  60 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  19 x 43  60 %
@Yu Gothic UI Semibold  Swiss  Regular  Japanese  19 x 43  60 %
@Yu Gothic UI Semibold  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  19 x 43  60 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  19 x 43  60 %
@Yu Gothic UI Semilight  Swiss  Regular  Baltic  17 x 43  35 %
@Yu Gothic UI Semilight  Swiss  Regular  Central European  17 x 43  35 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 43  35 %
@Yu Gothic UI Semilight  Swiss  Regular  Greek  17 x 43  35 %
@Yu Gothic UI Semilight  Swiss  Regular  Japanese  17 x 43  35 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 43  35 %
@Yu Gothic UI Semilight  Swiss  Regular  Western  17 x 43  35 %
@Yu Gothic UI  Swiss  Regular  Baltic  17 x 43  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 43  40 %
@Yu Gothic UI  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  17 x 43  40 %
@Yu Gothic UI  Swiss  Regular  Greek  17 x 43  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 43  40 %
@Yu Gothic UI  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  17 x 43  40 %
@Yu Gothic UI  Swiss  Regular  Western  17 x 43  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 41  40 %
@Yu Gothic  Swiss  Regular  Central European  31 x 41  40 %
@Yu Gothic  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  31 x 41  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 41  40 %
@Yu Gothic  Swiss  Regular  Japanese  31 x 41  40 %
@Yu Gothic  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  31 x 41  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 41  40 %
Admiration Pains   Special  Regular  Turkish  26 x 55  40 %
Admiration Pains   Special  Regular  Vietnamese  26 x 55  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  26 x 55  40 %
Adobe Arabic  Roman  Regular  Arabic  20 x 35  40 %
Adobe Arabic  Roman  Regular  Mac  20 x 35  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  20 x 35  40 %
Adobe Caslon Pro Bold  Roman  Bold  Baltic  17 x 54  70 %
Adobe Caslon Pro Bold  Roman  Bold  Central European  17 x 54  70 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 54  70 %
Adobe Caslon Pro Bold  Roman  Bold  Turkish  17 x 54  70 %
Adobe Caslon Pro Bold  Roman  Bold  Western  17 x 54  70 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 54  40 %
Adobe Caslon Pro  Roman  Regular  Central European  17 x 54  40 %
Adobe Caslon Pro  Roman  Regular  Mac  17 x 54  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 54  40 %
Adobe Caslon Pro  Roman  Regular  Western  17 x 54  40 %
Adobe Devanagari  Roman  Regular  Mac  16 x 43  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 43  40 %
Adobe Fan Heiti Std B  Swiss  B  CHINESE_BIG5  32 x 40  60 %
Adobe Fan Heiti Std B  Swiss  B  Cyrillic  32 x 40  60 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  32 x 40  60 %
Adobe Fan Heiti Std B  Swiss  B  Western  32 x 40  60 %
Adobe Fangsong Std R  Roman  R  Central European  31 x 40  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 40  40 %
Adobe Fangsong Std R  Roman  R  Cyrillic  31 x 40  40 %
Adobe Fangsong Std R  Roman  R  Japanese  31 x 40  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 40  40 %
Adobe Garamond Pro Bold  Roman  Bold  Baltic  16 x 38  70 %
Adobe Garamond Pro Bold  Roman  Bold  Central European  16 x 38  70 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 38  70 %
Adobe Garamond Pro Bold  Roman  Bold  Turkish  16 x 38  70 %
Adobe Garamond Pro Bold  Roman  Bold  Western  16 x 38  70 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 41  40 %
Adobe Garamond Pro  Roman  Regular  Central European  16 x 41  40 %
Adobe Garamond Pro  Roman  Regular  Mac  16 x 41  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 41  40 %
Adobe Garamond Pro  Roman  Regular  Western  16 x 41  40 %
Adobe Gothic Std B  Swiss  B  Cyrillic  32 x 40  70 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  32 x 40  70 %
Adobe Gothic Std B  Swiss  B  Hangul  32 x 40  70 %
Adobe Gothic Std B  Swiss  B  Japanese  32 x 40  70 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  32 x 40  70 %
Adobe Gothic Std B  Swiss  B  Western  32 x 40  70 %
Adobe Gurmukhi  Modern  Regular  Mac  14 x 38  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  14 x 38  40 %
Adobe Hebrew  Roman  Regular  Hebrew  15 x 40  40 %
Adobe Hebrew  Roman  Regular  Mac  15 x 40  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 40  40 %
Adobe Heiti Std R  Swiss  R  Central European  31 x 40  40 %
Adobe Heiti Std R  Swiss  R  CHINESE_GB2312  31 x 40  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 40  40 %
Adobe Heiti Std R  Swiss  R  Japanese  31 x 40  40 %
Adobe Heiti Std R  Swiss  R  Western  31 x 40  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 40  40 %
Adobe Kaiti Std R  Roman  R  CHINESE_GB2312  31 x 40  40 %
Adobe Kaiti Std R  Roman  R  Cyrillic  31 x 40  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 40  40 %
Adobe Kaiti Std R  Roman  R  Western  31 x 40  40 %
Adobe Ming Std L  Roman  L  CHINESE_BIG5  32 x 33  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  32 x 33  30 %
Adobe Ming Std L  Roman  L  Japanese  32 x 33  30 %
Adobe Ming Std L  Roman  L  Western  32 x 33  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  32 x 33  50 %
Adobe Myungjo Std M  Roman  M  Hangul(Johab)  32 x 33  50 %
Adobe Myungjo Std M  Roman  M  Hangul  32 x 33  50 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  32 x 33  50 %
Adobe Myungjo Std M  Roman  M  Mac  32 x 33  50 %
Adobe Myungjo Std M  Roman  M  Western  32 x 33  50 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  20 x 51  50 %
Adobe Naskh Medium  Modern  Medium  Mac  20 x 51  50 %
Adobe Naskh Medium  Modern  Medium  Western  20 x 51  50 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 37  30 %
Adobe Song Std L  Roman  L  CHINESE_GB2312  31 x 37  30 %
Adobe Song Std L  Roman  L  Cyrillic  31 x 37  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 37  30 %
Adobe Song Std L  Roman  L  Western  31 x 37  30 %
Agency FB  Swiss  Regular  Western  10 x 36  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 36  40 %
Arial Black  Swiss  Regular  Baltic  18 x 45  90 %
Arial Black  Swiss  Regular  Central European  18 x 45  90 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  18 x 45  90 %
Arial Black  Swiss  Regular  Greek  18 x 45  90 %
Arial Black  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  18 x 45  90 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  18 x 45  90 %
Arial Narrow  Swiss  Regular  Baltic  12 x 36  40 %
Arial Narrow  Swiss  Regular  Central European  12 x 36  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  12 x 36  40 %
Arial Narrow  Swiss  Regular  Greek  12 x 36  40 %
Arial Narrow  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  12 x 36  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  12 x 36  40 %
Arial Rounded MT Bold  Swiss  Regular  Western  15 x 37  40 %
Arial  Swiss  Regular  Arabic  14 x 36  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  14 x 36  40 %
Arial  Swiss  Regular  Central European  14 x 36  40 %
Arial  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  14 x 36  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  14 x 36  40 %
Arial  Swiss  Regular  Hebrew  14 x 36  40 %
Arial  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  14 x 36  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  14 x 36  40 %
Arial  Swiss  Regular  Western  14 x 36  40 %
Baskerville Old Face  Roman  Regular  Western  13 x 37  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  14 x 36  40 %
Bell MT  Roman  Regular  Western  13 x 35  40 %
Berlin Sans FB Demi  Swiss  Bold  Western  14 x 36  70 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  13 x 35  40 %
Bernard MT Condensed  Roman  Regular  Western  12 x 38  40 %
Birch Std  Script  Regular  Mac  10 x 38  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  10 x 38  40 %
Blackadder ITC  Decorative  Regular  Western  10 x 41  40 %
Blackoak Std  Decorative  Regular  Mac  39 x 43  90 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  39 x 43  90 %
Bodoni MT Black  Roman  Regular  Western  16 x 37  90 %
Bodoni MT Condensed  Roman  Regular  Western  9 x 38  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  8 x 37  30 %
Bodoni MT Poster Compressed  Roman  Regular  Western  8 x 37  30 %
Bodoni MT  Roman  Regular  Western  13 x 38  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  14 x 40  40 %
Book Antiqua  Roman  Regular  Central European  14 x 40  40 %
Book Antiqua  Roman  Regular  Cyrillic  14 x 40  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  14 x 40  40 %
Book Antiqua  Roman  Regular  Turkish  14 x 40  40 %
Book Antiqua  Roman  Regular  Western  14 x 40  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 36  30 %
Bookman Old Style  Roman  Regular  Central European  16 x 36  30 %
Bookman Old Style  Roman  Regular  Cyrillic  16 x 36  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 36  30 %
Bookman Old Style  Roman  Regular  Turkish  16 x 36  30 %
Bookman Old Style  Roman  Regular  Western  16 x 36  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  21 x 32  40 %
Bradley Hand ITC  Script  Regular  Western  13 x 40  40 %
Britannic Bold  Swiss  Regular  Western  14 x 35  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 36  40 %
Brush Script MT  Script  Italic  Western  10 x 39  40 %
Brush Script Std  Script  Medium  Mac  17 x 37  50 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 37  50 %
Calibri Light  Swiss  Regular  Arabic  17 x 39  30 %
Calibri Light  Swiss  Regular  Baltic  17 x 39  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 39  30 %
Calibri Light  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  17 x 39  30 %
Calibri Light  Swiss  Regular  Greek  17 x 39  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 39  30 %
Calibri Light  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  17 x 39  30 %
Calibri Light  Swiss  Regular  Vietnamese  17 x 39  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 39  30 %
Calibri  Swiss  Regular  Arabic  17 x 39  40 %
Calibri  Swiss  Regular  Baltic  17 x 39  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 39  40 %
Calibri  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  17 x 39  40 %
Calibri  Swiss  Regular  Greek  17 x 39  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 39  40 %
Calibri  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  17 x 39  40 %
Calibri  Swiss  Regular  Vietnamese  17 x 39  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 39  40 %
Californian FB  Roman  Regular  Western  13 x 36  40 %
Calisto MT  Roman  Regular  Western  13 x 37  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  20 x 179  40 %
Cambria Math  Roman  Regular  Central European  20 x 179  40 %
Cambria Math  Roman  Regular  Cyrillic  20 x 179  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  20 x 179  40 %
Cambria Math  Roman  Regular  Turkish  20 x 179  40 %
Cambria Math  Roman  Regular  Vietnamese  20 x 179  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  20 x 179  40 %
Cambria  Roman  Regular  Baltic  20 x 38  40 %
Cambria  Roman  Regular  Central European  20 x 38  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  20 x 38  40 %
Cambria  Roman  Regular  Greek  20 x 38  40 %
Cambria  Roman  Regular  Turkish  20 x 38  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  20 x 38  40 %
Cambria  Roman  Regular  Western  20 x 38  40 %
Candara  Swiss  Regular  Baltic  17 x 39  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 39  40 %
Candara  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  17 x 39  40 %
Candara  Swiss  Regular  Greek  17 x 39  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 39  40 %
Candara  Swiss  Regular  Vietnamese  17 x 39  40 %
Candara  Swiss  Regular  Western  17 x 39  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  21 x 39  40 %
Centaur  Roman  Regular  Western  12 x 36  40 %
Century Gothic  Swiss  Regular  Baltic  16 x 38  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 38  40 %
Century Gothic  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  16 x 38  40 %
Century Gothic  Swiss  Regular  Greek  16 x 38  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 38  40 %
Century Gothic  Swiss  Regular  Western  16 x 38  40 %
Century Schoolbook  Roman  Regular  Baltic  15 x 38  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 38  40 %
Century Schoolbook  Roman  Regular  Cyrillic  15 x 38  40 %
Century Schoolbook  Roman  Regular  Greek  15 x 38  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 38  40 %
Century Schoolbook  Roman  Regular  Western  15 x 38  40 %
Century  Roman  Regular  Baltic  15 x 38  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 38  40 %
Century  Roman  Regular  Cyrillic  15 x 38  40 %
Century  Roman  Regular  Greek  15 x 38  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 38  40 %
Century  Roman  Regular  Western  15 x 38  40 %
Chaparral Pro Light  Roman  Light Italic  Baltic  15 x 38  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 38  30 %
Chaparral Pro Light  Roman  Light Italic  Mac  15 x 38  30 %
Chaparral Pro Light  Roman  Light Italic  Turkish  15 x 38  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 38  30 %
Chaparral Pro  Roman  Regular  Baltic  16 x 38  40 %
Chaparral Pro  Roman  Regular  Central European  16 x 38  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 38  40 %
Chaparral Pro  Roman  Regular  Turkish  16 x 38  40 %
Chaparral Pro  Roman  Regular  Western  16 x 38  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  21 x 38  70 %
Charlemagne Std  Decorative  Bold  Western  21 x 38  70 %
Chiller  Decorative  Regular  Western  9 x 37  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  13 x 34  40 %
Comic Sans MS  Script  Regular  Baltic  15 x 45  40 %
Comic Sans MS  Script  Regular  Central European  15 x 45  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 45  40 %
Comic Sans MS  Script  Regular  Greek  15 x 45  40 %
Comic Sans MS  Script  Regular  Turkish  15 x 45  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 45  40 %
Consolas  Modern  Regular  Baltic  18 x 37  40 %
Consolas  Modern  Regular  Central European  18 x 37  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  18 x 37  40 %
Consolas  Modern  Regular  Greek  18 x 37  40 %
Consolas  Modern  Regular  Turkish  18 x 37  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  18 x 37  40 %
Consolas  Modern  Regular  Western  18 x 37  40 %
Constantia  Roman  Regular  Baltic  17 x 39  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 39  40 %
Constantia  Roman  Regular  Cyrillic  17 x 39  40 %
Constantia  Roman  Regular  Greek  17 x 39  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 39  40 %
Constantia  Roman  Regular  Vietnamese  17 x 39  40 %
Constantia  Roman  Regular  Western  17 x 39  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 37  40 %
Copperplate Gothic Bold  Swiss  Regular  Western  19 x 36  40 %
Copperplate Gothic Light  Swiss  Regular  Western  18 x 35  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 39  40 %
Corbel  Swiss  Regular  Central European  17 x 39  40 %
Corbel  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  17 x 39  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 39  40 %
Corbel  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  17 x 39  40 %
Corbel  Swiss  Regular  Vietnamese  17 x 39  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 39  40 %
Courier New  Modern  Regular  Arabic  19 x 36  40 %
Courier New  Modern  Regular  Baltic  19 x 36  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  19 x 36  40 %
Courier New  Modern  Regular  Cyrillic  19 x 36  40 %
Courier New  Modern  Regular  Greek  19 x 36  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  19 x 36  40 %
Courier New  Modern  Regular  Turkish  19 x 36  40 %
Courier New  Modern  Regular  Vietnamese  19 x 36  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  19 x 36  40 %
Courier  Modern    Western  8 x 13  40 %
Curlz MT  Decorative  Regular  Western  12 x 42  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  13 x 34  30 %
Dekar  Modern  Regular  Western  14 x 34  40 %
Ebrima  Special  Regular  Baltic  19 x 43  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  19 x 43  40 %
Ebrima  Special  Regular  Turkish  19 x 43  40 %
Ebrima  Special  Regular  Western  19 x 43  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  8 x 38  40 %
Elephant  Roman  Regular  Western  16 x 41  40 %
Engravers MT  Roman  Regular  Western  25 x 37  50 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 37  40 %
Eras Demi ITC  Swiss  Regular  Western  15 x 36  40 %
Eras Light ITC  Swiss  Regular  Western  13 x 36  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  14 x 36  40 %
Felix Titling  Decorative  Regular  Western  19 x 37  40 %
Fixedsys  Modern    Western  8 x 15  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  13 x 34  30 %
Forte  Script  Regular  Western  14 x 35  40 %
Franklin Gothic Book  Swiss  Regular  Baltic  13 x 36  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  13 x 36  40 %
Franklin Gothic Book  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  13 x 36  40 %
Franklin Gothic Book  Swiss  Regular  Greek  13 x 36  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  13 x 36  40 %
Franklin Gothic Book  Swiss  Regular  Western  13 x 36  40 %
Franklin Gothic Demi Cond  Swiss  Regular  Baltic  12 x 36  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  12 x 36  40 %
Franklin Gothic Demi Cond  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  12 x 36  40 %
Franklin Gothic Demi Cond  Swiss  Regular  Greek  12 x 36  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  12 x 36  40 %
Franklin Gothic Demi Cond  Swiss  Regular  Western  12 x 36  40 %
Franklin Gothic Demi  Swiss  Regular  Baltic  14 x 36  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  14 x 36  40 %
Franklin Gothic Demi  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  14 x 36  40 %
Franklin Gothic Demi  Swiss  Regular  Greek  14 x 36  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  14 x 36  40 %
Franklin Gothic Demi  Swiss  Regular  Western  14 x 36  40 %
Franklin Gothic Heavy  Swiss  Regular  Baltic  15 x 36  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 36  40 %
Franklin Gothic Heavy  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  15 x 36  40 %
Franklin Gothic Heavy  Swiss  Regular  Greek  15 x 36  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 36  40 %
Franklin Gothic Heavy  Swiss  Regular  Western  15 x 36  40 %
Franklin Gothic Medium Cond  Swiss  Regular  Baltic  12 x 36  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  12 x 36  40 %
Franklin Gothic Medium Cond  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  12 x 36  40 %
Franklin Gothic Medium Cond  Swiss  Regular  Greek  12 x 36  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  12 x 36  40 %
Franklin Gothic Medium Cond  Swiss  Regular  Western  12 x 36  40 %
Franklin Gothic Medium  Swiss  Regular  Baltic  14 x 36  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  14 x 36  40 %
Franklin Gothic Medium  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  14 x 36  40 %
Franklin Gothic Medium  Swiss  Regular  Greek  14 x 36  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  14 x 36  40 %
Franklin Gothic Medium  Swiss  Regular  Western  14 x 36  40 %
Freestyle Script  Script  Regular  Western  8 x 38  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  9 x 36  40 %
Gabriola  Decorative  Regular  Baltic  16 x 59  40 %
Gabriola  Decorative  Regular  Central European  16 x 59  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 59  40 %
Gabriola  Decorative  Regular  Greek  16 x 59  40 %
Gabriola  Decorative  Regular  Turkish  16 x 59  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 59  40 %
Gadugi  Swiss  Regular  Western  18 x 43  40 %
Garamond  Roman  Regular  Baltic  12 x 36  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  12 x 36  40 %
Garamond  Roman  Regular  Cyrillic  12 x 36  40 %
Garamond  Roman  Regular  Greek  12 x 36  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  12 x 36  40 %
Garamond  Roman  Regular  Western  12 x 36  40 %
Georgia  Roman  Regular  Baltic  14 x 36  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  14 x 36  40 %
Georgia  Roman  Regular  Cyrillic  14 x 36  40 %
Georgia  Roman  Regular  Greek  14 x 36  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  14 x 36  40 %
Georgia  Roman  Regular  Western  14 x 36  40 %
Gigi  Decorative  Regular  Western  13 x 44  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  10 x 39  40 %
Gill Sans MT Condensed  Swiss  Regular  Western  10 x 39  40 %
Gill Sans MT Ext Condensed Bold  Swiss  Regular  Central European  7 x 38  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  7 x 38  40 %
Gill Sans MT  Swiss  Regular  Central European  13 x 37  40 %
Gill Sans MT  Swiss  Regular  Western  13 x 37  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  14 x 40  40 %
Gill Sans Ultra Bold Condensed  Swiss  Regular  Western  14 x 40  40 %
Gill Sans Ultra Bold  Swiss  Regular  Central European  20 x 40  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  20 x 40  40 %
Gloucester MT Extra Condensed  Roman  Regular  Western  9 x 37  40 %
Goudy Old Style  Roman  Regular  Western  13 x 36  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  36 x 44  40 %
Haettenschweiler  Swiss  Regular  Baltic  10 x 33  40 %
Haettenschweiler  Swiss  Regular  Central European  10 x 33  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  10 x 33  40 %
Haettenschweiler  Swiss  Regular  Greek  10 x 33  40 %
Haettenschweiler  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  10 x 33  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  10 x 33  40 %
Harlow Solid Italic  Decorative  Italic  Western  12 x 40  40 %
Harrington  Decorative  Regular  Western  14 x 38  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  13 x 37  40 %
Hobo Std  Swiss  Medium  Mac  18 x 45  50 %
Hobo Std  Swiss  Medium  Western  18 x 45  50 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  19 x 39  40 %
Impact  Swiss  Regular  Central European  19 x 39  40 %
Impact  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  19 x 39  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  19 x 39  40 %
Impact  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  19 x 39  40 %
Impact  Swiss  Regular  Western  19 x 39  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  13 x 38  40 %
Informal Roman  Script  Regular  Western  12 x 32  40 %
Javanese Text  Special  Regular  Western  26 x 73  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 48  40 %
Juice ITC  Decorative  Regular  Western  9 x 36  40 %
Kozuka Gothic Pr6N B  Swiss  B  Baltic  31 x 59  70 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 59  70 %
Kozuka Gothic Pr6N B  Swiss  B  Cyrillic  31 x 59  70 %
Kozuka Gothic Pr6N B  Swiss  B  Greek  31 x 59  70 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 59  70 %
Kozuka Gothic Pr6N B  Swiss  B  Mac  31 x 59  70 %
Kozuka Gothic Pr6N B  Swiss  B  Turkish  31 x 59  70 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 59  70 %
Kozuka Gothic Pr6N EL  Swiss  EL  Baltic  31 x 55  25 %
Kozuka Gothic Pr6N EL  Swiss  EL  Central European  31 x 55  25 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 55  25 %
Kozuka Gothic Pr6N EL  Swiss  EL  Greek  31 x 55  25 %
Kozuka Gothic Pr6N EL  Swiss  EL  Japanese  31 x 55  25 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 55  25 %
Kozuka Gothic Pr6N EL  Swiss  EL  Turkish  31 x 55  25 %
Kozuka Gothic Pr6N EL  Swiss  EL  Western  31 x 55  25 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 59  90 %
Kozuka Gothic Pr6N H  Swiss  H  Central European  31 x 59  90 %
Kozuka Gothic Pr6N H  Swiss  H  Cyrillic  31 x 59  90 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 59  90 %
Kozuka Gothic Pr6N H  Swiss  H  Japanese  31 x 59  90 %
Kozuka Gothic Pr6N H  Swiss  H  Mac  31 x 59  90 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 59  90 %
Kozuka Gothic Pr6N H  Swiss  H  Western  31 x 59  90 %
Kozuka Gothic Pr6N L  Swiss  L  Baltic  31 x 56  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 56  30 %
Kozuka Gothic Pr6N L  Swiss  L  Cyrillic  31 x 56  30 %
Kozuka Gothic Pr6N L  Swiss  L  Greek  31 x 56  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 56  30 %
Kozuka Gothic Pr6N L  Swiss  L  Mac  31 x 56  30 %
Kozuka Gothic Pr6N L  Swiss  L  Turkish  31 x 56  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 56  30 %
Kozuka Gothic Pr6N M  Swiss  M  Baltic  31 x 57  50 %
Kozuka Gothic Pr6N M  Swiss  M  Central European  31 x 57  50 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 57  50 %
Kozuka Gothic Pr6N M  Swiss  M  Greek  31 x 57  50 %
Kozuka Gothic Pr6N M  Swiss  M  Japanese  31 x 57  50 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 57  50 %
Kozuka Gothic Pr6N M  Swiss  M  Turkish  31 x 57  50 %
Kozuka Gothic Pr6N M  Swiss  M  Western  31 x 57  50 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 56  40 %
Kozuka Gothic Pr6N R  Swiss  R  Central European  31 x 56  40 %
Kozuka Gothic Pr6N R  Swiss  R  Cyrillic  31 x 56  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 56  40 %
Kozuka Gothic Pr6N R  Swiss  R  Japanese  31 x 56  40 %
Kozuka Gothic Pr6N R  Swiss  R  Mac  31 x 56  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 56  40 %
Kozuka Gothic Pr6N R  Swiss  R  Western  31 x 56  40 %
Kozuka Gothic Pro B  Swiss  B  Cyrillic  31 x 45  70 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 45  70 %
Kozuka Gothic Pro B  Swiss  B  Mac  31 x 45  70 %
Kozuka Gothic Pro B  Swiss  B  Western  31 x 45  70 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 42  25 %
Kozuka Gothic Pro EL  Swiss  EL  Japanese  31 x 42  25 %
Kozuka Gothic Pro EL  Swiss  EL  Mac  31 x 42  25 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 42  25 %
Kozuka Gothic Pro H  Swiss  H  Cyrillic  31 x 46  90 %
Kozuka Gothic Pro H  Swiss  H  Japanese  31 x 46  90 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 46  90 %
Kozuka Gothic Pro H  Swiss  H  Western  31 x 46  90 %
Kozuka Gothic Pro L  Swiss  L  Cyrillic  31 x 42  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 42  30 %
Kozuka Gothic Pro L  Swiss  L  Mac  31 x 42  30 %
Kozuka Gothic Pro L  Swiss  L  Western  31 x 42  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 44  50 %
Kozuka Gothic Pro M  Swiss  M  Japanese  31 x 44  50 %
Kozuka Gothic Pro M  Swiss  M  Mac  31 x 44  50 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 44  50 %
Kozuka Gothic Pro R  Swiss  R  Cyrillic  31 x 43  40 %
Kozuka Gothic Pro R  Swiss  R  Japanese  31 x 43  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 43  40 %
Kozuka Gothic Pro R  Swiss  R  Western  31 x 43  40 %
Kozuka Mincho Pr6N B  Roman  B  Baltic  31 x 54  70 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 54  70 %
Kozuka Mincho Pr6N B  Roman  B  Cyrillic  31 x 54  70 %
Kozuka Mincho Pr6N B  Roman  B  Greek  31 x 54  70 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 54  70 %
Kozuka Mincho Pr6N B  Roman  B  Mac  31 x 54  70 %
Kozuka Mincho Pr6N B  Roman  B  Turkish  31 x 54  70 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 54  70 %
Kozuka Mincho Pr6N EL  Roman  EL  Baltic  31 x 52  25 %
Kozuka Mincho Pr6N EL  Roman  EL  Central European  31 x 52  25 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 52  25 %
Kozuka Mincho Pr6N EL  Roman  EL  Greek  31 x 52  25 %
Kozuka Mincho Pr6N EL  Roman  EL  Japanese  31 x 52  25 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 52  25 %
Kozuka Mincho Pr6N EL  Roman  EL  Turkish  31 x 52  25 %
Kozuka Mincho Pr6N EL  Roman  EL  Western  31 x 52  25 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 55  90 %
Kozuka Mincho Pr6N H  Roman  H  Central European  31 x 55  90 %
Kozuka Mincho Pr6N H  Roman  H  Cyrillic  31 x 55  90 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 55  90 %
Kozuka Mincho Pr6N H  Roman  H  Japanese  31 x 55  90 %
Kozuka Mincho Pr6N H  Roman  H  Mac  31 x 55  90 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 55  90 %
Kozuka Mincho Pr6N H  Roman  H  Western  31 x 55  90 %
Kozuka Mincho Pr6N L  Roman  L  Baltic  31 x 53  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 53  30 %
Kozuka Mincho Pr6N L  Roman  L  Cyrillic  31 x 53  30 %
Kozuka Mincho Pr6N L  Roman  L  Greek  31 x 53  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 53  30 %
Kozuka Mincho Pr6N L  Roman  L  Mac  31 x 53  30 %
Kozuka Mincho Pr6N L  Roman  L  Turkish  31 x 53  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 53  30 %
Kozuka Mincho Pr6N M  Roman  M  Baltic  31 x 53  50 %
Kozuka Mincho Pr6N M  Roman  M  Central European  31 x 53  50 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 53  50 %
Kozuka Mincho Pr6N M  Roman  M  Greek  31 x 53  50 %
Kozuka Mincho Pr6N M  Roman  M  Japanese  31 x 53  50 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 53  50 %
Kozuka Mincho Pr6N M  Roman  M  Turkish  31 x 53  50 %
Kozuka Mincho Pr6N M  Roman  M  Western  31 x 53  50 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 53  40 %
Kozuka Mincho Pr6N R  Roman  R  Central European  31 x 53  40 %
Kozuka Mincho Pr6N R  Roman  R  Cyrillic  31 x 53  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 53  40 %
Kozuka Mincho Pr6N R  Roman  R  Japanese  31 x 53  40 %
Kozuka Mincho Pr6N R  Roman  R  Mac  31 x 53  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 53  40 %
Kozuka Mincho Pr6N R  Roman  R  Western  31 x 53  40 %
Kozuka Mincho Pro B  Roman  B  Cyrillic  31 x 44  70 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 44  70 %
Kozuka Mincho Pro B  Roman  B  Mac  31 x 44  70 %
Kozuka Mincho Pro B  Roman  B  Western  31 x 44  70 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 43  25 %
Kozuka Mincho Pro EL  Roman  EL  Japanese  31 x 43  25 %
Kozuka Mincho Pro EL  Roman  EL  Mac  31 x 43  25 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 43  25 %
Kozuka Mincho Pro H  Roman  H  Cyrillic  31 x 44  90 %
Kozuka Mincho Pro H  Roman  H  Japanese  31 x 44  90 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 44  90 %
Kozuka Mincho Pro H  Roman  H  Western  31 x 44  90 %
Kozuka Mincho Pro L  Roman  L  Cyrillic  31 x 43  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 43  30 %
Kozuka Mincho Pro L  Roman  L  Mac  31 x 43  30 %
Kozuka Mincho Pro L  Roman  L  Western  31 x 43  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 43  50 %
Kozuka Mincho Pro M  Roman  M  Japanese  31 x 43  50 %
Kozuka Mincho Pro M  Roman  M  Mac  31 x 43  50 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 43  50 %
Kozuka Mincho Pro R  Roman  R  Cyrillic  31 x 43  40 %
Kozuka Mincho Pro R  Roman  R  Japanese  31 x 43  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 43  40 %
Kozuka Mincho Pro R  Roman  R  Western  31 x 43  40 %
Kristen ITC  Script  Regular  Western  16 x 44  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  8 x 35  40 %
Leelawadee UI Semilight  Swiss  Regular  Thai  17 x 43  35 %
Leelawadee UI Semilight  Swiss  Regular  Vietnamese  17 x 43  35 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 43  35 %
Leelawadee UI  Swiss  Regular  Thai  17 x 43  40 %
Leelawadee UI  Swiss  Regular  Vietnamese  17 x 43  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 43  40 %
Leelawadee  Swiss  Regular  Thai  17 x 38  40 %
Leelawadee  Swiss  Regular  Western  17 x 38  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  19 x 39  40 %
Letter Gothic Std  Modern  Medium  Western  19 x 39  40 %
Lithos Pro Regular  Decorative  Regular  Baltic  20 x 38  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  20 x 38  40 %
Lithos Pro Regular  Decorative  Regular  Greek  20 x 38  40 %
Lithos Pro Regular  Decorative  Regular  Mac  20 x 38  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  20 x 38  40 %
Lithos Pro Regular  Decorative  Regular  Western  20 x 38  40 %
Lucida Bright  Roman  Regular  Western  16 x 36  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 40  40 %
Lucida Console  Modern  Regular  Central European  19 x 32  40 %
Lucida Console  Modern  Regular  Cyrillic  19 x 32  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  19 x 32  40 %
Lucida Console  Modern  Regular  Turkish  19 x 32  40 %
Lucida Console  Modern  Regular  Western  19 x 32  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 37  40 %
Lucida Handwriting  Script  Italic  Western  18 x 41  40 %
Lucida Sans Typewriter  Modern  Regular  Western  19 x 36  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 49  40 %
Lucida Sans Unicode  Swiss  Regular  Central European  16 x 49  40 %
Lucida Sans Unicode  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  16 x 49  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 49  40 %
Lucida Sans Unicode  Swiss  Regular  Hebrew  16 x 49  40 %
Lucida Sans Unicode  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  16 x 49  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 49  40 %
Lucida Sans  Swiss  Regular  Western  16 x 36  40 %
Magneto  Decorative  Bold  Western  18 x 39  70 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  14 x 38  40 %
Malgun Gothic Semilight  Swiss  Regular  Baltic  31 x 43  30 %
Malgun Gothic Semilight  Swiss  Regular  CHINESE_BIG5  31 x 43  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 43  30 %
Malgun Gothic Semilight  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  31 x 43  30 %
Malgun Gothic Semilight  Swiss  Regular  Greek  31 x 43  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 43  30 %
Malgun Gothic Semilight  Swiss  Regular  Hangul  31 x 43  30 %
Malgun Gothic Semilight  Swiss  Regular  Hebrew  31 x 43  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 43  30 %
Malgun Gothic Semilight  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  31 x 43  30 %
Malgun Gothic Semilight  Swiss  Regular  Vietnamese  31 x 43  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 43  30 %
Malgun Gothic  Swiss  Regular  Hangul  15 x 43  40 %
Malgun Gothic  Swiss  Regular  Western  15 x 43  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 32  50 %
Matura MT Script Capitals  Script  Regular  Western  14 x 43  40 %
Microsoft Himalaya  Special  Regular  Western  13 x 32  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  32 x 43  29 %
Microsoft JhengHei Light  Swiss  Regular  Greek  32 x 43  29 %
Microsoft JhengHei Light  Swiss  Regular  Western  32 x 43  29 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  32 x 41  29 %
Microsoft JhengHei UI Light  Swiss  Regular  Greek  32 x 41  29 %
Microsoft JhengHei UI Light  Swiss  Regular  Western  32 x 41  29 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 41  40 %
Microsoft JhengHei UI  Swiss  Regular  Greek  15 x 41  40 %
Microsoft JhengHei UI  Swiss  Regular  Western  15 x 41  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 43  40 %
Microsoft JhengHei  Swiss  Regular  Greek  15 x 43  40 %
Microsoft JhengHei  Swiss  Regular  Western  15 x 43  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  19 x 42  40 %
Microsoft PhagsPa  Swiss  Regular  Western  24 x 41  40 %
Microsoft Sans Serif  Swiss  Regular  Arabic  14 x 36  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  14 x 36  40 %
Microsoft Sans Serif  Swiss  Regular  Central European  14 x 36  40 %
Microsoft Sans Serif  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  14 x 36  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  14 x 36  40 %
Microsoft Sans Serif  Swiss  Regular  Hebrew  14 x 36  40 %
Microsoft Sans Serif  Swiss  Regular  Thai  14 x 36  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  14 x 36  40 %
Microsoft Sans Serif  Swiss  Regular  Vietnamese  14 x 36  40 %
Microsoft Sans Serif  Swiss  Regular  Western  14 x 36  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  19 x 41  40 %
Microsoft Uighur  Special  Regular  Arabic  13 x 32  40 %
Microsoft Uighur  Special  Regular  Western  13 x 32  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 41  29 %
Microsoft YaHei Light  Swiss  Regular  CHINESE_GB2312  15 x 41  29 %
Microsoft YaHei Light  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  15 x 41  29 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 41  29 %
Microsoft YaHei Light  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  15 x 41  29 %
Microsoft YaHei Light  Swiss  Regular  Western  15 x 41  29 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 42  29 %
Microsoft YaHei UI Light  Swiss  Regular  CHINESE_GB2312  15 x 42  29 %
Microsoft YaHei UI Light  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  15 x 42  29 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 42  29 %
Microsoft YaHei UI Light  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  15 x 42  29 %
Microsoft YaHei UI Light  Swiss  Regular  Western  15 x 42  29 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 41  40 %
Microsoft YaHei UI  Swiss  Regular  CHINESE_GB2312  15 x 41  40 %
Microsoft YaHei UI  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  15 x 41  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 41  40 %
Microsoft YaHei UI  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  15 x 41  40 %
Microsoft YaHei UI  Swiss  Regular  Western  15 x 41  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 42  40 %
Microsoft YaHei  Swiss  Regular  CHINESE_GB2312  15 x 42  40 %
Microsoft YaHei  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  15 x 42  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 42  40 %
Microsoft YaHei  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  15 x 42  40 %
Microsoft YaHei  Swiss  Regular  Western  15 x 42  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  21 x 32  40 %
MingLiU_HKSCS-ExtB  Roman  Regular  CHINESE_BIG5  16 x 32  40 %
MingLiU_HKSCS-ExtB  Roman  Regular  Western  16 x 32  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 32  40 %
MingLiU-ExtB  Roman  Regular  Western  16 x 32  40 %
Minion Pro Cond  Roman  Bold Cond  Baltic  17 x 44  70 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 44  70 %
Minion Pro Cond  Roman  Bold Cond  Cyrillic  17 x 44  70 %
Minion Pro Cond  Roman  Bold Cond  Greek  17 x 44  70 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 44  70 %
Minion Pro Cond  Roman  Bold Cond  Turkish  17 x 44  70 %
Minion Pro Cond  Roman  Bold Cond  Western  17 x 44  70 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 43  50 %
Minion Pro Med  Roman  Medium  Central European  17 x 43  50 %
Minion Pro Med  Roman  Medium  Cyrillic  17 x 43  50 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 43  50 %
Minion Pro Med  Roman  Medium  Mac  17 x 43  50 %
Minion Pro Med  Roman  Medium  Turkish  17 x 43  50 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 43  50 %
Minion Pro SmBd  Roman  Semibold  Baltic  18 x 44  60 %
Minion Pro SmBd  Roman  Semibold  Central European  18 x 44  60 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  18 x 44  60 %
Minion Pro SmBd  Roman  Semibold  Greek  18 x 44  60 %
Minion Pro SmBd  Roman  Semibold  Mac  18 x 44  60 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  18 x 44  60 %
Minion Pro SmBd  Roman  Semibold  Western  18 x 44  60 %
Minion Pro  Roman  Regular  Baltic  17 x 43  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 43  40 %
Minion Pro  Roman  Regular  Cyrillic  17 x 43  40 %
Minion Pro  Roman  Regular  Greek  17 x 43  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 43  40 %
Minion Pro  Roman  Regular  Turkish  17 x 43  40 %
Minion Pro  Roman  Regular  Western  17 x 43  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  10 x 39  40 %
Mistral  Script  Regular  Central European  10 x 39  40 %
Mistral  Script  Regular  Cyrillic  10 x 39  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  10 x 39  40 %
Mistral  Script  Regular  Turkish  10 x 39  40 %
Mistral  Script  Regular  Western  10 x 39  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  13 x 33  40 %
Modern  Modern    OEM/DOS  19 x 37  40 %
Mongolian Baiti  Script  Regular  Western  14 x 34  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  11 x 35  40 %
Monotype Corsiva  Script  Regular  Central European  11 x 35  40 %
Monotype Corsiva  Script  Regular  Cyrillic  11 x 35  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  11 x 35  40 %
Monotype Corsiva  Script  Regular  Turkish  11 x 35  40 %
Monotype Corsiva  Script  Regular  Western  11 x 35  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 32  40 %
MS Gothic  Modern  Regular  Central European  16 x 32  40 %
MS Gothic  Modern  Regular  Cyrillic  16 x 32  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 32  40 %
MS Gothic  Modern  Regular  Japanese  16 x 32  40 %
MS Gothic  Modern  Regular  Turkish  16 x 32  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 32  40 %
MS Outlook  Special  Regular  Symbol  31 x 33  40 %
MS PGothic  Swiss  Regular  Baltic  13 x 32  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  13 x 32  40 %
MS PGothic  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  13 x 32  40 %
MS PGothic  Swiss  Regular  Greek  13 x 32  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  13 x 32  40 %
MS PGothic  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  13 x 32  40 %
MS PGothic  Swiss  Regular  Western  13 x 32  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 39  40 %
MS Reference Sans Serif  Swiss  Regular  Central European  16 x 39  40 %
MS Reference Sans Serif  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  16 x 39  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 39  40 %
MS Reference Sans Serif  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  16 x 39  40 %
MS Reference Sans Serif  Swiss  Regular  Vietnamese  16 x 39  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 39  40 %
MS Reference Specialty  Special  Regular  Symbol  23 x 39  40 %
MS Sans Serif  Swiss    Western  5 x 13  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  5 x 13  40 %
MS UI Gothic  Swiss  Regular  Baltic  13 x 32  40 %
MS UI Gothic  Swiss  Regular  Central European  13 x 32  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  13 x 32  40 %
MS UI Gothic  Swiss  Regular  Greek  13 x 32  40 %
MS UI Gothic  Swiss  Regular  Japanese  13 x 32  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  13 x 32  40 %
MS UI Gothic  Swiss  Regular  Western  13 x 32  40 %
MT Extra  Roman  Regular  Symbol  20 x 32  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  18 x 52  40 %
Myanmar Text  Swiss  Regular  Western  18 x 60  40 %
Myriad Arabic  Modern  Regular  Arabic  13 x 44  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  13 x 44  40 %
Myriad Arabic  Modern  Regular  Mac  13 x 44  40 %
Myriad Arabic  Modern  Regular  Western  13 x 44  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  14 x 39  40 %
Myriad Hebrew  Modern  Regular  Hebrew  14 x 39  40 %
Myriad Hebrew  Modern  Regular  Mac  14 x 39  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  14 x 39  40 %
Myriad Pro Cond  Swiss  Condensed  Baltic  12 x 38  40 %
Myriad Pro Cond  Swiss  Condensed  Central European  12 x 38  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  12 x 38  40 %
Myriad Pro Cond  Swiss  Condensed  Greek  12 x 38  40 %
Myriad Pro Cond  Swiss  Condensed  Mac  12 x 38  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  12 x 38  40 %
Myriad Pro Cond  Swiss  Condensed  Western  12 x 38  40 %
Myriad Pro Light  Swiss  Semibold  Baltic  16 x 39  60 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 39  60 %
Myriad Pro Light  Swiss  Semibold  Cyrillic  16 x 39  60 %
Myriad Pro Light  Swiss  Semibold  Greek  16 x 39  60 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 39  60 %
Myriad Pro Light  Swiss  Semibold  Turkish  16 x 39  60 %
Myriad Pro Light  Swiss  Semibold  Western  16 x 39  60 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 38  40 %
Myriad Pro  Swiss  Regular  Central European  15 x 38  40 %
Myriad Pro  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  15 x 38  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 38  40 %
Myriad Pro  Swiss  Regular  Mac  15 x 38  40 %
Myriad Pro  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  15 x 38  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 38  40 %
Niagara Engraved  Decorative  Regular  Western  8 x 34  40 %
Niagara Solid  Decorative  Regular  Western  8 x 34  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 43  35 %
Nirmala UI  Swiss  Regular  Western  31 x 43  40 %
NSimSun  Modern  Regular  CHINESE_GB2312  16 x 32  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 32  40 %
Nueva Std Cond  Swiss  Condensed  Mac  10 x 32  40 %
Nueva Std Cond  Swiss  Condensed  Western  10 x 32  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 33  70 %
Nueva Std  Swiss  Bold  Western  15 x 33  70 %
OCR A Extended  Modern  Regular  Western  19 x 33  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  23 x 34  40 %
OCR A Std  Modern  Regular  Western  23 x 34  40 %
Old English Text MT  Script  Regular  Western  12 x 39  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  8 x 37  40 %
Orator Std  Modern  Medium  Mac  19 x 43  40 %
Orator Std  Modern  Medium  Western  19 x 43  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  7 x 30  40 %
Palatino Linotype  Roman  Regular  Baltic  14 x 43  40 %
Palatino Linotype  Roman  Regular  Central European  14 x 43  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  14 x 43  40 %
Palatino Linotype  Roman  Regular  Greek  14 x 43  40 %
Palatino Linotype  Roman  Regular  Turkish  14 x 43  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  14 x 43  40 %
Palatino Linotype  Roman  Regular  Western  14 x 43  40 %
Papyrus  Script  Regular  Western  13 x 50  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  6 x 34  40 %
Perpetua Titling MT  Roman  Light  Western  19 x 38  30 %
Perpetua  Roman  Regular  Western  12 x 37  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  8 x 32  40 %
PMingLiU-ExtB  Roman  Regular  CHINESE_BIG5  16 x 32  40 %
PMingLiU-ExtB  Roman  Regular  Western  16 x 32  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  12 x 36  40 %
Poplar Std  Decorative  Black  Mac  13 x 38  70 %
Poplar Std  Decorative  Black  Western  13 x 38  70 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  19 x 36  70 %
Prestige Elite Std  Modern  Bold  Western  19 x 36  70 %
Pristina  Script  Regular  Western  10 x 42  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  11 x 40  40 %
Raleway  Swiss  Thin  Baltic  17 x 38  10 %
Raleway  Swiss  Thin  Central European  17 x 38  10 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 38  10 %
Raleway  Swiss  Thin  Western  17 x 38  10 %
Ravie  Decorative  Regular  Western  22 x 43  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  11 x 38  40 %
Rockwell Extra Bold  Roman  Regular  Western  19 x 38  80 %
Rockwell  Roman  Regular  Western  15 x 38  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  22 x 37  40 %
Script MT Bold  Script  Regular  Western  13 x 39  70 %
Script  Script    OEM/DOS  16 x 36  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  33 x 32  40 %
Segoe Print  Special  Regular  Baltic  21 x 56  40 %
Segoe Print  Special  Regular  Central European  21 x 56  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  21 x 56  40 %
Segoe Print  Special  Regular  Greek  21 x 56  40 %
Segoe Print  Special  Regular  Turkish  21 x 56  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  21 x 56  40 %
Segoe Script  Script  Regular  Baltic  22 x 51  40 %
Segoe Script  Script  Regular  Central European  22 x 51  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  22 x 51  40 %
Segoe Script  Script  Regular  Greek  22 x 51  40 %
Segoe Script  Script  Regular  Turkish  22 x 51  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  22 x 51  40 %
Segoe UI Black  Swiss  Regular  Baltic  20 x 43  90 %
Segoe UI Black  Swiss  Regular  Central European  20 x 43  90 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  20 x 43  90 %
Segoe UI Black  Swiss  Regular  Greek  20 x 43  90 %
Segoe UI Black  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  20 x 43  90 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  20 x 43  90 %
Segoe UI Black  Swiss  Regular  Western  20 x 43  90 %
Segoe UI Emoji  Swiss  Regular  Western  40 x 43  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  27 x 43  40 %
Segoe UI Light  Swiss  Regular  Arabic  17 x 43  30 %
Segoe UI Light  Swiss  Regular  Baltic  17 x 43  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 43  30 %
Segoe UI Light  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  17 x 43  30 %
Segoe UI Light  Swiss  Regular  Greek  17 x 43  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 43  30 %
Segoe UI Light  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  17 x 43  30 %
Segoe UI Light  Swiss  Regular  Vietnamese  17 x 43  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 43  30 %
Segoe UI Semibold  Swiss  Regular  Arabic  18 x 43  60 %
Segoe UI Semibold  Swiss  Regular  Baltic  18 x 43  60 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  18 x 43  60 %
Segoe UI Semibold  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  18 x 43  60 %
Segoe UI Semibold  Swiss  Regular  Greek  18 x 43  60 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  18 x 43  60 %
Segoe UI Semibold  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  18 x 43  60 %
Segoe UI Semibold  Swiss  Regular  Vietnamese  18 x 43  60 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  18 x 43  60 %
Segoe UI Semilight  Swiss  Regular  Arabic  17 x 43  35 %
Segoe UI Semilight  Swiss  Regular  Baltic  17 x 43  35 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 43  35 %
Segoe UI Semilight  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  17 x 43  35 %
Segoe UI Semilight  Swiss  Regular  Greek  17 x 43  35 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 43  35 %
Segoe UI Semilight  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  17 x 43  35 %
Segoe UI Semilight  Swiss  Regular  Vietnamese  17 x 43  35 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 43  35 %
Segoe UI Symbol  Swiss  Regular  Western  23 x 43  40 %
Segoe UI  Swiss  Regular  Arabic  17 x 43  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 43  40 %
Segoe UI  Swiss  Regular  Central European  17 x 43  40 %
Segoe UI  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  17 x 43  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 43  40 %
Segoe UI  Swiss  Regular  Hebrew  17 x 43  40 %
Segoe UI  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  17 x 43  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 43  40 %
Segoe UI  Swiss  Regular  Western  17 x 43  40 %
Showcard Gothic  Decorative  Regular  Western  18 x 40  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 32  40 %
SimSun  Special  Regular  Western  16 x 32  40 %
SimSun-ExtB  Modern  Regular  CHINESE_GB2312  16 x 32  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 32  40 %
Sitka Banner  Special  Regular  Baltic  16 x 46  40 %
Sitka Banner  Special  Regular  Central European  16 x 46  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 46  40 %
Sitka Banner  Special  Regular  Greek  16 x 46  40 %
Sitka Banner  Special  Regular  Turkish  16 x 46  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 46  40 %
Sitka Banner  Special  Regular  Western  16 x 46  40 %
Sitka Display  Special  Regular  Baltic  17 x 46  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 46  40 %
Sitka Display  Special  Regular  Cyrillic  17 x 46  40 %
Sitka Display  Special  Regular  Greek  17 x 46  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 46  40 %
Sitka Display  Special  Regular  Vietnamese  17 x 46  40 %
Sitka Display  Special  Regular  Western  17 x 46  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 46  40 %
Sitka Heading  Special  Regular  Central European  17 x 46  40 %
Sitka Heading  Special  Regular  Cyrillic  17 x 46  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 46  40 %
Sitka Heading  Special  Regular  Turkish  17 x 46  40 %
Sitka Heading  Special  Regular  Vietnamese  17 x 46  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 46  40 %
Sitka Small  Special  Regular  Baltic  21 x 47  40 %
Sitka Small  Special  Regular  Central European  21 x 47  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  21 x 47  40 %
Sitka Small  Special  Regular  Greek  21 x 47  40 %
Sitka Small  Special  Regular  Turkish  21 x 47  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  21 x 47  40 %
Sitka Small  Special  Regular  Western  21 x 47  40 %
Sitka Subheading  Special  Regular  Baltic  18 x 46  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  18 x 46  40 %
Sitka Subheading  Special  Regular  Cyrillic  18 x 46  40 %
Sitka Subheading  Special  Regular  Greek  18 x 46  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  18 x 46  40 %
Sitka Subheading  Special  Regular  Vietnamese  18 x 46  40 %
Sitka Subheading  Special  Regular  Western  18 x 46  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  19 x 46  40 %
Sitka Text  Special  Regular  Central European  19 x 46  40 %
Sitka Text  Special  Regular  Cyrillic  19 x 46  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  19 x 46  40 %
Sitka Text  Special  Regular  Turkish  19 x 46  40 %
Sitka Text  Special  Regular  Vietnamese  19 x 46  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  19 x 46  40 %
Slim Tony Ornaments  Modern  Regular  Western  55 x 46  40 %
Slim Tony  Modern  Regular  Baltic  25 x 81  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  25 x 81  40 %
Slim Tony  Modern  Regular  Mac  25 x 81  40 %
Slim Tony  Modern  Regular  Turkish  25 x 81  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  25 x 81  40 %
Small Fonts  Swiss    Western  1 x 3  40 %
Snap ITC  Decorative  Regular  Western  19 x 41  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 40  90 %
Source Sans Pro Black  Swiss  Black  Central European  15 x 40  90 %
Source Sans Pro Black  Swiss  Black  Mac  15 x 40  90 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 40  90 %
Source Sans Pro Black  Swiss  Black  Western  15 x 40  90 %
Source Sans Pro ExtraLight  Swiss  ExtraLight  Baltic  14 x 40  20 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  14 x 40  20 %
Source Sans Pro ExtraLight  Swiss  ExtraLight  Mac  14 x 40  20 %
Source Sans Pro ExtraLight  Swiss  ExtraLight  Turkish  14 x 40  20 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  14 x 40  20 %
Source Sans Pro Light  Swiss  Light  Baltic  14 x 40  30 %
Source Sans Pro Light  Swiss  Light  Central European  14 x 40  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  14 x 40  30 %
Source Sans Pro Light  Swiss  Light  Turkish  14 x 40  30 %
Source Sans Pro Light  Swiss  Light  Western  14 x 40  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 40  60 %
Source Sans Pro Semibold  Swiss  Semibold  Central European  15 x 40  60 %
Source Sans Pro Semibold  Swiss  Semibold  Mac  15 x 40  60 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 40  60 %
Source Sans Pro Semibold  Swiss  Semibold  Western  15 x 40  60 %
Source Sans Pro  Swiss  Regular  Baltic  14 x 40  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  14 x 40  40 %
Source Sans Pro  Swiss  Regular  Mac  14 x 40  40 %
Source Sans Pro  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  14 x 40  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  14 x 40  40 %
Stencil  Decorative  Regular  Western  18 x 38  40 %
Sylfaen  Roman  Regular  Baltic  13 x 42  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  13 x 42  40 %
Sylfaen  Roman  Regular  Cyrillic  13 x 42  40 %
Sylfaen  Roman  Regular  Greek  13 x 42  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  13 x 42  40 %
Sylfaen  Roman  Regular  Western  13 x 42  40 %
Symbol  Roman  Regular  Symbol  19 x 39  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  7 x 16  70 %
Tahoma  Swiss  Regular  Arabic  14 x 39  40 %
Tahoma  Swiss  Regular  Baltic  14 x 39  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  14 x 39  40 %
Tahoma  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  14 x 39  40 %
Tahoma  Swiss  Regular  Greek  14 x 39  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  14 x 39  40 %
Tahoma  Swiss  Regular  Thai  14 x 39  40 %
Tahoma  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  14 x 39  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  14 x 39  40 %
Tahoma  Swiss  Regular  Western  14 x 39  40 %
TeamViewer12  Decorative  Medium  Other  22 x 32  50 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  12 x 39  70 %
Tekton Pro Cond  Swiss  Bold Condensed  Central European  12 x 39  70 %
Tekton Pro Cond  Swiss  Bold Condensed  Mac  12 x 39  70 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  12 x 39  70 %
Tekton Pro Cond  Swiss  Bold Condensed  Western  12 x 39  70 %
Tekton Pro Ext  Swiss  Bold Extended  Baltic  19 x 39  70 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  19 x 39  70 %
Tekton Pro Ext  Swiss  Bold Extended  Mac  19 x 39  70 %
Tekton Pro Ext  Swiss  Bold Extended  Turkish  19 x 39  70 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  19 x 39  70 %
Tekton Pro  Swiss  Bold  Baltic  15 x 39  70 %
Tekton Pro  Swiss  Bold  Central European  15 x 39  70 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 39  70 %
Tekton Pro  Swiss  Bold  Turkish  15 x 39  70 %
Tekton Pro  Swiss  Bold  Western  15 x 39  70 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  13 x 42  40 %
Terminal  Modern    OEM/DOS  8 x 12  40 %
Times New Roman  Roman  Regular  Arabic  13 x 35  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  13 x 35  40 %
Times New Roman  Roman  Regular  Central European  13 x 35  40 %
Times New Roman  Roman  Regular  Cyrillic  13 x 35  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  13 x 35  40 %
Times New Roman  Roman  Regular  Hebrew  13 x 35  40 %
Times New Roman  Roman  Regular  Turkish  13 x 35  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  13 x 35  40 %
Times New Roman  Roman  Regular  Western  13 x 35  40 %
Trajan Pro 3  Roman  Regular  Baltic  21 x 47  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  21 x 47  40 %
Trajan Pro 3  Roman  Regular  Cyrillic  21 x 47  40 %
Trajan Pro 3  Roman  Regular  Greek  21 x 47  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  21 x 47  40 %
Trajan Pro 3  Roman  Regular  Turkish  21 x 47  40 %
Trajan Pro 3  Roman  Regular  Western  21 x 47  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 37  40 %
Trebuchet MS  Swiss  Regular  Central European  15 x 37  40 %
Trebuchet MS  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  15 x 37  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 37  40 %
Trebuchet MS  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  15 x 37  40 %
Trebuchet MS  Swiss  Regular  Western  15 x 37  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  12 x 35  40 %
Tw Cen MT Condensed Extra Bold  Swiss  Regular  Western  12 x 35  40 %
Tw Cen MT Condensed  Swiss  Regular  Central European  10 x 34  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  10 x 34  40 %
Tw Cen MT  Swiss  Regular  Central European  13 x 35  40 %
Tw Cen MT  Swiss  Regular  Western  13 x 35  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  24 x 64  40 %
UVF Some Weatz Swashes  Special  Regular  Central European  24 x 64  40 %
UVF Some Weatz Swashes  Special  Regular  Turkish  24 x 64  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  24 x 64  40 %
UVF Some Weatz Swashes  Special  Regular  Western  24 x 64  40 %
Verdana  Swiss  Regular  Baltic  16 x 39  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 39  40 %
Verdana  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  16 x 39  40 %
Verdana  Swiss  Regular  Greek  16 x 39  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  16 x 39  40 %
Verdana  Swiss  Regular  Vietnamese  16 x 39  40 %
Verdana  Swiss  Regular  Western  16 x 39  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15 x 52  40 %
Vivaldi  Script  Italic  Western  9 x 38  40 %
Vladimir Script  Script  Regular  Western  10 x 39  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 32  40 %
Wide Latin  Roman  Regular  Western  26 x 39  40 %
Wingdings 2  Roman  Regular  Symbol  27 x 34  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  25 x 36  40 %
Wingdings  Special  Regular  Symbol  28 x 36  40 %
Yu Gothic Light  Swiss  Regular  Baltic  31 x 41  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 41  30 %
Yu Gothic Light  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  31 x 41  30 %
Yu Gothic Light  Swiss  Regular  Greek  31 x 41  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 41  30 %
Yu Gothic Light  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  31 x 41  30 %
Yu Gothic Light  Swiss  Regular  Western  31 x 41  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 41  50 %
Yu Gothic Medium  Swiss  Regular  Central European  31 x 41  50 %
Yu Gothic Medium  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  31 x 41  50 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 41  50 %
Yu Gothic Medium  Swiss  Regular  Japanese  31 x 41  50 %
Yu Gothic Medium  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  31 x 41  50 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 41  50 %
Yu Gothic UI Light  Swiss  Regular  Baltic  17 x 43  30 %
Yu Gothic UI Light  Swiss  Regular  Central European  17 x 43  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 43  30 %
Yu Gothic UI Light  Swiss  Regular  Greek  17 x 43  30 %
Yu Gothic UI Light  Swiss  Regular  Japanese  17 x 43  30 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 43  30 %
Yu Gothic UI Light  Swiss  Regular  Western  17 x 43  30 %
Yu Gothic UI Semibold  Swiss  Regular  Baltic  19 x 43  60 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  19 x 43  60 %
Yu Gothic UI Semibold  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  19 x 43  60 %
Yu Gothic UI Semibold  Swiss  Regular  Greek  19 x 43  60 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  19 x 43  60 %
Yu Gothic UI Semibold  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  19 x 43  60 %
Yu Gothic UI Semibold  Swiss  Regular  Western  19 x 43  60 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 43  35 %
Yu Gothic UI Semilight  Swiss  Regular  Central European  17 x 43  35 %
Yu Gothic UI Semilight  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  17 x 43  35 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 43  35 %
Yu Gothic UI Semilight  Swiss  Regular  Japanese  17 x 43  35 %
Yu Gothic UI Semilight  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  17 x 43  35 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 43  35 %
Yu Gothic UI  Swiss  Regular  Baltic  17 x 43  40 %
Yu Gothic UI  Swiss  Regular  Central European  17 x 43  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 43  40 %
Yu Gothic UI  Swiss  Regular  Greek  17 x 43  40 %
Yu Gothic UI  Swiss  Regular  Japanese  17 x 43  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  17 x 43  40 %
Yu Gothic UI  Swiss  Regular  Western  17 x 43  40 %
Yu Gothic  Swiss  Regular  Baltic  31 x 41  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 41  40 %
Yu Gothic  Swiss  Regular  Cyrillic  31 x 41  40 %
Yu Gothic  Swiss  Regular  Greek  31 x 41  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  31 x 41  40 %
Yu Gothic  Swiss  Regular  Turkish  31 x 41  40 %
Yu Gothic  Swiss  Regular  Western  31 x 41  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  6 x 21  40 %
ZWAdobeF  Special  Regular  Baltic  6 x 21  40 %
ZWAdobeF  Special  Regular  Central European  6 x 21  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  6 x 21  40 %
ZWAdobeF  Special  Regular  Greek  6 x 21  40 %
ZWAdobeF  Special  Regular  Hebrew  6 x 21  40 %
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  6 x 21  40 %
ZWAdobeF  Special  Regular  Vietnamese  6 x 21  40 %
ZWAdobeF  Special  Regular  Western  6 x 21  40 %


Windows Audio

 
Device  Identifier  Device Description
midi-out.0  0001 001B  Microsoft GS Wavetable Synth
mixer.0  0001 FFFF  Speakers (High Definition Audio
mixer.1  0001 0068  Speakers (Razer Surround Audio
mixer.2  0001 FFFF  Microphone (High Definition Aud
wave-in.0  0001 FFFF  Microphone (High Definition Aud
wave-out.0  0001 FFFF  Speakers (High Definition Audio
wave-out.1  0001 0064  Speakers (Razer Surround Audio


PCI / PnP Audio

 
Device Description  Type
Intel Panther Point HDMI @ Intel Panther Point PCH - High Definition Audio Controller [C-1]  PCI
Realtek ALC270 @ Intel Panther Point PCH - High Definition Audio Controller [C-1]  PCI


HD Audio

 
[ Intel Panther Point PCH - High Definition Audio Controller [C-1] ]
 
Device Properties:
Device Description  Intel Panther Point PCH - High Definition Audio Controller [C-1]
Device Description (Windows)  High Definition Audio Controller
Bus Type  PCI
Bus / Device / Function  0 / 27 / 0
Device ID  8086-1E20
Subsystem ID  1043-100D
Revision  04
Hardware ID  PCI\VEN_8086&DEV_1E20&SUBSYS_100D1043&REV_04
 
Device Manufacturer:
Company Name  Intel Corporation
Product Information  http://www.intel.com/products/chipsets
Driver Download  http://support.intel.com/support/chipsets
BIOS Upgrades  http://www.aida64.com/bios-updates
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Realtek ALC270 ]
 
Device Properties:
Device Description  Realtek ALC270
Device Description (Windows)  High Definition Audio Device
Device Type  Audio
Bus Type  HDAUDIO
Device ID  10EC-0270
Subsystem ID  1043-100D
Revision  1001
Hardware ID  HDAUDIO\FUNC_01&VEN_10EC&DEV_0270&SUBSYS_1043100D&REV_1001
 
Device Manufacturer:
Company Name  Realtek Semiconductor Corp.
Product Information  http://www.realtek.com.tw/products/productsView.aspx?Langid=1&PNid=8&PFid=14&Level=3&Conn=2
Driver Download  http://www.realtek.com.tw/downloads
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Intel Panther Point HDMI ]
 
Device Properties:
Device Description  Intel Panther Point HDMI
Device Description (Windows)  Intel(R) Display Audio
Device Type  Audio
Bus Type  HDAUDIO
Device ID  8086-2806
Subsystem ID  8086-0101
Revision  1000
Hardware ID  HDAUDIO\FUNC_01&VEN_8086&DEV_2806&SUBSYS_80860101&REV_1000
 
Device Manufacturer:
Company Name  Intel Corporation
Product Information  http://www.intel.com/products/chipsets
Driver Download  http://support.intel.com/support/chipsets
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates


Audio Codecs

 
[ Fraunhofer IIS MPEG Layer-3 Codec (decode only) ]
 
ACM Driver Properties:
Driver Description  Fraunhofer IIS MPEG Layer-3 Codec (decode only)
Copyright Notice  Copyright © 1996-1999 Fraunhofer Institut Integrierte Schaltungen IIS
Driver Features  decoder only version
Driver Version  1.09
 
[ Microsoft ADPCM CODEC ]
 
ACM Driver Properties:
Driver Description  Microsoft ADPCM CODEC
Copyright Notice  Copyright (C) 1992-1996 Microsoft Corporation
Driver Features  Compresses and decompresses Microsoft ADPCM audio data.
Driver Version  4.00
 
[ Microsoft CCITT G.711 A-Law and u-Law CODEC ]
 
ACM Driver Properties:
Driver Description  Microsoft CCITT G.711 A-Law and u-Law CODEC
Copyright Notice  Copyright (c) 1993-1996 Microsoft Corporation
Driver Features  Compresses and decompresses CCITT G.711 A-Law and u-Law audio data.
Driver Version  4.00
 
[ Microsoft GSM 6.10 Audio CODEC ]
 
ACM Driver Properties:
Driver Description  Microsoft GSM 6.10 Audio CODEC
Copyright Notice  Copyright (C) 1993-1996 Microsoft Corporation
Driver Features  Compresses and decompresses audio data conforming to the ETSI-GSM (European Telecommunications Standards Institute-Groupe Special Mobile) recommendation 6.10.
Driver Version  4.00
 
[ Microsoft IMA ADPCM CODEC ]
 
ACM Driver Properties:
Driver Description  Microsoft IMA ADPCM CODEC
Copyright Notice  Copyright (C) 1992-1996 Microsoft Corporation
Driver Features  Compresses and decompresses IMA ADPCM audio data.
Driver Version  4.00
 
[ Microsoft PCM Converter ]
 
ACM Driver Properties:
Driver Description  Microsoft PCM Converter
Copyright Notice  Copyright (C) 1992-1996 Microsoft Corporation
Driver Features  Converts frequency and bits per sample of PCM audio data.
Driver Version  5.00


Video Codecs

 
Driver  Version  Description
iccvid.dll  1.10.0.11  Cinepak® Codec
iyuv_32.dll  10.0.14393.0 (rs1_release.160715-1616)  Intel Indeo(R) Video YUV Codec
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
msvidc32.dll  10.0.14393.0 (rs1_release.160715-1616)  Microsoft Video 1 Compressor
msyuv.dll  10.0.14393.0 (rs1_release.160715-1616)  Microsoft UYVY Video Decompressor
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]


MCI

 
[ AVIVideo ]
 
MCI Device Properties:
Device  AVIVideo
Name  Video for Windows
Description  Video For Windows MCI driver
Type  Digital Video Device
Driver  mciavi32.dll
Status  Enabled
 
MCI Device Features:
Compound Device  Yes
File Based Device  Yes
Can Eject  No
Can Play  Yes
Can Play In Reverse  Yes
Can Record  No
Can Save Data  No
Can Freeze Data  No
Can Lock Data  No
Can Stretch Frame  Yes
Can Stretch Input  No
Can Test  Yes
Audio Capable  Yes
Video Capable  Yes
Still Image Capable  No
 
[ CDAudio ]
 
MCI Device Properties:
Device  CDAudio
Name  CD Audio
Description  MCI driver for cdaudio devices
Type  CD Audio Device
Driver  mcicda.dll
Status  Enabled
 
MCI Device Features:
Compound Device  No
File Based Device  No
Can Eject  Yes
Can Play  Yes
Can Record  No
Can Save Data  No
Audio Capable  Yes
Video Capable  No
 
[ MPEGVideo ]
 
MCI Device Properties:
Device  MPEGVideo
Name  DirectShow
Description  DirectShow MCI Driver
Type  Digital Video Device
Driver  mciqtz32.dll
Status  Enabled
 
MCI Device Features:
Compound Device  Yes
File Based Device  Yes
Can Eject  No
Can Play  Yes
Can Play In Reverse  No
Can Record  No
Can Save Data  No
Can Freeze Data  No
Can Lock Data  No
Can Stretch Frame  Yes
Can Stretch Input  No
Can Test  Yes
Audio Capable  Yes
Video Capable  Yes
Still Image Capable  No
 
[ Sequencer ]
 
MCI Device Properties:
Device  Sequencer
Name  MIDI Sequencer
Description  MCI driver for MIDI sequencer
Type  Sequencer Device
Driver  mciseq.dll
Status  Enabled
 
MCI Device Features:
Compound Device  Yes
File Based Device  Yes
Can Eject  No
Can Play  Yes
Can Record  No
Can Save Data  No
Audio Capable  Yes
Video Capable  No
 
[ WaveAudio ]
 
MCI Device Properties:
Device  WaveAudio
Name  Sound
Description  MCI driver for waveform audio
Type  Waveform Audio Device
Driver  mciwave.dll
Status  Enabled
 
MCI Device Features:
Compound Device  Yes
File Based Device  Yes
Can Eject  No
Can Play  Yes
Can Record  Yes
Can Save Data  Yes
Audio Capable  Yes
Video Capable  No


SAPI

 
SAPI Properties:
SAPI4 Version  -
SAPI5 Version  5.3.19915.0
 
Voice (SAPI5):
Name  Microsoft David Desktop - English (United States)
Voice Path  C:\Windows\Speech_OneCore\Engines\TTS\en-US\M1033David
Age  Adult
Gender  Male
Language  English (United States)
Vendor  Microsoft
Version  11.0
DLL File  C:\Windows\SysWOW64\speech_onecore\engines\tts\MSTTSEngine_OneCore.dll (x86)
CLSID  {179F3D56-1B0B-42B2-A962-59B7EF59FE1B}
 
Voice (SAPI5):
Name  Microsoft Zira Desktop - English (United States)
Voice Path  C:\Windows\Speech\Engines\TTS\en-US\M1033ZIR
Age  Adult
Gender  Female
Language  English (United States)
Vendor  Microsoft
Version  11.0
DLL File  C:\Windows\SysWOW64\speech\engines\tts\MSTTSEngine.dll (x86)
CLSID  {C64501F6-E6E6-451f-A150-25D0839BC510}
 
Speech Recognizer (SAPI5):
Name  Microsoft Speech Recognizer 8.0 for Windows (English - US)
Description  Microsoft Speech Recognizer 8.0 for Windows (English - US)
FE Config Data File  C:\Windows\Speech\Engines\SR\en-US\c1033dsk.fe
Language  English (United States); English
Speaking Style  Discrete;Continuous
Supported Locales  English (United States); English (Canada); English (Philippines); English
Vendor  Microsoft
Version  8.0
DLL File  C:\Windows\System32\Speech\Engines\SR\spsreng.dll (x64)
CLSID  {DAC9F469-0C67-4643-9258-87EC128C5941}
RecoExtension  {4F4DB904-CA35-4A3A-90AF-C9D8BE7532AC}


Windows Storage

 
[ Kingston DataTraveler 3.0 USB Device ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Kingston DataTraveler 3.0 USB Device
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  disk.inf
INF Section  disk_install.NT
 
[ KINGSTON SMSR150S3256G ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  KINGSTON SMSR150S3256G
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  disk.inf
INF Section  disk_install.NT
 
[ Samsung SSD 850 EVO 250GB ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Samsung SSD 850 EVO 250GB
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  disk.inf
INF Section  disk_install.NT
 
[ SanDisk SSD U100 24GB ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  SanDisk SSD U100 24GB
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  disk.inf
INF Section  disk_install.NT
 
[ Intel(R) 7 Series Chipset Family SATA AHCI Controller ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Intel(R) 7 Series Chipset Family SATA AHCI Controller
Driver Date  11/19/2012
Driver Version  11.7.0.1013
Driver Provider  Intel Corporation
INF File  oem7.inf
INF Section  iaStorA_inst_8.NTamd64
 
Device Resources:
IRQ  65536
Memory  F7A1E000-F7A1E7FF
Port  F060-F07F
Port  F080-F083
Port  F090-F097
Port  F0A0-F0A3
Port  F0B0-F0B7
 
[ Realtek PCIE CardReader ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Realtek PCIE CardReader
Driver Date  5/28/2015
Driver Version  6.3.9600.27053
Driver Provider  Realtek Semiconduct Corp.
INF File  oem6.inf
INF Section  Rts5208.Inst.NTamd64
 
Device Resources:
IRQ  65536
Memory  F7800000-F780FFFF
 
[ Microsoft Storage Spaces Controller ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Microsoft Storage Spaces Controller
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.351
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  spaceport.inf
INF Section  Spaceport_Install


Logical Drives

 
Drive  Drive Type  File System  Total Size  Used Space  Free Space  % Free  Volume Serial
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  Local Disk  NTFS  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
D: (Multimedia)  Local Disk  NTFS  160952 MB  88493 MB  72459 MB  45 %  9FFA-8890
E: (WINPE-CD(FU)  Removable Disk  FAT32  14769 MB  810 MB  13958 MB  95 %  B4FE-5315
H:  Optical Drive            


Physical Drives

 
[ Drive #1 - Samsung SSD 850 EVO 250GB (232 GB) ]
 
Partition  Partition Type  Drive  Start Offset  Partition Length
#1  MS Recovery    1 MB  450 MB
#2  EFI System    451 MB  100 MB
#3  MS Reserved    551 MB  16 MB
#4  Basic Data  C: (Windows 10 Pro)  567 MB  76952 MB
#5  Basic Data  D: (Multimedia)  77519 MB  160953 MB
 
[ Drive #2 - SanDisk SSD U100 24GB (22 GB) ]
 
Partition  Partition Type  Drive  Start Offset  Partition Length
#1  EFI System    0 MB  200 MB
#2  Unknown (GUID: {48465300-0000-11AA-AA11-00306543ECAC})    200 MB  22574 MB
 
[ Drive #3 - KINGSTON SMSR150S3256G (119 GB) ]
 
Partition  Partition Type  Drive  Start Offset  Partition Length
#1  EFI System    0 MB  200 MB
#2  Unknown (GUID: {48465300-0000-11AA-AA11-00306543ECAC})    200 MB  121284 MB
#3  Unknown (GUID: {426F6F74-0000-11AA-AA11-00306543ECAC})    121484 MB  619 MB
 
[ Drive #4 - KingstonDataTraveler 3.0 (14 GB) ]
 
Partition  Partition Type  Drive  Start Offset  Partition Length
#1 (Active)  FAT32  E:  0 MB  14783 MB


ASPI

 
Host  ID  LUN  Device Type  Vendor  Model  Rev  Extra Information
00  00  00  Disk Drive  ATA  KINGSTON SMSR150  04.7  
00  00  00  Disk Drive  ATA  Samsung SSD 850  2B6Q  
00  00  00  Disk Drive  ATA  SanDisk SSD U100  6.02  
00  07  00  Host Adapter  iaStorA      


ATA

 
[ Samsung SSD 850 EVO 250GB (S21MNSAG404652F) ]
 
ATA Device Properties:
Model ID  Samsung SSD 850 EVO 250GB
Serial Number  S21MNSAG404652F
Revision  EMT02B6Q
World Wide Name  5-002538-DA02A2D96
Device Type  SATA-III
Parameters  484521 cylinders, 16 heads, 63 sectors per track, 512 bytes per sector
LBA Sectors  488397168
Physical / Logical Sector Size  512 bytes / 512 bytes
Multiple Sectors  1
Max. PIO Transfer Mode  PIO 4
Max. MWDMA Transfer Mode  MWDMA 2
Max. UDMA Transfer Mode  UDMA 6
Active UDMA Transfer Mode  UDMA 5
Unformatted Capacity  238475 MB
Rotational Speed  SSD
ATA Standard  ACS-2
 
ATA Device Features:
48-bit LBA  Supported, Enabled
Automatic Acoustic Management (AAM)  Not Supported
Device Configuration Overlay (DCO)  Supported, Enabled
DMA Setup Auto-Activate  Supported, Disabled
Free-Fall Control  Not Supported
General Purpose Logging (GPL)  Supported, Enabled
Hardware Feature Control  Supported, Enabled
Host Protected Area (HPA)  Supported, Enabled
HPA Security Extensions  Supported, Disabled
Hybrid Information Feature  Not Supported
In-Order Data Delivery  Not Supported
Native Command Queuing (NCQ)  Supported
NCQ Autosense  Not Supported
NCQ Priority Information  Not Supported
NCQ Queue Management Command  Not Supported
NCQ Streaming  Not Supported
Phy Event Counters  Supported
Read Look-Ahead  Supported, Enabled
Release Interrupt  Not Supported
Security Mode  Supported, Disabled
Sense Data Reporting (SDR)  Not Supported
Service Interrupt  Not Supported
SMART  Supported, Enabled
SMART Error Logging  Supported, Enabled
SMART Self-Test  Supported, Enabled
Software Settings Preservation (SSP)  Supported, Enabled
Streaming  Not Supported
Tagged Command Queuing (TCQ)  Not Supported
Write Cache  Supported, Enabled
Write-Read-Verify  Supported, Disabled
 
SSD Features:
Data Set Management  Supported
Deterministic Read After TRIM  Not Supported
TRIM Command  Supported
 
Power Management Features:
Advanced Power Management  Not Supported
Automatic Partial to Slumber Transitions (APST)  Disabled
Device Initiated Interface Power Management (DIPM)  Supported, Enabled
Device Sleep (DEVSLP)  Supported
Extended Power Conditions (EPC)  Not Supported
Host Initiated Interface Power Management (HIPM)  Not Supported
IDLE IMMEDIATE With UNLOAD FEATURE  Not Supported
Link Power State Device Sleep  Supported, Disabled
Power Management  Supported, Enabled
Power-Up In Standby (PUIS)  Not Supported
 
ATA Commands:
DEVICE RESET  Not Supported
DOWNLOAD MICROCODE  Supported, Enabled
FLUSH CACHE  Supported, Enabled
FLUSH CACHE EXT  Supported, Enabled
NOP  Supported, Enabled
READ BUFFER  Supported, Enabled
WRITE BUFFER  Supported, Enabled
 
SSD Physical Info:
Manufacturer  Samsung
SSD Family  850 Evo
Form Factor  2.5"
Formatted Capacity  250 GB
Controller Type  Samsung MGX S4LN062X01
Flash Memory Type  Samsung 40nm TLC V-NAND
Physical Dimensions  100 x 69.85 x 6.8 mm
Max. Weight  66 g
Max. Sequential Read Speed  540 MB/s
Max. Sequential Write Speed  520 MB/s
Max. Random 4 KB Read  97000 IOPS
Max. Random 4 KB Write  88000 IOPS
Interface  SATA-III
Interface Data Rate  600 MB/s
Buffer Size  512 MB
 
Device Manufacturer:
Company Name  Samsung
Product Information  http://www.samsung.com/us/computer/solid-state-drives
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ SanDisk SSD U100 24GB (124225401526) ]
 
ATA Device Properties:
Model ID  SanDisk SSD U100 24GB
Serial Number  124225401526
Revision  CS.56.02
World Wide Name  5-001B44-7F7FE2EB6
Device Type  SATA-III
Parameters  46533 cylinders, 16 heads, 63 sectors per track, 512 bytes per sector
LBA Sectors  46905264
Physical / Logical Sector Size  512 bytes / 512 bytes
Multiple Sectors  1
Max. PIO Transfer Mode  PIO 4
Max. MWDMA Transfer Mode  MWDMA 2
Max. UDMA Transfer Mode  UDMA 6
Active UDMA Transfer Mode  UDMA 5
Unformatted Capacity  22903 MB
Form Factor  1.8"
Rotational Speed  SSD
ATA Standard  ACS-2
 
ATA Device Features:
48-bit LBA  Supported, Enabled
Automatic Acoustic Management (AAM)  Not Supported
Device Configuration Overlay (DCO)  Supported, Enabled
DMA Setup Auto-Activate  Not Supported
Free-Fall Control  Not Supported
General Purpose Logging (GPL)  Supported, Enabled
Hardware Feature Control  Not Supported
Host Protected Area (HPA)  Supported, Enabled
HPA Security Extensions  Supported, Disabled
Hybrid Information Feature  Not Supported
In-Order Data Delivery  Not Supported
Native Command Queuing (NCQ)  Supported
NCQ Autosense  Not Supported
NCQ Priority Information  Not Supported
NCQ Queue Management Command  Not Supported
NCQ Streaming  Not Supported
Phy Event Counters  Supported
Read Look-Ahead  Supported, Enabled
Release Interrupt  Not Supported
Security Mode  Supported, Disabled
Sense Data Reporting (SDR)  Not Supported
Service Interrupt  Not Supported
SMART  Supported, Enabled
SMART Error Logging  Supported, Enabled
SMART Self-Test  Supported, Enabled
Software Settings Preservation (SSP)  Supported, Enabled
Streaming  Not Supported
Tagged Command Queuing (TCQ)  Not Supported
Write Cache  Supported, Enabled
Write-Read-Verify  Not Supported
 
SSD Features:
Data Set Management  Supported
Deterministic Read After TRIM  Supported
TRIM Command  Supported
 
Power Management Features:
Advanced Power Management  Supported, Disabled
Automatic Partial to Slumber Transitions (APST)  Disabled
Device Initiated Interface Power Management (DIPM)  Supported, Enabled
Device Sleep (DEVSLP)  Not Supported
Extended Power Conditions (EPC)  Not Supported
Host Initiated Interface Power Management (HIPM)  Not Supported
IDLE IMMEDIATE With UNLOAD FEATURE  Not Supported
Link Power State Device Sleep  Not Supported
Power Management  Supported, Enabled
Power-Up In Standby (PUIS)  Not Supported
 
ATA Commands:
DEVICE RESET  Not Supported
DOWNLOAD MICROCODE  Supported, Enabled
FLUSH CACHE  Supported, Enabled
FLUSH CACHE EXT  Supported, Enabled
NOP  Supported, Enabled
READ BUFFER  Supported, Enabled
WRITE BUFFER  Supported, Enabled
 
SSD Physical Info:
Manufacturer  SanDisk
SSD Family  U100
Formatted Capacity  24 GB
Controller Type  SanDisk 20-82-00270-1
Flash Memory Type  SanDisk MLC NAND
Max. Sequential Read Speed  450 MB/s
Max. Sequential Write Speed  350 MB/s
Max. Random 4 KB Read  9400 IOPS
Max. Random 4 KB Write  1250 IOPS
Interface  SATA-III
Interface Data Rate  600 MB/s
Buffer Size  0
 
Device Manufacturer:
Company Name  SanDisk Corporation
Product Information  http://www.sandisk.com/products/ssd
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ KINGSTON SMSR150S3256G (50026B7E32AC92EB) ]
 
ATA Device Properties:
Model ID  KINGSTON SMSR150S3256G
Serial Number  50026B7E32AC92EB
Revision  S8FM04.7
Device Type  SATA-III
Parameters  248085 cylinders, 16 heads, 63 sectors per track, 512 bytes per sector
LBA Sectors  250069680
Physical / Logical Sector Size  512 bytes / 512 bytes
Multiple Sectors  16
Max. PIO Transfer Mode  PIO 4
Max. MWDMA Transfer Mode  MWDMA 2
Max. UDMA Transfer Mode  UDMA 5
Active UDMA Transfer Mode  UDMA 5
Unformatted Capacity  122104 MB
Form Factor  Sub-1.8"
Rotational Speed  SSD
ATA Standard  ATA8-ACS
 
ATA Device Features:
48-bit LBA  Supported, Enabled
Automatic Acoustic Management (AAM)  Not Supported
Device Configuration Overlay (DCO)  Supported, Enabled
DMA Setup Auto-Activate  Supported, Disabled
Free-Fall Control  Not Supported
General Purpose Logging (GPL)  Supported, Enabled
Hardware Feature Control  Not Supported
Host Protected Area (HPA)  Supported, Enabled
HPA Security Extensions  Supported, Disabled
Hybrid Information Feature  Not Supported
In-Order Data Delivery  Not Supported
Native Command Queuing (NCQ)  Supported
NCQ Autosense  Not Supported
NCQ Priority Information  Not Supported
NCQ Queue Management Command  Not Supported
NCQ Streaming  Not Supported
Phy Event Counters  Supported
Read Look-Ahead  Supported, Enabled
Release Interrupt  Not Supported
Security Mode  Supported, Disabled
Sense Data Reporting (SDR)  Not Supported
Service Interrupt  Not Supported
SMART  Supported, Enabled
SMART Error Logging  Supported, Enabled
SMART Self-Test  Supported, Enabled
Software Settings Preservation (SSP)  Supported, Enabled
Streaming  Not Supported
Tagged Command Queuing (TCQ)  Not Supported
Write Cache  Supported, Enabled
Write-Read-Verify  Not Supported
 
SSD Features:
Data Set Management  Supported
Deterministic Read After TRIM  Not Supported
TRIM Command  Supported
 
Power Management Features:
Advanced Power Management  Supported, Enabled
Automatic Partial to Slumber Transitions (APST)  Disabled
Device Initiated Interface Power Management (DIPM)  Supported, Enabled
Device Sleep (DEVSLP)  Not Supported
Extended Power Conditions (EPC)  Not Supported
Host Initiated Interface Power Management (HIPM)  Supported
IDLE IMMEDIATE With UNLOAD FEATURE  Supported, Enabled
Link Power State Device Sleep  Supported, Disabled
Power Management  Supported, Enabled
Power-Up In Standby (PUIS)  Not Supported
 
ATA Commands:
DEVICE RESET  Not Supported
DOWNLOAD MICROCODE  Supported, Enabled
FLUSH CACHE  Supported, Enabled
FLUSH CACHE EXT  Supported, Enabled
NOP  Not Supported
READ BUFFER  Supported, Enabled
WRITE BUFFER  Supported, Enabled
 
Device Manufacturer:
Company Name  Kingston Technology Corporation
Product Information  http://www.kingston.com/en/ssd
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates


SMART

 
[ Samsung SSD 850 EVO 250GB (S21MNSAG404652F) ]
 
ID  Attribute Description  Threshold  Value  Worst  Data  Status
05  Reallocated Sector Count  10  100  100  0  OK: Value is normal
09  Power-On Hours Count  0  98  98  6124  OK: Always passes
0C  Power Cycle Count  0  98  98  1586  OK: Always passes
B1  Wear Leveling Count  0  95  95  87  OK: Always passes
B3  Used Reserved Block Count (Total)  10  100  100  0  OK: Value is normal
B5  Program Fail Count (Total)  10  100  100  0  OK: Value is normal
B6  Erase Fail Count (Total)  10  100  100  0  OK: Value is normal
B7  Runtime Bad Block (Total)  10  100  100  0  OK: Value is normal
BB  Uncorrectable Error Count  0  100  100  0  OK: Always passes
BE  Airflow Temperature  0  66  43  34  OK: Always passes
C3  ECC Error Rate  0  200  200  0  OK: Always passes
C7  CRC Error Count  0  100  100  0  OK: Always passes
EB  POR Recovery Count  0  99  99  223  OK: Always passes
F1  Total LBAs Written  0  99  99  18.22 TB  OK: Always passes
 
[ SanDisk SSD U100 24GB (124225401526) ]
 
ID  Attribute Description  Threshold  Value  Worst  Data  Status
05  Reallocated Sector Count  0  100  100  0  OK: Always passes
09  Power-On Hours Count  0  100  100  4162  OK: Always passes
0C  Power Cycle Count  0  100  100  3859  OK: Always passes
AB  Program Fail Count  0  100  100  0  OK: Always passes
AC  Erase Fail Count  0  100  100  0  OK: Always passes
AD  <vendor-specific>  0  100  100  1293  OK: Always passes
AE  Unexpected Power Loss Count  0  100  100  788  OK: Always passes
BB  Reported Uncorrectable Errors  0  100  100  0  OK: Always passes
E6  <vendor-specific>  0  100  100  4310  OK: Always passes
E8  Remaining Drive Life  5  100  100  0  OK: Value is normal
EA  <vendor-specific>  0  100  100  2845  OK: Always passes
F1  Total Host Writes  0  100  100  163.86 GB  OK: Always passes
F2  Total Host Reads  0  100  100  131.93 GB  OK: Always passes
 
[ KINGSTON SMSR150S3256G (50026B7E32AC92EB) ]
 
ID  Attribute Description  Threshold  Value  Worst  Data  Status
01  Raw Read Error Rate  50  100  100  0  OK: Value is normal
09  Power-On Time Count  0  100  100  8008  OK: Always passes
0C  Power Cycle Count  0  100  100  11568  OK: Always passes
A1  <vendor-specific>  0  100  100  152  OK: Always passes
A8  <vendor-specific>  0  100  100  1  OK: Always passes
BB  Reported Uncorrectable Errors  10  100  100  0  OK: Value is normal
C0  Power-Off Retract Count  0  100  100  23  OK: Always passes
AA  <vendor-specific>  10  100  100  152  OK: Value is normal
AD  <vendor-specific>  0  100  100  45089559  OK: Always passes
C7  Ultra ATA CRC Error Rate  50  100  100  0  OK: Value is normal
DA  <vendor-specific>  50  100  100  0  OK: Value is normal
E9  <vendor-specific>  0  100  100  10443  OK: Always passes
F1  Total Host Writes  0  100  100  5664  OK: Always passes
F2  Total Host Reads  0  100  100  4480  OK: Always passes
F4  <vendor-specific>  50  100  100  688  OK: Value is normal
F5  <vendor-specific>  50  100  100  791  OK: Value is normal
F6  <vendor-specific>  50  100  100  23191730  OK: Value is normal


Windows Network

 
[ Microsoft Wi-Fi Direct Virtual Adapter ]
 
Network Adapter Properties:
Network Adapter  Microsoft Wi-Fi Direct Virtual Adapter
Interface Type  802.11 Wireless Ethernet
Hardware Address  1E-0F-6E-E4-9C-FA
Connection Name  Local Area Connection* 2
MTU  1500 bytes
Bytes Received  0
Bytes Sent  0
 
[ Qualcomm Atheros AR9285 Wireless Network Adapter ]
 
Network Adapter Properties:
Network Adapter  Qualcomm Atheros AR9285 Wireless Network Adapter
Interface Type  802.11 Wireless Ethernet
Hardware Address  4C-0F-6E-E4-9C-FA
Connection Name  Wi-Fi
Connection Speed  65 Mbps
MTU  1500 bytes
DHCP Lease Obtained  1/16/2017 9:02:50 AM
DHCP Lease Expires  1/16/2017 7:02:50 PM
Bytes Received  73359194 (70.0 MB)
Bytes Sent  3220726 (3.1 MB)
 
Network Adapter Addresses:
IP / Subnet Mask  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
Gateway  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
DHCP  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
DNS  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
DNS  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
DNS  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
 
WLAN Properties:
Network Type  Infrastructure
SSID  Private
BSSID  C0-C1-C0-1B-27-55
Authentication Algorithm  WPA2-PSK
Cipher Algorithm  CCMP
Channel  11 (2462 MHz)
Signal Strength  -43 dBm (Excellent)
Transmit Rate  65 Mbps
Receive Rate  65 Mbps
 
Network Adapter Manufacturer:
Company Name  Qualcomm Technologies, Inc.
Product Information  http://www.qualcomm.com/products/networking
Driver Download  http://www.qualcomm.com
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Realtek PCIe GBE Family Controller ]
 
Network Adapter Properties:
Network Adapter  Realtek PCIe GBE Family Controller
Interface Type  Ethernet
Hardware Address  30-85-A9-29-CB-B6
Connection Name  Ethernet
MTU  1500 bytes
Bytes Received  0
Bytes Sent  0
 
Network Adapter Addresses:
DNS  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
 
Network Adapter Manufacturer:
Company Name  Realtek Semiconductor Corp.
Product Information  http://www.realtek.com.tw/products/productsView.aspx?Langid=1&PNid=7&PFid=10&Level=3&Conn=2
Driver Download  http://www.realtek.com.tw/downloads
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ VMware Virtual Ethernet Adapter for VMnet1 ]
 
Network Adapter Properties:
Network Adapter  VMware Virtual Ethernet Adapter for VMnet1
Interface Type  Ethernet
Hardware Address  00-50-56-C0-00-01
Connection Name  VMware Network Adapter VMnet1
Connection Speed  100 Mbps
MTU  1500 bytes
DHCP Lease Obtained  1/16/2017 9:00:42 AM
DHCP Lease Expires  1/16/2017 9:30:42 AM
Bytes Received  48
Bytes Sent  3373 (3.3 KB)
 
Network Adapter Addresses:
IP / Subnet Mask  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
DHCP  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
 
Network Adapter Manufacturer:
Company Name  VMware, Inc.
Product Information  http://www.vmware.com
Driver Download  http://www.vmware.com
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ VMware Virtual Ethernet Adapter for VMnet8 ]
 
Network Adapter Properties:
Network Adapter  VMware Virtual Ethernet Adapter for VMnet8
Interface Type  Ethernet
Hardware Address  00-50-56-C0-00-08
Connection Name  VMware Network Adapter VMnet8
Connection Speed  100 Mbps
MTU  1500 bytes
DHCP Lease Obtained  1/16/2017 9:00:42 AM
DHCP Lease Expires  1/16/2017 9:30:42 AM
Bytes Received  17
Bytes Sent  4372 (4.3 KB)
 
Network Adapter Addresses:
IP / Subnet Mask  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
DHCP  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
WINS  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
 
Network Adapter Manufacturer:
Company Name  VMware, Inc.
Product Information  http://www.vmware.com
Driver Download  http://www.vmware.com
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates


PCI / PnP Network

 
Device Description  Type
Atheros AR9285 802.11b/g/n Wireless Network Adapter  PCI
Realtek RTL8168/8111 PCI-E Gigabit Ethernet Adapter (PHY: Realtek RTL8211/8212)  PCI


Internet

 
Internet Settings:
Start Page  http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?LinkId=619797&pc=UE13&ocid=UE13DHP
Search Page  http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=54896
Local Page  %11%\blank.htm
Download Folder  
 
Current Proxy:
Proxy Status  Disabled
 
LAN Proxy:
Proxy Status  Disabled


Routes

 
Type  Net Destination  Netmask  Gateway  Metric  Interface
Active  0.0.0.0  0.0.0.0  192.168.10.1  55  192.168.10.51 (Qualcomm Atheros AR9285 Wireless Network Adapter)
Active  127.0.0.0  255.0.0.0  127.0.0.1  331  127.0.0.1 (Software Loopback Interface 1)
Active  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  331  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
Active  127.255.255.255  255.255.255.255  127.0.0.1  331  127.0.0.1 (Software Loopback Interface 1)
Active  192.168.10.0  255.255.255.0  192.168.10.51  311  192.168.10.51 (Qualcomm Atheros AR9285 Wireless Network Adapter)
Active  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  311  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
Active  192.168.10.255  255.255.255.255  192.168.10.51  311  192.168.10.51 (Qualcomm Atheros AR9285 Wireless Network Adapter)
Active  192.168.76.0  255.255.255.0  192.168.76.1  291  192.168.76.1 (VMware Virtual Ethernet Adapter for VMnet8)
Active  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  291  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
Active  192.168.76.255  255.255.255.255  192.168.76.1  291  192.168.76.1 (VMware Virtual Ethernet Adapter for VMnet8)
Active  192.168.174.0  255.255.255.0  192.168.174.1  291  192.168.174.1 (VMware Virtual Ethernet Adapter for VMnet1)
Active  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  291  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
Active  192.168.174.255  255.255.255.255  192.168.174.1  291  192.168.174.1 (VMware Virtual Ethernet Adapter for VMnet1)
Active  224.0.0.0  240.0.0.0  127.0.0.1  331  127.0.0.1 (Software Loopback Interface 1)
Active  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  291  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
Active  224.0.0.0  240.0.0.0  192.168.76.1  291  192.168.76.1 (VMware Virtual Ethernet Adapter for VMnet8)
Active  224.0.0.0  240.0.0.0  192.168.10.51  311  192.168.10.51 (Qualcomm Atheros AR9285 Wireless Network Adapter)
Active  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  331  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
Active  255.255.255.255  255.255.255.255  192.168.174.1  291  192.168.174.1 (VMware Virtual Ethernet Adapter for VMnet1)
Active  255.255.255.255  255.255.255.255  192.168.76.1  291  192.168.76.1 (VMware Virtual Ethernet Adapter for VMnet8)
Active  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  311  [ TRIAL VERSION ]


IE Cookie

 
Last Access  URL
2017-01-11 08:05:55  deathadder™@pastebin.com/
2017-01-16 07:31:01  deathadder™@live.com/
2017-01-16 07:31:05  deathadder™@c1.skype.com/
2017-01-16 07:31:05  deathadder™@dps.bing.com/
2017-01-16 07:31:07  deathadder™@bay406-m.hotmail.com/
2017-01-16 07:36:16  deathadder™@microsoft.com/
2017-01-16 08:43:02  deathadder™@skype.com/


Browser History

 
Last Access  URL
2017-01-09 09:19:06  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file:///Z:/Document/AMA-IT%20Daily%20Check%20Report%2009-01-2017.xlsx
2017-01-09 10:21:12  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file:///D:/OneDrive/Movies/Tham.Hoa.Pompeii-Pompeii-2014-Vietsub-720p/Tham.Hoa.Pompeii-Pompeii-2014-Vietsub-720p.mp4
2017-01-09 14:29:17  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
2017-01-09 16:51:24  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file:///D:/OneDrive/Movies/xxx/MCDV-15%20ăˇă«ă‚·ăĽăśăĽă‚ŻăĽ%20DV%2015%20二宮ăŠăŠă®ćśťă‹ă‚‰ă‚şăăťăłä¸­ĺ‡şă—生活%20%20二宮ăŠăŠ%20%20[UNCENSORED].mp4
2017-01-09 19:58:25  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@https://login.live.com/oauth20_desktop.srf?lc=1033
2017-01-09 19:58:25  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
2017-01-09 21:26:26  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file:///D:/OneDrive/Movies/Cá»›m%20SiĂŞu%20Quáş­y%202%20-%20Bad%20Boys%20II%20(2003)/Cá»›m%20SiĂŞu%20Quáş­y%202%20-%20Bad%20Boys%20II%20(2003).mp4
2017-01-10 07:13:21  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file://10.26.0.5/NS%20Group/OANH/YR%20THƯỞNG%20TáşľT%202016.csv
2017-01-10 07:14:49  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
2017-01-10 07:18:40  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file://10.26.0.5/NS%20Group/OANH/OAnga%20chuan.xlsx
2017-01-10 07:47:44  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file:///Z:/Document/AMA-IT%20Daily%20Check%20Report%2010-01-2017.xlsx
2017-01-10 09:10:31  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
2017-01-10 09:13:51  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@outlook:000000006CCCEF4611B83A498474B8B277039CF082800000
2017-01-10 09:16:10  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file:///C:/Users/Deathadder™/AppData/Roaming/Skype/thangduong.dev/media_messaging/media_cache_v3/i177%5Ecimgpsh_orig.png
2017-01-10 09:16:13  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
2017-01-10 09:42:09  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file:///C:/Users/Deathadder™/Desktop/lap%202%20bom%2006.12.2016(2).xlsx
2017-01-10 09:42:26  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file:///D:/My%20Skype%20Received%20Files/lap%202%20bom%2006.12.2016(2).XLS
2017-01-10 09:44:45  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
2017-01-10 09:44:45  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file:///E:/movies
2017-01-10 09:47:09  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file:///D:/OneDrive/Movies/New%20folder
2017-01-10 09:47:18  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
2017-01-10 09:47:18  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file:///D:/OneDrive/Movies/Show.dien.hai.huoc-Kevin.Hart.What.Now-2016-Vietsub-720p
2017-01-10 09:53:20  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file:///D:/OneDrive/Software/USB%20BOOT/WinPE-CD(Full)%20Edit.iso
2017-01-10 10:45:57  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
2017-01-10 15:44:55  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file:///C:/Users/Deathadder™/AppData/Roaming/Skype/thangduong.dev/media_messaging/media_cache_v3/i183%5Ecimgpsh_orig.png
2017-01-10 19:35:33  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file:///C:/Users/Deathadder™/Downloads/Compressed/CrystalDiskMark5_2_1Shizuku/CdmResource/dialog/Main.html
2017-01-10 21:23:55  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
2017-01-11 07:38:28  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file:///Z:/Document/AMA-IT%20Daily%20Check%20Report%2011-01-2017.xlsx
2017-01-11 08:05:42  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file:///D:/OneDrive/Software/Internet/[opensource]%20IDM%20trial%20reset.rar
2017-01-11 09:40:17  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
2017-01-11 09:58:15  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file:///D:/OneDrive/Hackintosh/VMware/OS%20X%2010.10/vmware.log
2017-01-11 10:02:41  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file:///D:/OneDrive/Hackintosh/VMware/OS%20X%2010.10/OS%20X%2010.10.vmx
2017-01-11 10:30:29  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
2017-01-11 20:52:34  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file:///E:/movies/Biệt%20Äá»™i%20Ăm%20Sát%20VietSub%20-%20Thuyáşżt%20Minh%20-%20HD%20_%20Silmido%202003.MP4
2017-01-12 07:23:31  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@ms-settings:windowsupdate-history
2017-01-12 07:33:32  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
2017-01-12 07:46:58  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file:///D:/My%20Skype%20Received%20Files/Book1.xlsx
2017-01-12 11:45:48  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file:///D:/Work
2017-01-12 11:46:13  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
2017-01-12 11:46:13  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file:///D:/New%20folder
2017-01-13 04:35:51  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file:///C:/Users/Deathadder™/Desktop/YR%20THƯỞNG%20TáşľT%202016.csv
2017-01-13 07:22:17  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
2017-01-13 07:53:18  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file:///Z:/Document/Amara%20IT%20Assets%202016%20Update%2001-12-2016.xlsx
2017-01-13 08:33:20  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file:///C:/Users/Deathadder™/AppData/Roaming/Skype/thangduong.dev/media_messaging/media_cache_v3/i184%5Ecimgpsh_orig.png
2017-01-13 14:28:43  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
2017-01-13 14:29:53  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file:///C:/Users/Deathadder™/Desktop/clover.png
2017-01-13 14:30:17  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file:///C:/Users/Deathadder™/Desktop/kext%20clover.png
2017-01-13 14:30:23  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
2017-01-13 20:58:22  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file:///D:/OneDrive/Movies/Những%20Tay%20Cứng%20Cá»±a%20-%20Takers%20-%202010%20—%20Táş­p%201-End%20—%20Phim7.com.MP4
2017-01-14 07:31:18  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file:///Z:/Document/AMA-IT%20Daily%20Check%20Report%2014-01-2017.xlsx
2017-01-14 10:39:18  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
2017-01-14 10:41:06  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file:///C:/Users/Deathadder™/AppData/Roaming/Skype/thangduong.dev/media_messaging/media_cache_v3/i187%5Ecimgpsh_orig.png
2017-01-14 10:42:05  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file:///C:/Users/Deathadder™/AppData/Roaming/Skype/thangduong.dev/media_messaging/media_cache_v3/i188%5Ecimgpsh_orig.png
2017-01-14 10:46:09  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
2017-01-14 10:50:22  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file:///C:/Users/Deathadder™/AppData/Roaming/Skype/thangduong.dev/media_messaging/media_cache_v3/i190%5Ecimgpsh_orig.png
2017-01-14 20:15:04  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@file:///C:/Users/Deathadder™/Downloads/Video/PhimMoi.Net---Truy.Duoi.Den.Cung-Never.Let.Go-2016-ThuyetMinh-720p.mp4
2017-01-15 19:59:58  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
2017-01-16 07:31:03  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@https://m.hotmail.com/
2017-01-16 07:31:26  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@https://apps.skype.com/chatadwidget/?containerType=NR
2017-01-16 07:50:51  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
2017-01-16 08:12:22  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@ms-settings:network-vpn
2017-01-16 08:13:18  Deathadder%E2%84%A2@https://apps.skype.com/adcontrol/prelogic.html
2017-01-16 08:52:08  [ TRIAL VERSION ]


DirectX Files

 
Name  Version  Type  Language  Size  Date
amstream.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  82944  7/16/2016 6:42:48 PM
bdaplgin.ax  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  78336  7/16/2016 6:43:52 PM
d2d1.dll  10.00.14393.0693  Final Retail  English  5061120  12/21/2016 11:24:32 AM
d3d10.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  1057280  7/16/2016 6:43:06 PM
d3d10_1.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  158720  7/16/2016 6:43:06 PM
d3d10_1core.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  354816  7/16/2016 6:43:06 PM
d3d10core.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  320000  7/16/2016 6:43:06 PM
d3d10level9.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  350680  7/16/2016 6:42:50 PM
d3d10warp.dll  10.00.14393.0576  Final Retail  English  2323728  12/9/2016 5:02:00 PM
d3d11.dll  10.00.14393.0479  Final Retail  English  2277248  11/11/2016 2:48:02 PM
d3d12.dll  10.00.14393.0594  Final Retail  English  806400  12/14/2016 11:32:42 AM
d3d8.dll  10.00.14393.0447  Final Retail  English  731136  11/2/2016 5:43:29 PM
d3d8thk.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  12800  7/16/2016 6:43:04 PM
d3d9.dll  10.00.14393.0447  Final Retail  English  1425000  11/2/2016 6:01:37 PM
d3dim.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  401920  7/16/2016 6:43:04 PM
d3dim700.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  425984  7/16/2016 6:43:04 PM
d3dramp.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  595456  7/16/2016 6:43:04 PM
d3dxof.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  58880  7/16/2016 6:43:04 PM
ddraw.dll  10.00.14393.0447  Final Retail  English  548352  11/2/2016 5:40:21 PM
ddrawex.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  45056  7/16/2016 6:43:04 PM
devenum.dll  10.00.14393.0206  Final Retail  English  83120  9/16/2016 12:33:53 AM
dinput.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  136192  7/16/2016 6:43:00 PM
dinput8.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  172032  7/16/2016 6:43:00 PM
dmband.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  35328  7/16/2016 6:43:00 PM
dmcompos.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  75776  7/16/2016 6:43:00 PM
dmime.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  207872  7/16/2016 6:43:00 PM
dmloader.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  43008  7/16/2016 6:43:00 PM
dmscript.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  96256  7/16/2016 6:43:00 PM
dmstyle.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  121856  7/16/2016 6:43:00 PM
dmsynth.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  115712  7/16/2016 6:43:00 PM
dmusic.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  115712  7/16/2016 6:43:00 PM
dplaysvr.exe  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  8192  7/16/2016 6:43:00 PM
dplayx.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  8192  7/16/2016 6:43:00 PM
dpmodemx.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  8192  7/16/2016 6:43:00 PM
dpnaddr.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  8192  7/16/2016 6:43:00 PM
dpnathlp.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  8192  7/16/2016 6:43:02 PM
dpnet.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  8192  7/16/2016 6:43:00 PM
dpnhpast.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  8192  7/16/2016 6:43:00 PM
dpnhupnp.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  8192  7/16/2016 6:43:00 PM
dpnlobby.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  8192  7/16/2016 6:43:00 PM
dpnsvr.exe  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  8192  7/16/2016 6:43:00 PM
dpwsockx.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  8192  7/16/2016 6:43:00 PM
dsdmo.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  189440  7/16/2016 6:42:49 PM
dsound.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  538112  7/16/2016 6:42:49 PM
dswave.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  24064  7/16/2016 6:43:00 PM
dwrite.dll  10.00.14393.0351  Final Retail  English  2005504  10/15/2016 10:35:32 AM
dxdiagn.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  274944  7/16/2016 6:43:04 PM
dxgi.dll  10.00.14393.0479  Final Retail  English  527880  11/11/2016 2:47:46 PM
dxmasf.dll  12.00.14393.0082  Final Retail  English  5120  8/6/2016 10:48:12 AM
dxtmsft.dll  11.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  413696  7/16/2016 6:44:02 PM
dxtrans.dll  11.00.14393.0447  Final Retail  English  270336  11/2/2016 5:43:34 PM
dxva2.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  114720  7/16/2016 6:42:50 PM
encapi.dll  10.00.14393.0105  Final Retail  English  22528  8/27/2016 11:43:11 AM
gcdef.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  123904  7/16/2016 6:43:00 PM
iac25_32.ax  2.00.0005.0053  Final Retail  English  197632  7/16/2016 6:43:00 PM
ir41_32.ax  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  9216  7/16/2016 6:43:00 PM
ir41_qc.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  9216  7/16/2016 6:43:00 PM
ir41_qcx.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  9216  7/16/2016 6:43:00 PM
ir50_32.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  9216  7/16/2016 6:43:00 PM
ir50_qc.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  9216  7/16/2016 6:43:00 PM
ir50_qcx.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  9216  7/16/2016 6:43:00 PM
ivfsrc.ax  5.10.0002.0051  Final Retail  English  146944  7/16/2016 6:43:00 PM
joy.cpl  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  92672  7/16/2016 6:43:00 PM
ksproxy.ax  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  234496  7/16/2016 6:42:49 PM
kstvtune.ax  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  95232  7/16/2016 6:43:52 PM
ksuser.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  20672  7/16/2016 6:42:49 PM
kswdmcap.ax  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  118784  7/16/2016 6:42:49 PM
ksxbar.ax  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  57856  7/16/2016 6:43:52 PM
mciqtz32.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  39936  7/16/2016 6:42:48 PM
mfc40.dll  4.01.0000.6140  Final Retail  English  924944  7/16/2016 6:42:48 PM
mfc42.dll  6.06.8063.0000  Beta Retail  English  1187328  7/16/2016 6:42:48 PM
Microsoft.DirectX.AudioVideoPlayback.dll  5.04.0000.2904  Final Retail  English  53248  12/8/2016 7:16:46 PM
Microsoft.DirectX.Diagnostics.dll  5.04.0000.2904  Final Retail  English  12800  12/8/2016 7:16:46 PM
Microsoft.DirectX.Direct3D.dll  9.05.0132.0000  Final Retail  English  473600  12/8/2016 7:16:46 PM
Microsoft.DirectX.Direct3DX.dll  5.04.0000.3900  Final Retail  English  2676224  12/8/2016 7:16:45 PM
Microsoft.DirectX.Direct3DX.dll  9.04.0091.0000  Final Retail  English  2846720  12/8/2016 7:16:45 PM
Microsoft.DirectX.Direct3DX.dll  9.05.0132.0000  Final Retail  English  563712  12/8/2016 7:16:45 PM
Microsoft.DirectX.Direct3DX.dll  9.06.0168.0000  Final Retail  English  567296  12/8/2016 7:16:45 PM
Microsoft.DirectX.Direct3DX.dll  9.07.0239.0000  Final Retail  English  576000  12/8/2016 7:16:45 PM
Microsoft.DirectX.Direct3DX.dll  9.08.0299.0000  Final Retail  English  577024  12/8/2016 7:16:45 PM
Microsoft.DirectX.Direct3DX.dll  9.09.0376.0000  Final Retail  English  577536  12/8/2016 7:16:45 PM
Microsoft.DirectX.Direct3DX.dll  9.10.0455.0000  Final Retail  English  577536  12/8/2016 7:16:45 PM
Microsoft.DirectX.Direct3DX.dll  9.11.0519.0000  Final Retail  English  578560  12/8/2016 7:16:45 PM
Microsoft.DirectX.Direct3DX.dll  9.12.0589.0000  Final Retail  English  578560  12/8/2016 7:16:46 PM
Microsoft.DirectX.DirectDraw.dll  5.04.0000.2904  Final Retail  English  145920  12/8/2016 7:16:46 PM
Microsoft.DirectX.DirectInput.dll  5.04.0000.2904  Final Retail  English  159232  12/8/2016 7:16:46 PM
Microsoft.DirectX.DirectPlay.dll  5.04.0000.2904  Final Retail  English  364544  12/8/2016 7:16:46 PM
Microsoft.DirectX.DirectSound.dll  5.04.0000.2904  Final Retail  English  178176  12/8/2016 7:16:46 PM
Microsoft.DirectX.dll  5.04.0000.2904  Final Retail  English  223232  12/8/2016 7:16:46 PM
mpeg2data.ax  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  82944  7/16/2016 6:43:52 PM
mpg2splt.ax  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  223232  7/16/2016 6:43:00 PM
msdmo.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  28936  7/16/2016 6:42:49 PM
msdvbnp.ax  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  72192  7/16/2016 6:43:52 PM
msvidctl.dll  6.05.14393.0447  Final Retail  English  2356736  11/2/2016 5:23:48 PM
msyuv.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  24064  7/16/2016 6:42:49 PM
pid.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  37888  7/16/2016 6:43:00 PM
psisdecd.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  501248  7/16/2016 6:43:52 PM
psisrndr.ax  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  88064  7/16/2016 6:43:52 PM
qasf.dll  12.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  139264  7/16/2016 6:43:00 PM
qcap.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  224256  7/16/2016 6:42:48 PM
qdv.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  300544  7/16/2016 6:42:49 PM
qdvd.dll  10.00.14393.0187  Final Retail  English  575488  9/7/2016 11:46:35 AM
qedit.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  577024  7/16/2016 6:43:52 PM
qedwipes.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  733696  7/16/2016 6:43:52 PM
quartz.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  1564160  7/16/2016 6:42:48 PM
vbisurf.ax  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  41472  7/16/2016 6:43:52 PM
vfwwdm32.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  58880  7/16/2016 6:42:49 PM
wsock32.dll  10.00.14393.0000  Final Retail  English  16384  7/16/2016 6:43:01 PM


DirectX Video

 
[ Primary Display Driver ]
 
DirectDraw Device Properties:
DirectDraw Driver Name  display
DirectDraw Driver Description  Primary Display Driver
Hardware Driver  igdumdim32.dll (10.18.10.4358)
Hardware Description  Intel(R) HD Graphics 4000
 
Direct3D Device Properties:
Rendering Bit Depths  16, 32
Z-Buffer Bit Depths  16, 24, 32
Multisample Anti-Aliasing Modes  MSAA 2x, MSAA 4x, MSAA 8x, CSAA 8x, CSAA 8xQ, CSAA 16x, CSAA 16xQ
Min Texture Size  1 x 1
Max Texture Size  16384 x 16384
Unified Shader Version  5.0
DirectX Hardware Support  DirectX v11.0
 
Direct3D Device Features:
Additive Texture Blending  Supported
AGP Texturing  Supported
Anisotropic Filtering  Supported
Automatic Mipmap Generation  Supported
Bilinear Filtering  Supported
Compute Shader  Supported
Cubic Environment Mapping  Supported
Cubic Filtering  Not Supported
Decal-Alpha Texture Blending  Supported
Decal Texture Blending  Supported
Directional Lights  Supported
DirectX Texture Compression  Not Supported
DirectX Volumetric Texture Compression  Not Supported
Dithering  Supported
Dot3 Texture Blending  Supported
Double-Precision Floating-Point  Supported
Driver Concurrent Creates  Supported
Driver Command Lists  Supported
Dynamic Textures  Supported
Edge Anti-Aliasing  Not Supported
Environmental Bump Mapping  Supported
Environmental Bump Mapping + Luminance  Supported
Factor Alpha Blending  Supported
Geometric Hidden-Surface Removal  Not Supported
Geometry Shader  Supported
Guard Band  Supported
Hardware Scene Rasterization  Supported
Hardware Transform & Lighting  Supported
Legacy Depth Bias  Supported
Map On Default Buffers  Supported
Mipmap LOD Bias Adjustments  Supported
Mipmapped Cube Textures  Supported
Mipmapped Volume Textures  Supported
Modulate-Alpha Texture Blending  Supported
Modulate Texture Blending  Supported
Non-Square Textures  Supported
N-Patches  Not Supported
Perspective Texture Correction  Supported
Point Lights  Supported
Point Sampling  Supported
Projective Textures  Supported
Quintic Bezier Curves & B-Splines  Not Supported
Range-Based Fog  Supported
Rectangular & Triangular Patches  Not Supported
Rendering In Windowed Mode  Supported
Runtime Shader Linking  Supported
Scissor Test  Supported
Slope-Scale Based Depth Bias  Supported
Specular Flat Shading  Supported
Specular Gouraud Shading  Supported
Specular Phong Shading  Not Supported
Spherical Mapping  Supported
Spot Lights  Supported
Stencil Buffers  Supported
Sub-Pixel Accuracy  Supported
Subtractive Texture Blending  Supported
Table Fog  Supported
Texture Alpha Blending  Supported
Texture Clamping  Supported
Texture Mirroring  Supported
Texture Transparency  Supported
Texture Wrapping  Supported
Tiled Resources  Supported
Triangle Culling  Not Supported
Trilinear Filtering  Supported
Two-Sided Stencil Test  Supported
Vertex Alpha Blending  Supported
Vertex Fog  Supported
Vertex Tweening  Not Supported
Volume Textures  Supported
W-Based Fog  Supported
W-Buffering  Not Supported
Z-Based Fog  Supported
Z-Bias  Supported
Z-Test  Supported
 
Supported FourCC Codes:
AI44  Supported
AYUV  Supported
I420  Supported
IA44  Supported
IMC1  Supported
IMC2  Supported
IMC3  Supported
IMC4  Supported
IYUV  Supported
NV11  Supported
NV12  Supported
P208  Supported
UYVY  Supported
VYUY  Supported
YUY2  Supported
YV12  Supported
YVU9  Supported
YVYU  Supported
 
Video Adapter Manufacturer:
Company Name  Intel Corporation
Product Information  http://www.intel.com/products/chipsets
Driver Download  http://support.intel.com/support/graphics
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates


DirectX Sound

 
[ Primary Sound Driver ]
 
DirectSound Device Properties:
Device Description  Primary Sound Driver
Driver Module  
Primary Buffers  1
Min / Max Secondary Buffers Sample Rate  100 / 200000 Hz
Primary Buffers Sound Formats  8-bit, 16-bit, Mono, Stereo
Secondary Buffers Sound Formats  8-bit, 16-bit, Mono, Stereo
Total / Free Sound Buffers  1 / 0
Total / Free Static Sound Buffers  1 / 0
Total / Free Streaming Sound Buffers  1 / 0
Total / Free 3D Sound Buffers  0 / 0
Total / Free 3D Static Sound Buffers  0 / 0
Total / Free 3D Streaming Sound Buffers  0 / 0
 
DirectSound Device Features:
Certified Driver  No
Emulated Device  No
Precise Sample Rate  Supported
DirectSound3D  Not Supported
Creative EAX 1.0  Not Supported
Creative EAX 2.0  Not Supported
Creative EAX 3.0  Not Supported
Creative EAX 4.0  Not Supported
Creative EAX 5.0  Not Supported
I3DL2  Not Supported
Sensaura ZoomFX  Not Supported
 
[ Speakers (High Definition Audio Device) ]
 
DirectSound Device Properties:
Device Description  Speakers (High Definition Audio Device)
Driver Module  {0.0.0.00000000}.{462e2419-a7cf-4064-b509-796a6c806428}
Primary Buffers  1
Min / Max Secondary Buffers Sample Rate  100 / 200000 Hz
Primary Buffers Sound Formats  8-bit, 16-bit, Mono, Stereo
Secondary Buffers Sound Formats  8-bit, 16-bit, Mono, Stereo
Total / Free Sound Buffers  1 / 0
Total / Free Static Sound Buffers  1 / 0
Total / Free Streaming Sound Buffers  1 / 0
Total / Free 3D Sound Buffers  0 / 0
Total / Free 3D Static Sound Buffers  0 / 0
Total / Free 3D Streaming Sound Buffers  0 / 0
 
DirectSound Device Features:
Certified Driver  No
Emulated Device  No
Precise Sample Rate  Supported
DirectSound3D  Not Supported
Creative EAX 1.0  Not Supported
Creative EAX 2.0  Not Supported
Creative EAX 3.0  Not Supported
Creative EAX 4.0  Not Supported
Creative EAX 5.0  Not Supported
I3DL2  Not Supported
Sensaura ZoomFX  Not Supported
 
[ Speakers (Razer Surround Audio Controller) ]
 
DirectSound Device Properties:
Device Description  Speakers (Razer Surround Audio Controller)
Driver Module  {0.0.0.00000000}.{5bc397f2-208a-4ecb-b80b-30006912f7c1}
Primary Buffers  1
Min / Max Secondary Buffers Sample Rate  100 / 200000 Hz
Primary Buffers Sound Formats  8-bit, 16-bit, Mono, Stereo
Secondary Buffers Sound Formats  8-bit, 16-bit, Mono, Stereo
Total / Free Sound Buffers  1 / 0
Total / Free Static Sound Buffers  1 / 0
Total / Free Streaming Sound Buffers  1 / 0
Total / Free 3D Sound Buffers  0 / 0
Total / Free 3D Static Sound Buffers  0 / 0
Total / Free 3D Streaming Sound Buffers  0 / 0
 
DirectSound Device Features:
Certified Driver  No
Emulated Device  No
Precise Sample Rate  Supported
DirectSound3D  Not Supported
Creative EAX 1.0  Not Supported
Creative EAX 2.0  Not Supported
Creative EAX 3.0  Not Supported
Creative EAX 4.0  Not Supported
Creative EAX 5.0  Not Supported
I3DL2  Not Supported
Sensaura ZoomFX  Not Supported


Windows Devices

 
[ Devices ]
 
Audio inputs and outputs:
Microphone (High Definition Audio Device)  10.0.14393.0
Speakers (High Definition Audio Device)  10.0.14393.0
Speakers (Razer Surround Audio Controller)  10.0.14393.0
 
Batteries:
Microsoft AC Adapter  10.0.14393.0
Microsoft ACPI-Compliant Control Method Battery  10.0.14393.0
 
Computer:
ACPI x64-based PC  10.0.14393.0
 
Disk drives:
Kingston DataTraveler 3.0 USB Device  10.0.14393.0
KINGSTON SMSR150S3256G  10.0.14393.0
Samsung SSD 850 EVO 250GB  10.0.14393.0
SanDisk SSD U100 24GB  10.0.14393.0
 
Display adapters:
Intel(R) HD Graphics 4000  10.18.10.4358
NVIDIA GeForce GT 635M  21.21.13.7633
 
Human Interface Devices:
HID-compliant wireless radio controls  10.0.14393.351
Razer DeathAdder 3.5G Keyboard  6.2.9200.16384
Razer DeathAdder 3.5G  6.2.9200.16384
 
IDE ATA/ATAPI controllers:
Intel(R) 7 Series Chipset Family SATA AHCI Controller  11.7.0.1013
 
Imaging devices:
USB 2.0 UVC HD Webcam  10.0.14393.82
 
Keyboards:
PC/AT Enhanced PS/2 Keyboard (101/102-Key)  10.0.14393.206
Razer DeathAdder 3.5G  6.2.9200.16384
 
Memory technology devices:
Realtek PCIE CardReader  6.3.9600.27053
 
Mice and other pointing devices:
ASUS Touchpad  1.0.0.262
Razer DeathAdder 3.5G  6.2.9200.16384
 
Monitors:
Generic PnP Monitor  10.0.14393.0
 
Network adapters:
Microsoft ISATAP Adapter #2  10.0.14393.0
Microsoft ISATAP Adapter #5  10.0.14393.0
Microsoft ISATAP Adapter  10.0.14393.0
Microsoft Kernel Debug Network Adapter  10.0.14393.0
Microsoft Teredo Tunneling Adapter  10.0.14393.0
Microsoft Wi-Fi Direct Virtual Adapter  10.0.14393.0
Qualcomm Atheros AR9285 Wireless Network Adapter  10.0.0.341
Realtek PCIe GBE Family Controller  9.1.404.2015
VMware Virtual Ethernet Adapter for VMnet1  4.2.7.0
VMware Virtual Ethernet Adapter for VMnet8  4.2.7.0
WAN Miniport (IKEv2)  10.0.14393.0
WAN Miniport (IP)  10.0.14393.0
WAN Miniport (IPv6)  10.0.14393.0
WAN Miniport (L2TP)  10.0.14393.0
WAN Miniport (Network Monitor)  10.0.14393.0
WAN Miniport (PPPOE)  10.0.14393.0
WAN Miniport (PPTP)  10.0.14393.0
WAN Miniport (SSTP)  10.0.14393.0
 
Portable Devices:
WINPE-CD(FU  10.0.14393.0
 
Print queues:
\\10.26.0.7\BigOffice- RICOH Aficio MP 6001  10.0.14393.0
Adobe PDF  10.0.14393.0
Fax  10.0.14393.0
Microsoft Print to PDF  10.0.14393.0
Microsoft XPS Document Writer  10.0.14393.0
Root Print Queue  10.0.14393.0
Send To OneNote 2016  10.0.14393.0
 
Printers:
\\10.26.0.7\TONG VU HP LJ300-400 color M351-M451  
 
Processors:
Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3317U CPU @ 1.70GHz  10.0.14393.0
Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3317U CPU @ 1.70GHz  10.0.14393.0
Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3317U CPU @ 1.70GHz  10.0.14393.0
Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3317U CPU @ 1.70GHz  10.0.14393.0
 
Software devices:
Microsoft Device Association Root Enumerator  10.0.14393.0
Microsoft GS Wavetable Synth  10.0.14393.0
Microsoft IPv4 IPv6 Transition Adapter Bus  10.0.14393.0
Microsoft Radio Device Enumeration Bus  10.0.14393.0
Microsoft RRAS Root Enumerator  10.0.14393.0
Wi-Fi  10.0.14393.0
 
Sound, video and game controllers:
High Definition Audio Device  10.0.14393.0
Intel(R) Display Audio  6.16.0.3154
Razer Surround Audio Controller  15.57.36.635
 
Storage controllers:
Microsoft Storage Spaces Controller  10.0.14393.351
 
Storage volumes:
Volume  10.0.14393.0
Volume  10.0.14393.0
Volume  10.0.14393.0
Volume  10.0.14393.0
Volume  10.0.14393.0
Volume  10.0.14393.0
Volume  10.0.14393.0
Volume  10.0.14393.0
Volume  10.0.14393.0
Volume  10.0.14393.0
Volume  10.0.14393.0
 
System devices:
ACPI Fixed Feature Button  10.0.14393.0
ACPI Lid  10.0.14393.0
ACPI Sleep Button  10.0.14393.0
ACPI Thermal Zone  10.0.14393.0
ASUS Wireless Radio Control  1.0.0.5
Composite Bus Enumerator  10.0.14393.0
Direct memory access controller  10.0.14393.0
High Definition Audio Controller  10.0.14393.0
High precision event timer  10.0.14393.0
Intel(R) Dynamic Platform and Thermal Framework Driver  6.0.7.1084
Intel(R) Dynamic Platform and Thermal Framework Fan Participant Driver  6.0.7.1084
Intel(R) Dynamic Platform and Thermal Framework Generic Participant Driver  6.0.7.1084
Intel(R) Dynamic Platform and Thermal Framework Generic Participant Driver  6.0.7.1084
Intel(R) Dynamic Platform and Thermal Framework Generic Participant Driver  6.0.7.1084
Intel(R) Dynamic Platform and Thermal Framework Generic Participant Driver  6.0.7.1084
Intel(R) Dynamic Platform and Thermal Framework Memory Participant Driver  6.0.7.1084
Intel(R) Dynamic Platform and Thermal Framework Processor Participant Driver  6.0.7.1084
Intel(R) Management Engine Interface  11.0.0.1157
IWD Bus Enumerator  4.5.71.0
Legacy device  10.0.14393.0
LPC Controller  10.0.14393.0
Memory Controller  10.0.14393.0
Microsoft ACPI-Compliant Embedded Controller  10.0.14393.0
Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System  10.0.14393.447
Microsoft Basic Display Driver  10.0.14393.0
Microsoft Basic Render Driver  10.0.14393.0
Microsoft System Management BIOS Driver  10.0.14393.0
Microsoft Virtual Drive Enumerator  10.0.14393.0
Microsoft Windows Management Interface for ACPI  10.0.14393.0
Microsoft Windows Management Interface for ACPI  10.0.14393.0
Motherboard resources  10.0.14393.0
Motherboard resources  10.0.14393.0
Motherboard resources  10.0.14393.0
Motherboard resources  10.0.14393.0
Motherboard resources  10.0.14393.0
Motherboard resources  10.0.14393.0
NDIS Virtual Network Adapter Enumerator  10.0.14393.0
Numeric data processor  10.0.14393.0
PCI Express Root Complex  10.0.14393.594
PCI-to-PCI Bridge  10.0.14393.594
PCI-to-PCI Bridge  10.0.14393.594
PCI-to-PCI Bridge  10.0.14393.594
PCI-to-PCI Bridge  10.0.14393.594
Plug and Play Software Device Enumerator  10.0.14393.0
Programmable interrupt controller  10.0.14393.0
Remote Desktop Device Redirector Bus  10.0.14393.0
SM Bus Controller  10.0.14393.0
System board  10.0.14393.0
System board  10.0.14393.0
System CMOS/real time clock  10.0.14393.0
System timer  10.0.14393.0
UMBus Root Bus Enumerator  10.0.14393.0
VMware VMCI Host Device  9.8.6.0
Volume Manager  10.0.14393.0
 
Universal Serial Bus controllers:
Generic USB Hub  10.0.14393.0
Generic USB Hub  10.0.14393.0
Intel(R) 7 Series/C216 Chipset Family USB Enhanced Host Controller - 1E26  10.0.14393.0
Intel(R) 7 Series/C216 Chipset Family USB Enhanced Host Controller - 1E2D  10.0.14393.0
Intel(R) USB 3.0 eXtensible Host Controller - 1.0 (Microsoft)  10.0.14393.0
USB Composite Device  10.0.14393.0
USB Mass Storage Device  10.0.14393.0
USB Root Hub (xHCI)  10.0.14393.0
USB Root Hub  10.0.14393.0
USB Root Hub  10.0.14393.0
 
Unknown:
Unknown  
 
[ Audio inputs and outputs / Microphone (High Definition Audio Device) ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Microphone (High Definition Audio Device)
Driver Date  7/15/2016
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  audioendpoint.inf
INF Section  NO_DRV
Hardware ID  MMDEVAPI\AudioEndpoints
 
[ Audio inputs and outputs / Speakers (High Definition Audio Device) ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Speakers (High Definition Audio Device)
Driver Date  7/15/2016
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  audioendpoint.inf
INF Section  NO_DRV
Hardware ID  MMDEVAPI\AudioEndpoints
 
[ Audio inputs and outputs / Speakers (Razer Surround Audio Controller) ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Speakers (Razer Surround Audio Controller)
Driver Date  7/15/2016
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  audioendpoint.inf
INF Section  NO_DRV
Hardware ID  MMDEVAPI\AudioEndpoints
 
[ Batteries / Microsoft AC Adapter ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Microsoft AC Adapter
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  cmbatt.inf
INF Section  AcAdapter_Inst
Hardware ID  ACPI\VEN_ACPI&DEV_0003
 
Device Manufacturer:
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Batteries / Microsoft ACPI-Compliant Control Method Battery ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant Control Method Battery
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  cmbatt.inf
INF Section  CmBatt_Inst
Hardware ID  ACPI\VEN_PNP&DEV_0C0A
 
Device Manufacturer:
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Computer / ACPI x64-based PC ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  ACPI x64-based PC
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  hal.inf
INF Section  ACPI_AMD64_HAL
Hardware ID  acpiapic
 
[ Disk drives / Kingston DataTraveler 3.0 USB Device ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Kingston DataTraveler 3.0 USB Device
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  disk.inf
INF Section  disk_install.NT
Hardware ID  USBSTOR\DiskKingstonDataTraveler_3.0PMAP
 
Device Manufacturer:
Company Name  Kingston Technology Corporation
Product Information  http://www.kingston.com/en/ssd
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Disk drives / KINGSTON SMSR150S3256G ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  KINGSTON SMSR150S3256G
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  disk.inf
INF Section  disk_install.NT
Hardware ID  SCSI\DiskATA_____KINGSTON_SMSR15004.7
Location Information  Bus Number 2, Target Id 0, LUN 0
 
Device Manufacturer:
Company Name  Kingston Technology Corporation
Product Information  http://www.kingston.com/en/ssd
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Disk drives / Samsung SSD 850 EVO 250GB ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Samsung SSD 850 EVO 250GB
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  disk.inf
INF Section  disk_install.NT
Hardware ID  SCSI\DiskATA_____Samsung_SSD_850_2B6Q
Location Information  Bus Number 0, Target Id 0, LUN 0
 
Device Manufacturer:
Company Name  Samsung
Product Information  http://www.samsung.com/us/computer/solid-state-drives
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Disk drives / SanDisk SSD U100 24GB ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  SanDisk SSD U100 24GB
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  disk.inf
INF Section  disk_install.NT
Hardware ID  SCSI\DiskATA_____SanDisk_SSD_U1006.02
Location Information  Bus Number 1, Target Id 0, LUN 0
 
Device Manufacturer:
Company Name  SanDisk Corporation
Product Information  http://www.sandisk.com/products/ssd
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Display adapters / Intel(R) HD Graphics 4000 ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Intel(R) HD Graphics 4000
Driver Date  12/21/2015
Driver Version  10.18.10.4358
Driver Provider  Intel Corporation
INF File  oem42.inf
INF Section  iIVBM_w10
Hardware ID  PCI\VEN_8086&DEV_0166&SUBSYS_100D1043&REV_09
Location Information  PCI bus 0, device 2, function 0
PCI Device  Intel Ivy Bridge-MB - Integrated Graphics Controller (MB GT2)
 
Device Resources:
IRQ  65536
Memory  D0000000-DFFFFFFF
Memory  F7400000-F77FFFFF
Port  F000-F03F
 
Video Adapter Manufacturer:
Company Name  Intel Corporation
Product Information  http://www.intel.com/products/chipsets
Driver Download  http://support.intel.com/support/graphics
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Display adapters / NVIDIA GeForce GT 635M ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  NVIDIA GeForce GT 635M
Driver Date  12/11/2016
Driver Version  21.21.13.7633
Driver Provider  NVIDIA
INF File  oem70.inf
INF Section  Section026
Hardware ID  PCI\VEN_10DE&DEV_0DE3&SUBSYS_100D1043&REV_A1
Location Information  PCI bus 1, device 0, function 0
PCI Device  nVIDIA GeForce GT 635M (Asus) Video Adapter
 
Device Resources:
IRQ  16
Memory  E0000000-EFFFFFFF
Memory  F0000000-F1FFFFFF
Memory  F6000000-F6FFFFFF
 
Video Adapter Manufacturer:
Company Name  NVIDIA Corporation
Product Information  http://www.nvidia.com/page/products.html
Driver Download  http://www.nvidia.com/content/drivers/drivers.asp
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Human Interface Devices / HID-compliant wireless radio controls ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  HID-compliant wireless radio controls
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.351
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  input.inf
INF Section  HID_Raw_Inst.NT
Hardware ID  HID\VEN_ATK&DEV_4001
 
Device Manufacturer:
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Human Interface Devices / Razer DeathAdder 3.5G Keyboard ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Razer DeathAdder 3.5G Keyboard
Driver Date  8/11/2015
Driver Version  6.2.9200.16384
Driver Provider  Razer
INF File  oem30.inf
INF Section  rzvkeyboard.Inst.Win7.NT
Hardware ID  {16EA057E-3926-43C6-B752-353F3D0BF493}\HID_DEVICE
Location Information  Razer Keyboard
 
Device Manufacturer:
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Human Interface Devices / Razer DeathAdder 3.5G ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Razer DeathAdder 3.5G
Driver Date  8/11/2015
Driver Version  6.2.9200.16384
Driver Provider  Razer Inc
INF File  oem21.inf
INF Section  RZMOUENDPT.NT
Hardware ID  USB\VID_1532&PID_0016&REV_0100
Location Information  Port_#0002.Hub_#0005
 
Device Manufacturer:
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ IDE ATA/ATAPI controllers / Intel(R) 7 Series Chipset Family SATA AHCI Controller ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Intel(R) 7 Series Chipset Family SATA AHCI Controller
Driver Date  11/19/2012
Driver Version  11.7.0.1013
Driver Provider  Intel Corporation
INF File  oem7.inf
INF Section  iaStorA_inst_8.NTamd64
Hardware ID  PCI\VEN_8086&DEV_1E03&SUBSYS_100D1043&REV_04
Location Information  PCI bus 0, device 31, function 2
PCI Device  Intel Panther Point-M PCH - SATA AHCI Controller [C-1]
 
Device Resources:
IRQ  65536
Memory  F7A1E000-F7A1E7FF
Port  F060-F07F
Port  F080-F083
Port  F090-F097
Port  F0A0-F0A3
Port  F0B0-F0B7
 
Chipset Manufacturer:
Company Name  Intel Corporation
Product Information  http://www.intel.com/products/chipsets
Driver Download  http://support.intel.com/support/chipsets
BIOS Upgrades  http://www.aida64.com/bios-updates
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Imaging devices / USB 2.0 UVC HD Webcam ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  USB 2.0 UVC HD Webcam
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.82
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  usbvideo.inf
INF Section  USBVideo.NT
Hardware ID  USB\VID_13D3&PID_5165&REV_0823&MI_00
Location Information  0000.001a.0000.001.003.000.000.000.000
 
Device Manufacturer:
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Keyboards / PC/AT Enhanced PS/2 Keyboard (101/102-Key) ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  PC/AT Enhanced PS/2 Keyboard (101/102-Key)
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.206
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  keyboard.inf
INF Section  STANDARD_Inst
Hardware ID  ACPI\VEN_ATK&DEV_3001
 
Device Resources:
IRQ  01
Port  0060-0060
Port  0064-0064
 
Device Manufacturer:
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Keyboards / Razer DeathAdder 3.5G ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Razer DeathAdder 3.5G
Driver Date  8/11/2015
Driver Version  6.2.9200.16384
Driver Provider  Razer Inc
INF File  oem37.inf
INF Section  Razer.NT
Hardware ID  HID\VID_1532&PID_0016&DID_0000&MI_02
 
Device Manufacturer:
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Memory technology devices / Realtek PCIE CardReader ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Realtek PCIE CardReader
Driver Date  5/28/2015
Driver Version  6.3.9600.27053
Driver Provider  Realtek Semiconduct Corp.
INF File  oem6.inf
INF Section  Rts5208.Inst.NTamd64
Hardware ID  PCI\VEN_10EC&DEV_5289&SUBSYS_202F1043&REV_01
Location Information  PCI bus 4, device 0, function 0
PCI Device  Realtek RTS5289 PCI-E Card Reader
 
Device Resources:
IRQ  65536
Memory  F7800000-F780FFFF
 
[ Mice and other pointing devices / ASUS Touchpad ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  ASUS Touchpad
Driver Date  11/11/2015
Driver Version  1.0.0.262
Driver Provider  ASUS
INF File  oem5.inf
INF Section  ATP0105_Inst
Hardware ID  ACPI\VEN_ETD&DEV_0108
 
Device Resources:
IRQ  12
 
Device Manufacturer:
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Mice and other pointing devices / Razer DeathAdder 3.5G ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Razer DeathAdder 3.5G
Driver Date  8/11/2015
Driver Version  6.2.9200.16384
Driver Provider  Razer Inc
INF File  oem38.inf
INF Section  Razer.NT
Hardware ID  HID\VID_1532&PID_0016&REV_0100
 
Mouse Manufacturer:
Company Name  Razer Inc.
Product Information  http://www.razerzone.com
Driver Download  http://www.razerzone.com
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Monitors / Generic PnP Monitor ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Generic PnP Monitor
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  monitor.inf
INF Section  PnPMonitor.Install
Hardware ID  MONITOR\CMN1472
 
Device Manufacturer:
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Network adapters / Microsoft ISATAP Adapter #2 ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Microsoft ISATAP Adapter #2
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  nettun.inf
INF Section  ISATAP.ndi
Hardware ID  *ISATAP
 
Device Manufacturer:
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Network adapters / Microsoft ISATAP Adapter #5 ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Microsoft ISATAP Adapter #5
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  nettun.inf
INF Section  ISATAP.ndi
Hardware ID  *ISATAP
 
Device Manufacturer:
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Network adapters / Microsoft ISATAP Adapter ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Microsoft ISATAP Adapter
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  nettun.inf
INF Section  ISATAP.ndi
Hardware ID  *ISATAP
 
Device Manufacturer:
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Network adapters / Microsoft Kernel Debug Network Adapter ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Microsoft Kernel Debug Network Adapter
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  kdnic.inf
INF Section  KdNic.ndi
Hardware ID  root\kdnic
 
Device Manufacturer:
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Network adapters / Microsoft Teredo Tunneling Adapter ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Microsoft Teredo Tunneling Adapter
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  nettun.inf
INF Section  TEREDO.ndi
Hardware ID  *TEREDO
 
Device Manufacturer:
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Network adapters / Microsoft Wi-Fi Direct Virtual Adapter ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Microsoft Wi-Fi Direct Virtual Adapter
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  netvwifimp.inf
INF Section  vwifimp_wfd.ndi
Hardware ID  {5d624f94-8850-40c3-a3fa-a4fd2080baf3}\vwifimp_wfd
Location Information  VWiFi Bus 0
 
Device Manufacturer:
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Network adapters / Qualcomm Atheros AR9285 Wireless Network Adapter ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Qualcomm Atheros AR9285 Wireless Network Adapter
Driver Date  5/11/2016
Driver Version  10.0.0.341
Driver Provider  Qualcomm Atheros Communications Inc.
INF File  oem67.inf
INF Section  ATHR_DEV_OS61_S30A1.ndi.NTamd64
Hardware ID  PCI\VEN_168C&DEV_002B&SUBSYS_E017105B&REV_01
Location Information  PCI bus 3, device 0, function 0
PCI Device  Atheros AR9285 802.11b/g/n Wireless Network Adapter
 
Device Resources:
IRQ  17
Memory  F7900000-F790FFFF
 
Network Adapter Manufacturer:
Company Name  Qualcomm Technologies, Inc.
Product Information  http://www.qualcomm.com/products/networking
Driver Download  http://www.qualcomm.com
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Network adapters / Realtek PCIe GBE Family Controller ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Realtek PCIe GBE Family Controller
Driver Date  4/5/2015
Driver Version  9.1.404.2015
Driver Provider  Realtek
INF File  rt640x64.inf
INF Section  RTL8168FB.ndi.NT
Hardware ID  PCI\VEN_10EC&DEV_8168&SUBSYS_200F1043&REV_0A
Location Information  PCI bus 4, device 0, function 2
PCI Device  Realtek RTL8168/8111 PCI-E Gigabit Ethernet Adapter
 
Device Resources:
IRQ  65536
Memory  F2100000-F2103FFF
Memory  F2104000-F2104FFF
Port  D000-D0FF
 
Network Adapter Manufacturer:
Company Name  Realtek Semiconductor Corp.
Product Information  http://www.realtek.com.tw/products/productsView.aspx?Langid=1&PNid=7&PFid=10&Level=3&Conn=2
Driver Download  http://www.realtek.com.tw/downloads
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Network adapters / VMware Virtual Ethernet Adapter for VMnet1 ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  VMware Virtual Ethernet Adapter for VMnet1
Driver Date  7/18/2016
Driver Version  4.2.7.0
Driver Provider  VMware, Inc.
INF File  oem72.inf
INF Section  VMnetAdapter1.Install
Hardware ID  *VMnetAdapter1
 
Network Adapter Manufacturer:
Company Name  VMware, Inc.
Product Information  http://www.vmware.com
Driver Download  http://www.vmware.com
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Network adapters / VMware Virtual Ethernet Adapter for VMnet8 ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  VMware Virtual Ethernet Adapter for VMnet8
Driver Date  7/18/2016
Driver Version  4.2.7.0
Driver Provider  VMware, Inc.
INF File  oem72.inf
INF Section  VMnetAdapter8.Install
Hardware ID  *VMnetAdapter8
 
Network Adapter Manufacturer:
Company Name  VMware, Inc.
Product Information  http://www.vmware.com
Driver Download  http://www.vmware.com
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Network adapters / WAN Miniport (IKEv2) ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  WAN Miniport (IKEv2)
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  netavpna.inf
INF Section  Ndi-Mp-AgileVpn
Hardware ID  ms_agilevpnminiport
 
Device Manufacturer:
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Network adapters / WAN Miniport (IP) ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  WAN Miniport (IP)
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  netrasa.inf
INF Section  Ndi-Mp-Ip
Hardware ID  ms_ndiswanip
 
Device Manufacturer:
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Network adapters / WAN Miniport (IPv6) ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  WAN Miniport (IPv6)
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  netrasa.inf
INF Section  Ndi-Mp-Ipv6
Hardware ID  ms_ndiswanipv6
 
Device Manufacturer:
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Network adapters / WAN Miniport (L2TP) ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  WAN Miniport (L2TP)
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  netrasa.inf
INF Section  Ndi-Mp-L2tp
Hardware ID  ms_l2tpminiport
 
Device Manufacturer:
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Network adapters / WAN Miniport (Network Monitor) ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  WAN Miniport (Network Monitor)
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  netrasa.inf
INF Section  Ndi-Mp-Bh
Hardware ID  ms_ndiswanbh
 
Device Manufacturer:
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Network adapters / WAN Miniport (PPPOE) ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  WAN Miniport (PPPOE)
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  netrasa.inf
INF Section  Ndi-Mp-Pppoe
Hardware ID  ms_pppoeminiport
 
Device Manufacturer:
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Network adapters / WAN Miniport (PPTP) ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  WAN Miniport (PPTP)
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  netrasa.inf
INF Section  Ndi-Mp-Pptp
Hardware ID  ms_pptpminiport
 
Device Manufacturer:
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Network adapters / WAN Miniport (SSTP) ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  WAN Miniport (SSTP)
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  netsstpa.inf
INF Section  Ndi-Mp-Sstp
Hardware ID  ms_sstpminiport
 
Device Manufacturer:
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Portable Devices / WINPE-CD(FU ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  WINPE-CD(FU
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  WpdFs.inf
INF Section  Basic_Install
 
[ Print queues / \\10.26.0.7\BigOffice- RICOH Aficio MP 6001 ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  \\10.26.0.7\BigOffice- RICOH Aficio MP 6001
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  printqueue.inf
INF Section  NO_DRV
Hardware ID  PRINTENUM\PrinterConnection
Location Information  \Users\S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001\Printers\^\^\10.26.0.7^\BigOffice- RICOH Aficio MP 6001
 
[ Print queues / Adobe PDF ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Adobe PDF
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  printqueue.inf
INF Section  NO_DRV_LOCAL
Hardware ID  PRINTENUM\LocalPrintQueue
 
[ Print queues / Fax ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Fax
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  printqueue.inf
INF Section  NO_DRV_LOCAL
Hardware ID  PRINTENUM\microsoftmicrosoft_s7d14
 
[ Print queues / Microsoft Print to PDF ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Microsoft Print to PDF
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  printqueue.inf
INF Section  NO_DRV_LOCAL
Hardware ID  PRINTENUM\{084f01fa-e634-4d77-83ee-074817c03581}
 
[ Print queues / Microsoft XPS Document Writer ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Microsoft XPS Document Writer
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  printqueue.inf
INF Section  NO_DRV_LOCAL
Hardware ID  PRINTENUM\{0f4130dd-19c7-7ab6-99a1-980f03b2ee4e}
 
[ Print queues / Root Print Queue ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Root Print Queue
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  printqueue.inf
INF Section  NO_DRV_LOCAL
Hardware ID  PRINTENUM\LocalPrintQueue
 
[ Print queues / Send To OneNote 2016 ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Send To OneNote 2016
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  printqueue.inf
INF Section  NO_DRV_LOCAL
Hardware ID  PRINTENUM\{3ee39114-30b4-45a4-a109-19d4a40fcc22}
 
[ Printers / \\10.26.0.7\TONG VU HP LJ300-400 color M351-M451 ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  \\10.26.0.7\TONG VU HP LJ300-400 color M351-M451
Hardware ID  PRINTENUM\PrinterConnection
Location Information  \Users\S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001\Printers\^\^\10.26.0.7^\TONG VU HP LJ300-400 color M351-M451
 
Device Manufacturer:
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Processors / Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3317U CPU @ 1.70GHz ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3317U CPU @ 1.70GHz
Driver Date  4/21/2009
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  cpu.inf
INF Section  IntelPPM_Inst.NT
Hardware ID  ACPI\GenuineIntel_-_Intel64_Family_6_Model_58
 
CPU Manufacturer:
Company Name  Intel Corporation
Product Information  http://ark.intel.com/search.aspx?q=Intel%20Core%20i5-3317U
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Processors / Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3317U CPU @ 1.70GHz ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3317U CPU @ 1.70GHz
Driver Date  4/21/2009
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  cpu.inf
INF Section  IntelPPM_Inst.NT
Hardware ID  ACPI\GenuineIntel_-_Intel64_Family_6_Model_58
 
CPU Manufacturer:
Company Name  Intel Corporation
Product Information  http://ark.intel.com/search.aspx?q=Intel%20Core%20i5-3317U
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Processors / Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3317U CPU @ 1.70GHz ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3317U CPU @ 1.70GHz
Driver Date  4/21/2009
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  cpu.inf
INF Section  IntelPPM_Inst.NT
Hardware ID  ACPI\GenuineIntel_-_Intel64_Family_6_Model_58
 
CPU Manufacturer:
Company Name  Intel Corporation
Product Information  http://ark.intel.com/search.aspx?q=Intel%20Core%20i5-3317U
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Processors / Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3317U CPU @ 1.70GHz ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3317U CPU @ 1.70GHz
Driver Date  4/21/2009
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  cpu.inf
INF Section  IntelPPM_Inst.NT
Hardware ID  ACPI\GenuineIntel_-_Intel64_Family_6_Model_58
 
CPU Manufacturer:
Company Name  Intel Corporation
Product Information  http://ark.intel.com/search.aspx?q=Intel%20Core%20i5-3317U
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Software devices / Microsoft Device Association Root Enumerator ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Microsoft Device Association Root Enumerator
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  c_swdevice.inf
INF Section  SoftwareDevice
 
[ Software devices / Microsoft GS Wavetable Synth ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Microsoft GS Wavetable Synth
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  c_swdevice.inf
INF Section  SoftwareDevice
 
[ Software devices / Microsoft IPv4 IPv6 Transition Adapter Bus ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Microsoft IPv4 IPv6 Transition Adapter Bus
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  c_swdevice.inf
INF Section  SoftwareDevice
 
[ Software devices / Microsoft Radio Device Enumeration Bus ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Microsoft Radio Device Enumeration Bus
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  c_swdevice.inf
INF Section  SoftwareDevice
 
[ Software devices / Microsoft RRAS Root Enumerator ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Microsoft RRAS Root Enumerator
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  c_swdevice.inf
INF Section  SoftwareDevice
 
[ Software devices / Wi-Fi ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Wi-Fi
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  c_swdevice.inf
INF Section  SoftwareDevice
 
[ Sound, video and game controllers / High Definition Audio Device ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  High Definition Audio Device
Driver Date  7/15/2016
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  hdaudio.inf
INF Section  HdAudModel
Hardware ID  HDAUDIO\FUNC_01&VEN_10EC&DEV_0270&SUBSYS_1043100D&REV_1001
Location Information  Internal High Definition Audio Bus
 
Device Manufacturer:
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Sound, video and game controllers / Intel(R) Display Audio ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Intel(R) Display Audio
Driver Date  9/9/2014
Driver Version  6.16.0.3154
Driver Provider  Intel(R) Corporation
INF File  oem51.inf
INF Section  IntcDAudModel8
Hardware ID  HDAUDIO\FUNC_01&VEN_8086&DEV_2806&SUBSYS_80860101&REV_1000
Location Information  Internal High Definition Audio Bus
 
Device Manufacturer:
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Sound, video and game controllers / Razer Surround Audio Controller ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Razer Surround Audio Controller
Driver Date  10/13/2016
Driver Version  15.57.36.635
Driver Provider  Razer
INF File  oem62.inf
INF Section  RZSURROUNDVAD.NT
Hardware ID  *RZSURROUNDVAD
 
Device Manufacturer:
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Storage controllers / Microsoft Storage Spaces Controller ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Microsoft Storage Spaces Controller
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.351
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  spaceport.inf
INF Section  Spaceport_Install
Hardware ID  Root\Spaceport
 
Device Manufacturer:
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Storage volumes / Volume ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Volume
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  volume.inf
INF Section  volume_install.NT
Hardware ID  STORAGE\Volume
 
[ Storage volumes / Volume ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Volume
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  volume.inf
INF Section  volume_install.NT
Hardware ID  STORAGE\Volume
 
[ Storage volumes / Volume ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Volume
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  volume.inf
INF Section  volume_install.NT
Hardware ID  STORAGE\Volume
 
[ Storage volumes / Volume ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Volume
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  volume.inf
INF Section  volume_install.NT
Hardware ID  STORAGE\Volume
 
[ Storage volumes / Volume ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Volume
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  volume.inf
INF Section  volume_install.NT
Hardware ID  STORAGE\Volume
 
[ Storage volumes / Volume ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Volume
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  volume.inf
INF Section  volume_install.NT
Hardware ID  STORAGE\Volume
 
[ Storage volumes / Volume ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Volume
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  volume.inf
INF Section  volume_install.NT
Hardware ID  STORAGE\Volume
 
[ Storage volumes / Volume ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Volume
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  volume.inf
INF Section  volume_install.NT
Hardware ID  STORAGE\Volume
 
[ Storage volumes / Volume ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Volume
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  volume.inf
INF Section  volume_install.NT
Hardware ID  STORAGE\Volume
 
[ Storage volumes / Volume ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Volume
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  volume.inf
INF Section  volume_install.NT
Hardware ID  STORAGE\Volume
 
[ Storage volumes / Volume ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Volume
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  volume.inf
INF Section  volume_install.NT
Hardware ID  STORAGE\Volume
 
[ System devices / ACPI Fixed Feature Button ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  ACPI Fixed Feature Button
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  machine.inf
INF Section  NO_DRV
Hardware ID  ACPI\FixedButton
 
[ System devices / ACPI Lid ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  ACPI Lid
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  machine.inf
INF Section  NO_DRV
Hardware ID  ACPI\VEN_PNP&DEV_0C0D
 
[ System devices / ACPI Sleep Button ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  ACPI Sleep Button
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  machine.inf
INF Section  NO_DRV
Hardware ID  ACPI\VEN_PNP&DEV_0C0E
 
[ System devices / ACPI Thermal Zone ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  ACPI Thermal Zone
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  machine.inf
INF Section  NO_DRV
Hardware ID  ACPI\ThermalZone
 
[ System devices / ASUS Wireless Radio Control ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  ASUS Wireless Radio Control
Driver Date  8/18/2015
Driver Version  1.0.0.5
Driver Provider  ASUS
INF File  oem16.inf
INF Section  Radio_Control
Hardware ID  ACPI\VEN_ATK&DEV_4001
 
[ System devices / Composite Bus Enumerator ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Composite Bus Enumerator
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  compositebus.inf
INF Section  CompositeBus_Device.NT
Hardware ID  ROOT\CompositeBus
 
[ System devices / Direct memory access controller ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Direct memory access controller
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  machine.inf
INF Section  NO_DRV_X
Hardware ID  ACPI\VEN_PNP&DEV_0200
 
[ System devices / High Definition Audio Controller ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  High Definition Audio Controller
Driver Date  7/15/2016
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  hdaudbus.inf
INF Section  HDAudio_Device.NT
Hardware ID  PCI\VEN_8086&DEV_1E20&SUBSYS_100D1043&REV_04
Location Information  PCI bus 0, device 27, function 0
PCI Device  Intel Panther Point PCH - High Definition Audio Controller [C-1]
 
Device Resources:
IRQ  22
Memory  F7A18000-F7A1BFFF
 
[ System devices / High precision event timer ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  High precision event timer
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  machine.inf
INF Section  NO_DRV_HPET
Hardware ID  ACPI\VEN_PNP&DEV_0103
 
[ System devices / Intel(R) Dynamic Platform and Thermal Framework Driver ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Intel(R) Dynamic Platform and Thermal Framework Driver
Driver Date  12/17/2012
Driver Version  6.0.7.1084
Driver Provider  Intel
INF File  oem49.inf
INF Section  DptfManager.NTamd64
Hardware ID  ACPI\VEN_INT&DEV_3400
 
[ System devices / Intel(R) Dynamic Platform and Thermal Framework Fan Participant Driver ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Intel(R) Dynamic Platform and Thermal Framework Fan Participant Driver
Driver Date  12/17/2012
Driver Version  6.0.7.1084
Driver Provider  Intel
INF File  oem49.inf
INF Section  DptfDevFan
Hardware ID  ACPI\VEN_INT&DEV_3404
 
[ System devices / Intel(R) Dynamic Platform and Thermal Framework Generic Participant Driver ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Intel(R) Dynamic Platform and Thermal Framework Generic Participant Driver
Driver Date  12/17/2012
Driver Version  6.0.7.1084
Driver Provider  Intel
INF File  oem49.inf
INF Section  DptfDevGen
Hardware ID  ACPI\VEN_INT&DEV_3403
 
[ System devices / Intel(R) Dynamic Platform and Thermal Framework Generic Participant Driver ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Intel(R) Dynamic Platform and Thermal Framework Generic Participant Driver
Driver Date  12/17/2012
Driver Version  6.0.7.1084
Driver Provider  Intel
INF File  oem49.inf
INF Section  DptfDevGen
Hardware ID  ACPI\VEN_INT&DEV_3403
 
[ System devices / Intel(R) Dynamic Platform and Thermal Framework Generic Participant Driver ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Intel(R) Dynamic Platform and Thermal Framework Generic Participant Driver
Driver Date  12/17/2012
Driver Version  6.0.7.1084
Driver Provider  Intel
INF File  oem49.inf
INF Section  DptfDevGen
Hardware ID  ACPI\VEN_INT&DEV_3403
 
[ System devices / Intel(R) Dynamic Platform and Thermal Framework Generic Participant Driver ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Intel(R) Dynamic Platform and Thermal Framework Generic Participant Driver
Driver Date  12/17/2012
Driver Version  6.0.7.1084
Driver Provider  Intel
INF File  oem49.inf
INF Section  DptfDevGen
Hardware ID  ACPI\VEN_INT&DEV_3403
 
[ System devices / Intel(R) Dynamic Platform and Thermal Framework Memory Participant Driver ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Intel(R) Dynamic Platform and Thermal Framework Memory Participant Driver
Driver Date  12/17/2012
Driver Version  6.0.7.1084
Driver Provider  Intel
INF File  oem49.inf
INF Section  DptfDevDram
Hardware ID  ACPI\VEN_INT&DEV_3402
 
[ System devices / Intel(R) Dynamic Platform and Thermal Framework Processor Participant Driver ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Intel(R) Dynamic Platform and Thermal Framework Processor Participant Driver
Driver Date  12/17/2012
Driver Version  6.0.7.1084
Driver Provider  Intel
INF File  oem49.inf
INF Section  DptfDevProc.NTamd64
Hardware ID  PCI\VEN_8086&DEV_0153&SUBSYS_100D1043&REV_09
Location Information  PCI bus 0, device 4, function 0
PCI Device  Intel Ivy Bridge - Thermal Management Controller
 
Device Resources:
IRQ  16
Memory  FEAF8000-FEAFFFFF
 
[ System devices / Intel(R) Management Engine Interface ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Intel(R) Management Engine Interface
Driver Date  7/7/2015
Driver Version  11.0.0.1157
Driver Provider  Intel
INF File  oem4.inf
INF Section  TEE_DDI_W10_x64
Hardware ID  PCI\VEN_8086&DEV_1E3A&SUBSYS_100D1043&REV_04
Location Information  PCI bus 0, device 22, function 0
PCI Device  Intel Panther Point PCH - Host Embedded Controller Interface 1 (HECI1) [C-1]
 
Device Resources:
IRQ  65536
Memory  F7A22000-F7A2200F
 
Chipset Manufacturer:
Company Name  Intel Corporation
Product Information  http://www.intel.com/products/chipsets
Driver Download  http://support.intel.com/support/chipsets
BIOS Upgrades  http://www.aida64.com/bios-updates
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ System devices / IWD Bus Enumerator ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  IWD Bus Enumerator
Driver Date  11/19/2015
Driver Version  4.5.71.0
Driver Provider  Intel Corporation
INF File  oem15.inf
INF Section  IWDBus_Device.NT
Hardware ID  root\iwdbus
 
[ System devices / Legacy device ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Legacy device
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  machine.inf
INF Section  NO_DRV_MEM
Hardware ID  ACPI\VEN_INT&DEV_0800
 
[ System devices / LPC Controller ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  LPC Controller
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  machine.inf
INF Section  MSISADRV
Hardware ID  PCI\VEN_8086&DEV_1E59&SUBSYS_100D1043&REV_04
Location Information  PCI bus 0, device 31, function 0
PCI Device  Intel HM76 Chipset - LPC Interface Controller [C-1]
 
[ System devices / Memory Controller ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Memory Controller
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  machine.inf
INF Section  NO_DRV
Hardware ID  PCI\VEN_8086&DEV_0154&SUBSYS_100D1043&REV_09
Location Information  PCI bus 0, device 0, function 0
PCI Device  Intel Ivy Bridge-MB - Host Bridge/DRAM Controller
 
[ System devices / Microsoft ACPI-Compliant Embedded Controller ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant Embedded Controller
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  machine.inf
INF Section  NO_DRV
Hardware ID  ACPI\VEN_PNP&DEV_0C09
 
Device Resources:
Port  0062-0062
Port  0066-0066
 
[ System devices / Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.447
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  acpi.inf
INF Section  ACPI_Inst.NT
Hardware ID  ACPI_HAL\PNP0C08
PnP Device  ACPI Driver/BIOS
 
Device Resources:
IRQ  100
IRQ  101
IRQ  102
IRQ  103
IRQ  104
IRQ  105
IRQ  106
IRQ  107
IRQ  108
IRQ  109
IRQ  110
IRQ  111
IRQ  112
IRQ  113
IRQ  114
IRQ  115
IRQ  116
IRQ  117
IRQ  118
IRQ  119
IRQ  120
IRQ  121
IRQ  122
IRQ  123
IRQ  124
IRQ  125
IRQ  126
IRQ  127
IRQ  128
IRQ  129
IRQ  130
IRQ  131
IRQ  132
IRQ  133
IRQ  134
IRQ  135
IRQ  136
IRQ  137
IRQ  138
IRQ  139
IRQ  140
IRQ  141
IRQ  142
IRQ  143
IRQ  144
IRQ  145
IRQ  146
IRQ  147
IRQ  148
IRQ  149
IRQ  150
IRQ  151
IRQ  152
IRQ  153
IRQ  154
IRQ  155
IRQ  156
IRQ  157
IRQ  158
IRQ  159
IRQ  160
IRQ  161
IRQ  162
IRQ  163
IRQ  164
IRQ  165
IRQ  166
IRQ  167
IRQ  168
IRQ  169
IRQ  170
IRQ  171
IRQ  172
IRQ  173
IRQ  174
IRQ  175
IRQ  176
IRQ  177
IRQ  178
IRQ  179
IRQ  180
IRQ  181
IRQ  182
IRQ  183
IRQ  184
IRQ  185
IRQ  186
IRQ  187
IRQ  188
IRQ  189
IRQ  190
IRQ  191
IRQ  192
IRQ  193
IRQ  194
IRQ  195
IRQ  196
IRQ  197
IRQ  198
IRQ  199
IRQ  200
IRQ  201
IRQ  202
IRQ  203
IRQ  204
IRQ  256
IRQ  257
IRQ  258
IRQ  259
IRQ  260
IRQ  261
IRQ  262
IRQ  263
IRQ  264
IRQ  265
IRQ  266
IRQ  267
IRQ  268
IRQ  269
IRQ  270
IRQ  271
IRQ  272
IRQ  273
IRQ  274
IRQ  275
IRQ  276
IRQ  277
IRQ  278
IRQ  279
IRQ  280
IRQ  281
IRQ  282
IRQ  283
IRQ  284
IRQ  285
IRQ  286
IRQ  287
IRQ  288
IRQ  289
IRQ  290
IRQ  291
IRQ  292
IRQ  293
IRQ  294
IRQ  295
IRQ  296
IRQ  297
IRQ  298
IRQ  299
IRQ  300
IRQ  301
IRQ  302
IRQ  303
IRQ  304
IRQ  305
IRQ  306
IRQ  307
IRQ  308
IRQ  309
IRQ  310
IRQ  311
IRQ  312
IRQ  313
IRQ  314
IRQ  315
IRQ  316
IRQ  317
IRQ  318
IRQ  319
IRQ  320
IRQ  321
IRQ  322
IRQ  323
IRQ  324
IRQ  325
IRQ  326
IRQ  327
IRQ  328
IRQ  329
IRQ  330
IRQ  331
IRQ  332
IRQ  333
IRQ  334
IRQ  335
IRQ  336
IRQ  337
IRQ  338
IRQ  339
IRQ  340
IRQ  341
IRQ  342
IRQ  343
IRQ  344
IRQ  345
IRQ  346
IRQ  347
IRQ  348
IRQ  349
IRQ  350
IRQ  351
IRQ  352
IRQ  353
IRQ  354
IRQ  355
IRQ  356
IRQ  357
IRQ  358
IRQ  359
IRQ  360
IRQ  361
IRQ  362
IRQ  363
IRQ  364
IRQ  365
IRQ  366
IRQ  367
IRQ  368
IRQ  369
IRQ  370
IRQ  371
IRQ  372
IRQ  373
IRQ  374
IRQ  375
IRQ  376
IRQ  377
IRQ  378
IRQ  379
IRQ  380
IRQ  381
IRQ  382
IRQ  383
IRQ  384
IRQ  385
IRQ  386
IRQ  387
IRQ  388
IRQ  389
IRQ  390
IRQ  391
IRQ  392
IRQ  393
IRQ  394
IRQ  395
IRQ  396
IRQ  397
IRQ  398
IRQ  399
IRQ  400
IRQ  401
IRQ  402
IRQ  403
IRQ  404
IRQ  405
IRQ  406
IRQ  407
IRQ  408
IRQ  409
IRQ  410
IRQ  411
IRQ  412
IRQ  413
IRQ  414
IRQ  415
IRQ  416
IRQ  417
IRQ  418
IRQ  419
IRQ  420
IRQ  421
IRQ  422
IRQ  423
IRQ  424
IRQ  425
IRQ  426
IRQ  427
IRQ  428
IRQ  429
IRQ  430
IRQ  431
IRQ  432
IRQ  433
IRQ  434
IRQ  435
IRQ  436
IRQ  437
IRQ  438
IRQ  439
IRQ  440
IRQ  441
IRQ  442
IRQ  443
IRQ  444
IRQ  445
IRQ  446
IRQ  447
IRQ  448
IRQ  449
IRQ  450
IRQ  451
IRQ  452
IRQ  453
IRQ  454
IRQ  455
IRQ  456
IRQ  457
IRQ  458
IRQ  459
IRQ  460
IRQ  461
IRQ  462
IRQ  463
IRQ  464
IRQ  465
IRQ  466
IRQ  467
IRQ  468
IRQ  469
IRQ  470
IRQ  471
IRQ  472
IRQ  473
IRQ  474
IRQ  475
IRQ  476
IRQ  477
IRQ  478
IRQ  479
IRQ  480
IRQ  481
IRQ  482
IRQ  483
IRQ  484
IRQ  485
IRQ  486
IRQ  487
IRQ  488
IRQ  489
IRQ  490
IRQ  491
IRQ  492
IRQ  493
IRQ  494
IRQ  495
IRQ  496
IRQ  497
IRQ  498
IRQ  499
IRQ  500
IRQ  501
IRQ  502
IRQ  503
IRQ  504
IRQ  505
IRQ  506
IRQ  507
IRQ  508
IRQ  509
IRQ  510
IRQ  511
IRQ  54
IRQ  55
IRQ  56
IRQ  57
IRQ  58
IRQ  59
IRQ  60
IRQ  61
IRQ  62
IRQ  63
IRQ  64
IRQ  65
IRQ  66
IRQ  67
IRQ  68
IRQ  69
IRQ  70
IRQ  71
IRQ  72
IRQ  73
IRQ  74
IRQ  75
IRQ  76
IRQ  77
IRQ  78
IRQ  79
IRQ  80
IRQ  81
IRQ  82
IRQ  83
IRQ  84
IRQ  85
IRQ  86
IRQ  87
IRQ  88
IRQ  89
IRQ  90
IRQ  91
IRQ  92
IRQ  93
IRQ  94
IRQ  95
IRQ  96
IRQ  97
IRQ  98
IRQ  99
 
[ System devices / Microsoft Basic Display Driver ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Microsoft Basic Display Driver
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  basicdisplay.inf
INF Section  MSBDD_Fallback
Hardware ID  ROOT\BasicDisplay
 
[ System devices / Microsoft Basic Render Driver ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Microsoft Basic Render Driver
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  basicrender.inf
INF Section  BasicRender
Hardware ID  ROOT\BasicRender
 
[ System devices / Microsoft System Management BIOS Driver ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Microsoft System Management BIOS Driver
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  mssmbios.inf
INF Section  MSSMBIOS_DRV
Hardware ID  ROOT\mssmbios
 
[ System devices / Microsoft Virtual Drive Enumerator ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Microsoft Virtual Drive Enumerator
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  vdrvroot.inf
INF Section  VDRVROOT
Hardware ID  ROOT\vdrvroot
 
[ System devices / Microsoft Windows Management Interface for ACPI ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Microsoft Windows Management Interface for ACPI
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  wmiacpi.inf
INF Section  WMIMAP_Inst.NT
Hardware ID  ACPI\VEN_pnp&DEV_0c14
 
[ System devices / Microsoft Windows Management Interface for ACPI ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Microsoft Windows Management Interface for ACPI
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  wmiacpi.inf
INF Section  WMIMAP_Inst.NT
Hardware ID  ACPI\VEN_pnp&DEV_0c14
 
[ System devices / Motherboard resources ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Motherboard resources
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  machine.inf
INF Section  NO_DRV_MBRES
Hardware ID  ACPI\VEN_INT&DEV_340E
 
[ System devices / Motherboard resources ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Motherboard resources
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  machine.inf
INF Section  NO_DRV_MBRES
Hardware ID  ACPI\VEN_PNP&DEV_0C02
 
[ System devices / Motherboard resources ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Motherboard resources
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  machine.inf
INF Section  NO_DRV_MBRES
Hardware ID  ACPI\VEN_PNP&DEV_0C02
 
[ System devices / Motherboard resources ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Motherboard resources
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  machine.inf
INF Section  NO_DRV_MBRES
Hardware ID  ACPI\VEN_PNP&DEV_0C02
 
[ System devices / Motherboard resources ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Motherboard resources
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  machine.inf
INF Section  NO_DRV_MBRES
Hardware ID  ACPI\VEN_INT&DEV_3F0D
 
[ System devices / Motherboard resources ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Motherboard resources
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  machine.inf
INF Section  NO_DRV_MBRES
Hardware ID  ACPI\VEN_PNP&DEV_0C02
 
[ System devices / NDIS Virtual Network Adapter Enumerator ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  NDIS Virtual Network Adapter Enumerator
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  ndisvirtualbus.inf
INF Section  NdisVirtualBus_Device.NT
Hardware ID  ROOT\NdisVirtualBus
 
[ System devices / Numeric data processor ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Numeric data processor
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  machine.inf
INF Section  NO_DRV_X
Hardware ID  ACPI\VEN_PNP&DEV_0C04
 
[ System devices / PCI Express Root Complex ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  PCI Express Root Complex
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.594
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  pci.inf
INF Section  PCI_ROOT
Hardware ID  ACPI\VEN_PNP&DEV_0A08
 
Device Resources:
Memory  000A0000-000BFFFF
Memory  000C0000-000C3FFF
Memory  000C4000-000C7FFF
Memory  000C8000-000CBFFF
Memory  000CC000-000CFFFF
Memory  000D0000-000D3FFF
Memory  000D4000-000D7FFF
Memory  000D8000-000DBFFF
Memory  000DC000-000DFFFF
Memory  CFE00000-FEAFFFFF
Port  0000-0CF7
Port  0D00-FFFF
 
[ System devices / PCI-to-PCI Bridge ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  PCI-to-PCI Bridge
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.594
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  pci.inf
INF Section  PCI_BRIDGE
Hardware ID  PCI\VEN_8086&DEV_0151&SUBSYS_100D1043&REV_09
Location Information  PCI bus 0, device 1, function 0
PCI Device  Intel Ivy Bridge - PCI Express Controller
 
Device Resources:
Memory  000A0000-000BFFFF
Memory  E0000000-F1FFFFFF
Memory  F6000000-F70FFFFF
Port  03B0-03BB
Port  03C0-03DF
Port  E000-EFFF
 
[ System devices / PCI-to-PCI Bridge ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  PCI-to-PCI Bridge
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.594
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  pci.inf
INF Section  PCI_BRIDGE
Hardware ID  PCI\VEN_8086&DEV_1E10&SUBSYS_100D1043&REV_C4
Location Information  PCI bus 0, device 28, function 0
PCI Device  Intel Panther Point PCH - PCI Express Port 1
 
[ System devices / PCI-to-PCI Bridge ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  PCI-to-PCI Bridge
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.594
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  pci.inf
INF Section  PCI_BRIDGE
Hardware ID  PCI\VEN_8086&DEV_1E12&SUBSYS_100D1043&REV_C4
Location Information  PCI bus 0, device 28, function 1
PCI Device  Intel Panther Point PCH - PCI Express Port 2
 
Device Resources:
Memory  F7900000-F79FFFFF
 
[ System devices / PCI-to-PCI Bridge ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  PCI-to-PCI Bridge
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.594
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  pci.inf
INF Section  PCI_BRIDGE
Hardware ID  PCI\VEN_8086&DEV_1E16&SUBSYS_100D1043&REV_C4
Location Information  PCI bus 0, device 28, function 3
PCI Device  Intel Panther Point PCH - PCI Express Port 4
 
Device Resources:
Memory  F2100000-F21FFFFF
Memory  F7800000-F78FFFFF
Port  D000-DFFF
 
[ System devices / Plug and Play Software Device Enumerator ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Plug and Play Software Device Enumerator
Driver Date  7/15/2016
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  swenum.inf
INF Section  SWENUM
Hardware ID  ROOT\SWENUM
 
[ System devices / Programmable interrupt controller ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Programmable interrupt controller
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  machine.inf
INF Section  NO_DRV_PIC
Hardware ID  ACPI\VEN_PNP&DEV_0000
 
[ System devices / Remote Desktop Device Redirector Bus ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Remote Desktop Device Redirector Bus
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  rdpbus.inf
INF Section  RDPBUS
Hardware ID  ROOT\RDPBUS
 
[ System devices / SM Bus Controller ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  SM Bus Controller
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  machine.inf
INF Section  NO_DRV
Hardware ID  PCI\VEN_8086&DEV_1E22&SUBSYS_100D1043&REV_04
Location Information  PCI bus 0, device 31, function 3
PCI Device  Intel Panther Point PCH - SMBus Controller [C-1]
 
[ System devices / System board ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  System board
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  machine.inf
INF Section  NO_DRV_MBRES
Hardware ID  ACPI\VEN_PNP&DEV_0C01
 
[ System devices / System board ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  System board
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  machine.inf
INF Section  NO_DRV_MBRES
Hardware ID  ACPI\VEN_PNP&DEV_0C01
 
[ System devices / System CMOS/real time clock ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  System CMOS/real time clock
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  machine.inf
INF Section  NO_DRV_X
Hardware ID  ACPI\VEN_PNP&DEV_0B00
 
Device Resources:
IRQ  08
Port  0070-0077
 
[ System devices / System timer ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  System timer
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  machine.inf
INF Section  NO_DRV_X
Hardware ID  ACPI\VEN_PNP&DEV_0100
 
[ System devices / UMBus Root Bus Enumerator ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  UMBus Root Bus Enumerator
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  umbus.inf
INF Section  UmBusRoot_Device.NT
Hardware ID  root\umbus
 
[ System devices / VMware VMCI Host Device ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  VMware VMCI Host Device
Driver Date  5/25/2016
Driver Version  9.8.6.0
Driver Provider  VMware, Inc.
INF File  oem73.inf
INF Section  vmci.install.x64.NT
Hardware ID  ROOT\VMWVMCIHOSTDEV
 
[ System devices / Volume Manager ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Volume Manager
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  volmgr.inf
INF Section  Volmgr
Hardware ID  ROOT\VOLMGR
 
[ Universal Serial Bus controllers / Generic USB Hub ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Generic USB Hub
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  usb.inf
INF Section  StandardHub.Dev.NT
Hardware ID  USB\VID_8087&PID_0024&REV_0000
Location Information  Port_#0001.Hub_#0001
 
[ Universal Serial Bus controllers / Generic USB Hub ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Generic USB Hub
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  usb.inf
INF Section  StandardHub.Dev.NT
Hardware ID  USB\VID_8087&PID_0024&REV_0000
Location Information  Port_#0001.Hub_#0002
 
[ Universal Serial Bus controllers / Intel(R) 7 Series/C216 Chipset Family USB Enhanced Host Controller - 1E26 ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Intel(R) 7 Series/C216 Chipset Family USB Enhanced Host Controller - 1E26
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  usbport.inf
INF Section  EHCI.Dev.NT
Hardware ID  PCI\VEN_8086&DEV_1E26&SUBSYS_100D1043&REV_04
Location Information  PCI bus 0, device 29, function 0
PCI Device  Intel Panther Point PCH - USB 2.0 EHCI Controller #1 [C-1]
 
Device Resources:
IRQ  23
Memory  F7A1F000-F7A1F3FF
 
Chipset Manufacturer:
Company Name  Intel Corporation
Product Information  http://www.intel.com/products/chipsets
Driver Download  http://support.intel.com/support/chipsets
BIOS Upgrades  http://www.aida64.com/bios-updates
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Universal Serial Bus controllers / Intel(R) 7 Series/C216 Chipset Family USB Enhanced Host Controller - 1E2D ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Intel(R) 7 Series/C216 Chipset Family USB Enhanced Host Controller - 1E2D
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  usbport.inf
INF Section  EHCI.Dev.NT
Hardware ID  PCI\VEN_8086&DEV_1E2D&SUBSYS_100D1043&REV_04
Location Information  PCI bus 0, device 26, function 0
PCI Device  Intel Panther Point PCH - USB 2.0 EHCI Controller #2 [C-1]
 
Device Resources:
IRQ  16
Memory  F7A20000-F7A203FF
 
Chipset Manufacturer:
Company Name  Intel Corporation
Product Information  http://www.intel.com/products/chipsets
Driver Download  http://support.intel.com/support/chipsets
BIOS Upgrades  http://www.aida64.com/bios-updates
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Universal Serial Bus controllers / Intel(R) USB 3.0 eXtensible Host Controller - 1.0 (Microsoft) ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Intel(R) USB 3.0 eXtensible Host Controller - 1.0 (Microsoft)
Driver Date  7/15/2016
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  usbxhci.inf
INF Section  Generic.Install.NT
Hardware ID  PCI\VEN_8086&DEV_1E31&SUBSYS_100D1043&REV_04
Location Information  PCI bus 0, device 20, function 0
PCI Device  Intel Panther Point PCH - USB 3.0 xHCI Controller [C-1]
 
Device Resources:
IRQ  65536
Memory  F7A00000-F7A0FFFF
 
Chipset Manufacturer:
Company Name  Intel Corporation
Product Information  http://www.intel.com/products/chipsets
Driver Download  http://support.intel.com/support/chipsets
BIOS Upgrades  http://www.aida64.com/bios-updates
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Universal Serial Bus controllers / USB Composite Device ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  USB Composite Device
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  usb.inf
INF Section  Composite.Dev.NT
Hardware ID  USB\VID_13D3&PID_5165&REV_0823
Location Information  Port_#0003.Hub_#0004
 
[ Universal Serial Bus controllers / USB Mass Storage Device ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  USB Mass Storage Device
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  usbstor.inf
INF Section  USBSTOR_BULK.NT
Hardware ID  USB\VID_0951&PID_1666&REV_0110
Location Information  Port_#0005.Hub_#0003
 
[ Universal Serial Bus controllers / USB Root Hub (xHCI) ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  USB Root Hub (xHCI)
Driver Date  7/15/2016
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  usbhub3.inf
INF Section  Generic.Install.NT
Hardware ID  USB\ROOT_HUB30&VID8086&PID1E31&REV0004
 
[ Universal Serial Bus controllers / USB Root Hub ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  USB Root Hub
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  usbport.inf
INF Section  ROOTHUB.Dev.NT
Hardware ID  USB\ROOT_HUB20&VID8086&PID1E2D&REV0004
 
[ Universal Serial Bus controllers / USB Root Hub ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  USB Root Hub
Driver Date  6/21/2006
Driver Version  10.0.14393.0
Driver Provider  Microsoft
INF File  usbport.inf
INF Section  ROOTHUB.Dev.NT
Hardware ID  USB\ROOT_HUB20&VID8086&PID1E26&REV0004
 
[ Unknown / Unknown ]
 
Device Properties:
Driver Description  Unknown


Physical Devices

 
PCI Devices:
Bus 3, Device 0, Function 0  Atheros AR9285 802.11b/g/n Wireless Network Adapter
Bus 0, Device 31, Function 0  Intel HM76 Chipset - LPC Interface Controller [C-1]
Bus 0, Device 1, Function 0  Intel Ivy Bridge - PCI Express Controller
Bus 0, Device 4, Function 0  Intel Ivy Bridge - Thermal Management Controller
Bus 0, Device 0, Function 0  Intel Ivy Bridge-MB - Host Bridge/DRAM Controller
Bus 0, Device 2, Function 0  Intel Ivy Bridge-MB - Integrated Graphics Controller (MB GT2)
Bus 0, Device 27, Function 0  Intel Panther Point PCH - High Definition Audio Controller [C-1]
Bus 0, Device 22, Function 0  Intel Panther Point PCH - Host Embedded Controller Interface 1 (HECI1) [C-1]
Bus 0, Device 28, Function 0  Intel Panther Point PCH - PCI Express Port 1
Bus 0, Device 28, Function 1  Intel Panther Point PCH - PCI Express Port 2
Bus 0, Device 28, Function 3  Intel Panther Point PCH - PCI Express Port 4
Bus 0, Device 31, Function 3  Intel Panther Point PCH - SMBus Controller [C-1]
Bus 0, Device 31, Function 6  Intel Panther Point PCH - Thermal Management Controller [C-1]
Bus 0, Device 29, Function 0  Intel Panther Point PCH - USB 2.0 EHCI Controller #1 [C-1]
Bus 0, Device 26, Function 0  Intel Panther Point PCH - USB 2.0 EHCI Controller #2 [C-1]
Bus 0, Device 20, Function 0  Intel Panther Point PCH - USB 3.0 xHCI Controller [C-1]
Bus 0, Device 31, Function 2  Intel Panther Point-M PCH - SATA AHCI Controller [C-1]
Bus 4, Device 0, Function 2  Realtek RTL8168/8111 PCI-E Gigabit Ethernet Adapter
Bus 4, Device 0, Function 0  Realtek RTS5289 PCI-E Card Reader
 
PnP Devices:
PNP0C08  ACPI Driver/BIOS
FIXEDBUTTON  ACPI Fixed Feature Button
PNP0C14  ACPI Management Interface
PNP0C14  ACPI Management Interface
THERMALZONE  ACPI Thermal Zone
PNP0A08  ACPI Three-wire Device Bus
ATK3001  Asus Keyboard Device Filter
ATK4001  Asus Wireless Radio Control
PNP0C0A  Control Method Battery
PNP0200  DMA Controller
ETD0108  ELAN PS/2 Port Smart-Pad
PNP0C09  Embedded Controller Device
PNP0103  High Precision Event Timer
INT3404  Intel Dynamic Platform & Thermal Framework Fan Participant
INT3403  Intel Dynamic Platform & Thermal Framework Generic Participant
INT3403  Intel Dynamic Platform & Thermal Framework Generic Participant
INT3403  Intel Dynamic Platform & Thermal Framework Generic Participant
INT3403  Intel Dynamic Platform & Thermal Framework Generic Participant
INT3402  Intel Dynamic Platform & Thermal Framework Memory Participant
INT3400  Intel Dynamic Platform & Thermal Framework
INT0800  Intel Flash EEPROM
INT340E  Intel System Device
INT3F0D  Intel Watchdog Timer
GENUINEINTEL_-_INTEL64_FAMILY_6_MODEL_58_-________INTEL(R)_CORE(TM)_I5-3317U_CPU_@_1.70GHZ  Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3317U CPU @ 1.70GHz
GENUINEINTEL_-_INTEL64_FAMILY_6_MODEL_58_-________INTEL(R)_CORE(TM)_I5-3317U_CPU_@_1.70GHZ  Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3317U CPU @ 1.70GHz
GENUINEINTEL_-_INTEL64_FAMILY_6_MODEL_58_-________INTEL(R)_CORE(TM)_I5-3317U_CPU_@_1.70GHZ  Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3317U CPU @ 1.70GHz
GENUINEINTEL_-_INTEL64_FAMILY_6_MODEL_58_-________INTEL(R)_CORE(TM)_I5-3317U_CPU_@_1.70GHZ  Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3317U CPU @ 1.70GHz
PNP0C0D  Lid
ACPI0003  Microsoft AC Adapter
PNP0C04  Numeric Data Processor
PNP0000  Programmable Interrupt Controller
PNP0B00  Real-Time Clock
PNP0C0E  Sleep Button
PNP0C01  System Board Extension
PNP0C01  System Board Extension
PNP0100  System Timer
PNP0C02  Thermal Monitoring ACPI Device
PNP0C02  Thermal Monitoring ACPI Device
PNP0C02  Thermal Monitoring ACPI Device
PNP0C02  Thermal Monitoring ACPI Device
 
USB Devices:
8087 0024  Generic USB Hub
8087 0024  Generic USB Hub
1532 0016  Razer DeathAdder 3.5G
13D3 5165  USB 2.0 UVC HD Webcam
13D3 5165  USB Composite Device
0951 1666  USB Mass Storage Device


PCI Devices

 
[ Atheros AR9285 802.11b/g/n Wireless Network Adapter ]
 
Device Properties:
Device Description  Atheros AR9285 802.11b/g/n Wireless Network Adapter
Bus Type  PCI Express 2.0 x1
Bus / Device / Function  3 / 0 / 0
Device ID  168C-002B
Subsystem ID  105B-E017
Device Class  0280 (Network Controller)
Revision  01
Fast Back-to-Back Transactions  Not Supported
 
Device Features:
66 MHz Operation  Not Supported
Bus Mastering  Enabled
 
[ Intel HM76 Chipset - LPC Interface Controller [C-1] ]
 
Device Properties:
Device Description  Intel HM76 Chipset - LPC Interface Controller [C-1]
Bus Type  PCI
Bus / Device / Function  0 / 31 / 0
Device ID  8086-1E59
Subsystem ID  1043-100D
Device Class  0601 (PCI/ISA Bridge)
Revision  04
Fast Back-to-Back Transactions  Not Supported
 
Device Features:
66 MHz Operation  Not Supported
Bus Mastering  Enabled
 
[ Intel Ivy Bridge - PCI Express Controller ]
 
Device Properties:
Device Description  Intel Ivy Bridge - PCI Express Controller
Bus Type  PCI
Bus / Device / Function  0 / 1 / 0
Device ID  8086-0151
Subsystem ID  0000-0000
Device Class  0604 (PCI/PCI Bridge)
Revision  09
Fast Back-to-Back Transactions  Not Supported
 
Device Features:
66 MHz Operation  Not Supported
Bus Mastering  Enabled
 
[ Intel Ivy Bridge - Thermal Management Controller ]
 
Device Properties:
Device Description  Intel Ivy Bridge - Thermal Management Controller
Bus Type  PCI
Bus / Device / Function  0 / 4 / 0
Device ID  8086-0153
Subsystem ID  1043-100D
Device Class  1180 (Data Acquisition / Signal Processing Controller)
Revision  09
Fast Back-to-Back Transactions  Supported, Disabled
 
Device Features:
66 MHz Operation  Not Supported
Bus Mastering  Enabled
 
[ Intel Ivy Bridge-MB - Host Bridge/DRAM Controller ]
 
Device Properties:
Device Description  Intel Ivy Bridge-MB - Host Bridge/DRAM Controller
Bus Type  PCI
Bus / Device / Function  0 / 0 / 0
Device ID  8086-0154
Subsystem ID  1043-100D
Device Class  0600 (Host/PCI Bridge)
Revision  09
Fast Back-to-Back Transactions  Supported, Disabled
 
Device Features:
66 MHz Operation  Not Supported
Bus Mastering  Enabled
 
[ Intel Ivy Bridge-MB - Integrated Graphics Controller (MB GT2) ]
 
Device Properties:
Device Description  Intel Ivy Bridge-MB - Integrated Graphics Controller (MB GT2)
Bus Type  PCI
Bus / Device / Function  0 / 2 / 0
Device ID  8086-0166
Subsystem ID  1043-100D
Device Class  0300 (VGA Display Controller)
Revision  09
Fast Back-to-Back Transactions  Supported, Disabled
 
Device Features:
66 MHz Operation  Not Supported
Bus Mastering  Enabled
 
Video Adapter Manufacturer:
Company Name  Intel Corporation
Product Information  http://www.intel.com/products/chipsets
Driver Download  http://support.intel.com/support/graphics
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Intel Panther Point PCH - High Definition Audio Controller [C-1] ]
 
Device Properties:
Device Description  Intel Panther Point PCH - High Definition Audio Controller [C-1]
Bus Type  PCI Express 1.0
Bus / Device / Function  0 / 27 / 0
Device ID  8086-1E20
Subsystem ID  1043-100D
Device Class  0403 (High Definition Audio)
Revision  04
Fast Back-to-Back Transactions  Not Supported
 
Device Features:
66 MHz Operation  Not Supported
Bus Mastering  Enabled
 
[ Intel Panther Point PCH - Host Embedded Controller Interface 1 (HECI1) [C-1] ]
 
Device Properties:
Device Description  Intel Panther Point PCH - Host Embedded Controller Interface 1 (HECI1) [C-1]
Bus Type  PCI
Bus / Device / Function  0 / 22 / 0
Device ID  8086-1E3A
Subsystem ID  1043-100D
Device Class  0780 (Communications Controller)
Revision  04
Fast Back-to-Back Transactions  Not Supported
 
Device Features:
66 MHz Operation  Not Supported
Bus Mastering  Enabled
 
[ Intel Panther Point PCH - PCI Express Port 1 ]
 
Device Properties:
Device Description  Intel Panther Point PCH - PCI Express Port 1
Bus Type  PCI
Bus / Device / Function  0 / 28 / 0
Device ID  8086-1E10
Subsystem ID  0000-0000
Device Class  0604 (PCI/PCI Bridge)
Revision  C4
Fast Back-to-Back Transactions  Not Supported
 
Device Features:
66 MHz Operation  Not Supported
Bus Mastering  Enabled
 
[ Intel Panther Point PCH - PCI Express Port 2 ]
 
Device Properties:
Device Description  Intel Panther Point PCH - PCI Express Port 2
Bus Type  PCI
Bus / Device / Function  0 / 28 / 1
Device ID  8086-1E12
Subsystem ID  0000-0000
Device Class  0604 (PCI/PCI Bridge)
Revision  C4
Fast Back-to-Back Transactions  Not Supported
 
Device Features:
66 MHz Operation  Not Supported
Bus Mastering  Enabled
 
[ Intel Panther Point PCH - PCI Express Port 4 ]
 
Device Properties:
Device Description  Intel Panther Point PCH - PCI Express Port 4
Bus Type  PCI
Bus / Device / Function  0 / 28 / 3
Device ID  8086-1E16
Subsystem ID  0000-0000
Device Class  0604 (PCI/PCI Bridge)
Revision  C4
Fast Back-to-Back Transactions  Not Supported
 
Device Features:
66 MHz Operation  Not Supported
Bus Mastering  Enabled
 
[ Intel Panther Point PCH - SMBus Controller [C-1] ]
 
Device Properties:
Device Description  Intel Panther Point PCH - SMBus Controller [C-1]
Bus Type  PCI
Bus / Device / Function  0 / 31 / 3
Device ID  8086-1E22
Subsystem ID  1043-100D
Device Class  0C05 (SMBus Controller)
Revision  04
Fast Back-to-Back Transactions  Supported, Disabled
 
Device Features:
66 MHz Operation  Not Supported
Bus Mastering  Disabled
 
[ Intel Panther Point PCH - Thermal Management Controller [C-1] ]
 
Device Properties:
Device Description  Intel Panther Point PCH - Thermal Management Controller [C-1]
Bus Type  PCI
Bus / Device / Function  0 / 31 / 6
Device ID  8086-1E24
Subsystem ID  1043-100D
Device Class  1180 (Data Acquisition / Signal Processing Controller)
Revision  04
Fast Back-to-Back Transactions  Not Supported
 
Device Features:
66 MHz Operation  Not Supported
Bus Mastering  Disabled
 
[ Intel Panther Point PCH - USB 2.0 EHCI Controller #1 [C-1] ]
 
Device Properties:
Device Description  Intel Panther Point PCH - USB 2.0 EHCI Controller #1 [C-1]
Bus Type  PCI
Bus / Device / Function  0 / 29 / 0
Device ID  8086-1E26
Subsystem ID  1043-100D
Device Class  0C03 (USB2 EHCI Controller)
Revision  04
Fast Back-to-Back Transactions  Supported, Disabled
 
Device Features:
66 MHz Operation  Not Supported
Bus Mastering  Enabled
 
[ Intel Panther Point PCH - USB 2.0 EHCI Controller #2 [C-1] ]
 
Device Properties:
Device Description  Intel Panther Point PCH - USB 2.0 EHCI Controller #2 [C-1]
Bus Type  PCI
Bus / Device / Function  0 / 26 / 0
Device ID  8086-1E2D
Subsystem ID  1043-100D
Device Class  0C03 (USB2 EHCI Controller)
Revision  04
Fast Back-to-Back Transactions  Supported, Disabled
 
Device Features:
66 MHz Operation  Not Supported
Bus Mastering  Enabled
 
[ Intel Panther Point PCH - USB 3.0 xHCI Controller [C-1] ]
 
Device Properties:
Device Description  Intel Panther Point PCH - USB 3.0 xHCI Controller [C-1]
Bus Type  PCI
Bus / Device / Function  0 / 20 / 0
Device ID  8086-1E31
Subsystem ID  1043-100D
Device Class  0C03 (USB3 xHCI Controller)
Revision  04
Fast Back-to-Back Transactions  Supported, Disabled
 
Device Features:
66 MHz Operation  Not Supported
Bus Mastering  Enabled
 
[ Intel Panther Point-M PCH - SATA AHCI Controller [C-1] ]
 
Device Properties:
Device Description  Intel Panther Point-M PCH - SATA AHCI Controller [C-1]
Bus Type  PCI
Bus / Device / Function  0 / 31 / 2
Device ID  8086-1E03
Subsystem ID  1043-100D
Device Class  0106 (SATA Controller)
Revision  04
Fast Back-to-Back Transactions  Supported, Disabled
 
Device Features:
66 MHz Operation  Supported
Bus Mastering  Enabled
 
[ Realtek RTL8168/8111 PCI-E Gigabit Ethernet Adapter ]
 
Device Properties:
Device Description  Realtek RTL8168/8111 PCI-E Gigabit Ethernet Adapter
Bus Type  PCI Express 2.0 x1
Bus / Device / Function  4 / 0 / 2
Device ID  10EC-8168
Subsystem ID  1043-200F
Device Class  0200 (Ethernet Controller)
Revision  0A
Fast Back-to-Back Transactions  Not Supported
 
Device Features:
66 MHz Operation  Not Supported
Bus Mastering  Enabled
 
Network Adapter Manufacturer:
Company Name  Realtek Semiconductor Corp.
Product Information  http://www.realtek.com.tw/products/productsView.aspx?Langid=1&PNid=7&PFid=10&Level=3&Conn=2
Driver Download  http://www.realtek.com.tw/downloads
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ Realtek RTS5289 PCI-E Card Reader ]
 
Device Properties:
Device Description  Realtek RTS5289 PCI-E Card Reader
Bus Type  PCI Express 2.0 x1
Bus / Device / Function  4 / 0 / 0
Device ID  10EC-5289
Subsystem ID  1043-202F
Device Class  FF00
Revision  01
Fast Back-to-Back Transactions  Not Supported
 
Device Features:
66 MHz Operation  Not Supported
Bus Mastering  Enabled


USB Devices

 
[ USB Mass Storage Device (DataTraveler 3.0) ]
 
Device Properties:
Device Description  USB Mass Storage Device
Device ID  0951-1666
Device Class  08 / 06 (Mass Storage)
Device Protocol  50
Revision  0110h
Manufacturer  Kingston
Product  DataTraveler 3.0
Serial Number  60A44C3FB294B05099680068
Supported USB Version  3.00
Current Speed  Super (USB 3.0)
 
[ Generic USB Hub ]
 
Device Properties:
Device Description  Generic USB Hub
Device ID  8087-0024
Device Class  09 / 00 (Hi-Speed Hub with single TT)
Device Protocol  01
Revision  0000h
Supported USB Version  2.00
Current Speed  High (USB 2.0)
 
[ USB Composite Device ]
 
Device Properties:
Device Description  USB Composite Device
Device ID  13D3-5165
Device Class  EF / 02 (Interface Association Descriptor)
Device Protocol  01
Revision  0823h
Supported USB Version  2.00
Current Speed  High (USB 2.0)
 
[ Generic USB Hub ]
 
Device Properties:
Device Description  Generic USB Hub
Device ID  8087-0024
Device Class  09 / 00 (Hi-Speed Hub with single TT)
Device Protocol  01
Revision  0000h
Supported USB Version  2.00
Current Speed  High (USB 2.0)
 
[ Razer DeathAdder 3.5G (Razer DeathAdder) ]
 
Device Properties:
Device Description  Razer DeathAdder 3.5G
Device ID  1532-0016
Device Class  03 / 01 (Human Interface Device)
Device Protocol  02
Revision  0100h
Manufacturer  Razer
Product  Razer DeathAdder
Supported USB Version  2.00
Current Speed  Full (USB 1.1)


Device Resources

 
Resource  Share  Device Description
IRQ 01  Exclusive  PC/AT Enhanced PS/2 Keyboard (101/102-Key)
IRQ 08  Exclusive  System CMOS/real time clock
IRQ 100  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 101  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 102  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 103  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 104  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 105  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 106  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 107  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 108  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 109  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 110  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 111  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 112  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 113  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 114  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 115  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 116  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 117  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 118  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 119  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 12  Exclusive  ASUS Touchpad
IRQ 120  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 121  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 122  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 123  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 124  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 125  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 126  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 127  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 128  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 129  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 130  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 131  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 132  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 133  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 134  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 135  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 136  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 137  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 138  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 139  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 140  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 141  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 142  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 143  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 144  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 145  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 146  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 147  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 148  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 149  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 150  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 151  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 152  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 153  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 154  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 155  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 156  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 157  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 158  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 159  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 16  Shared  Intel(R) 7 Series/C216 Chipset Family USB Enhanced Host Controller - 1E2D
IRQ 16  Shared  Intel(R) Dynamic Platform and Thermal Framework Processor Participant Driver
IRQ 16  Shared  NVIDIA GeForce GT 635M
IRQ 160  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 161  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 162  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 163  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 164  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 165  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 166  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 167  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 168  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 169  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 17  Shared  Qualcomm Atheros AR9285 Wireless Network Adapter
IRQ 170  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 171  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 172  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 173  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 174  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 175  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 176  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 177  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 178  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 179  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 180  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 181  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 182  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 183  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 184  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 185  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 186  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 187  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 188  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 189  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 190  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 191  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 192  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 193  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 194  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 195  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 196  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 197  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 198  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 199  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 200  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 201  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 202  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 203  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 204  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 22  Shared  High Definition Audio Controller
IRQ 23  Shared  Intel(R) 7 Series/C216 Chipset Family USB Enhanced Host Controller - 1E26
IRQ 256  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 257  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 258  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 259  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 260  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 261  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 262  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 263  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 264  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 265  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 266  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 267  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 268  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 269  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 270  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 271  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 272  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 273  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 274  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 275  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 276  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 277  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 278  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 279  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 280  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 281  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 282  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 283  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 284  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 285  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 286  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 287  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 288  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 289  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 290  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 291  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 292  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 293  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 294  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 295  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 296  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 297  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 298  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 299  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 300  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 301  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 302  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 303  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 304  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 305  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 306  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 307  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 308  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 309  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 310  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 311  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 312  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 313  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 314  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 315  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 316  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 317  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 318  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 319  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 320  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 321  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 322  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 323  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 324  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 325  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 326  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 327  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 328  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 329  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 330  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 331  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 332  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 333  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 334  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 335  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 336  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 337  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 338  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 339  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 340  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 341  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 342  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 343  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 344  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 345  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 346  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 347  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 348  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 349  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 350  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 351  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 352  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 353  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 354  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 355  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 356  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 357  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 358  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 359  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 360  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 361  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 362  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 363  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 364  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 365  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 366  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 367  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 368  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 369  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 370  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 371  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 372  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 373  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 374  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 375  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 376  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 377  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 378  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 379  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 380  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 381  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 382  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 383  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 384  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 385  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 386  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 387  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 388  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 389  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 390  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 391  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 392  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 393  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 394  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 395  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 396  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 397  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 398  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 399  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 400  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 401  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 402  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 403  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 404  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 405  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 406  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 407  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 408  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 409  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 410  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 411  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 412  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 413  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 414  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 415  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 416  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 417  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 418  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 419  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 420  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 421  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 422  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 423  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 424  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 425  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 426  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 427  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 428  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 429  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 430  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 431  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 432  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 433  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 434  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 435  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 436  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 437  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 438  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 439  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 440  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 441  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 442  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 443  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 444  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 445  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 446  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 447  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 448  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 449  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 450  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 451  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 452  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 453  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 454  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 455  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 456  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 457  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 458  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 459  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 460  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 461  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 462  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 463  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 464  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 465  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 466  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 467  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 468  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 469  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 470  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 471  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 472  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 473  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 474  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 475  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 476  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 477  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 478  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 479  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 480  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 481  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 482  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 483  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 484  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 485  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 486  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 487  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 488  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 489  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 490  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 491  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 492  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 493  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 494  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 495  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 496  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 497  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 498  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 499  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 500  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 501  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 502  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 503  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 504  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 505  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 506  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 507  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 508  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 509  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 510  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 511  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 54  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 55  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 56  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 57  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 58  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 59  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 60  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 61  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 62  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 63  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 64  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 65  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 65536  Exclusive  Intel(R) USB 3.0 eXtensible Host Controller - 1.0 (Microsoft)
IRQ 65536  Exclusive  Realtek PCIe GBE Family Controller
IRQ 65536  Exclusive  Intel(R) Management Engine Interface
IRQ 65536  Exclusive  Intel(R) 7 Series Chipset Family SATA AHCI Controller
IRQ 65536  Exclusive  Realtek PCIE CardReader
IRQ 65536  Exclusive  Intel(R) HD Graphics 4000
IRQ 66  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 67  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 68  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 69  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 70  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 71  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 72  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 73  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 74  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 75  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 76  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 77  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 78  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 79  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 80  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 81  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 82  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 83  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 84  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 85  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 86  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 87  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 88  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 89  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 90  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 91  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 92  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 93  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 94  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 95  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 96  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 97  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 98  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
IRQ 99  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant System
Memory 000A0000-000BFFFF  Shared  PCI Express Root Complex
Memory 000A0000-000BFFFF  Undetermined  PCI-to-PCI Bridge
Memory 000C0000-000C3FFF  Shared  PCI Express Root Complex
Memory 000C4000-000C7FFF  Shared  PCI Express Root Complex
Memory 000C8000-000CBFFF  Shared  PCI Express Root Complex
Memory 000CC000-000CFFFF  Shared  PCI Express Root Complex
Memory 000D0000-000D3FFF  Shared  PCI Express Root Complex
Memory 000D4000-000D7FFF  Shared  PCI Express Root Complex
Memory 000D8000-000DBFFF  Shared  PCI Express Root Complex
Memory 000DC000-000DFFFF  Shared  PCI Express Root Complex
Memory CFE00000-FEAFFFFF  Shared  PCI Express Root Complex
Memory D0000000-DFFFFFFF  Exclusive  Intel(R) HD Graphics 4000
Memory E0000000-EFFFFFFF  Exclusive  NVIDIA GeForce GT 635M
Memory E0000000-F1FFFFFF  Exclusive  PCI-to-PCI Bridge
Memory F0000000-F1FFFFFF  Exclusive  NVIDIA GeForce GT 635M
Memory F2100000-F2103FFF  Exclusive  Realtek PCIe GBE Family Controller
Memory F2100000-F21FFFFF  Exclusive  PCI-to-PCI Bridge
Memory F2104000-F2104FFF  Exclusive  Realtek PCIe GBE Family Controller
Memory F6000000-F6FFFFFF  Exclusive  NVIDIA GeForce GT 635M
Memory F6000000-F70FFFFF  Exclusive  PCI-to-PCI Bridge
Memory F7400000-F77FFFFF  Exclusive  Intel(R) HD Graphics 4000
Memory F7800000-F780FFFF  Exclusive  Realtek PCIE CardReader
Memory F7800000-F78FFFFF  Exclusive  PCI-to-PCI Bridge
Memory F7900000-F790FFFF  Exclusive  Qualcomm Atheros AR9285 Wireless Network Adapter
Memory F7900000-F79FFFFF  Exclusive  PCI-to-PCI Bridge
Memory F7A00000-F7A0FFFF  Exclusive  Intel(R) USB 3.0 eXtensible Host Controller - 1.0 (Microsoft)
Memory F7A18000-F7A1BFFF  Exclusive  High Definition Audio Controller
Memory F7A1E000-F7A1E7FF  Exclusive  Intel(R) 7 Series Chipset Family SATA AHCI Controller
Memory F7A1F000-F7A1F3FF  Exclusive  Intel(R) 7 Series/C216 Chipset Family USB Enhanced Host Controller - 1E26
Memory F7A20000-F7A203FF  Exclusive  Intel(R) 7 Series/C216 Chipset Family USB Enhanced Host Controller - 1E2D
Memory F7A22000-F7A2200F  Exclusive  Intel(R) Management Engine Interface
Memory FEAF8000-FEAFFFFF  Exclusive  Intel(R) Dynamic Platform and Thermal Framework Processor Participant Driver
Port 0000-0CF7  Shared  PCI Express Root Complex
Port 0060-0060  Exclusive  PC/AT Enhanced PS/2 Keyboard (101/102-Key)
Port 0062-0062  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant Embedded Controller
Port 0064-0064  Exclusive  PC/AT Enhanced PS/2 Keyboard (101/102-Key)
Port 0066-0066  Exclusive  Microsoft ACPI-Compliant Embedded Controller
Port 0070-0077  Exclusive  System CMOS/real time clock
Port 03B0-03BB  Undetermined  PCI-to-PCI Bridge
Port 03C0-03DF  Undetermined  PCI-to-PCI Bridge
Port 0D00-FFFF  Shared  PCI Express Root Complex
Port D000-D0FF  Exclusive  Realtek PCIe GBE Family Controller
Port D000-DFFF  Exclusive  PCI-to-PCI Bridge
Port E000-EFFF  Exclusive  PCI-to-PCI Bridge
Port F000-F03F  Exclusive  Intel(R) HD Graphics 4000
Port F060-F07F  Exclusive  Intel(R) 7 Series Chipset Family SATA AHCI Controller
Port F080-F083  Exclusive  Intel(R) 7 Series Chipset Family SATA AHCI Controller
Port F090-F097  Exclusive  Intel(R) 7 Series Chipset Family SATA AHCI Controller
Port F0A0-F0A3  Exclusive  Intel(R) 7 Series Chipset Family SATA AHCI Controller
Port F0B0-F0B7  Exclusive  Intel(R) 7 Series Chipset Family SATA AHCI Controller


Input

 
[ PC/AT Enhanced PS/2 Keyboard (101/102-Key) ]
 
Keyboard Properties:
Keyboard Name  PC/AT Enhanced PS/2 Keyboard (101/102-Key)
Keyboard Type  Japanese keyboard
Keyboard Layout  US
ANSI Code Page  1252 - Western European (Windows)
OEM Code Page  437
Repeat Delay  1
Repeat Rate  31
 
[ ASUS Touchpad ]
 
Mouse Properties:
Mouse Name  ASUS Touchpad
Mouse Buttons  8
Mouse Hand  Right
Pointer Speed  1
Double-Click Time  500 msec
X/Y Threshold  0 / 0
Wheel Scroll Lines  3
 
Mouse Features:
Active Window Tracking  Disabled
ClickLock  Disabled
Hide Pointer While Typing  Enabled
Mouse Wheel  Present
Move Pointer To Default Button  Disabled
Pointer Trails  Disabled
Sonar  Disabled


Printers

 
[ \\10.26.0.7\BigOffice- RICOH Aficio MP 6001 ]
 
Printer Properties:
Printer Name  \\10.26.0.7\BigOffice- RICOH Aficio MP 6001
Default Printer  No
Share Point  BigOffice- RICOH Aficio MP 6001
Printer Port  10.26.10.251_3
Printer Driver  RICOH Aficio MP 6001 PCL 6 (v1.00)
Device Name  \\CSR|10.26.0.7\{BCFC8197-714F-
Print Processor  winprint
Separator Page  None
Availability  Always
Priority  1
Print Jobs Queued  0
Status  Unknown
 
Paper Properties:
Paper Size  Letter, 8.5 x 11 in
Orientation  Portrait
Print Quality  600 x 600 dpi Mono
 
Printer Manufacturer:
Company Name  Ricoh Company, Ltd.
Product Information  http://www.ricoh.com/products
Driver Update  http://www.aida64.com/driver-updates
 
[ \\10.26.0.7\TONG VU HP LJ300-400 color M351-M451 ]
 
 
[ Adobe PDF (Default) ]
 
Printer Properties:
Printer Name  Adobe PDF
Default Printer  Yes
Share Point  Not shared
Printer Port  Documents\*.pdf
Printer Driver  Adobe PDF Converter (v6.03)
Device Name  Adobe PDF
Print Processor  winprint
Separator Page  None
Availability  Always
Priority  1
Print Jobs Queued  0
Status  Unknown
 
Paper Properties:
Paper Size  Letter, 8.5 x 11 in
Orientation  Portrait
Print Quality  1200 x 1200 dpi Colo
 
[ Fax ]
 
Printer Properties:
Printer Name  Fax
Default Printer  No
Share Point  Not shared
Printer Port  SHRFAX:
Printer Driver  Microsoft Shared Fax Driver (v4.00)
Device Name  Fax
Print Processor  winprint
Separator Page  None
Availability  8:00 AM - 8:00 AM
Priority  1
Print Jobs Queued  0
Status  Unknown
 
Paper Properties:
Paper Size  Letter, 8.5 x 11 in
Orientation  Portrait
Print Quality  200 x 200 dpi Mono
 
[ Microsoft Print to PDF ]
 
Printer Properties:
Printer Name  Microsoft Print to PDF
Default Printer  No
Share Point  Not shared
Printer Port  PORTPROMPT:
Printer Driver  Microsoft Print To PDF (v6.03)
Device Name  Microsoft Print to PDF
Print Processor  winprint
Separator Page  None
Availability  8:00 AM - 8:00 AM
Priority  1
Print Jobs Queued  0
Status  Unknown
 
Paper Properties:
Paper Size  Letter, 8.5 x 11 in
Orientation  Portrait
Print Quality  600 x 600 dpi Color
 
[ Microsoft XPS Document Writer ]
 
Printer Properties:
Printer Name  Microsoft XPS Document Writer
Default Printer  No
Share Point  Not shared
Printer Port  PORTPROMPT:
Printer Driver  Microsoft XPS Document Writer v4 (v6.03)
Device Name  Microsoft XPS Document Writer
Print Processor  winprint
Separator Page  None
Availability  8:00 AM - 8:00 AM
Priority  1
Print Jobs Queued  0
Status  Unknown
 
Paper Properties:
Paper Size  Letter, 8.5 x 11 in
Orientation  Portrait
Print Quality  600 x 600 dpi Color
 
[ Send To OneNote 2016 ]
 
Printer Properties:
Printer Name  Send To OneNote 2016
Default Printer  No
Share Point  Not shared
Printer Port  nul:
Printer Driver  Send to Microsoft OneNote 16 Driver (v6.03)
Device Name  Send To OneNote 2016
Print Processor  winprint
Separator Page  None
Availability  Always
Priority  1
Print Jobs Queued  0
Status  Unknown
 
Paper Properties:
Paper Size  Letter, 8.5 x 11 in
Orientation  Portrait
Print Quality  600 x 600 dpi Color


Auto Start

 
Application Description  Start From  Application Command
AdobeAAMUpdater-1.0  Registry\Common\Run  C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\Adobe\OOBE\PDApp\UWA\UpdaterStartupUtility.exe
Application Restart #0  Registry\User\RunOnce  C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\Adobe\Adobe Desktop Common\ADS\Adobe Desktop Service.exe --appMode=Uninstall --appletID=AppsPanel_BL --appletVersion=1.0 --productPlatform=win64 --productVersion=10.0.0 --sapCode=AUDT --waitForRegistration=true /RestartByRestartManager:A7E787B2-BD3A-415e-9205-35EB5D80ECD4
AVP  Registry\Common\Run  C:\Program Files (x86)\Kaspersky Lab\Kaspersky Endpoint Security 10 for Windows SP1\avp.exe
Franz  Registry\User\Run  C:\Users\Deathadder™\AppData\Local\Franz\app-4.0.4\Franz.exe
IDM trial reset  Registry\User\Run  C:\Users\Deathadder™\AppData\Local\Temp\Rar$EXa0.748\idm_trial_reset.exe /trial
IDMan  Registry\User\Run  C:\Program Files (x86)\Internet Download Manager\IDMan.exe /onboot
OneDrive  Registry\User\Run  C:\Users\Deathadder™\AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\OneDrive.exe /background
Send to OneNote  StartMenu\User  C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\ONENOTEM.EXE /tsr
Skype  Registry\User\Run  C:\Program Files (x86)\Skype\Phone\Skype.exe /minimized /regrun
WindowsDefender  Registry\Common\Run  %ProgramFiles%\Windows Defender\MSASCuiL.exe


Scheduled

 
[ {3B56303A-2DE2-45A0-AB44-81FB8FAB9037} ]
 
Task Properties:
Task Name  {3B56303A-2DE2-45A0-AB44-81FB8FAB9037}
Status  Enabled
Application Name  "c:\windows\system32\launchwinapp.exe"
Application Parameters  http://www.skype.com/go/downloading?source=lightinstaller&ver=7.12.0.101&LastError=404
Working Folder  
Comment  
Account Name  
Creator  SkypeSetupLight
Last Run  10/22/2016 8:42:28 AM
Next Run  Unknown
 
[ Adobe Acrobat Update Task ]
 
Task Properties:
Task Name  Adobe Acrobat Update Task
Status  Disabled
Application Name  C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\Adobe\ARM\1.0\AdobeARM.exe
Application Parameters  
Working Folder  
Comment  This task keeps your Adobe Reader and Acrobat applications up to date with the latest enhancements and security fixes
Account Name  
Creator  Adobe Systems Incorporated
Last Run  11/21/2016 10:12:41 AM
Next Run  1/16/2017 7:00:00 PM
 
Task Triggers:
At log on  At log on of any user - After triggered, repeat every 3 hours indefinitely
Daily  At 7:00:00 PM every day
 
[ Adobe Uninstaller ]
 
Task Properties:
Task Name  Adobe Uninstaller
Status  Enabled
Application Name  C:\Program Files (x86)\Adobe\Adobe Creative Cloud\ACC\Creative Cloud.exe
Application Parameters  --sapCode=AUDT --productVersion=10.0.0 --productPlatform=win64 --appletID=AppsPanel_BL --appletVersion=1.0 --appMode=Uninstall
Working Folder  
Comment  
Account Name  
Creator  Adobe Systems Inc.
Last Run  12/10/2016 7:27:11 AM
Next Run  Unknown
 
[ AdobeAAMUpdater-1.0-MicrosoftAccount-thangduong.dev@gmail ]
 
 
[ ASUS Smart Gesture Launcher ]
 
Task Properties:
Task Name  ASUS Smart Gesture Launcher
Status  Enabled
Application Name  C:\Program Files (x86)\ASUS\ASUS Smart Gesture\AsTPCenter\x64\AsusTPLauncher.exe
Application Parameters  
Working Folder  
Comment  ASUS Smart Gesture Launcher
Account Name  
Creator  ASUS
Last Run  1/16/2017 7:29:41 AM
Next Run  Unknown
 
Task Triggers:
At log on  At log on of any user
 
[ GoogleUpdateTaskMachineCore ]
 
Task Properties:
Task Name  GoogleUpdateTaskMachineCore
Status  Disabled
Application Name  C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Update\GoogleUpdate.exe
Application Parameters  /c
Working Folder  
Comment  Keeps your Google software up to date. If this task is disabled or stopped, your Google software will not be kept up to date, meaning security vulnerabilities that may arise cannot be fixed and features may not work. This task uninstalls itself when there is no Google software using it.
Account Name  SYSTEM
Creator  DESKTOP-AAE0F3D\Deathadder™
Last Run  11/8/2016 7:16:48 AM
Next Run  1/16/2017 6:55:00 PM
 
Task Triggers:
At log on  At log on of any user
Daily  At 6:55:00 PM every day
 
[ GoogleUpdateTaskMachineUA ]
 
Task Properties:
Task Name  GoogleUpdateTaskMachineUA
Status  Disabled
Application Name  C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Update\GoogleUpdate.exe
Application Parameters  /ua /installsource scheduler
Working Folder  
Comment  Keeps your Google software up to date. If this task is disabled or stopped, your Google software will not be kept up to date, meaning security vulnerabilities that may arise cannot be fixed and features may not work. This task uninstalls itself when there is no Google software using it.
Account Name  SYSTEM
Creator  DESKTOP-AAE0F3D\Deathadder™
Last Run  11/8/2016 7:57:35 AM
Next Run  1/16/2017 9:55:00 AM
 
Task Triggers:
Daily  At 6:55:00 PM every day - After triggered, repeat every 1 hour for a duration of 1 day
 
[ NvProfileUpdaterDaily_{B2FE1952-0186-46C3-BAEC-A80AA35AC5B8} ]
 
Task Properties:
Task Name  NvProfileUpdaterDaily_{B2FE1952-0186-46C3-BAEC-A80AA35AC5B8}
Status  Enabled
Application Name  C:\Program Files\NVIDIA Corporation\Update Core\NvProfileUpdater64.exe
Application Parameters  
Working Folder  C:\Program Files\NVIDIA Corporation\Update Core
Comment  NVIDIA Profile Updater
Account Name  Deathadder™
Creator  NVIDIA Corporation
Last Run  1/15/2017 12:25:19 PM
Next Run  1/16/2017 12:25:19 PM
 
Task Triggers:
Daily  At 12:25:19 PM every day
 
[ NvProfileUpdaterOnLogon_{B2FE1952-0186-46C3-BAEC-A80AA35AC5B8} ]
 
Task Properties:
Task Name  NvProfileUpdaterOnLogon_{B2FE1952-0186-46C3-BAEC-A80AA35AC5B8}
Status  Enabled
Application Name  C:\Program Files\NVIDIA Corporation\Update Core\NvProfileUpdater64.exe
Application Parameters  
Working Folder  C:\Program Files\NVIDIA Corporation\Update Core
Comment  NVIDIA Profile Updater
Account Name  Deathadder™
Creator  NVIDIA Corporation
Last Run  1/16/2017 7:29:37 AM
Next Run  Unknown
 
Task Triggers:
At log on  At log on of any user
 
[ NvTmMon_{B2FE1952-0186-46C3-BAEC-A80AA35AC5B8} ]
 
Task Properties:
Task Name  NvTmMon_{B2FE1952-0186-46C3-BAEC-A80AA35AC5B8}
Status  Enabled
Application Name  C:\Program Files (x86)\NVIDIA Corporation\Update Core\NvTmMon.exe
Application Parameters  
Working Folder  C:\Program Files (x86)\NVIDIA Corporation\Update Core
Comment  NVIDIA telemetry monitor
Account Name  Deathadder™
Creator  NVIDIA Corporation
Last Run  1/16/2017 8:29:38 AM
Next Run  Unknown
 
Task Triggers:
At log on  At log on of any user - After triggered, repeat every 1 hour indefinitely
 
[ NvTmRep_{B2FE1952-0186-46C3-BAEC-A80AA35AC5B8} ]
 
Task Properties:
Task Name  NvTmRep_{B2FE1952-0186-46C3-BAEC-A80AA35AC5B8}
Status  Enabled
Application Name  C:\Program Files (x86)\NVIDIA Corporation\Update Core\NvTmRep.exe
Application Parameters  
Working Folder  C:\Program Files (x86)\NVIDIA Corporation\Update Core
Comment  NVIDIA crash and telemetry reporter
Account Name  Deathadder™
Creator  NVIDIA Corporation
Last Run  1/15/2017 12:25:19 PM
Next Run  1/16/2017 12:25:19 PM
 
Task Triggers:
Daily  At 12:25:19 PM every day
 
[ NvTmRepOnLogon_{B2FE1952-0186-46C3-BAEC-A80AA35AC5B8} ]
 
Task Properties:
Task Name  NvTmRepOnLogon_{B2FE1952-0186-46C3-BAEC-A80AA35AC5B8}
Status  Enabled
Application Name  C:\Program Files (x86)\NVIDIA Corporation\Update Core\NvTmRep.exe
Application Parameters  --logon
Working Folder  C:\Program Files (x86)\NVIDIA Corporation\Update Core
Comment  NVIDIA Profile Updater
Account Name  Deathadder™
Creator  NVIDIA Corporation
Last Run  1/16/2017 7:29:37 AM
Next Run  Unknown
 
Task Triggers:
At log on  At log on of any user
 
[ OneDrive Standalone Update Task v2 ]
 
Task Properties:
Task Name  OneDrive Standalone Update Task v2
Status  Enabled
Application Name  %localappdata%\Microsoft\OneDrive\OneDriveStandaloneUpdater.exe
Application Parameters  
Working Folder  
Comment  
Account Name  Deathadder™
Creator  Microsoft Corporation
Last Run  1/16/2017 7:36:15 AM
Next Run  1/17/2017 8:37:27 AM
 
Task Triggers:
One time  At 4:00:00 AM on 5/1/1992 - After triggered, repeat every 1 day indefinitely
 
[ SamsungMagician ]
 
Task Properties:
Task Name  SamsungMagician
Status  Running
Application Name  "C:\Program Files (x86)\Samsung\Samsung Magician\Samsung Magician.exe"
Application Parameters  /AUTOHIDE
Working Folder  C:\Program Files (x86)\Samsung\Samsung Magician\
Comment  
Account Name  Deathadder™
Creator  SamsungMagician
Last Run  1/16/2017 7:29:58 AM
Next Run  Unknown
 
Task Triggers:
At log on  At log on of any user


Installed Programs

 
Program  Version  Inst. Size  GUID  Publisher  Inst. Date
µTorrent  3.4.9.43085  Unknown  uTorrent  BitTorrent Inc.  
64 Bit HP CIO Components Installer  8.2.1  Unknown  {5737101A-27C4-408A-8A57-D1DC78DF84B4}  Hewlett-Packard  2016-11-17
7-Zip 16.02 (x64)  16.02  Unknown  7-Zip  Igor Pavlov  
Adobe [ TRIAL VERSION ]  15.020.20042  Unknown  {AC76BA [ TRIAL VERSION ]  Adobe Systems Incorporated  2016-11-04
Adobe [ TRIAL VERSION ]  14.0.1  Unknown  AEFT_14 [ TRIAL VERSION ]  Adobe Systems Incorporated  
Adobe [ TRIAL VERSION ]  3.9.1.335  Unknown  Adobe C [ TRIAL VERSION ]  Adobe Systems Incorporated  
Adobe [ TRIAL VERSION ]  6.8  Unknown  {8048A5 [ TRIAL VERSION ]  Adobe Systems Incorporated  
Adobe [ TRIAL VERSION ]  11.0.0  Unknown  AME_11_ [ TRIAL VERSION ]  Adobe Systems Incorporated  
Adobe [ TRIAL VERSION ]  18.0.0  Unknown  PHSP_18 [ TRIAL VERSION ]  Adobe Systems Incorporated  
Adobe [ TRIAL VERSION ]  11.0.1  Unknown  PPRO_11 [ TRIAL VERSION ]  Adobe Systems Incorporated  
Adobe [ TRIAL VERSION ]  1.8.0  Unknown  {AC76BA [ TRIAL VERSION ]  Adobe Systems Incorporated  2016-11-13
Adobe. [ TRIAL VERSION ]  1.0.0000  Unknown  {E88DF9 [ TRIAL VERSION ]  Adobe Systems Incorporated  2016-10-22
Adobe. [ TRIAL VERSION ]  1.0.0000  Unknown  {F50273 [ TRIAL VERSION ]  Adobe Systems Incorporated  2016-10-22
Adobe. [ TRIAL VERSION ]  1.0.0000  Unknown  {6038F0 [ TRIAL VERSION ]  Adobe Systems Incorporated  2016-10-22
AIDA64 [ TRIAL VERSION ]  5.80  Unknown  AIDA64 [ TRIAL VERSION ]  FinalWire Ltd.  2017-01-16
Ansel [ TRIAL VERSION ]  376.33  Unknown  {B2FE19 [ TRIAL VERSION ]  NVIDIA Corporation  2016-12-31
Apple [ TRIAL VERSION ]  5.0.1  Unknown  {29DB91 [ TRIAL VERSION ]  Apple Inc.  2016-10-22
Apple [ TRIAL VERSION ]  5.0.1  Unknown  {5905C8 [ TRIAL VERSION ]  Apple Inc.  2016-10-22
Apple [ TRIAL VERSION ]  10.0.0.18  Unknown  {D4D86C [ TRIAL VERSION ]  Apple Inc.  2016-10-22
Apple [ TRIAL VERSION ]  2.2.0.150  Unknown  {56EC47 [ TRIAL VERSION ]  Apple Inc.  2016-10-22
ASUS S [ TRIAL VERSION ]  4.0.12  Unknown  {4D3286 [ TRIAL VERSION ]  ASUS  2016-10-21
Battle [ TRIAL VERSION ]    Unknown  Battle. [ TRIAL VERSION ]  Blizzard Entertainment  
Bonjou [ TRIAL VERSION ]  3.1.0.1  Unknown  {56DDDF [ TRIAL VERSION ]  Apple Inc.  2016-10-22
CPUID [ TRIAL VERSION ]    Unknown  CPUID H [ TRIAL VERSION ]    2016-10-22
Flashtool  0.9.22.3  Unknown  Flashtool  Androxyde  
FormatFactory 3.9.5.0  3.9.5.0  Unknown  FormatFactory  Free Time  
Google Chrome  55.0.2883.87  Unknown  Google Chrome  Google Inc.  2017-01-04
Google Update Helper  1.3.31.5  Unknown  {60EC980A-BDA2-4CB6-A427-B07A5498B4CA}  Google Inc.  2016-10-21
Hearthstone    Unknown  Hearthstone  Blizzard Entertainment  
Intel(R) Dynamic Platform and Thermal Framework  6.0.7.1084  Unknown  FFD10ECE-F715-4a86-9BD8-F6F47DA5DA1C  Intel Corporation  
Intel(R) Processor Graphics  10.18.10.4358  Unknown  {F0E3AD40-2BBD-4360-9C76-B9AC9A5886EA}  Intel Corporation  
Intel(R) SDK for OpenCL - CPU Only Runtime Package  2.0.0.37149  Unknown  {FCB3772C-B7D0-4933-B1A9-3707EBACC573}  Intel Corporation  
Intel(R) Turbo Boost Technology Monitor 2.6  2.6.2.0  Unknown  {6C9365EB-1F9E-4893-9196-3EC77C88D0C5}  Intel  2016-10-22
Internet Download Manager    Unknown  Internet Download Manager  Tonec Inc.  
iTunes  12.5.1.21  Unknown  {9946A4F7-E0FD-4A33-82D1-06CBFFBBB9F9}  Apple Inc.  2016-10-22
Kaspersky Endpoint Security 10 for Windows  10.2.5.3201  Unknown  {7A4192A1-84C4-4E90-A31B-B4847CA8E23A}  Kaspersky Lab  2016-10-21
Microsoft Office 365 - en-us  16.0.7571.2075  Unknown  O365HomePremRetail - en-us  Microsoft Corporation  
Microsoft OneDrive  17.3.6720.1207  Unknown  OneDriveSetup.exe  Microsoft Corporation  
Microsoft Visio Professional 2016 - en-us  16.0.7571.2075  Unknown  VisioProRetail - en-us  Microsoft Corporation  
Microsoft Visual C++ 2005 Redistributable (x64)  8.0.56336  Unknown  {071c9b48-7c32-4621-a0ac-3f809523288f}  Microsoft Corporation  2016-10-22
Microsoft Visual C++ 2005 Redistributable  8.0.56336  Unknown  {7299052b-02a4-4627-81f2-1818da5d550d}  Microsoft Corporation  2016-10-22
Microsoft Visual C++ 2008 Redistributable - x64 9.0.30729.17  9.0.30729  Unknown  {8220EEFE-38CD-377E-8595-13398D740ACE}  Microsoft Corporation  2016-10-22
Microsoft Visual C++ 2008 Redistributable - x64 9.0.30729.4148  9.0.30729.4148  Unknown  {4B6C7001-C7D6-3710-913E-5BC23FCE91E6}  Microsoft Corporation  2016-10-22
Microsoft Visual C++ 2008 Redistributable - x64 9.0.30729.6161  9.0.30729.6161  Unknown  {5FCE6D76-F5DC-37AB-B2B8-22AB8CEDB1D4}  Microsoft Corporation  2016-10-24
Microsoft Visual C++ 2008 Redistributable - x86 9.0.30729.17  9.0.30729  Unknown  {9A25302D-30C0-39D9-BD6F-21E6EC160475}  Microsoft Corporation  2016-10-22
Microsoft Visual C++ 2008 Redistributable - x86 9.0.30729.4148  9.0.30729.4148  Unknown  {1F1C2DFC-2D24-3E06-BCB8-725134ADF989}  Microsoft Corporation  2016-10-22
Microsoft Visual C++ 2008 Redistributable - x86 9.0.30729.6161  9.0.30729.6161  Unknown  {9BE518E6-ECC6-35A9-88E4-87755C07200F}  Microsoft Corporation  2016-10-22
Microsoft Visual C++ 2010 x64 Redistributable - 10.0.40219  10.0.40219  Unknown  {1D8E6291-B0D5-35EC-8441-6616F567A0F7}  Microsoft Corporation  2016-10-24
Microsoft Visual C++ 2010 x86 Redistributable - 10.0.40219  10.0.40219  Unknown  {F0C3E5D1-1ADE-321E-8167-68EF0DE699A5}  Microsoft Corporation  2016-10-24
Microsoft Visual C++ 2012 Redistributable (x64) - 11.0.61030  11.0.61030.0  Unknown  {ca67548a-5ebe-413a-b50c-4b9ceb6d66c6}  Microsoft Corporation  
Microsoft Visual C++ 2012 Redistributable (x86) - 11.0.61030  11.0.61030.0  Unknown  {33d1fd90-4274-48a1-9bc1-97e33d9c2d6f}  Microsoft Corporation  
Microsoft Visual C++ 2012 x64 Additional Runtime - 11.0.61030  11.0.61030  Unknown  {37B8F9C7-03FB-3253-8781-2517C99D7C00}  Microsoft Corporation  2016-10-22
Microsoft Visual C++ 2012 x64 Minimum Runtime - 11.0.61030  11.0.61030  Unknown  {CF2BEA3C-26EA-32F8-AA9B-331F7E34BA97}  Microsoft Corporation  2016-10-22
Microsoft Visual C++ 2012 x86 Additional Runtime - 11.0.61030  11.0.61030  Unknown  {B175520C-86A2-35A7-8619-86DC379688B9}  Microsoft Corporation  2016-10-22
Microsoft Visual C++ 2012 x86 Minimum Runtime - 11.0.61030  11.0.61030  Unknown  {BD95A8CD-1D9F-35AD-981A-3E7925026EBB}  Microsoft Corporation  2016-10-22
Microsoft Visual C++ 2013 Redistributable (x64) - 12.0.30501  12.0.30501.0  Unknown  {050d4fc8-5d48-4b8f-8972-47c82c46020f}  Microsoft Corporation  
Microsoft Visual C++ 2013 Redistributable (x86) - 12.0.30501  12.0.30501.0  Unknown  {f65db027-aff3-4070-886a-0d87064aabb1}  Microsoft Corporation  
Microsoft Visual C++ 2013 x64 Additional Runtime - 12.0.21005  12.0.21005  Unknown  {929FBD26-9020-399B-9A7A-751D61F0B942}  Microsoft Corporation  2016-10-22
Microsoft Visual C++ 2013 x64 Minimum Runtime - 12.0.21005  12.0.21005  Unknown  {A749D8E6-B613-3BE3-8F5F-045C84EBA29B}  Microsoft Corporation  2016-10-22
Microsoft Visual C++ 2013 x86 Additional Runtime - 12.0.21005  12.0.21005  Unknown  {F8CFEB22-A2E7-3971-9EDA-4B11EDEFC185}  Microsoft Corporation  2016-10-22
Microsoft Visual C++ 2013 x86 Minimum Runtime - 12.0.21005  12.0.21005  Unknown  {13A4EE12-23EA-3371-91EE-EFB36DDFFF3E}  Microsoft Corporation  2016-10-22
Microsoft Visual C++ 2015 Redistributable (x64) - 14.0.23918  14.0.23918.0  Unknown  {dab68466-3a7d-41a8-a5cf-415e3ff8ef71}  Microsoft Corporation  
Microsoft Visual C++ 2015 Redistributable (x86) - 14.0.23918  14.0.23918.0  Unknown  {2e085fd2-a3e4-4b39-8e10-6b8d35f55244}  Microsoft Corporation  
Microsoft Visual C++ 2015 x64 Additional Runtime - 14.0.23918  14.0.23918  Unknown  {DFFEB619-5455-3697-B145-243D936DB95B}  Microsoft Corporation  2016-10-22
Microsoft Visual C++ 2015 x64 Minimum Runtime - 14.0.23918  14.0.23918  Unknown  {7B50D081-E670-3B43-A460-0E2CDB5CE984}  Microsoft Corporation  2016-10-22
Microsoft Visual C++ 2015 x86 Additional Runtime - 14.0.23918  14.0.23918  Unknown  {BD9CFD69-EB91-354E-9C98-D439E6091932}  Microsoft Corporation  2016-10-22
Microsoft Visual C++ 2015 x86 Minimum Runtime - 14.0.23918  14.0.23918  Unknown  {B5FC62F5-A367-37A5-9FD2-A6E137C0096F}  Microsoft Corporation  2016-10-22
Microsoft Visual J# 2.0 Redistributable Package - SE (x64)    Unknown  Microsoft Visual J# 2.0 Redistributable Package - SE (x64)  Microsoft Corporation  
Microsoft Visual J# 2.0 Redistributable Package - SE (x64)  2.0.50728  Unknown  {B0A5A6EE-F8BA-48B1-BB32-BAC17E96C2B4}  Microsoft Corporation  2016-10-22
Mozilla Firefox 50.1.0 (x86 en-GB)  50.1.0  Unknown  Mozilla Firefox 50.1.0 (x86 en-GB)  Mozilla  
Mozilla Maintenance Service  50.1.0.6186  Unknown  MozillaMaintenanceService  Mozilla  
MSI Afterburner 4.2.0  4.2.0  Unknown  Afterburner  MSI Co., LTD  
Notepad++ (64-bit x64)  7.2.2  Unknown  Notepad++  Notepad++ Team  
NVIDIA Control Panel 376.33 [english (united states)]  376.33  Unknown  {B2FE1952-0186-46C3-BAEC-A80AA35AC5B8}_Display.ControlPanel  NVIDIA Corporation  2016-12-31
NVIDIA Display Container [english (united states)]  1.0  Unknown  {B2FE1952-0186-46C3-BAEC-A80AA35AC5B8}_NVDisplayContainer  NVIDIA Corporation  2016-12-31
NVIDIA Display Container LS [english (united states)]  1.0  Unknown  {B2FE1952-0186-46C3-BAEC-A80AA35AC5B8}_NVDisplayContainerLS  NVIDIA Corporation  2016-12-31
NVIDIA Graphics Driver 376.33 [english (united states)]  376.33  Unknown  {B2FE1952-0186-46C3-BAEC-A80AA35AC5B8}_Display.Driver  NVIDIA Corporation  2016-12-31
NVIDIA Install Application [english (united states)]  2.1002.226.1988  Unknown  {B2FE1952-0186-46C3-BAEC-A80AA35AC5B8}_installer  NVIDIA Corporation  2016-12-31
NVIDIA Optimus Update 2.13.0.21 [english (united states)]  2.13.0.21  Unknown  {B2FE1952-0186-46C3-BAEC-A80AA35AC5B8}_Display.Optimus  NVIDIA Corporation  2016-12-31
NVIDIA PhysX System Software 9.16.0318 [english (united states)]  9.16.0318  Unknown  {B2FE1952-0186-46C3-BAEC-A80AA35AC5B8}_Display.PhysX  NVIDIA Corporation  2016-10-27
NVIDIA Update Core [english (united states)]  2.13.0.21  Unknown  {B2FE1952-0186-46C3-BAEC-A80AA35AC5B8}_Update.Core  NVIDIA Corporation  2016-12-31
Office 16 Click-to-Run Extensibility Component  16.0.7571.2075  Unknown  {90160000-008C-0000-1000-0000000FF1CE}  Microsoft Corporation  2016-12-15
Office 16 Click-to-Run Licensing Component  16.0.7571.2075  Unknown  {90160000-007E-0000-1000-0000000FF1CE}  Microsoft Corporation  2016-12-15
Office 16 Click-to-Run Localization Component  16.0.7571.2075  Unknown  {90160000-008C-0409-1000-0000000FF1CE}  Microsoft Corporation  2016-12-15
Origin  10.3.3.1921  Unknown  Origin  Electronic Arts, Inc.  
Ping tester    Unknown  Ping tester9.45    
RAPID Mode  1.0.1.96  Unknown  {18DF567E-AA9B-434D-BE77-BFE2292712F6}  Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.  2016-10-24
Razer Surround  1.05.25  Unknown  Razer Surround  Razer Inc.  
Razer Synapse  2.20.15.1031  Unknown  {0D78BEE2-F8FF-4498-AF1A-3FF81CED8AC6}  Razer Inc.  2016-11-15
Samsung Magician  4.9.7  Unknown  {29AE3F9F-7158-4ca7-B1ED-28A73ECDB215}_is1  Samsung Electronics  2016-10-22
SDTtelecom USBDrv v3.0 for x64 [chinese (simplified, china)]  1.0.0  Unknown  {91EFBF0A-594C-5C14-AEC0-96516B69ABDE}  SDTtelecom  2016-10-26
Skype™ 7.30  7.30.105  Unknown  {FC965A47-4839-40CA-B618-18F486F042C6}  Skype Technologies S.A.  2016-11-24
TeamViewer 12  12.0.72365  Unknown  TeamViewer  TeamViewer  
UltraI [ TRIAL VERSION ]    Unknown  UltraIS [ TRIAL VERSION ]    2016-10-22
Uplay [ TRIAL VERSION ]  25.0  Unknown  Uplay [ TRIAL VERSION ]  Ubisoft  
VLC me [ TRIAL VERSION ]  2.2.4  Unknown  VLC med [ TRIAL VERSION ]  VideoLAN  
VMware [ TRIAL VERSION ]  12.5.1  Unknown  {646FD2 [ TRIAL VERSION ]  VMware, Inc.  2017-01-11
VMware [ TRIAL VERSION ]  6.0.0.6376  Unknown  {593390 [ TRIAL VERSION ]  VMware, Inc.  2016-10-22
Vulkan [ TRIAL VERSION ]  1.0.26.0  Unknown  VulkanR [ TRIAL VERSION ]  LunarG, Inc.  
Window [ TRIAL VERSION ]  11/11/2015 1.0.0.262  Unknown  A044C59 [ TRIAL VERSION ]  ASUS  
WinRAR [ TRIAL VERSION ]  5.30.0  Unknown  WinRAR [ TRIAL VERSION ]  win.rar GmbH  
Your Uninstaller! 7  7.5.2014.3  Unknown  YU2010_is1  URSoft, Inc.  2016-10-22
Zalo 2.2.0  2.2.0  Unknown  Zalo  VNG Corp.  
ZKTime5.0    Unknown  ZKTime5.0_is1    2016-12-23


Licenses

 
Software  Product Key
Microsoft Internet Explorer 11.576.14393.0  VK7JG- [ TRIAL VERSION ]
Microsoft Windows 10 Pro  VK7JG- [ TRIAL VERSION ]


File Types

 
Extension  File Type Description  Content Type
001  WinRAR archive  
386  Virtual Device Driver  
3DS  3DS File  
3FR  3FR File  
3G2  3GPP2 Audio/Video  video/3gpp2
3GA  VLC media file (.3ga)  
3GP  3GPP Audio/Video  video/3gpp
3GP2  3GPP2 Audio/Video  video/3gpp2
3GPP  3GPP Audio/Video  video/3gpp
669  VLC media file (.669)  
7Z  WinRAR archive  
8BA  8BA File  
8BC  8BC File  
8BE  8BE File  
8BP  8BP File  
8BS  8BS File  
8BX  8BX File  
8BY  8BY File  
8LI  8LI File  
A52  VLC media file (.a52)  
AAC  ADTS Audio  audio/vnd.dlna.adts
AAUI  Acrobat User Interface  application/vnd.adobe.acrobat.aaui+xml
ABR  ABR File  
ACCDA  Microsoft Access Add-in  application/msaccess.addin
ACCDB  Microsoft Access Database  application/msaccess
ACCDC  Microsoft Access Signed Package  application/msaccess.cab
ACCDE  Microsoft Access ACCDE Database  application/msaccess.exec
ACCDR  Microsoft Access Runtime Application  application/msaccess.runtime
ACCDT  Microsoft Access Template  application/msaccess.template
ACCDU  Microsoft Access Add-in Data  
ACCDW  Microsoft Access Web Application  application/msaccess.webapplication
ACCFT  Microsoft Access Template  application/msaccess.ftemplate
ACCOUNTPICTURE-MS  Account Picture File  application/windows-accountpicture
ACE  WinRAR archive  
ACF  ACF File  
ACL  AutoCorrect List File  
ACO  ACO File  
ACROBATSECURITYSETTINGS  Adobe Acrobat Security Settings Document  application/vnd.adobe.acrobat-security-settings
ACT  ACT File  
ACV  ACV File  
ADE  Microsoft Access Project Extension  application/msaccess
ADN  Microsoft Access Blank Project Template  
ADO  ADO File  
ADP  Microsoft Access Project  application/msaccess
ADT  ADTS Audio  audio/vnd.dlna.adts
ADTS  ADTS Audio  audio/vnd.dlna.adts
AECAP  Adobe After Effects Text Template  
AEPX  Adobe After Effects XML Project  
AET  Adobe After Effects Project Template  
AEX  Adobe After Effects Plug-in  
AHS  AHS File  
AHU  AHU File  
ALV  ALV File  
AMP  AMP File  
AMS  AMS File  
AMV  VLC media file (.amv)  
ANI  Animated Cursor  
AOB  VLC media file (.aob)  
AOM  Adobe After Effects Output Module Template  
APE  VLC media file (.ape)  
API  API File  
APL  APL File  
APPCONTENT-MS  Application Content  application/windows-appcontent+xml
APPLICATION  Application Manifest  application/x-ms-application
APPREF-MS  Application Reference  
ARJ  WinRAR archive  
ARS  Adobe After Effects Render Settings Template  
ASA  ASA File  
ASF  Windows Media Audio/Video file  video/x-ms-asf
ASL  ASL File  
ASP  ASP File  
AST  AST File  
ASV  ASV File  
ASX  VLC media file (.asx)  video/x-ms-asf
ATF  ATF File  
ATN  ATN File  
AVA  AVA File  
AVI  Video Clip  video/avi
AW  Answer Wizard File  
AXT  AXT File  
B4S  VLC media file (.b4s)  
BAT  Windows Batch File  
BIK  VLC media file (.bik)  
BIN  BIN File  
BLG  Performance Monitor File  
BLW  BLW File  
BMP  Bitmap Image  image/bmp
BPDX  Adobe Acrobat Batch PDX files  
BZ  WinRAR archive  
BZ2  WinRAR archive  
CAB  WinRAR archive  
CAF  VLC media file (.caf)  
CAMP  WCS Viewing Condition Profile  
CAT  Security Catalog  application/vnd.ms-pki.seccat
CDA  VLC media file (.cda)  
CDDA  Audio CD Track  
CDMP  WCS Device Profile  
CDX  CDX File  
CDXML  CDXML File  
CER  Security Certificate  application/x-x509-ca-cert
CHA  CHA File  
CHK  Recovered File Fragments  
CHM  Compiled HTML Help file  
CIN  CIN File  
CMD  Windows Command Script  
COM  MS-DOS Application  
COMPOSITEFONT  Composite Font File  
CONTACT  Contact File  text/x-ms-contact
CPL  Control Panel Item  
CRL  Certificate Revocation List  application/pkix-crl
CRT  Security Certificate  application/x-x509-ca-cert
CRTX  Microsoft Office Chart Template  
CSH  CSH File  
CSS  Cascading Style Sheet Document  text/css
CSV  Microsoft Excel Comma Separated Values File  application/vnd.ms-excel
CUE  VLC media file (.cue)  
CUR  Cursor  
DAE  DAE File  
DB  Data Base File  
DCP  DCP File  
DCPR  DCPR File  
DCR  DCR File  
DCTX  Open Extended Dictionary  
DCTXC  Open Extended Dictionary  
DDS  DDS Image  image/vnd.ms-dds
DEL  Adobe Premiere Edit Decision List  
DER  Security Certificate  application/x-x509-ca-cert
DESKLINK  Desktop Shortcut  
DESKTHEMEPACK  Windows Desktop Theme Pack  
DET  Office Data File  
DIAGCAB  Diagnostic Cabinet  
DIAGCFG  Diagnostic Configuration  
DIAGPKG  Diagnostic Document  
DIB  Bitmap Image  image/bmp
DIC  Text Document  
DLL  Application Extension  application/x-msdownload
DLX  Adobe Premiere Movie  
DNG  DNG File  image/DNG
DOC  Microsoft Word 97 - 2003 Document  application/msword
DOCHTML  Microsoft Word HTML Document  
DOCM  Microsoft Word Macro-Enabled Document  application/vnd.ms-word.document.macroEnabled.12
DOCMHTML  DOCMHTML File  
DOCX  Microsoft Word Document  application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document
DOCXML  Microsoft Word XML Document  
DOT  Microsoft Word 97 - 2003 Template  application/msword
DOTHTML  Microsoft Word HTML Template  
DOTM  Microsoft Word Macro-Enabled Template  application/vnd.ms-word.template.macroEnabled.12
DOTX  Microsoft Word Template  application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.template
DQY  Microsoft Excel ODBC Query File  
DRC  VLC media file (.drc)  
DRV  Device Driver  
DSN  Microsoft OLE DB Provider for ODBC Drivers  
DTS  VLC media file (.dts)  
DV  VLC media file (.dv)  
DWFX  XPS Document  model/vnd.dwfx+xps
EAP  EAP File  
EASMX  XPS Document  model/vnd.easmx+xps
EDRWX  XPS Document  model/vnd.edrwx+xps
ELM  Microsoft Office Themes File  
EMF  EMF File  image/x-emf
EML  E-mail Message  
EPRTX  XPS Document  model/vnd.eprtx+xps
EVT  EVT File  
EVTX  EVTX File  
EXC  Text Document  
EXE  Application  application/x-msdownload
EXR  EXR File  
F4V  VLC media file (.f4v)  
FCDT  FCDT File  application/vnd.adobe.formscentral.fcdt
FDF  Adobe Acrobat Forms Document  application/vnd.fdf
FDM  Outlook Form Definition  
FFF  FFF File  
FFO  FFO File  
FFX  Adobe After Effects Preset  
FL3  FL3 File  
FLAC  FLAC Audio  audio/x-flac
FLV  VLC media file (.flv)  video/x-flv
FON  Font file  
GCSX  Microsoft Office SmartArt Graphic Color Variation  
GIF  GIF Image  image/gif
GLOX  Microsoft Office SmartArt Graphic Layout  
GMMP  WCS Gamut Mapping Profile  
GQSX  Microsoft Office SmartArt Graphic Quick Style  
GRA  Microsoft Graph Chart  
GRD  GRD File  
GROUP  Contact Group File  text/x-ms-group
GRP  Microsoft Program Group  
GVI  VLC media file (.gvi)  
GXF  VLC media file (.gxf)  
GZ  WinRAR archive  
HDR  HDR File  
HLP  Help File  
HML  RivaTuner hardware monitoring log file  
HOL  Outlook Holidays  
HTA  HTML Application  application/hta
HTM  HTML Document  text/html
HTML  HTML Document  text/html
HXA  Microsoft Help Attribute Definition File  application/xml
HXC  Microsoft Help Collection Definition File  application/xml
HXD  Microsoft Help Validator File  application/octet-stream
HXE  Microsoft Help Samples Definition File  application/xml
HXF  Microsoft Help Include File  application/xml
HXH  Microsoft Help Merged Hierarchy File  application/octet-stream
HXI  Microsoft Help Compiled Index File  application/octet-stream
HXK  Microsoft Help Index File  application/xml
HXQ  Microsoft Help Merged Query Index File  application/octet-stream
HXR  Microsoft Help Merged Attribute Index File  application/octet-stream
HXS  Microsoft Help Compiled Storage File  application/octet-stream
HXT  Microsoft Help Table of Contents File  application/xml
HXV  Microsoft Help Virtual Topic Definition File  application/xml
HXW  Microsoft Help Attribute Definition File  application/octet-stream
ICC  ICC Profile  
ICL  Icon Library  
ICM  ICC Profile  
ICO  Icon  image/x-icon
ICS  iCalendar File  text/calendar
IFO  VLC media file (.ifo)  
IGP  Intel Graphics Profiles  
IIQ  IIQ File  
IMESX  IME Search provider definition  
IMG  Disc Image File  
INF  Setup Information  
INI  Configuration Settings  
IPA  Apple Device Application File  application/x-itunes-ipa
IPG  iPod Game File  application/x-itunes-ipg
IPSW  Apple Device Software Update File  application/x-itunes-ipsw
IQY  Microsoft Excel Web Query File  text/x-ms-iqy
IROS  IROS File  
IRS  IRS File  
ISO  UltraISO File  
ISZ  UltraISO File  
IT  VLC media file (.it)  
ITDB  iTunes Database File  
ITE  iTunes Extras  application/x-itunes-ite
ITL  iTunes Music Database File  
ITLP  ITLP File  application/x-itunes-itlp
ITLS  iTunes Live Stream File  application/x-itunes-itls
ITMS  iTunes Music Store URL  application/x-itunes-itms
ITPC  Podcast Subscription File  application/x-itunes-itpc
JAR  WinRAR archive  
JFIF  JPEG Image  image/jpeg
JOB  Task Scheduler Task Object  
JOBOPTIONS  Adobe PDF Settings  
JOD  Microsoft.Jet.OLEDB.4.0  
JPE  JPEG Image  image/jpeg
JPEG  JPEG Image  image/jpeg
JPG  JPEG Image  image/jpeg
JS  JavaScript File  
JSE  JScript Encoded File  
JTX  XPS Document  application/x-jtx+xps
JXR  Windows Media Photo  image/vnd.ms-photo
KMZ  KMZ File  
KYS  KYS File  
LABEL  Property List  
LACCDB  Microsoft Access Record-Locking Information  
LAYOUT  Adobe Premiere Layout  
LDB  Microsoft Access Record-Locking Information  
LEX  Dictionary File  
LHA  WinRAR archive  
LIBRARY-MS  Library Folder  application/windows-library+xml
LNK  Shortcut  
LOG  Text Document  
LRCAT  Adobe Lightroom  
LZH  WinRAR archive  
M1V  VLC media file (.m1v)  video/mpeg
M2T  AVCHD Video  video/vnd.dlna.mpeg-tts
M2TS  AVCHD Video  video/vnd.dlna.mpeg-tts
M2V  VLC media file (.m2v)  video/mpeg
M3U  M3U Audio Playlist  audio/mpegurl
M3U8  VLC media file (.m3u8)  audio/x-mpegurl
M4A  MPEG-4 Audio File  audio/m4a
M4B  MPEG-4 Audio File (Protected)  audio/m4b
M4P  VLC media file (.m4p)  audio/m4p
M4R  Ringtone  audio/x-m4r
M4V  MPEG-4 Video File  video/x-m4v
MAD  Microsoft Access Module Shortcut  
MAF  Microsoft Access Form Shortcut  
MAG  Microsoft Access Diagram Shortcut  
MAM  Microsoft Access Macro Shortcut  
MAPIMAIL  Mail Service  
MAQ  Microsoft Access Query Shortcut  
MAR  Microsoft Access Report Shortcut  
MAS  Microsoft Access Stored Procedure Shortcut  
MAT  Microsoft Access Table Shortcut  
MAU  MAU File  
MAV  Microsoft Access View Shortcut  
MAW  Microsoft Access Data Access Page Shortcut  
MDA  Microsoft Access Add-in  application/msaccess
MDB  Microsoft Access Database  application/msaccess
MDBHTML  Microsoft Access HTML Document  
MDE  Microsoft Access MDE Database  application/msaccess
MDN  Microsoft Access Blank Database Template  
MDT  Microsoft Access Add-in Data  
MDW  Microsoft Access Workgroup Information  
MEF  MEF File  
MFW  MFW File  
MHT  MHTML Document  message/rfc822
MHTML  MHTML Document  message/rfc822
MID  VLC media file (.mid)  audio/mid
MIDI  MIDI Sequence  audio/mid
MK3D  MK3D Video  
MKA  VLC media file (.mka)  audio/x-matroska
MKV  MKV Video  video/x-matroska
MLC  Language Pack File_  
MLP  VLC media file (.mlp)  
MNU  MNU File  
MOD  Movie Clip  video/mpeg
MOS  MOS File  
MOV  QuickTime Movie  video/quicktime
MP1  VLC media file (.mp1)  
MP2  VLC media file (.mp2)  audio/mpeg
MP2V  VLC media file (.mp2v)  video/mpeg
MP3  MPEG Layer 3 Audio  audio/mpeg
MP4  MP4 Video  video/mp4
MP4V  MP4 Video  video/mp4
MPA  Movie Clip  audio/mpeg
MPC  VLC media file (.mpc)  
MPE  Movie Clip  video/mpeg
MPEG  Movie Clip  video/mpeg
MPEG1  VLC media file (.mpeg1)  
MPEG2  VLC media file (.mpeg2)  
MPEG4  VLC media file (.mpeg4)  
MPG  Movie Clip  video/mpeg
MPGA  VLC media file (.mpga)  
MPV2  Movie Clip  video/mpeg
MSC  Microsoft Common Console Document  
MSG  Outlook Item  
MSI  Windows Installer Package  
MSP  Windows Installer Patch  
MSRCINCIDENT  Windows Remote Assistance Invitation  
MSSTYLES  Windows Visual Style File  
MSU  Microsoft Update Standalone Package  
MS-WINDOWS-STORE-LICENSE  Windows Store License  
MTL  MTL File  
MTS  AVCHD Video  video/vnd.dlna.mpeg-tts
MTV  VLC media file (.mtv)  
MXF  VLC media file (.mxf)  
MYDOCS  MyDocs Drop Target  
NFO  MSInfo Configuration File  
NK2  Outlook Nickname File  
NST  Outlook Data File  
NSV  VLC media file (.nsv)  
NUV  VLC media file (.nuv)  
OCX  ActiveX control  
ODC  Microsoft Office Data Connection  text/x-ms-odc
ODCCUBEFILE  ODCCUBEFILE File  
ODCDATABASEFILE  ODCDATABASEFILE File  
ODCNEWFILE  ODCNEWFILE File  
ODCTABLECOLLECTIONFILE  ODCTABLECOLLECTIONFILE File  
ODCTABLEFILE  ODCTABLEFILE File  
ODP  OpenDocument Presentation  application/vnd.oasis.opendocument.presentation
ODS  OpenDocument Spreadsheet  application/vnd.oasis.opendocument.spreadsheet
ODT  OpenDocument Text  application/vnd.oasis.opendocument.text
OFS  Outlook Form Regions  
OFT  Outlook Item Template  
OGA  VLC media file (.oga)  
OGG  VLC media file (.ogg)  
OGM  VLC media file (.ogm)  
OGV  VLC media file (.ogv)  
OGX  VLC media file (.ogx)  
OLS  Office List Shortcut  application/vnd.ms-publisher
OMA  VLC media file (.oma)  
ONE  Microsoft OneNote Section  application/msonenote
ONEPKG  Microsoft OneNote Single File Package  application/msonenote
ONETOC  Microsoft OneNote 2003 Table Of Contents  
ONETOC2  Microsoft OneNote Table Of Contents  
OPC  Microsoft Clean-up Wizard File  
OPUS  VLC media file (.opus)  
OQY  Microsoft Excel OLAP Query File  
OSDX  OpenSearch Description File  application/opensearchdescription+xml
OST  Outlook Data File  
OTF  OpenType Font file  
OTM  Outlook VBA Project File  
OVA  OVA File  
OVF  OVF File  
OXPS  XPS Document  
P10  Certificate Request  application/pkcs10
P12  Personal Information Exchange  application/x-pkcs12
P3L  P3L File  
P3M  P3M File  
P3R  P3R File  
P7B  PKCS #7 Certificates  application/x-pkcs7-certificates
P7C  Digital ID File  application/pkcs7-mime
P7M  PKCS #7 MIME Message  application/pkcs7-mime
P7R  Certificate Request Response  application/x-pkcs7-certreqresp
P7S  PKCS #7 Signature  application/pkcs7-signature
PAB  Outlook Personal Address Book  
PANO  PANO File  application/vnd.ms-pano
PARTIAL  Partial Download  
PAT  PAT File  
PBK  Dial-Up Phonebook  
PBM  PBM File  
PCAST  Podcast Subscription File  application/x-podcast
PCB  PCB File  
PCD  PCD File  
PCX  PCX File  
PDD  PDD File  
PDF  Adobe Acrobat Document  application/pdf
PDFXML  Adobe Acrobat PDFXML Document  application/vnd.adobe.pdfxml
PDP  PDP File  
PDX  Adobe Acrobat Catalog Index  application/vnd.adobe.pdx
PERFMONCFG  Performance Monitor Configuration  
PFM  Type 1 Font file  
PFX  Personal Information Exchange  application/x-pkcs12
PIF  Shortcut to MS-DOS Program  
PKO  Public Key Security Object  application/vnd.ms-pki.pko
PLE  PLE File  
PLS  VLC media file (.pls)  audio/scpls
PNF  Precompiled Setup Information  
PNG  PNG Image  image/png
POT  Microsoft PowerPoint 97-2003 Template  application/vnd.ms-powerpoint
POTHTML  Microsoft PowerPoint HTML Template  
POTM  Microsoft PowerPoint Macro-Enabled Design Template  application/vnd.ms-powerpoint.template.macroEnabled.12
POTX  Microsoft PowerPoint Template  application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.presentationml.template
PPA  Microsoft PowerPoint 97-2003 Addin  application/vnd.ms-powerpoint
PPAM  Microsoft PowerPoint Addin  application/vnd.ms-powerpoint.addin.macroEnabled.12
PPJ  PPJ File  
PPKG  RunTime Provisioning Tool  
PPROJ  PPROJ File  
PPS  Microsoft PowerPoint 97-2003 Slide Show  application/vnd.ms-powerpoint
PPSM  Microsoft PowerPoint Macro-Enabled Slide Show  application/vnd.ms-powerpoint.slideshow.macroEnabled.12
PPSX  Microsoft PowerPoint Slide Show  application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.presentationml.slideshow
PPT  Microsoft PowerPoint 97-2003 Presentation  application/vnd.ms-powerpoint
PPTHTML  Microsoft PowerPoint HTML Document  
PPTM  Microsoft PowerPoint Macro-Enabled Presentation  application/vnd.ms-powerpoint.presentation.macroEnabled.12
PPTMHTML  PPTMHTML File  
PPTX  Microsoft PowerPoint Presentation  application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.presentationml.presentation
PPTXML  Microsoft PowerPoint XML Presentation  
PREXPORT  PREXPORT File  
PRF  PICS Rules File  application/pics-rules
PRFPSET  PRFPSET File  
PRINTEREXPORT  Printer Migration File  
PRM  Adobe Premiere Plugin  
PRMP  Adobe Premiere Plugin  
PRPRESET  PRPRESET File  
PRSL  PRSL File  
PRTL  Adobe Premiere Title  
PS  PostScript File  
PS1  PS1 File  
PS1XML  PS1XML File  
PSB  PSB File  
PSC1  PSC1 File  application/PowerShell
PSD  PSD File  
PSD1  PSD1 File  
PSDT  PSDT File  
PSF  PSF File  
PSM1  PSM1 File  
PSP  PSP File  
PSSC  PSSC File  
PST  Outlook Data File  
PUB  Microsoft Publisher Document  application/vnd.ms-publisher
PUBHTML  PUBHTML File  
PUBMHTML  PUBMHTML File  
PWZ  Microsoft PowerPoint Wizard  application/vnd.ms-powerpoint
PXR  PXR File  
QCP  VLC media file (.qcp)  
QDS  Directory Query  
R00  WinRAR archive  
R01  WinRAR archive  
R02  WinRAR archive  
R03  WinRAR archive  
R04  WinRAR archive  
R05  WinRAR archive  
R06  WinRAR archive  
R07  WinRAR archive  
R08  WinRAR archive  
R09  WinRAR archive  
R10  WinRAR archive  
R11  WinRAR archive  
R12  WinRAR archive  
R13  WinRAR archive  
R14  WinRAR archive  
R15  WinRAR archive  
R16  WinRAR archive  
R17  WinRAR archive  
R18  WinRAR archive  
R19  WinRAR archive  
R20  WinRAR archive  
R21  WinRAR archive  
R22  WinRAR archive  
R23  WinRAR archive  
R24  WinRAR archive  
R25  WinRAR archive  
R26  WinRAR archive  
R27  WinRAR archive  
R28  WinRAR archive  
R29  WinRAR archive  
RA  VLC media file (.ra)  
RAM  VLC media file (.ram)  
RAR  WinRAR archive  
RAT  Rating System File  application/rat-file
RDP  Remote Desktop Connection  
REC  VLC media file (.rec)  
REG  Registration Entries  
RELS  XML Document  
RESMONCFG  Resource Monitor Configuration  
REV  RAR recovery volume  
RLE  RLE File  
RLL  Application Extension  
RM  VLC media file (.rm)  
RMF  Adobe Acrobat Rights Management Document  application/vnd.adobe.rmf
RMI  VLC media file (.rmi)  audio/mid
RMVB  VLC media file (.rmvb)  
RPL  VLC media file (.rpl)  
RQY  Microsoft Excel OLE DB Query File  text/x-ms-rqy
RTF  Rich Text Format  application/msword
S3M  VLC media file (.s3m)  
SCF  File Explorer Command  
SCP  Text Document  
SCR  Screen saver  
SCT  SCT File  text/scriptlet
SDP  VLC media file (.sdp)  
SEARCHCONNECTOR-MS  Search Connector Folder  application/windows-search-connector+xml
SEARCH-MS  Saved Search  
SECSTORE  SECSTORE File  
SEQU  Adobe Acrobat Action File  
SETTINGCONTENT-MS  Setting Content  
SFCACHE  ReadyBoost Cache File  
SHC  SHC File  
SHH  SHH File  
SHTML  SHTML File  text/html
SKYPE  Skype Content  application/x-skype
SLDM  Microsoft PowerPoint Macro-Enabled Slide  application/vnd.ms-powerpoint.slide.macroEnabled.12
SLDX  Microsoft PowerPoint Slide  application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.presentationml.slide
SLK  Microsoft Excel SLK Data Import Format  application/vnd.ms-excel
SPC  PKCS #7 Certificates  application/x-pkcs7-certificates
SPL  Shockwave Flash Object  application/futuresplash
SPX  VLC media file (.spx)  
SRF  SRF File  
SST  Microsoft Serialized Certificate Store  application/vnd.ms-pki.certstore
STA  STA File  
SVG  SVG Document  image/svg+xml
SWF  Shockwave Flash Object  application/x-shockwave-flash
SYMLINK  .symlink  
SYS  System file  
TAR  WinRAR archive  
TAZ  WinRAR archive  
TBZ  WinRAR archive  
TBZ2  WinRAR archive  
TGA  TGA File  
TGZ  WinRAR archive  
THEME  Windows Theme File  
THEMEPACK  Windows Theme Pack  
THMX  Microsoft Office Theme  application/vnd.ms-officetheme
THP  VLC media file (.thp)  
TIF  TIF File  image/tiff
TIFF  TIFF File  image/tiff
TPL  TPL File  
TS  MPEG-2 TS Video  video/vnd.dlna.mpeg-tts
TTA  VLC media file (.tta)  
TTC  TrueType Collection Font file  
TTF  TrueType Font file  
TTS  MPEG-2 TS Video  video/vnd.dlna.mpeg-tts
TVC  TVC File  
TVLINK  TVLINK File  
TVS  TVS File  
TXT  Text Document  text/plain
TXZ  WinRAR archive  
U3D  U3D File  
UDL  Microsoft Data Link  
UI  UltraISO File  
URL  URL File  
UU  WinRAR archive  
UUE  WinRAR archive  
UXDC  UXDC File  
VBE  VBScript Encoded File  
VBS  VBScript Script File  
VCF  vCard File  text/x-vcard
VCS  vCalendar File  
VHD  Disc Image File  
VHDX  Disc Image File  
VLC  VLC media file (.vlc)  
VMDK  VMware virtual disk file  
VMSN  VMware virtual machine snapshot  
VMSS  VMware suspended virtual machine state  
VMX  VMware virtual machine configuration  
VOB  VLC media file (.vob)  
VPR  VPR File  
VQF  VLC media file (.vqf)  
VRO  VLC media file (.vro)  
VSL  @C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Root\VFS\ProgramFilesCommonX86\Microsoft Shared\Office16\oregres.dll,-426  application/vnd.visio
VSTO  VSTO Deployment Manifest  application/x-ms-vsto
VSU  Microsoft Visio Custom Toolbars  application/vnd.visio
VSW  Microsoft Visio 2003-2010 Workspace  application/vnd.visio
VXD  Virtual Device Driver  
W64  VLC media file (.w64)  
WAB  Address Book File  
WAV  WAVE Audio File  audio/wav
WAVE  WAVE Audio File  audio/wav
WAX  Windows Media Audio shortcut  audio/x-ms-wax
WBCAT  Windows Backup Catalog File  
WBK  Microsoft Word Backup Document  application/msword
WCX  Workspace Configuration File  
WDP  Windows Media Photo  image/vnd.ms-photo
WEBM  VLC media file (.webm)  
WEBPNP  Web Point And Print File  
WEBSITE  Pinned Site Shortcut  application/x-mswebsite
WIZ  Microsoft Word Wizard  application/msword
WIZHTML  Microsoft Access HTML Template  
WLL  WLL File  
WM  Windows Media Audio/Video file  video/x-ms-wm
WMA  Windows Media Audio file  audio/x-ms-wma
WMD  Windows Media Player Download Package  application/x-ms-wmd
WMDB  Windows Media Library  
WMF  WMF File  image/x-wmf
WMS  Windows Media Player Skin File  
WMV  Windows Media Audio/Video file  video/x-ms-wmv
WMX  Windows Media Audio/Video playlist  video/x-ms-wmx
WMZ  Windows Media Player Skin Package  application/x-ms-wmz
WPL  Windows Media playlist  application/vnd.ms-wpl
WSC  Windows Script Component  text/scriptlet
WSF  Windows Script File  
WSH  Windows Script Host Settings File  
WTX  Text Document  
WV  VLC media file (.wv)  
WVX  VLC media file (.wvx)  video/x-ms-wvx
X3F  X3F File  
XA  VLC media file (.xa)  
XAML  Windows Markup File  application/xaml+xml
XBAP  XAML Browser Application  application/x-ms-xbap
XDP  Adobe Acrobat XML Data Package File  application/vnd.adobe.xdp+xml
XEVGENXML  XEVGENXML File  
XFDF  Adobe Acrobat Forms Document  application/vnd.adobe.xfdf
XHT  XHTML Document  application/xhtml+xml
XHTML  XHTML Document  application/xhtml+xml
XLA  Microsoft Excel Add-In  application/vnd.ms-excel
XLAM  Microsoft Excel Add-In  application/vnd.ms-excel.addin.macroEnabled.12
XLD  Microsoft Excel 5.0 DialogSheet  application/vnd.ms-excel
XLK  Microsoft Excel Backup File  application/vnd.ms-excel
XLL  Microsoft Excel XLL Add-In  application/vnd.ms-excel
XLM  Microsoft Excel 4.0 Macro  application/vnd.ms-excel
XLS  Microsoft Excel 97-2003 Worksheet  application/vnd.ms-excel
XLSB  Microsoft Excel Binary Worksheet  application/vnd.ms-excel.sheet.binary.macroEnabled.12
XLSHTML  Microsoft Excel HTML Document  
XLSM  Microsoft Excel Macro-Enabled Worksheet  application/vnd.ms-excel.sheet.macroEnabled.12
XLSMHTML  XLSMHTML File  
XLSX  Microsoft Excel Worksheet  application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet
XLT  Microsoft Excel Template  application/vnd.ms-excel
XLTHTML  Microsoft Excel HTML Template  
XLTM  Microsoft Excel Macro-Enabled Template  application/vnd.ms-excel.template.macroEnabled.12
XLTX  Microsoft Excel Template  application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.template
XLW  Microsoft Excel Workspace  application/vnd.ms-excel
XLXML  Microsoft Excel XML Worksheet  
XM  VLC media file (.xm)  
XML  XML Document  text/xml
XPS  XPS Document  application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument
XRM-MS  XrML Digital License  text/xml
XSL  XSL Stylesheet  text/xml
XSPF  VLC media file (.xspf)  
XXE  WinRAR archive  
XZ  WinRAR archive  
Z  WinRAR archive  
ZFSENDTOTARGET  Compressed (zipped) Folder SendTo Target  
ZIP  WinRAR ZIP archive  


Windows Security

 
Operating System Properties:
OS Name  Microsoft Windows 10 Pro
OS Service Pack  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
Winlogon Shell  explorer.exe
User Account Control (UAC)  Enabled (Quiet Mode)
UAC Remote Restrictions  Enabled
System Restore  Enabled
Windows Update Agent  10.0.14393.0 (rs1_release.160715-1616)
 
Data Execution Prevention (DEP, NX, EDB):
Supported by Operating System  Yes
Supported by CPU  Yes
Active (To Protect Applications)  Yes
Active (To Protect Drivers)  Yes


Windows Update

 
Update Description  Update Type  Inst. Date
(Automatic Update)  Unknown  
Cumulative Update for Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems (KB3194798)  Update  10/22/2016
Cumulative Update for Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems (KB3197954)  Update  10/28/2016
Cumulative Update for Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems (KB3200970)  Update  11/9/2016
Cumulative Update for Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems (KB3201845)  Update  12/10/2016
Cumulative Update for Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems (KB3206632)  Update  12/15/2016
Cumulative Update for Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems (KB3213986)  Update  1/11/2017
Definition Update for Windows Defender - KB2267602 (Definition 1.233.1934.0)  Update  12/11/2016
Intel Corporation driver update for Intel(R) HD Graphics 4000  Update  10/22/2016
Intel Corporation driver update for Intel(R) HD Graphics 4000  Update  10/26/2016
Security Update for Adobe Flash Player for Windows 10 Version 1607 (for x64-based Systems) (KB3194343)  Update  10/22/2016
Security Update for Adobe Flash Player for Windows 10 Version 1607 (for x64-based Systems) (KB3201860)  Update  10/28/2016
Security Update for Adobe Flash Player for Windows 10 Version 1607 (for x64-based Systems) (KB3202790)  Update  11/9/2016
Security Update for Adobe Flash Player for Windows 10 Version 1607 (for x64-based Systems) (KB3209498)  Update  12/14/2016
Security Update for Adobe Flash Player for Windows 10 Version 1607 (for x64-based Systems) (KB3214628)  Update  1/11/2017
Update for Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems (KB3199209)  Update  10/22/2016
Update for Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems (KB3199986)  Update  10/28/2016
Windows Malicious Software Removal Tool for Windows 8, 8.1, 10 and Windows Server 2012, 2012 R2 x64 Edition - October 2016 (KB890830)  Update  10/22/2016
Windows Malicious Software Removal Tool for Windows 8, 8.1, 10 and Windows Server 2012, 2012 R2, 2016 x64 Edition - December 2016 (KB890830)  Update  12/14/2016
Windows Malicious Software Removal Tool for Windows 8, 8.1, 10 and Windows Server 2012, 2012 R2, 2016 x64 Edition - January 2017 (KB890830)  Update  1/11/2017
Windows Malicious Software Removal Tool for Windows 8, 8.1, 10 and Windows Server 2012, 2012 R2, 2016 x64 Edition - November 2016 (KB890830)  Update  11/9/2016


Anti-Virus

 
Software Description  Software Version  Virus Database Date  Known Viruses
Windows Defender  4.10.14393.187(rs1_release_inmarket.160906-1818)  12/14/2016  ?


Firewall

 
Software Description  Software Version  Status
Windows Firewall  10.0.14393.0  Enabled


Anti-Spyware

 
Software Description  Software Version
Microsoft Windows Defender  4.10.14393.187(rs1_release_inmarket.160906-1818)


Regional

 
Time Zone:
Current Time Zone  SE Asia Standard Time
Current Time Zone Description  (UTC+07:00) Bangkok, Hanoi, Jakarta
Change To Standard Time  
Change To Daylight Saving Time  
 
Language:
Language Name (Native)  English
Language Name (English)  English
Language Name (ISO 639)  en
 
Country/Region:
Country Name (Native)  United States
Country Name (English)  United States
Country Name (ISO 3166)  US
Country Code  1
 
Currency:
Currency Name (Native)  US Dollar
Currency Name (English)  US Dollar
Currency Symbol (Native)  $
Currency Symbol (ISO 4217)  USD
Currency Format  $123,456,789.00
Negative Currency Format  ($123,456,789.00)
 
Formatting:
Time Format  h:mm:ss tt
Short Date Format  M/d/yyyy
Long Date Format  dddd, MMMM d, yyyy
Number Format  123,456,789.00
Negative Number Format  -123,456,789.00
List Format  first, second, third
Native Digits  0123456789
 
Days of Week:
Native Name for Monday  Monday / Mon
Native Name for Tuesday  Tuesday / Tue
Native Name for Wednesday  Wednesday / Wed
Native Name for Thursday  Thursday / Thu
Native Name for Friday  Friday / Fri
Native Name for Saturday  Saturday / Sat
Native Name for Sunday  Sunday / Sun
 
Months:
Native Name for January  January / Jan
Native Name for February  February / Feb
Native Name for March  March / Mar
Native Name for April  April / Apr
Native Name for May  May / May
Native Name for June  June / Jun
Native Name for July  July / Jul
Native Name for August  August / Aug
Native Name for September  September / Sep
Native Name for October  October / Oct
Native Name for November  November / Nov
Native Name for December  December / Dec
 
Miscellaneous:
Calendar Type  Gregorian (localized)
Default Paper Size  US Letter
Measurement System  U.S.
 
Display Languages:
LCID 0409h (Active)  English (United States)


Environment

 
Variable  Value
__COMPAT_LAYER  DetectorsWin8
ALLUSERSPROFILE  C:\ProgramData
APPDATA  C:\Users\DeathadderT\AppData\Roaming
asl.log  Destination=file
CommonProgramFiles(x86)  C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files
CommonProgramFiles  C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files
CommonProgramW6432  C:\Program Files\Common Files
COMPUTERNAME  RAZER
ComSpec  C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe
FPS_BROWSER_APP_PROFILE_STRING  Internet Explorer
FPS_BROWSER_USER_PROFILE_STRING  Default
HOMEDRIVE  C:
HOMEPATH  \Users\DeathadderT
LOCALAPPDATA  C:\Users\DeathadderT\AppData\Local
LOGONSERVER  \\RAZER
MOZ_NO_REMOTE  1
NUMBER_OF_PROCESSORS  4
NVIDIAWHITELISTED  0x01
OneDrive  D:\OneDrive
OS  Windows_NT
Path  C:\Windows\system32;C:\Windows;C:\Windows\System32\Wbem;C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\;C:\Program Files (x86)\Kaspersky Lab\Kaspersky Endpoint Security 10 for Windows SP1\;C:\Program Files (x86)\Intel\OpenCL SDK\2.0\bin\x86;C:\Program Files (x86)\Intel\OpenCL SDK\2.0\bin\x64;C:\Program Files (x86)\NVIDIA Corporation\PhysX\Common;C:\Program Files (x86)\Skype\Phone\;C:\Users\DeathadderT\AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps
PATHEXT  .COM;.EXE;.BAT;.CMD;.VBS;.VBE;.JS;.JSE;.WSF;.WSH;.MSC
PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE  x86
PROCESSOR_ARCHITEW6432  AMD64
PROCESSOR_IDENTIFIER  Intel64 Family 6 Model 58 Stepping 9, GenuineIntel
PROCESSOR_LEVEL  6
PROCESSOR_REVISION  3a09
ProgramData  C:\ProgramData
ProgramFiles(x86)  C:\Program Files (x86)
ProgramFiles  C:\Program Files (x86)
ProgramW6432  C:\Program Files
PSModulePath  C:\Program Files\WindowsPowerShell\Modules;C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\Modules
PUBLIC  C:\Users\Public
SHIM_MCCOMPAT  0x810000001
SystemDrive  C:
SystemRoot  C:\Windows
TEMP  C:\Users\DEATHA~1\AppData\Local\Temp
TMP  C:\Users\DEATHA~1\AppData\Local\Temp
USERDOMAIN_ROAMINGPROFILE  RAZER
USERDOMAIN  RAZER
USERNAME  DeathadderT
USERPROFILE  C:\Users\DeathadderT
windir  C:\Windows


Control Panel

 
Name  Comment
Flash Player  Manage Flash Player Settings


Recycle Bin

 
Drive  Items Size  Items Count  Space %  Recycle Bin
C:  55 MB  3  ?  ?
D:  17324 KB  2  ?  ?


System Files

 
[ system.ini ]
 
; for 16-bit app support
[386Enh]
woafont=dosapp.fon
EGA80WOA.FON=EGA80WOA.FON
EGA40WOA.FON=EGA40WOA.FON
CGA80WOA.FON=CGA80WOA.FON
CGA40WOA.FON=CGA40WOA.FON
[drivers]
wave=mmdrv.dll
timer=timer.drv
[mci]
 
[ win.ini ]
 
; for 16-bit app support
[fonts]
[extensions]
[mci extensions]
[files]
[Mail]
MAPI=1
[sdtcom]
Baud=01C20001C20001C20001C20001C20001C20001C20001C20001C20001C20001C20001C20001C20001C20001C20001C20030
 
[ hosts ]
 
 
[ lmhosts.sam ]
 


System Folders

 
System Folder  Path
Administrative Tools  C:\Users\Deathadder™\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Administrative Tools
AppData  C:\Users\Deathadder™\AppData\Roaming
Cache  C:\Users\Deathadder™\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache
CD Burning  C:\Users\Deathadder™\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Burn\Burn
Common Administrative Tools  C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Administrative Tools
Common AppData  C:\ProgramData
Common Desktop  C:\Users\Public\Desktop
Common Documents  C:\Users\Public\Documents
Common Favorites  C:\Users\Deathadder™\Favorites
Common Files (x86)  C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files
Common Files  C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files
Common Music  C:\Users\Public\Music
Common Pictures  C:\Users\Public\Pictures
Common Programs  C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs
Common Start Menu  C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu
Common Startup  C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup
Common Templates  C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Templates
Common Video  C:\Users\Public\Videos
Cookies  C:\Users\Deathadder™\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCookies
Desktop  C:\Users\Deathadder™\Desktop
Device  C:\Windows\inf
Favorites  C:\Users\Deathadder™\Favorites
Fonts  C:\Windows\Fonts
History  C:\Users\Deathadder™\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\History
Local AppData  C:\Users\Deathadder™\AppData\Local
My Documents  C:\Users\Deathadder™\Documents
My Music  C:\Users\Deathadder™\Music
My Pictures  C:\Users\Deathadder™\Pictures
My Video  C:\Users\Deathadder™\Videos
NetHood  C:\Users\Deathadder™\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Network Shortcuts
PrintHood  C:\Users\Deathadder™\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Printer Shortcuts
Profile  C:\Users\Deathadder™
Program Files (x86)  C:\Program Files (x86)
Program Files  C:\Program Files (x86)
Programs  C:\Users\Deathadder™\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs
Recent  C:\Users\Deathadder™\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent
Resources  C:\Windows\resources
SendTo  C:\Users\Deathadder™\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\SendTo
Start Menu  C:\Users\Deathadder™\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu
Startup  C:\Users\Deathadder™\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup
System (x86)  C:\Windows\SysWoW64
System  C:\Windows\system32
Temp  C:\Users\DEATHA~1\AppData\Local\Temp\
Templates  C:\Users\Deathadder™\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Templates
Windows  C:\Windows


Event Logs

 
Log Name  Event Type  Category  Generated On  User  Source  Description
Application  Warning  None  2017-01-09 14:07:47    Outlook  25: Outlook is setting up a local copy of your mailbox. It may be several minutes until all of your data is available.
Application  Warning  None  2017-01-09 14:25:54    Outlook  25: Outlook is setting up a local copy of your mailbox. It may be several minutes until all of your data is available.
Application  Error  100  2017-01-09 19:34:33    Application Error  1000: Faulting application name: KSM.exe, version: 1.0.1.3, time stamp: 0x57cf4503 Faulting module name: KSM.exe, version: 1.0.1.3, time stamp: 0x57cf4503 Exception code: 0xc0000005 Fault offset: 0x000012dc Faulting process id: 0x2f3c Faulting application start time: 0x01d26a74b49ec425 Faulting application path: C:\Program Files (x86)\Kingston_SSD_Manager\KSM.exe Faulting module path: C:\Program Files (x86)\Kingston_SSD_Manager\KSM.exe Report Id: 23c88b8f-8a23-48af-8e5d-907c78a33063 Faulting package full name: Faulting package-relative application ID:
Application  Error  None  2017-01-09 19:39:13    SideBySide  78: Activation context generation failed for "c:\program files (x86)\adobe\adobe creative cloud\utils\Creative Cloud Uninstaller.exe".Error in manifest or policy file "" on line . A component version required by the application conflicts with another component version already active. Conflicting components are:. Component 1: C:\Windows\WinSxS\manifests\x86_microsoft.windows.common-controls_6595b64144ccf1df_6.0.14393.447_none_89c64d28dafea4b9.manifest. Component 2: C:\Windows\WinSxS\manifests\amd64_microsoft.windows.common-controls_6595b64144ccf1df_6.0.14393.447_none_42191651c6827bb3.manifest.
Application  Error  None  2017-01-09 19:53:16    Perflib  1008: The Open Procedure for service "BITS" in DLL "C:\Windows\System32\bitsperf.dll" failed. Performance data for this service will not be available. The first four bytes (DWORD) of the Data section contains the error code.
Application  Error  None  2017-01-09 19:53:16    Perflib  1023: Windows cannot load the extensible counter DLL rdyboost. The first four bytes (DWORD) of the Data section contains the Windows error code.
Application  Error  100  2017-01-10 10:22:22    Application Error  1000: Faulting application name: wmiprvse.exe, version: 10.0.14393.0, time stamp: 0x57899ab2 Faulting module name: ntdll.dll, version: 10.0.14393.479, time stamp: 0x5825887f Exception code: 0xc0000374 Fault offset: 0x00000000000f8283 Faulting process id: 0xdac Faulting application start time: 0x01d26af0929ed93f Faulting application path: C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe Faulting module path: C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll Report Id: 6d8bfad0-ea3c-48ee-870e-4b836cbd3e2e Faulting package full name: Faulting package-relative application ID:
Application  Error  101  2017-01-11 09:54:06    Application Hang  1002: The program vmplayer.exe version 12.5.1.12906 stopped interacting with Windows and was closed. To see if more information about the problem is available, check the problem history in the Security and Maintenance control panel. Process ID: 21b4 Start Time: 01d26bb5d5c51def Termination Time: 4294967295 Application Path: C:\Program Files (x86)\VMware\VMware Player\vmplayer.exe Report Id: 36403d25-d7a9-11e6-aaf7-005056c00008 Faulting package full name: Faulting package-relative application ID:
Application  Error  None  2017-01-11 10:21:20    Perflib  1008: The Open Procedure for service "BITS" in DLL "C:\Windows\System32\bitsperf.dll" failed. Performance data for this service will not be available. The first four bytes (DWORD) of the Data section contains the error code.
Application  Error  None  2017-01-11 10:21:20    Perflib  1023: Windows cannot load the extensible counter DLL rdyboost. The first four bytes (DWORD) of the Data section contains the Windows error code.
Application  Error  None  2017-01-11 10:21:21    Perflib  1022: Windows cannot open the 64-bit extensible counter DLL VMware in a 32-bit environment. Contact the file vendor to obtain a 32-bit version. Alternatively if you are running a 64-bit native environment, you can open the 64-bit extensible counter DLL by using the 64-bit version of Performance Monitor. To use this tool, open the Windows folder, open the System32 folder, and then start Perfmon.exe.
Application  Error  None  2017-01-11 10:21:21    Perflib  1017: Disabled performance counter data collection from the "VMware" service because the performance counter library for that service has generated one or more errors. The errors that forced this action have been written to the application event log. Correct the errors before enabling the performance counters for this service.
Application  Warning  None  2017-01-12 07:19:29  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-WMI  63: A provider, DMWmiBridgeProv, has been registered in the Windows Management Instrumentation namespace root\cimv2\mdm\dmmap to use the LocalSystem account. This account is privileged and the provider may cause a security violation if it does not correctly impersonate user requests.
Application  Warning  None  2017-01-12 07:19:29  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-WMI  63: A provider, DMWmiBridgeProv, has been registered in the Windows Management Instrumentation namespace root\cimv2\mdm\dmmap to use the LocalSystem account. This account is privileged and the provider may cause a security violation if it does not correctly impersonate user requests.
Application  Warning  None  2017-01-12 07:19:29  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-WMI  63: A provider, DMWmiBridgeProv, has been registered in the Windows Management Instrumentation namespace root\cimv2\mdm\dmmap to use the LocalSystem account. This account is privileged and the provider may cause a security violation if it does not correctly impersonate user requests.
Application  Warning  None  2017-01-12 07:19:29  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-WMI  63: A provider, DMWmiBridgeProv1, has been registered in the Windows Management Instrumentation namespace root\cimv2\mdm\dmmap to use the LocalSystem account. This account is privileged and the provider may cause a security violation if it does not correctly impersonate user requests.
Application  Warning  None  2017-01-12 07:19:29  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-WMI  63: A provider, DMWmiBridgeProv1, has been registered in the Windows Management Instrumentation namespace root\cimv2\mdm\dmmap to use the LocalSystem account. This account is privileged and the provider may cause a security violation if it does not correctly impersonate user requests.
Application  Warning  None  2017-01-12 07:19:29  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-WMI  63: A provider, DMWmiBridgeProv1, has been registered in the Windows Management Instrumentation namespace root\cimv2\mdm\dmmap to use the LocalSystem account. This account is privileged and the provider may cause a security violation if it does not correctly impersonate user requests.
Application  Error  None  2017-01-12 10:17:58    RasClient  20227: CoId={FD27EBCD-C636-4758-8203-F951142DEBD8}: The user SYSTEM dialed a connection named VPN VNPT which has failed. The error code returned on failure is 807.
Application  Error  None  2017-01-12 10:18:58    RasClient  20227: CoId={EF417DB8-8F50-46E2-9977-64BF8D06D05B}: The user SYSTEM dialed a connection named VNP which has failed. The error code returned on failure is 807.
Application  Error  None  2017-01-12 11:44:56    Perflib  1008: The Open Procedure for service "BITS" in DLL "C:\Windows\System32\bitsperf.dll" failed. Performance data for this service will not be available. The first four bytes (DWORD) of the Data section contains the error code.
Application  Error  None  2017-01-12 11:44:56    Perflib  1023: Windows cannot load the extensible counter DLL rdyboost. The first four bytes (DWORD) of the Data section contains the Windows error code.
Application  Error  100  2017-01-12 11:45:30    Application Error  1000: Faulting application name: wmiprvse.exe, version: 10.0.14393.0, time stamp: 0x57899ab2 Faulting module name: ntdll.dll, version: 10.0.14393.479, time stamp: 0x5825887f Exception code: 0xc0000374 Fault offset: 0x00000000000f8283 Faulting process id: 0xca4 Faulting application start time: 0x01d26c8e9ec8280e Faulting application path: C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe Faulting module path: C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll Report Id: f840daf7-0252-4995-843b-d28dfab1c40e Faulting package full name: Faulting package-relative application ID:
Application  Error  5973  2017-01-12 15:41:45  Deathadder™  Microsoft-Windows-Immersive-Shell  5973: Activation of app Microsoft.Windows.ContentDeliveryManager_cw5n1h2txyewy!App failed with error: -2144927141 See the Microsoft-Windows-TWinUI/Operational log for additional information.
Application  Error  2400  2017-01-12 19:14:45  Deathadder™  Microsoft-Windows-Immersive-Shell  2484: Package Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_1.7.0.14393_neutral_neutral_cw5n1h2txyewy+CortanaUI was terminated because it took too long to suspend.
Application  Error  None  2017-01-12 20:34:54    Microsoft Office 16  2011: Office Subscription licensing exception: Error Code: 0x803D0010; CorrelationId: {2F700375-DAA9-475F-9F75-C7E95E83A15C}
Application  Error  None  2017-01-12 20:35:15    Microsoft Office 16  2011: Office Subscription licensing exception: Error Code: 0x803D0010; CorrelationId: {2F700375-DAA9-475F-9F75-C7E95E83A15C}
Application  Error  None  2017-01-12 20:35:15    Office 2016 Licensing Service  0:
Application  Error  None  2017-01-12 21:33:23    .NET Runtime  1026: Application: Tiny.VN.exe Framework Version: v4.0.30319 Description: The process was terminated due to an unhandled exception. Exception Info: System.Net.Sockets.SocketException at System.Net.Sockets.Socket.DoConnect(System.Net.EndPoint, System.Net.SocketAddress) at System.Net.ServicePoint.ConnectSocketInternal(Boolean, System.Net.Sockets.Socket, System.Net.Sockets.Socket, System.Net.Sockets.Socket ByRef, System.Net.IPAddress ByRef, ConnectSocketState, System.IAsyncResult, System.Exception ByRef) Exception Info: System.Net.WebException at System.Net.WebClient.DownloadDataInternal(System.Uri, System.Net.WebRequest ByRef) at System.Net.WebClient.DownloadString(System.Uri) at Tiny.VN_C4.Form1..ctor() at Tiny.VN_C4.Program.Main()
Application  Error  100  2017-01-12 21:33:23    Application Error  1000: Faulting application name: Tiny.VN.exe, version: 1.0.0.8, time stamp: 0x58282db2 Faulting module name: KERNELBASE.dll, version: 10.0.14393.479, time stamp: 0x582588e6 Exception code: 0xe0434352 Fault offset: 0x0000000000017788 Faulting process id: 0x20a0 Faulting application start time: 0x01d26ce0c782632a Faulting application path: C:\Users\Deathadder™\Desktop\tiny.vn_1.0.8\Tiny.VN\Tiny.VN.exe Faulting module path: C:\Windows\System32\KERNELBASE.dll Report Id: ff7be9fd-cc59-4121-b4ad-2f9bbc5ed3d4 Faulting package full name: Faulting package-relative application ID:
Application  Error  None  2017-01-12 21:33:57    .NET Runtime  1026: Application: Tiny.VN.exe Framework Version: v4.0.30319 Description: The process was terminated due to an unhandled exception. Exception Info: System.Net.Sockets.SocketException at System.Net.Sockets.Socket.DoConnect(System.Net.EndPoint, System.Net.SocketAddress) at System.Net.ServicePoint.ConnectSocketInternal(Boolean, System.Net.Sockets.Socket, System.Net.Sockets.Socket, System.Net.Sockets.Socket ByRef, System.Net.IPAddress ByRef, ConnectSocketState, System.IAsyncResult, System.Exception ByRef) Exception Info: System.Net.WebException at System.Net.WebClient.DownloadDataInternal(System.Uri, System.Net.WebRequest ByRef) at System.Net.WebClient.DownloadString(System.Uri) at Tiny.VN_C4.Form1..ctor() at Tiny.VN_C4.Program.Main()
Application  Error  100  2017-01-12 21:33:57    Application Error  1000: Faulting application name: Tiny.VN.exe, version: 1.0.0.8, time stamp: 0x58282db2 Faulting module name: KERNELBASE.dll, version: 10.0.14393.479, time stamp: 0x582588e6 Exception code: 0xe0434352 Fault offset: 0x0000000000017788 Faulting process id: 0x1318 Faulting application start time: 0x01d26ce0dbe19875 Faulting application path: C:\Users\Deathadder™\Desktop\tiny.vn_1.0.8\Tiny.VN\Tiny.VN.exe Faulting module path: C:\Windows\System32\KERNELBASE.dll Report Id: 10c0b1a0-551c-403b-94ab-0e8c0ca75560 Faulting package full name: Faulting package-relative application ID:
Application  Error  None  2017-01-12 21:34:32    .NET Runtime  1026: Application: Tiny.VN.exe Framework Version: v4.0.30319 Description: The process was terminated due to an unhandled exception. Exception Info: System.Net.Sockets.SocketException at System.Net.Sockets.Socket.DoConnect(System.Net.EndPoint, System.Net.SocketAddress) at System.Net.ServicePoint.ConnectSocketInternal(Boolean, System.Net.Sockets.Socket, System.Net.Sockets.Socket, System.Net.Sockets.Socket ByRef, System.Net.IPAddress ByRef, ConnectSocketState, System.IAsyncResult, System.Exception ByRef) Exception Info: System.Net.WebException at System.Net.WebClient.DownloadDataInternal(System.Uri, System.Net.WebRequest ByRef) at System.Net.WebClient.DownloadString(System.Uri) at Tiny.VN_C4.Form1..ctor() at Tiny.VN_C4.Program.Main()
Application  Error  100  2017-01-12 21:34:32    Application Error  1000: Faulting application name: Tiny.VN.exe, version: 1.0.0.8, time stamp: 0x58282db2 Faulting module name: KERNELBASE.dll, version: 10.0.14393.479, time stamp: 0x582588e6 Exception code: 0xe0434352 Fault offset: 0x0000000000017788 Faulting process id: 0x1f90 Faulting application start time: 0x01d26ce0f0c099ef Faulting application path: C:\Users\Deathadder™\Desktop\tiny.vn_1.0.8\Tiny.VN\Tiny.VN.exe Faulting module path: C:\Windows\System32\KERNELBASE.dll Report Id: c6bcaaf7-5326-4f36-9560-c6b42ee04353 Faulting package full name: Faulting package-relative application ID:
Application  Error  None  2017-01-12 21:36:24    .NET Runtime  1026: Application: Tiny.VN.exe Framework Version: v4.0.30319 Description: The process was terminated due to an unhandled exception. Exception Info: System.Net.Sockets.SocketException at System.Net.Sockets.Socket.DoConnect(System.Net.EndPoint, System.Net.SocketAddress) at System.Net.ServicePoint.ConnectSocketInternal(Boolean, System.Net.Sockets.Socket, System.Net.Sockets.Socket, System.Net.Sockets.Socket ByRef, System.Net.IPAddress ByRef, ConnectSocketState, System.IAsyncResult, System.Exception ByRef) Exception Info: System.Net.WebException at System.Net.WebClient.DownloadDataInternal(System.Uri, System.Net.WebRequest ByRef) at System.Net.WebClient.DownloadString(System.Uri) at Tiny.VN_C4.Form1..ctor() at Tiny.VN_C4.Program.Main()
Application  Error  100  2017-01-12 21:36:24    Application Error  1000: Faulting application name: Tiny.VN.exe, version: 1.0.0.8, time stamp: 0x58282db2 Faulting module name: KERNELBASE.dll, version: 10.0.14393.479, time stamp: 0x582588e6 Exception code: 0xe0434352 Fault offset: 0x0000000000017788 Faulting process id: 0xe74 Faulting application start time: 0x01d26ce133833f57 Faulting application path: C:\Users\Deathadder™\Desktop\tiny.vn_1.0.8\Tiny.VN\Tiny.VN.exe Faulting module path: C:\Windows\System32\KERNELBASE.dll Report Id: 4f46dde0-b4fb-4958-a502-21469bb46439 Faulting package full name: Faulting package-relative application ID:
Application  Error  5973  2017-01-12 21:39:05  Deathadder™  Microsoft-Windows-Immersive-Shell  5973: Activation of app Microsoft.Windows.ContentDeliveryManager_cw5n1h2txyewy!App failed with error: -2144927141 See the Microsoft-Windows-TWinUI/Operational log for additional information.
Application  Error  5973  2017-01-12 21:39:05  Deathadder™  Microsoft-Windows-Immersive-Shell  5973: Activation of app Microsoft.Windows.ContentDeliveryManager_cw5n1h2txyewy!App failed with error: -2144927141 See the Microsoft-Windows-TWinUI/Operational log for additional information.
Application  Error  None  2017-01-13 14:10:03    Perflib  1023: Windows cannot load the extensible counter DLL rdyboost. The first four bytes (DWORD) of the Data section contains the Windows error code.
Application  Error  None  2017-01-13 19:13:41    Perflib  1008: The Open Procedure for service "BITS" in DLL "C:\Windows\System32\bitsperf.dll" failed. Performance data for this service will not be available. The first four bytes (DWORD) of the Data section contains the error code.
Application  Error  None  2017-01-13 19:13:44    Bonjour Service  100: mDNSCoreReceiveResponse: Received from FE80:0000:0000:0000:14A6:4D85:0AC3:14BF:5353 4 RAZER.local. Addr 169.254.20.191
Application  Error  None  2017-01-13 19:13:44    Bonjour Service  100: mDNSCoreReceiveResponse: ProbeCount 2; will deregister 16 RAZER.local. AAAA FE80:0000:0000:0000:14A6:4D85:0AC3:14BF
Application  Error  None  2017-01-13 19:13:44    Bonjour Service  100: Local Hostname RAZER.local already in use; will try RAZER-2.local instead
Application  Error  None  2017-01-14 07:20:23    Bonjour Service  100: mDNSCoreReceiveResponse: Received from FE80:0000:0000:0000:65EB:CAA6:C27D:072F:5353 4 RAZER.local. Addr 10.26.10.52
Application  Error  None  2017-01-14 07:20:23    Bonjour Service  100: mDNSCoreReceiveResponse: ProbeCount 2; will deregister 16 RAZER.local. AAAA FE80:0000:0000:0000:65EB:CAA6:C27D:072F
Application  Error  None  2017-01-14 07:20:23    Bonjour Service  100: Local Hostname RAZER.local already in use; will try RAZER-2.local instead
Application  Error  None  2017-01-14 19:27:57    Bonjour Service  100: mDNSCoreReceiveResponse: Received from FE80:0000:0000:0000:441B:787F:A43C:86D1:5353 4 RAZER.local. Addr 192.168.174.1
Application  Error  None  2017-01-14 19:27:57    Bonjour Service  100: mDNSCoreReceiveResponse: ProbeCount 2; will deregister 16 RAZER.local. AAAA FE80:0000:0000:0000:441B:787F:A43C:86D1
Application  Error  None  2017-01-14 19:27:57    Bonjour Service  100: Local Hostname RAZER.local already in use; will try RAZER-2.local instead
Application  Error  5973  2017-01-15 11:26:01  Deathadder™  Microsoft-Windows-Immersive-Shell  5973: Activation of app Microsoft.Windows.Photos_8wekyb3d8bbwe!App failed with error: -2144927142 See the Microsoft-Windows-TWinUI/Operational log for additional information.
Application  Error  101  2017-01-15 11:26:06    Application Hang  1002: The program Microsoft.Photos.exe version 1.0.1611.18000 stopped interacting with Windows and was closed. To see if more information about the problem is available, check the problem history in the Security and Maintenance control panel. Process ID: 1818 Start Time: 01d26ee73276e6b7 Termination Time: 4294967295 Application Path: C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.Windows.Photos_16.1118.10000.0_x64__8wekyb3d8bbwe\Microsoft.Photos.exe Report Id: b7c94de9-dada-11e6-ab05-3085a929cbb6 Faulting package full name: Microsoft.Windows.Photos_16.1118.10000.0_x64__8wekyb3d8bbwe Faulting package-relative application ID: App
Application  Error  None  2017-01-15 19:08:34    Perflib  1008: The Open Procedure for service "BITS" in DLL "C:\Windows\System32\bitsperf.dll" failed. Performance data for this service will not be available. The first four bytes (DWORD) of the Data section contains the error code.
Application  Error  None  2017-01-15 19:08:34    Perflib  1023: Windows cannot load the extensible counter DLL rdyboost. The first four bytes (DWORD) of the Data section contains the Windows error code.
Application  Error  5973  2017-01-15 20:06:32  Deathadder™  Microsoft-Windows-Immersive-Shell  5973: Activation of app Microsoft.Windows.Photos_8wekyb3d8bbwe!App failed with error: -2144927142 See the Microsoft-Windows-TWinUI/Operational log for additional information.
Application  Error  101  2017-01-15 20:06:35    Application Hang  1002: The program Microsoft.Photos.exe version 1.0.1611.18000 stopped interacting with Windows and was closed. To see if more information about the problem is available, check the problem history in the Security and Maintenance control panel. Process ID: ca0 Start Time: 01d26f2fe9d45b57 Termination Time: 4294967295 Application Path: C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.Windows.Photos_16.1118.10000.0_x64__8wekyb3d8bbwe\Microsoft.Photos.exe Report Id: 6f28dd6c-db23-11e6-ab06-3085a929cbb6 Faulting package full name: Microsoft.Windows.Photos_16.1118.10000.0_x64__8wekyb3d8bbwe Faulting package-relative application ID: App
Application  Error  None  2017-01-16 09:06:25    SideBySide  78: Activation context generation failed for "c:\program files (x86)\adobe\adobe creative cloud\utils\Creative Cloud Uninstaller.exe".Error in manifest or policy file "" on line . A component version required by the application conflicts with another component version already active. Conflicting components are:. Component 1: C:\Windows\WinSxS\manifests\x86_microsoft.windows.common-controls_6595b64144ccf1df_6.0.14393.447_none_89c64d28dafea4b9.manifest. Component 2: C:\Windows\WinSxS\manifests\amd64_microsoft.windows.common-controls_6595b64144ccf1df_6.0.14393.447_none_42191651c6827bb3.manifest.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 09:10:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x10fc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 09:10:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x10fc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 09:10:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x10fc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 09:10:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x10fc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 09:18:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x458 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 09:18:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2217f65c Linked Logon ID: 0x2217f68f Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x458 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 09:18:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2217f68f Linked Logon ID: 0x2217f65c Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x458 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 09:18:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 09:18:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2217fdef Linked Logon ID: 0x2217fe4b Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 09:18:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2217fe4b Linked Logon ID: 0x2217fdef Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 09:18:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x2217fe4b Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 09:18:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x2217f68f Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 09:18:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x2217fdef Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 09:18:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x2217f65c Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 09:18:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2217f65c Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 09:18:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2217fdef Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 09:18:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 09:18:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 09:18:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1b84 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 09:18:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1b84 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 09:19:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1b84 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 09:19:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1b84 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 09:19:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: wdmycloud Additional Information: wdmycloud Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.23 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 09:19:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 09:19:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x7e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 09:20:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 09:21:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 09:21:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x7e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 09:27:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: mien.hoangthi@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 09:27:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: mien.hoangthi@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 09:27:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 09:27:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 09:27:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 09:27:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x7e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 09:27:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x7e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 09:28:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 09:28:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x7e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 09:28:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x7e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 09:30:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: noi.tranthi Account Domain: RAZER Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 09:30:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: noi.tranthi@hff-group.com Account Domain: RAZER Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 09:30:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: noi.tranthi@hff-group.com Account Domain: RAZER Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 09:31:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: RAZER Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 09:31:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: RAZER Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 09:31:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 09:31:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x7e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 09:31:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x7e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 09:31:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x3140 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 09:31:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x3140 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 09:31:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x24e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 09:32:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x3140 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 09:32:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x3140 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 10:16:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x458 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 10:16:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x22315fcd Linked Logon ID: 0x22316000 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x458 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 10:16:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x22316000 Linked Logon ID: 0x22315fcd Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x458 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 10:16:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x22315fcd Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 10:16:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 10:16:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 10:16:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x223165f5 Linked Logon ID: 0x22316657 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 10:16:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x22316657 Linked Logon ID: 0x223165f5 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 10:16:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x22316657 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 10:16:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x223165f5 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 10:16:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x22316000 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 10:16:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x22315fcd Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 10:16:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x223165f5 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 10:16:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 10:16:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2f54 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 10:16:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2f54 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 10:16:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2f54 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 10:16:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2f54 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 10:28:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 10:28:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 10:28:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 10:28:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 10:28:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x3614 Process Name: C:\Windows\explorer.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 11:06:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 11:06:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 11:36:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xf78 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 11:36:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xf78 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 11:36:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xa60 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 11:36:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xf78 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 11:36:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xf78 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 11:48:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xa60 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 11:50:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x458 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 11:50:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x226b0633 Linked Logon ID: 0x226b0666 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x458 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 11:50:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x226b0666 Linked Logon ID: 0x226b0633 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x458 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 11:50:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 11:50:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x226b0d43 Linked Logon ID: 0x226b0d94 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 11:50:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x226b0d94 Linked Logon ID: 0x226b0d43 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 11:50:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x226b0d94 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 11:50:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x226b0666 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 11:50:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x226b0633 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 11:50:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x226b0d43 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 11:50:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x226b0633 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 11:50:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x226b0d43 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 11:50:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 11:50:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 11:50:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c34 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 11:50:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c34 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 11:51:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c34 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 11:51:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c34 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 11:59:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x101c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 11:59:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x101c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 11:59:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e98 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 11:59:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x101c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 11:59:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x101c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 12:58:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x458 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 12:58:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2288b48f Linked Logon ID: 0x2288b4c2 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x458 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 12:58:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2288b4c2 Linked Logon ID: 0x2288b48f Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x458 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 12:58:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 12:58:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2288ba93 Linked Logon ID: 0x2288baf8 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 12:58:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2288baf8 Linked Logon ID: 0x2288ba93 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 12:58:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x2288baf8 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 12:58:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x2288ba93 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 12:58:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x2288b4c2 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 12:58:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x2288b48f Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 12:58:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2288b48f Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 12:58:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2288ba93 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 12:58:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 12:58:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 12:58:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x31cc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 12:58:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x31cc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 12:58:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x31cc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 12:58:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x31cc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 13:05:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: EC2AMAZ-8MGC7TQ Additional Information: EC2AMAZ-8MGC7TQ Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 13:05:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: EC2AMAZ-8MGC7TQ Additional Information: EC2AMAZ-8MGC7TQ Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 13:05:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 13:05:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x7e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 13:08:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: RAZER Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 13:08:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: RAZER Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 13:08:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 13:08:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x7e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 13:08:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x7e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 13:08:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x7e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 13:12:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 13:12:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 13:21:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2ad4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 13:21:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2ad4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 13:21:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x153c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 13:22:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2ad4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 13:22:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2ad4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 13:23:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x458 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 13:23:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x22a220ad Linked Logon ID: 0x22a220e0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x458 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 13:23:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x22a220e0 Linked Logon ID: 0x22a220ad Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x458 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 13:23:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 13:23:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x22a22725 Linked Logon ID: 0x22a22775 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 13:23:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x22a22775 Linked Logon ID: 0x22a22725 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 13:23:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x22a22775 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 13:23:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x22a22725 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 13:23:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x22a220e0 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 13:23:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x22a220ad Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 13:23:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x22a220ad Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 13:23:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x22a22725 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 13:23:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 13:23:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 13:23:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1aa4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 13:23:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1aa4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 13:24:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1aa4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 13:24:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1aa4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 13:27:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2584 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 13:27:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2584 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 13:27:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2584 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 13:27:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2584 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 13:42:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 13:42:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 14:12:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 14:12:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 14:13:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 14:13:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 14:42:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 14:42:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 14:44:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x19fc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 14:44:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x19fc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 14:44:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x28ac Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 14:45:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x19fc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 14:45:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x19fc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 14:48:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x458 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 14:48:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x22e4332e Linked Logon ID: 0x22e43361 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x458 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 14:48:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x22e43361 Linked Logon ID: 0x22e4332e Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x458 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 14:48:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 14:48:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x22e43aad Linked Logon ID: 0x22e43b06 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 14:48:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x22e43b06 Linked Logon ID: 0x22e43aad Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 14:48:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x22e43b06 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 14:48:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x22e43aad Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 14:48:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x22e43361 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 14:48:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x22e4332e Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 14:48:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x22e4332e Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 14:48:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x22e43aad Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 14:48:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 14:48:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 14:48:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x15d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 14:48:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x15d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 14:49:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x15d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 14:49:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x15d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 15:12:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 15:12:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 15:42:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 15:42:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 16:12:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 16:12:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 16:18:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 16:18:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 16:42:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 16:42:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 17:00:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-37 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0xab4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 17:00:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-37 Account Name: DWM-37 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x232feb0f Linked Logon ID: 0x232feb2f Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0xab4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 17:00:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-37 Account Name: DWM-37 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x232feb2f Linked Logon ID: 0x232feb0f Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0xab4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 17:00:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 17:00:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 17:00:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-37 Account Name: DWM-37 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x232feb0f Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 17:00:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-37 Account Name: DWM-37 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x232feb2f Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 17:00:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 17:00:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 17:00:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4647: User initiated logoff: Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21a243bf This event is generated when a logoff is initiated. No further user-initiated activity can occur. This event can be interpreted as a logoff event.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:00:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2bf4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 17:00:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x458 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 17:00:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2332c02d Linked Logon ID: 0x2332c05f Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x458 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 17:00:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2332c05f Linked Logon ID: 0x2332c02d Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x458 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 17:00:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 17:00:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2332c272 Linked Logon ID: 0x2332c2bd Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 17:00:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2332c2bd Linked Logon ID: 0x2332c272 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 17:00:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x2332c2bd Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 17:00:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x2332c272 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 17:00:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2332c02d Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 17:00:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2332c272 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:00:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:00:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-09 17:00:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x458 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:00:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:00:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:00:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:00:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:00:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:00:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:00:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:00:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:00:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:00:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:00:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:00:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:00:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:00:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:00:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:00:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:00:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:00:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:00:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:00:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:00:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:00:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:00:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:00:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:00:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:01:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1658 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:01:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1658 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:01:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1658 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:01:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1658 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:01:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xf04 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:01:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xf04 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 17:01:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 17:01:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:01:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x2332c05f Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:01:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x2332c05f Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:01:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x2332c05f Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:01:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x2332c05f Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 17:01:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x2332c05f User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2acc Process Name: C:\Windows\explorer.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 17:01:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 17:01:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-09 19:30:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4616: The system time was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Process Information: Process ID: 0x5d0 Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Previous Time: 2017-01-09T10:01:37.090780100Z New Time: 2017-01-09T12:30:51.263578000Z This event is generated when the system time is changed. It is normal for the Windows Time Service, which runs with System privilege, to change the system time on a regular basis. Other system time changes may be indicative of attempts to tamper with the computer.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-09 19:30:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4616: The system time was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Process Information: Process ID: 0x5d0 Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Previous Time: 2017-01-09T12:30:51.263849700Z New Time: 2017-01-09T12:30:51.263000000Z This event is generated when the system time is changed. It is normal for the Windows Time Service, which runs with System privilege, to change the system time on a regular basis. Other system time changes may be indicative of attempts to tamper with the computer.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:30:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x2332c05f User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2908 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:30:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x2332c05f User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2908 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-09 19:30:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4616: The system time was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Process Information: Process ID: 0x5d0 Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Previous Time: 2017-01-09T12:30:52.542832800Z New Time: 2017-01-09T12:30:52.540000000Z This event is generated when the system time is changed. It is normal for the Windows Time Service, which runs with System privilege, to change the system time on a regular basis. Other system time changes may be indicative of attempts to tamper with the computer.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:31:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xf04 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:31:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xf04 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:32:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x2332c05f User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2264 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:34:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:34:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:35:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-38 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0xadc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:35:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-38 Account Name: DWM-38 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x234e8ba7 Linked Logon ID: 0x234e8bbe Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0xadc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:35:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-38 Account Name: DWM-38 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x234e8bbe Linked Logon ID: 0x234e8ba7 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0xadc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:35:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-38 Account Name: DWM-38 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x234e8ba7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:35:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-38 Account Name: DWM-38 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x234e8bbe Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 19:35:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4647: User initiated logoff: Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x2332c05f This event is generated when a logoff is initiated. No further user-initiated activity can occur. This event can be interpreted as a logoff event.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:39:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e2c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:39:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x19ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:39:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x19ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:39:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x458 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:39:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2351fc01 Linked Logon ID: 0x2351fc75 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x458 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:39:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2351fc75 Linked Logon ID: 0x2351fc01 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x458 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:39:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:39:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x235206ad Linked Logon ID: 0x235206fa Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:39:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x235206fa Linked Logon ID: 0x235206ad Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 19:39:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x235206fa Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 19:39:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x235206ad Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:39:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2351fc01 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:39:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x235206ad Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:39:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:39:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-09 19:39:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x458 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:39:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:39:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:39:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:39:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:39:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:39:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:39:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:39:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:39:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:39:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:39:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:39:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:39:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:39:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:39:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:39:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:39:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:39:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:39:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:39:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:39:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:39:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:39:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:39:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:39:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:39:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:39:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:39:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x19ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:39:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x19ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:39:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-39 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x2190 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:39:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-39 Account Name: DWM-39 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x235e5289 Linked Logon ID: 0x235e52ac Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x2190 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:39:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-39 Account Name: DWM-39 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x235e52ac Linked Logon ID: 0x235e5289 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x2190 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:39:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-39 Account Name: DWM-39 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x235e5289 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:39:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-39 Account Name: DWM-39 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x235e52ac Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 19:39:59    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4647: User initiated logoff: Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x2351fc75 This event is generated when a logoff is initiated. No further user-initiated activity can occur. This event can be interpreted as a logoff event.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xcc8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x25ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x25ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x25ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x25ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xf80 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xf80 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:40:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x458 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:40:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2361bfd7 Linked Logon ID: 0x2361c00d Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x458 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:40:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2361c00d Linked Logon ID: 0x2361bfd7 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x458 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:40:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:40:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2361c3d3 Linked Logon ID: 0x2361c424 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:40:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2361c424 Linked Logon ID: 0x2361c3d3 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 19:40:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x2361c424 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 19:40:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x2361c3d3 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:40:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2361bfd7 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:40:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2361c3d3 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-09 19:40:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x458 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xf80 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:40:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xf80 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-09 19:49:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4616: The system time was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Process Information: Process ID: 0x5d0 Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Previous Time: 2017-01-09T12:41:06.173152200Z New Time: 2017-01-09T12:49:43.466933200Z This event is generated when the system time is changed. It is normal for the Windows Time Service, which runs with System privilege, to change the system time on a regular basis. Other system time changes may be indicative of attempts to tamper with the computer.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-09 19:49:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4616: The system time was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Process Information: Process ID: 0x5d0 Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Previous Time: 2017-01-09T12:49:43.467044300Z New Time: 2017-01-09T12:49:43.466000000Z This event is generated when the system time is changed. It is normal for the Windows Time Service, which runs with System privilege, to change the system time on a regular basis. Other system time changes may be indicative of attempts to tamper with the computer.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-09 19:49:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4616: The system time was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Process Information: Process ID: 0x5d0 Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Previous Time: 2017-01-09T12:49:45.216029600Z New Time: 2017-01-09T12:49:45.214000000Z This event is generated when the system time is changed. It is normal for the Windows Time Service, which runs with System privilege, to change the system time on a regular basis. Other system time changes may be indicative of attempts to tamper with the computer.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:53:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1a8 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6?4?????? ? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x4 Creator Process Name: ??????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:53:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x218 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1a8 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13573  2017-01-09 19:53:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4826: Boot Configuration Data loaded. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 General Settings: Load Options: - Advanced Options: %%1843 Configuration Access Policy: %%1846 System Event Logging: %%1843 Kernel Debugging: %%1843 VSM Launch Type: %%1848 Signature Settings: Test Signing: %%1843 Flight Signing: %%1843 Disable Integrity Checks: %%1843 HyperVisor Settings: HyperVisor Load Options: - HyperVisor Launch Type: %%1848 HyperVisor Debugging: %%1843
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:53:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x2a8 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??8?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1a8 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:53:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x320 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x2a8 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-09 19:53:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4608: Windows is starting up. This event is logged when LSASS.EXE starts and the auditing subsystem is initialized.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:53:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 0 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: - New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Workstation Name: - Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: - Authentication Package: - Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:53:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:53:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:53:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x37c New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??8?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1a8 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:53:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3b4 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x2a8 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:53:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3f0 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x37c Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:53:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x24c New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??c?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x37c Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:53:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1e4 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??4?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x3b4 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:53:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1dc New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x3b4 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-09 19:53:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4902: The Per-user audit policy table was created. Number of Elements: 0 Policy ID: 0xb0c3
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:53:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:53:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  101  2017-01-09 19:53:10    Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog  1101: Audit events have been dropped by the transport. 0
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:53:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x24c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:53:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x114f6 Linked Logon ID: 0x11514 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x24c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:53:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x11514 Linked Logon ID: 0x114f6 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x24c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:53:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:53:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:53:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:53:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:53:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x114f6 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:53:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x11514 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:53:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:53:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:53:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:53:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-09 19:53:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5033: The Windows Firewall Driver started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:53:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:53:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-09 19:53:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5024: The Windows Firewall service started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:53:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:53:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:53:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:53:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:53:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x434 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:53:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x9dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:53:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x9dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-09 19:53:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x630 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-09 19:53:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x630 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-09 19:53:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x470 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-09 19:53:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x470 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:53:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 3 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-7 Account Name: ANONYMOUS LOGON Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3456c Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x0 Process Name: - Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: NtLmSsp Authentication Package: NTLM Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): NTLM V1 Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:53:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:53:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:53:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:53:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:53:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x9dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:53:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x9dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:53:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:53:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:53:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x470 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:53:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x57ffd Linked Logon ID: 0x5802b Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x470 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:53:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x5802b Linked Logon ID: 0x57ffd Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x470 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:53:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x57ffd Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:53:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:53:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:53:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x5823d Linked Logon ID: 0x5826e Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:53:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x5826e Linked Logon ID: 0x5823d Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 19:53:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x5826e Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 19:53:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x5823d Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:53:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x5823d Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:53:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-09 19:53:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x470 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:53:28    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:53:28    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-09 19:53:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x16d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-09 19:53:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x16d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-09 19:53:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  6406: Kaspersky Endpoint Security 10 for Windows registered to Windows Firewall to control filtering for the following: BootTimeRuleCategory, StealthRuleCategory, FirewallRuleCategory.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:57:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1a4 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6?4?????? ? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x4 Creator Process Name: ??????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:57:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x214 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1a4 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13573  2017-01-09 19:57:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4826: Boot Configuration Data loaded. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 General Settings: Load Options: - Advanced Options: %%1843 Configuration Access Policy: %%1846 System Event Logging: %%1843 Kernel Debugging: %%1843 VSM Launch Type: %%1848 Signature Settings: Test Signing: %%1843 Flight Signing: %%1843 Disable Integrity Checks: %%1843 HyperVisor Settings: HyperVisor Load Options: - HyperVisor Launch Type: %%1848 HyperVisor Debugging: %%1843
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:57:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x270 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??4?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1a4 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-09 19:57:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4608: Windows is starting up. This event is logged when LSASS.EXE starts and the auditing subsystem is initialized.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 0 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: - New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Workstation Name: - Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: - Authentication Package: - Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:57:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:57:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x31c New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x270 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:57:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x378 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??4?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1a4 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:57:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x390 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x270 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:57:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3f4 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x378 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:57:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x248 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??8?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x378 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:57:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1e4 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??0?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x390 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:57:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1dc New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x390 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-09 19:57:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4902: The Per-user audit policy table was created. Number of Elements: 0 Policy ID: 0xa5f1
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:57:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x248 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x109a8 Linked Logon ID: 0x109bd Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x248 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x109bd Linked Logon ID: 0x109a8 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x248 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:57:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x109a8 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:57:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x109bd Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:57:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:57:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:57:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:57:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1ac New Process Name: ??????????????-??6?4?????? ? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x4 Creator Process Name: ??????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:57:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x21c New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1ac Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13573  2017-01-09 19:57:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4826: Boot Configuration Data loaded. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 General Settings: Load Options: - Advanced Options: %%1843 Configuration Access Policy: %%1846 System Event Logging: %%1843 Kernel Debugging: %%1843 VSM Launch Type: %%1848 Signature Settings: Test Signing: %%1843 Flight Signing: %%1843 Disable Integrity Checks: %%1843 HyperVisor Settings: HyperVisor Load Options: - HyperVisor Launch Type: %%1848 HyperVisor Debugging: %%1843
Security  Audit Success  101  2017-01-09 19:57:46    Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog  1101: Audit events have been dropped by the transport. 0
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-09 19:57:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5033: The Windows Firewall Driver started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:57:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:57:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-09 19:57:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5024: The Windows Firewall service started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 3 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-7 Account Name: ANONYMOUS LOGON Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x21a07 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x0 Process Name: - Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: NtLmSsp Authentication Package: NTLM Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): NTLM V1 Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:57:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:57:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-09 19:57:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x600 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-09 19:57:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x600 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-09 19:57:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x45c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:57:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x26c New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??c?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1ac Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:57:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1a8 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6?4?????? ? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x4 Creator Process Name: ??????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:57:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x218 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1a8 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13573  2017-01-09 19:57:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4826: Boot Configuration Data loaded. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 General Settings: Load Options: - Advanced Options: %%1843 Configuration Access Policy: %%1846 System Event Logging: %%1843 Kernel Debugging: %%1843 VSM Launch Type: %%1848 Signature Settings: Test Signing: %%1843 Flight Signing: %%1843 Disable Integrity Checks: %%1843 HyperVisor Settings: HyperVisor Load Options: - HyperVisor Launch Type: %%1848 HyperVisor Debugging: %%1843
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:57:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x328 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x26c Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:57:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x384 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??c?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1ac Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:57:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3b0 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x26c Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:57:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3f8 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x384 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:57:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x214 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??4?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x384 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-09 19:57:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4608: Windows is starting up. This event is logged when LSASS.EXE starts and the auditing subsystem is initialized.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 0 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: - New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Workstation Name: - Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: - Authentication Package: - Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:57:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:57:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:57:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1e4 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??0?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x3b0 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:57:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1d4 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x3b0 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-09 19:57:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4902: The Per-user audit policy table was created. Number of Elements: 0 Policy ID: 0x9d4c
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x214 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10181 Linked Logon ID: 0x101a3 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x214 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x101a3 Linked Logon ID: 0x10181 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x214 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:57:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10181 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:57:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x101a3 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:57:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:57:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x268 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??8?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1a8 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  101  2017-01-09 19:57:54    Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog  1101: Audit events have been dropped by the transport. 0
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-09 19:57:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5033: The Windows Firewall Driver started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:57:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:57:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:57:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:57:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:57:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x31c New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x268 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-09 19:57:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4608: Windows is starting up. This event is logged when LSASS.EXE starts and the auditing subsystem is initialized.
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-09 19:57:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5024: The Windows Firewall service started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 3 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-7 Account Name: ANONYMOUS LOGON Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x1f803 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x0 Process Name: - Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: NtLmSsp Authentication Package: NTLM Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): NTLM V1 Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 0 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: - New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Workstation Name: - Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: - Authentication Package: - Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:57:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:57:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:57:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:57:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:57:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x378 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??8?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1a8 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:57:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x388 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x268 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:57:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3ec New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x378 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:57:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x23c New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??8?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x378 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:57:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1ec New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??8?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x388 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-09 19:57:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1e4 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x388 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-09 19:57:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4902: The Per-user audit policy table was created. Number of Elements: 0 Policy ID: 0x9d4b
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-09 19:57:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x604 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-09 19:57:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x604 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-09 19:57:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x454 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-09 19:57:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x454 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  101  2017-01-09 19:57:57    Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog  1101: Audit events have been dropped by the transport. 0
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x23c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x1055f Linked Logon ID: 0x1057c Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x23c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x1057c Linked Logon ID: 0x1055f Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x23c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:57:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x1055f Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:57:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x1057c Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:57:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:57:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:57:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:57:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:57:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:57:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x434 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-09 19:57:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5033: The Windows Firewall Driver started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-09 19:57:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5024: The Windows Firewall service started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 3 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-7 Account Name: ANONYMOUS LOGON Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x1fc95 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x0 Process Name: - Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: NtLmSsp Authentication Package: NTLM Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): NTLM V1 Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:57:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:57:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:57:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:57:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-09 19:57:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x604 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-09 19:57:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x604 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-09 19:57:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x450 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-09 19:57:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x450 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:58:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x7ac Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:58:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x7ac Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:58:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x428 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:58:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:58:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:58:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x7a4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:58:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x7a4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:58:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:58:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:58:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x7a4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:58:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x7a4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-09 19:58:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  6406: Kaspersky Endpoint Security 10 for Windows registered to Windows Firewall to control filtering for the following: BootTimeRuleCategory, StealthRuleCategory, FirewallRuleCategory.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:58:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x7ac Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:58:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x7ac Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:58:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x450 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:58:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x50bbc Linked Logon ID: 0x50beb Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x450 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:58:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x50beb Linked Logon ID: 0x50bbc Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x450 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:58:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:58:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x51014 Linked Logon ID: 0x5105f Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:58:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x5105f Linked Logon ID: 0x51014 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 19:58:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x5105f Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 19:58:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x51014 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:58:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x50bbc Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:58:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x51014 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:58:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:58:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-09 19:58:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x450 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:58:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:58:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-09 19:58:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  6406: Kaspersky Endpoint Security 10 for Windows registered to Windows Firewall to control filtering for the following: BootTimeRuleCategory, StealthRuleCategory, FirewallRuleCategory.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:58:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x454 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:58:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x5c58a Linked Logon ID: 0x5c5be Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x454 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:58:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x5c5be Linked Logon ID: 0x5c58a Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x454 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:58:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:58:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x5c8b8 Linked Logon ID: 0x5c8e6 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:58:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x5c8e6 Linked Logon ID: 0x5c8b8 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 19:58:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x5c8e6 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 19:58:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x5c8b8 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:58:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x5c58a Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:58:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x5c8b8 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:58:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 19:58:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-09 19:58:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x454 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:58:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:58:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-09 19:58:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x17ac Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-09 19:58:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x17ac Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 19:58:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 19:58:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-09 19:58:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x1610 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-09 19:58:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x1610 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-09 20:16:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4616: The system time was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Process Information: Process ID: 0x56c Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Previous Time: 2017-01-09T12:59:00.433547100Z New Time: 2017-01-09T13:16:36.508000000Z This event is generated when the system time is changed. It is normal for the Windows Time Service, which runs with System privilege, to change the system time on a regular basis. Other system time changes may be indicative of attempts to tamper with the computer.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 20:16:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e14 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 20:16:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e14 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-09 21:17:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4616: The system time was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Process Information: Process ID: 0x56c Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Previous Time: 2017-01-09T13:16:36.925358900Z New Time: 2017-01-09T14:17:32.882450300Z This event is generated when the system time is changed. It is normal for the Windows Time Service, which runs with System privilege, to change the system time on a regular basis. Other system time changes may be indicative of attempts to tamper with the computer.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-09 21:17:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4616: The system time was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Process Information: Process ID: 0x56c Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Previous Time: 2017-01-09T14:17:32.882661500Z New Time: 2017-01-09T14:17:32.882000000Z This event is generated when the system time is changed. It is normal for the Windows Time Service, which runs with System privilege, to change the system time on a regular basis. Other system time changes may be indicative of attempts to tamper with the computer.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 21:17:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x50beb User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e54 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 21:17:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x50beb User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e54 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 21:17:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e14 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 21:17:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e14 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-09 21:17:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4616: The system time was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Process Information: Process ID: 0x56c Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Previous Time: 2017-01-09T14:17:34.661729200Z New Time: 2017-01-09T14:17:34.661000000Z This event is generated when the system time is changed. It is normal for the Windows Time Service, which runs with System privilege, to change the system time on a regular basis. Other system time changes may be indicative of attempts to tamper with the computer.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 21:18:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 21:18:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12290  2017-01-09 21:18:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5061: Cryptographic operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: ECDSA_P256 Key Name: Microsoft Connected Devices Platform device certificate Key Type: %%2500 Cryptographic Operation: Operation: %%2480 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-09 21:18:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5058: Key file operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: UNKNOWN Key Name: Microsoft Connected Devices Platform device certificate Key Type: %%2500 Key File Operation Information: File Path: C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\LocalService\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Crypto\Keys\de7cf8a7901d2ad13e5c67c29e5d1662_515b10cc-5648-4ef1-85cd-ec69792150a2 Operation: %%2458 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-09 21:18:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5059: Key migration operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: ECDSA_P256 Key Name: Microsoft Connected Devices Platform device certificate Key Type: %%2500 Additional Information: Operation: %%2464 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 21:18:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 21:18:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-09 21:18:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x450 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-09 21:18:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x450 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 21:18:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 21:18:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 21:21:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x50beb User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x17d8 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 21:22:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1b88 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 21:22:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1b88 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 21:22:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1b88 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 21:22:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1b88 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 21:22:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 21:22:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-09 21:39:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x50beb User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xb38 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-09 22:19:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x450 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-09 22:19:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x450 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 22:44:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-2 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x48c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 22:44:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-2 Account Name: DWM-2 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x8c9f2b Linked Logon ID: 0x8c9f4a Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x48c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-09 22:44:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-2 Account Name: DWM-2 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x8c9f4a Linked Logon ID: 0x8c9f2b Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x48c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 22:44:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-2 Account Name: DWM-2 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x8c9f2b Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-09 22:44:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-2 Account Name: DWM-2 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x8c9f4a Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-09 22:44:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4647: User initiated logoff: Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x50beb This event is generated when a logoff is initiated. No further user-initiated activity can occur. This event can be interpreted as a logoff event.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:11:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c0c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 07:11:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x450 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 07:11:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x8e8e5c Linked Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x450 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 07:11:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e Linked Logon ID: 0x8e8e5c Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x450 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 07:11:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 07:11:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x8e90fa Linked Logon ID: 0x8e9154 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 07:11:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x8e9154 Linked Logon ID: 0x8e90fa Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 07:11:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e9154 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 07:11:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e90fa Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 07:11:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x8e8e5c Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 07:11:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x8e90fa Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:11:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:11:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 07:11:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x450 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:12:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd0c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:12:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd0c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:12:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd0c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:12:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd0c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:13:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2620 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:13:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2620 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:13:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2620 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:13:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2620 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 07:13:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.5 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:14:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x620 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:14:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x620 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:14:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x620 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:14:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x620 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:15:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-501 Account Name: Guest Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d48 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\CompatTelRunner.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 07:15:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 07:15:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 07:17:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.5 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 07:17:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 07:17:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x7fc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 07:18:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:18:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x984 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 07:20:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 07:20:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x7fc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 07:21:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: wdmycloud Additional Information: wdmycloud Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.23 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 07:25:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 07:25:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 07:25:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 07:25:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x7fc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 07:26:28    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.5 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:26:28    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x174c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:26:28    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x174c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:26:28    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x174c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:26:28    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x174c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:26:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:26:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:26:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:26:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:26:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:26:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:26:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:26:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:26:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:26:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:26:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:26:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:26:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x268c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:26:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x268c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:26:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x268c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:26:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x268c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:27:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xa8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 07:27:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xa8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 07:46:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x450 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 07:46:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x450 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 08:03:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 08:03:59    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 08:04:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 08:04:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x7fc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 08:04:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x7fc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 08:04:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x7fc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 08:09:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 08:09:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 08:11:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 08:36:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 08:36:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 08:36:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 08:36:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 08:36:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 08:36:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 08:36:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 08:36:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 08:36:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x24bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 08:36:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x24bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 08:36:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x24bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 08:36:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x24bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 08:36:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x24bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 08:36:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x24bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 08:36:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x24bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 08:36:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x24bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-10 08:36:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4616: The system time was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Process Information: Process ID: 0x56c Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Previous Time: 2017-01-10T01:36:39.645128200Z New Time: 2017-01-10T01:36:39.644000000Z This event is generated when the system time is changed. It is normal for the Windows Time Service, which runs with System privilege, to change the system time on a regular basis. Other system time changes may be indicative of attempts to tamper with the computer.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 08:36:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 08:36:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 08:49:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 08:49:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 08:50:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x45c Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 08:55:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 08:55:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 08:55:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: wdmycloud Additional Information: wdmycloud Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.23 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 08:55:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: wdmycloud Additional Information: wdmycloud Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.23 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 08:55:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 08:55:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 08:55:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 08:55:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 08:55:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1f88 Process Name: C:\Windows\explorer.exe
Security  Audit Success  103  2017-01-10 08:56:10    Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog  1100: The event logging service has shut down.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 08:56:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4647: User initiated logoff: Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8e8e8e This event is generated when a logoff is initiated. No further user-initiated activity can occur. This event can be interpreted as a logoff event.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:00:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1ac New Process Name: ??????????????-??6?4?????? ? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x4 Creator Process Name: ??????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:00:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x21c New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1ac Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13573  2017-01-10 09:00:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4826: Boot Configuration Data loaded. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 General Settings: Load Options: - Advanced Options: %%1843 Configuration Access Policy: %%1846 System Event Logging: %%1843 Kernel Debugging: %%1843 VSM Launch Type: %%1848 Signature Settings: Test Signing: %%1843 Flight Signing: %%1843 Disable Integrity Checks: %%1843 HyperVisor Settings: HyperVisor Load Options: - HyperVisor Launch Type: %%1848 HyperVisor Debugging: %%1843
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:00:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x26c New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??c?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1ac Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:00:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x328 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x26c Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-10 09:00:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4608: Windows is starting up. This event is logged when LSASS.EXE starts and the auditing subsystem is initialized.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:00:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 0 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: - New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Workstation Name: - Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: - Authentication Package: - Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:00:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:00:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:00:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:00:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:00:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x384 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??c?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1ac Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:00:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3ac New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x26c Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:00:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3f8 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x384 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:00:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x250 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??4?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x384 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:00:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1dc New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??c?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x3ac Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:00:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1d4 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x3ac Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-10 09:00:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4902: The Per-user audit policy table was created. Number of Elements: 0 Policy ID: 0x97d0
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:00:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x250 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:00:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10196 Linked Logon ID: 0x101af Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x250 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:00:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x101af Linked Logon ID: 0x10196 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x250 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:00:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:00:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:00:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:00:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:00:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10196 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:00:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x101af Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:00:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:00:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:00:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:00:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-10 09:00:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5033: The Windows Firewall Driver started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-10 09:00:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5024: The Windows Firewall service started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:00:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:00:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:00:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:00:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:00:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:00:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:00:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x438 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:00:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x648 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:00:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x648 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:00:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:00:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:00:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 3 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-7 Account Name: ANONYMOUS LOGON Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x22274 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x0 Process Name: - Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: NtLmSsp Authentication Package: NTLM Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): NTLM V1 Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:00:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:00:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:00:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x11e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:00:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x11e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-10 09:00:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  6406: Kaspersky Endpoint Security 10 for Windows registered to Windows Firewall to control filtering for the following: BootTimeRuleCategory, StealthRuleCategory, FirewallRuleCategory.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:00:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x11e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:00:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x11e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:00:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:00:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x4a0c2 Linked Logon ID: 0x4a0f0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:00:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x4a0f0 Linked Logon ID: 0x4a0c2 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:00:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:00:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x4a38c Linked Logon ID: 0x4a3c3 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:00:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x4a3c3 Linked Logon ID: 0x4a38c Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 09:00:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4a3c3 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 09:00:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4a38c Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:00:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x4a0c2 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:00:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x4a38c Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:00:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:00:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:00:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:00:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4a0f0 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:00:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4a0f0 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: wdmycloud Additional Information: wdmycloud Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.23 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:00:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4a0f0 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.5 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:00:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4a0f0 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x434 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:00:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:00:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:00:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4a0f0 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x434 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:00:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x16c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:00:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x16c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:00:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:00:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:00:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:00:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:00:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:00:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:00:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:00:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:00:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:00:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:00:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:00:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:00:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:00:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:00:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:00:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:00:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:00:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:00:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:00:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:00:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:00:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:00:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:00:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:00:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:01:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4a0c2 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:01:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4a0c2 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x434 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:01:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4a0c2 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x434 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:01:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4a0c2 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x434 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:01:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:01:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:02:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4a0f0 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d40 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
Security  Audit Success  12290  2017-01-10 09:02:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5061: Cryptographic operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: ECDSA_P256 Key Name: Microsoft Connected Devices Platform device certificate Key Type: %%2500 Cryptographic Operation: Operation: %%2480 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-10 09:02:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5058: Key file operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: UNKNOWN Key Name: Microsoft Connected Devices Platform device certificate Key Type: %%2500 Key File Operation Information: File Path: C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\LocalService\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Crypto\Keys\de7cf8a7901d2ad13e5c67c29e5d1662_515b10cc-5648-4ef1-85cd-ec69792150a2 Operation: %%2458 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-10 09:02:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5059: Key migration operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: ECDSA_P256 Key Name: Microsoft Connected Devices Platform device certificate Key Type: %%2500 Additional Information: Operation: %%2464 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:02:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:02:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:02:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:02:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:04:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:04:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:09:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1b70 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:09:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1b70 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:09:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1b70 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:09:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1b70 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:10:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x213c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:10:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x213c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:10:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x213c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:10:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x213c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:15:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4a0f0 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x23dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:15:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4a0f0 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x23dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:18:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:18:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 09:23:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4647: User initiated logoff: Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4a0f0 This event is generated when a logoff is initiated. No further user-initiated activity can occur. This event can be interpreted as a logoff event.
Security  Audit Success  103  2017-01-10 09:23:48    Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog  1100: The event logging service has shut down.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:29:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1ac New Process Name: ??????????????-??6?4?????? ? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x4 Creator Process Name: ??????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13573  2017-01-10 09:29:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4826: Boot Configuration Data loaded. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 General Settings: Load Options: - Advanced Options: %%1843 Configuration Access Policy: %%1846 System Event Logging: %%1843 Kernel Debugging: %%1843 VSM Launch Type: %%1848 Signature Settings: Test Signing: %%1843 Flight Signing: %%1843 Disable Integrity Checks: %%1843 HyperVisor Settings: HyperVisor Load Options: - HyperVisor Launch Type: %%1848 HyperVisor Debugging: %%1843
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:29:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x21c New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1ac Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:29:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x26c New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??c?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1ac Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:29:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x328 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x26c Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-10 09:29:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4608: Windows is starting up. This event is logged when LSASS.EXE starts and the auditing subsystem is initialized.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:29:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 0 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: - New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Workstation Name: - Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: - Authentication Package: - Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:29:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:29:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:29:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:29:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:29:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x384 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??c?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1ac Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:29:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3a4 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x26c Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:29:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3f8 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x384 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:29:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x250 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??4?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x384 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:29:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1dc New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??4?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x3a4 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:29:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1d4 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x3a4 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-10 09:29:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4902: The Per-user audit policy table was created. Number of Elements: 0 Policy ID: 0x97c4
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:29:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x250 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:29:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x100dc Linked Logon ID: 0x100fa Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x250 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:29:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x100fa Linked Logon ID: 0x100dc Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x250 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:29:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:29:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:29:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:29:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:29:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x100dc Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:29:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x100fa Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:29:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:29:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:29:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:29:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-10 09:29:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5033: The Windows Firewall Driver started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-10 09:29:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5024: The Windows Firewall service started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:29:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:29:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:29:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:29:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:29:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:29:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:29:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x42c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:29:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x660 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:29:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x660 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:29:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 3 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-7 Account Name: ANONYMOUS LOGON Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x24a75 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x0 Process Name: - Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: NtLmSsp Authentication Package: NTLM Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): NTLM V1 Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:29:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:29:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:29:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:29:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:29:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x7c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:29:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x7c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:29:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:29:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x3ecd3 Linked Logon ID: 0x3ed01 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:29:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x3ed01 Linked Logon ID: 0x3ecd3 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:29:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:29:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x3ef33 Linked Logon ID: 0x3ef72 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:29:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x3ef72 Linked Logon ID: 0x3ef33 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 09:29:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3ef72 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 09:29:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3ef33 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:29:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x3ecd3 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:29:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x3ef33 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:29:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:29:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:29:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:29:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3ed01 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:29:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3ed01 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: wdmycloud Additional Information: wdmycloud Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.23 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-10 09:29:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  6406: Kaspersky Endpoint Security 10 for Windows registered to Windows Firewall to control filtering for the following: BootTimeRuleCategory, StealthRuleCategory, FirewallRuleCategory.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:29:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3ed01 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.5 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:29:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3ed01 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x428 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:29:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3ed01 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x428 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:29:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:29:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:29:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x168c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:29:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x168c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:29:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:29:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:29:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:29:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:29:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:29:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:29:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:29:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:29:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:29:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:29:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:29:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:29:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:29:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:29:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:29:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x7c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:29:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:29:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:29:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:29:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:29:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x7c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:29:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:29:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:29:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:29:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:29:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:29:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:29:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3ecd3 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:29:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3ecd3 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x428 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:29:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3ecd3 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x428 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:29:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3ecd3 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x428 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:30:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3ecd3 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x428 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:31:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:31:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:31:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:31:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:31:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:31:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:33:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:33:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:35:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3ed01 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xbb8 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:36:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d00 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:36:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d00 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:36:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d00 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:36:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d00 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:36:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2680 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:39:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e00 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:39:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e00 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:39:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e00 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:39:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e00 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:41:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:41:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x212dcf Linked Logon ID: 0x212e02 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:41:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x212e02 Linked Logon ID: 0x212dcf Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:41:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x212dcf Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:41:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:41:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:41:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x213501 Linked Logon ID: 0x21355c Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:41:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x21355c Linked Logon ID: 0x213501 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 09:41:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x212e02 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 09:41:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x212dcf Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 09:41:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x21355c Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 09:41:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x213501 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:41:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x213501 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:41:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:41:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2068 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:41:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2068 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:41:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2068 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:41:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2068 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:41:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3ed01 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:41:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3ed01 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x428 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:41:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3ed01 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x428 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:42:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3ed01 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:42:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3ed01 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:42:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:42:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:44:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3ed01 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2430 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:44:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3ed01 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2430 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:44:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3ed01 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:44:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3ed01 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:44:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3ed01 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:44:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3ed01 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:44:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3ed01 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x14f0 Process Name: C:\Windows\explorer.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:48:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:48:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:51:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1a8 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6?4?????? ? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x4 Creator Process Name: ??????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:51:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x218 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1a8 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13573  2017-01-10 09:51:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4826: Boot Configuration Data loaded. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 General Settings: Load Options: - Advanced Options: %%1843 Configuration Access Policy: %%1846 System Event Logging: %%1843 Kernel Debugging: %%1843 VSM Launch Type: %%1848 Signature Settings: Test Signing: %%1843 Flight Signing: %%1843 Disable Integrity Checks: %%1843 HyperVisor Settings: HyperVisor Load Options: - HyperVisor Launch Type: %%1848 HyperVisor Debugging: %%1843
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:51:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x28c New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??8?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1a8 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:51:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x328 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x28c Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-10 09:51:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4608: Windows is starting up. This event is logged when LSASS.EXE starts and the auditing subsystem is initialized.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:51:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 0 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: - New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Workstation Name: - Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: - Authentication Package: - Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:51:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:51:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:51:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:51:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:51:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x384 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??8?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1a8 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:51:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x398 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x28c Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:51:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3f8 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x384 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:51:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x210 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??4?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x384 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:51:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1d4 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??8?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x398 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:51:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1cc New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x398 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-10 09:51:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4902: The Per-user audit policy table was created. Number of Elements: 0 Policy ID: 0x981a
Security  Audit Success  101  2017-01-10 09:51:10    Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog  1101: Audit events have been dropped by the transport. 0
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:51:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x210 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:51:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0xff8e Linked Logon ID: 0xffb1 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x210 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:51:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0xffb1 Linked Logon ID: 0xff8e Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x210 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:51:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:51:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:51:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:51:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:51:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0xff8e Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:51:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0xffb1 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:51:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:51:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:51:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:51:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-10 09:51:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5033: The Windows Firewall Driver started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-10 09:51:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5024: The Windows Firewall service started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:51:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:51:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:51:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:51:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:51:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:51:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 3 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-7 Account Name: ANONYMOUS LOGON Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x1efe9 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x0 Process Name: - Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: NtLmSsp Authentication Package: NTLM Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): NTLM V1 Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:51:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:51:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x638 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:51:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x638 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:51:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:51:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:51:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x438 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:51:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:51:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:51:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1164 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:51:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1164 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:51:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:51:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x3e419 Linked Logon ID: 0x3e462 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:51:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x3e462 Linked Logon ID: 0x3e419 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:51:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1cc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:51:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x3e83c Linked Logon ID: 0x3e86b Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1cc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:51:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x3e86b Linked Logon ID: 0x3e83c Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1cc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 09:51:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3e86b Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 09:51:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3e83c Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:51:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x3e419 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:51:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x3e83c Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:51:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:51:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:51:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:51:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3e462 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:51:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3e462 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:51:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3e462 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:51:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3e462 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: wdmycloud Additional Information: wdmycloud Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.23 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:51:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3e462 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.5 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-10 09:51:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  6406: Kaspersky Endpoint Security 10 for Windows registered to Windows Firewall to control filtering for the following: BootTimeRuleCategory, StealthRuleCategory, FirewallRuleCategory.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:51:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:51:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:51:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x16d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:51:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x16d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:51:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:51:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:51:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:51:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:51:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:51:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:51:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:51:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:51:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:51:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:51:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:51:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:51:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:51:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:51:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:51:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:51:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:51:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:51:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:51:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:51:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:51:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:51:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:51:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:51:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:51:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1164 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:51:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1164 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 09:51:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4647: User initiated logoff: Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3e462 This event is generated when a logoff is initiated. No further user-initiated activity can occur. This event can be interpreted as a logoff event.
Security  Audit Success  103  2017-01-10 09:51:43    Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog  1100: The event logging service has shut down.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:52:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1a4 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6?4?????? ? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x4 Creator Process Name: ??????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:52:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x214 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1a4 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13573  2017-01-10 09:52:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4826: Boot Configuration Data loaded. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 General Settings: Load Options: - Advanced Options: %%1843 Configuration Access Policy: %%1846 System Event Logging: %%1843 Kernel Debugging: %%1843 VSM Launch Type: %%1848 Signature Settings: Test Signing: %%1843 Flight Signing: %%1843 Disable Integrity Checks: %%1843 HyperVisor Settings: HyperVisor Load Options: - HyperVisor Launch Type: %%1848 HyperVisor Debugging: %%1843
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:52:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x288 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??4?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1a4 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:52:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x328 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x288 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:52:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x384 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??4?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1a4 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:52:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3b8 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x288 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:52:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3f8 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x384 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:52:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x20c New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??4?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x384 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-10 09:52:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4608: Windows is starting up. This event is logged when LSASS.EXE starts and the auditing subsystem is initialized.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:52:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 0 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: - New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Workstation Name: - Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: - Authentication Package: - Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:52:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:52:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:52:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:52:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:52:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1d0 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??8?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x3b8 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 09:52:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1c8 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x3b8 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-10 09:52:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4902: The Per-user audit policy table was created. Number of Elements: 0 Policy ID: 0x9995
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:52:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x20c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:52:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10111 Linked Logon ID: 0x1012f Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x20c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:52:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x1012f Linked Logon ID: 0x10111 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x20c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:52:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:52:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10111 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:52:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x1012f Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:52:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-10 09:52:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5033: The Windows Firewall Driver started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:52:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:52:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:52:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:52:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:52:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:52:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:52:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:52:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-10 09:52:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5024: The Windows Firewall service started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:52:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:52:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:52:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 3 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-7 Account Name: ANONYMOUS LOGON Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x21f20 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x0 Process Name: - Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: NtLmSsp Authentication Package: NTLM Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): NTLM V1 Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:52:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:52:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:52:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x434 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:52:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x64c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:52:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x64c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:52:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:52:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:52:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:52:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:52:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:52:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x36793 Linked Logon ID: 0x367fe Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:52:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x367fe Linked Logon ID: 0x36793 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:52:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:52:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x371e0 Linked Logon ID: 0x37230 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:52:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x37230 Linked Logon ID: 0x371e0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 09:52:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x37230 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 09:52:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x371e0 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:52:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x36793 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:52:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x371e0 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:52:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:52:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:52:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:52:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:52:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:52:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x1454 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:52:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x1454 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:52:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x367fe Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: wdmycloud Additional Information: wdmycloud Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.23 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:52:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x367fe Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.5 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-10 09:52:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  6406: Kaspersky Endpoint Security 10 for Windows registered to Windows Firewall to control filtering for the following: BootTimeRuleCategory, StealthRuleCategory, FirewallRuleCategory.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:52:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:52:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:52:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:52:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:52:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:52:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:52:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1574 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:52:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1574 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:52:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1574 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:52:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1574 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:53:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x36793 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:53:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x36793 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x69c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:53:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x36793 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x69c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:54:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x367fe Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.5 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:54:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x367fe Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: wdmycloud Additional Information: wdmycloud Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.23 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:54:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 09:54:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12290  2017-01-10 09:54:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5061: Cryptographic operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: ECDSA_P256 Key Name: Microsoft Connected Devices Platform device certificate Key Type: %%2500 Cryptographic Operation: Operation: %%2480 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-10 09:54:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5058: Key file operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: UNKNOWN Key Name: Microsoft Connected Devices Platform device certificate Key Type: %%2500 Key File Operation Information: File Path: C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\LocalService\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Crypto\Keys\de7cf8a7901d2ad13e5c67c29e5d1662_515b10cc-5648-4ef1-85cd-ec69792150a2 Operation: %%2458 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-10 09:54:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5059: Key migration operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: ECDSA_P256 Key Name: Microsoft Connected Devices Platform device certificate Key Type: %%2500 Additional Information: Operation: %%2464 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:54:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 09:54:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:54:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 09:54:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 09:55:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x367fe User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xb14 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 10:17:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1ac New Process Name: ??????????????-??6?4?????? ? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x4 Creator Process Name: ??????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 10:17:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x21c New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1ac Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13573  2017-01-10 10:17:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4826: Boot Configuration Data loaded. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 General Settings: Load Options: - Advanced Options: %%1843 Configuration Access Policy: %%1846 System Event Logging: %%1843 Kernel Debugging: %%1843 VSM Launch Type: %%1848 Signature Settings: Test Signing: %%1843 Flight Signing: %%1843 Disable Integrity Checks: %%1843 HyperVisor Settings: HyperVisor Load Options: - HyperVisor Launch Type: %%1848 HyperVisor Debugging: %%1843
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 10:17:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x26c New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??c?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1ac Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 10:17:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x328 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x26c Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-10 10:17:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4608: Windows is starting up. This event is logged when LSASS.EXE starts and the auditing subsystem is initialized.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:17:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 0 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: - New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Workstation Name: - Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: - Authentication Package: - Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:17:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 10:17:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 10:17:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x384 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??c?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1ac Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 10:17:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3a0 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x26c Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 10:17:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3f8 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x384 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 10:17:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x24c New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??4?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x384 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 10:17:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1e8 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??0?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x3a0 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 10:17:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1e0 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x3a0 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-10 10:17:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4902: The Per-user audit policy table was created. Number of Elements: 0 Policy ID: 0x98da
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:17:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 10:17:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  101  2017-01-10 10:17:46    Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog  1101: Audit events have been dropped by the transport. 0
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:17:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:17:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x24c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:17:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x106e6 Linked Logon ID: 0x10709 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x24c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:17:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10709 Linked Logon ID: 0x106e6 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x24c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:17:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:17:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 10:17:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 10:17:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x106e6 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 10:17:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10709 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 10:17:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 10:17:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-10 10:17:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5033: The Windows Firewall Driver started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:17:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:17:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:17:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 10:17:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 10:17:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 10:17:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-10 10:17:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5024: The Windows Firewall service started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:17:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 3 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-7 Account Name: ANONYMOUS LOGON Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x1f8ad Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x0 Process Name: - Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: NtLmSsp Authentication Package: NTLM Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): NTLM V1 Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:17:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 10:17:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 10:17:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x618 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 10:17:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x618 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 10:17:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x444 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 10:17:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x444 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:17:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x464 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:17:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 10:17:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:17:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x7f4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:17:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x7f4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-10 10:17:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  6406: Kaspersky Endpoint Security 10 for Windows registered to Windows Firewall to control filtering for the following: BootTimeRuleCategory, StealthRuleCategory, FirewallRuleCategory.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:17:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x7f4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:17:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x7f4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:19:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 10:19:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:19:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 10:19:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 10:19:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0xa00 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 10:19:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0xa00 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 10:19:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x444 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 10:19:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x444 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:19:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 10:19:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  103  2017-01-10 10:20:41    Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog  1100: The event logging service has shut down.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 10:20:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1a8 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6?4?????? ? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x4 Creator Process Name: ??????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13573  2017-01-10 10:20:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4826: Boot Configuration Data loaded. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 General Settings: Load Options: - Advanced Options: %%1843 Configuration Access Policy: %%1846 System Event Logging: %%1843 Kernel Debugging: %%1843 VSM Launch Type: %%1848 Signature Settings: Test Signing: %%1843 Flight Signing: %%1843 Disable Integrity Checks: %%1843 HyperVisor Settings: HyperVisor Load Options: - HyperVisor Launch Type: %%1848 HyperVisor Debugging: %%1843
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 10:20:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x218 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1a8 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 10:20:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x268 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??8?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1a8 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 10:20:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x328 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x268 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-10 10:20:59    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4608: Windows is starting up. This event is logged when LSASS.EXE starts and the auditing subsystem is initialized.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:20:59    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 0 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: - New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Workstation Name: - Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: - Authentication Package: - Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:20:59    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:20:59    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 10:20:59    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 10:20:59    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 10:20:59    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x384 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??8?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1a8 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 10:20:59    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x39c New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x268 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 10:20:59    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3f8 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x384 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 10:20:59    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x244 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??4?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x384 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 10:20:59    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1d8 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??c?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x39c Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-10 10:20:59    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1d0 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x39c Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-10 10:20:59    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4902: The Per-user audit policy table was created. Number of Elements: 0 Policy ID: 0x98ca
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:21:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x244 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:21:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0xfffd Linked Logon ID: 0x10018 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x244 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:21:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10018 Linked Logon ID: 0xfffd Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x244 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:21:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:21:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:21:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:21:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:21:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 10:21:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0xfffd Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 10:21:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10018 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 10:21:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 10:21:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 10:21:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 10:21:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 10:21:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-10 10:21:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5033: The Windows Firewall Driver started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-10 10:21:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5024: The Windows Firewall service started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:21:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:21:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 10:21:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 10:21:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:21:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x434 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 10:21:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x604 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 10:21:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x604 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 10:21:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 10:21:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:21:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 3 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-7 Account Name: ANONYMOUS LOGON Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x23324 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x0 Process Name: - Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: NtLmSsp Authentication Package: NTLM Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): NTLM V1 Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:21:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 10:21:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:21:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x7ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:21:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x7ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:21:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x7ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:21:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x7ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-10 10:21:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  6406: Kaspersky Endpoint Security 10 for Windows registered to Windows Firewall to control filtering for the following: BootTimeRuleCategory, StealthRuleCategory, FirewallRuleCategory.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:21:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:21:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x482a8 Linked Logon ID: 0x482d6 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:21:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x482d6 Linked Logon ID: 0x482a8 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:21:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:21:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x48534 Linked Logon ID: 0x48564 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:21:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x48564 Linked Logon ID: 0x48534 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 10:21:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x48564 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 10:21:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x48534 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 10:21:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x482a8 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 10:21:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x48534 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:21:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:21:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 10:21:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:21:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x482d6 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: wdmycloud Additional Information: wdmycloud Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.23 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:21:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x482d6 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:21:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x482d6 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x320 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:21:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x482d6 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x320 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:21:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x482d6 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.5 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:21:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x482d6 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x320 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:21:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 10:21:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:21:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:21:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:21:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:21:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:21:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:21:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 10:21:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x18bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 10:21:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x18bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:21:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:21:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:21:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:21:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:21:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:21:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:21:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:21:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:21:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:21:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:21:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:21:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:21:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:21:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:21:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:21:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:21:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:21:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:21:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:22:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x482a8 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:22:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x482a8 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x320 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:22:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 10:22:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:23:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 10:23:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 10:23:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 10:23:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12290  2017-01-10 10:23:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5061: Cryptographic operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: ECDSA_P256 Key Name: Microsoft Connected Devices Platform device certificate Key Type: %%2500 Cryptographic Operation: Operation: %%2480 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-10 10:23:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5058: Key file operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: UNKNOWN Key Name: Microsoft Connected Devices Platform device certificate Key Type: %%2500 Key File Operation Information: File Path: C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\LocalService\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Crypto\Keys\de7cf8a7901d2ad13e5c67c29e5d1662_515b10cc-5648-4ef1-85cd-ec69792150a2 Operation: %%2458 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-10 10:23:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5059: Key migration operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: ECDSA_P256 Key Name: Microsoft Connected Devices Platform device certificate Key Type: %%2500 Additional Information: Operation: %%2464 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 10:23:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 10:23:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:24:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x482d6 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x16b0 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:31:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2330 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:31:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2330 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:31:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2330 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:31:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2330 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:36:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x482d6 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x116c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 10:36:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x482d6 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x116c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 11:22:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x482d6 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 11:22:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x482d6 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 11:23:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x482d6 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 11:23:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x482d6 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x320 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 11:23:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x482d6 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x320 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 11:48:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1ff8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 11:48:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1ff8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 11:48:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x7d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 11:48:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1ff8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 11:48:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1ff8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 11:52:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 11:52:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x5270c9 Linked Logon ID: 0x5270fc Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 11:52:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x5270fc Linked Logon ID: 0x5270c9 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 11:52:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 11:52:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x5277ef Linked Logon ID: 0x52785a Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 11:52:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x52785a Linked Logon ID: 0x5277ef Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 11:52:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x52785a Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 11:52:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x5277ef Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 11:52:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x5270fc Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 11:52:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x5270c9 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 11:52:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x5270c9 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 11:52:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x5277ef Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 11:52:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 11:52:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 11:52:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x22c0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 11:52:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x22c0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 11:52:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x22c0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 11:52:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x22c0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 11:55:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 11:55:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 11:55:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 11:55:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 11:57:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c94 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 11:57:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c94 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 11:57:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c94 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 11:57:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c94 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 11:57:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1564 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 12:21:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 12:21:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 12:58:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 12:58:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x7ecd64 Linked Logon ID: 0x7ecd97 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 12:58:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x7ecd97 Linked Logon ID: 0x7ecd64 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 12:58:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x7ecd64 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 12:58:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 12:58:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 12:58:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x7ed374 Linked Logon ID: 0x7ed3c8 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 12:58:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x7ed3c8 Linked Logon ID: 0x7ed374 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 12:58:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x7ed3c8 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 12:58:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x7ed374 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 12:58:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x7ecd97 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 12:58:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x7ecd64 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 12:58:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x7ed374 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 12:58:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 12:58:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x216c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 12:58:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x216c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 12:58:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x216c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 12:58:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x216c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 14:25:59    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x482d6 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 14:25:59    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x482d6 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 14:26:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x482d6 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: EC2AMAZ-8MGC7TQ Additional Information: EC2AMAZ-8MGC7TQ Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 14:26:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x482d6 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: EC2AMAZ-8MGC7TQ Additional Information: EC2AMAZ-8MGC7TQ Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 14:26:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x482d6 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 14:26:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x482d6 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x320 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 14:31:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x157c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 14:31:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x157c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 14:31:59    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x828 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 14:32:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x157c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 14:32:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x157c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 14:34:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 14:34:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xbe945a Linked Logon ID: 0xbe948d Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 14:34:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xbe948d Linked Logon ID: 0xbe945a Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 14:34:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xbe945a Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 14:34:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 14:34:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 14:34:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xbe9b32 Linked Logon ID: 0xbe9b87 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 14:34:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xbe9b87 Linked Logon ID: 0xbe9b32 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 14:34:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xbe9b87 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 14:34:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xbe9b32 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 14:34:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xbe948d Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 14:34:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xbe945a Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 14:34:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xbe9b32 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 14:34:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 14:34:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1a00 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 14:34:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1a00 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 14:34:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1a00 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 14:34:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1a00 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 14:47:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd00 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 14:47:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd00 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 14:47:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd00 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 14:47:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd00 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 14:50:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x482d6 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xa30 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 14:58:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2228 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 14:58:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2228 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 14:58:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2228 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 14:58:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2228 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 14:58:59    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2350 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 15:38:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 15:38:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xe26887 Linked Logon ID: 0xe268ba Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 15:38:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xe268ba Linked Logon ID: 0xe26887 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 15:38:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 15:38:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xe26f07 Linked Logon ID: 0xe26f6c Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 15:38:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xe26f6c Linked Logon ID: 0xe26f07 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 15:38:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xe26f6c Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 15:38:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xe26f07 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 15:38:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xe268ba Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 15:38:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xe26887 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 15:38:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xe26887 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 15:38:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xe26f07 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 15:38:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 15:38:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 15:38:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x634 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 15:38:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x634 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 15:38:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x634 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 15:38:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x634 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 15:45:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x16e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 15:45:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x16e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 15:45:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x16e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 15:45:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x16e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 15:45:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x678 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 15:45:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 15:45:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xe83992 Linked Logon ID: 0xe839c5 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 15:45:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xe839c5 Linked Logon ID: 0xe83992 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 15:45:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xe83992 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 15:45:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 15:45:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 15:45:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xe84083 Linked Logon ID: 0xe840e0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 15:45:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xe840e0 Linked Logon ID: 0xe84083 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 15:45:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xe840e0 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 15:45:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xe84083 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 15:45:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xe839c5 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 15:45:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xe83992 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 15:45:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xe84083 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 15:45:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 15:45:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xedc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 15:45:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xedc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 15:45:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xedc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 15:45:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xedc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 15:52:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x4e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 15:52:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x4e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 15:52:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x4e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 15:52:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x4e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 15:52:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2284 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 16:05:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 16:05:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xf3a2f2 Linked Logon ID: 0xf3a325 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 16:05:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xf3a325 Linked Logon ID: 0xf3a2f2 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 16:05:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 16:05:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xf3a9d6 Linked Logon ID: 0xf3aa2d Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 16:05:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xf3aa2d Linked Logon ID: 0xf3a9d6 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 16:05:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf3aa2d Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 16:05:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf3a9d6 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 16:05:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf3a325 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 16:05:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf3a2f2 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 16:05:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xf3a2f2 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 16:05:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xf3a9d6 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 16:05:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 16:05:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 16:05:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e00 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 16:05:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e00 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 16:05:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e00 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 16:05:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e00 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 16:43:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-2 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x514 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 16:43:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-2 Account Name: DWM-2 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x107f8a4 Linked Logon ID: 0x107f8bc Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x514 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 16:43:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-2 Account Name: DWM-2 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x107f8bc Linked Logon ID: 0x107f8a4 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x514 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 16:43:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-2 Account Name: DWM-2 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x107f8a4 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 16:43:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-2 Account Name: DWM-2 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x107f8bc Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 16:43:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 16:43:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 16:43:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4647: User initiated logoff: Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x482d6 This event is generated when a logoff is initiated. No further user-initiated activity can occur. This event can be interpreted as a logoff event.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x19b4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x890 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x890 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 19:32:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 19:32:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x10a6941 Linked Logon ID: 0x10a6973 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 19:32:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x10a6973 Linked Logon ID: 0x10a6941 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 19:32:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 19:32:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x10a6b7a Linked Logon ID: 0x10a6bc3 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 19:32:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x10a6bc3 Linked Logon ID: 0x10a6b7a Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 19:32:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x10a6bc3 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 19:32:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x10a6b7a Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 19:32:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x10a6941 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 19:32:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x10a6b7a Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x890 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x890 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 19:32:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1a04 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1a04 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1a04 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1a04 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:32:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:33:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x10a6973 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x153c Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:35:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x10a6973 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:35:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x10a6973 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:35:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x10a6973 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:35:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x10a6973 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:35:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x10a6973 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1054 Process Name: C:\Windows\explorer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:47:28    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x10a6973 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1644 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 19:47:28    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x10a6973 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1644 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 19:56:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 19:56:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 19:56:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 19:56:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 20:54:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2418 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 20:54:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2418 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 20:55:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2418 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 20:55:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2418 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 21:06:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 21:06:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 22:13:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x56c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 22:13:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x56c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 22:14:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x56c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-10 22:14:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x56c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 23:10:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 23:10:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 23:10:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 23:10:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 23:10:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 23:10:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 23:10:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x3f4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 23:10:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x3f4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 23:10:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x3f4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 23:10:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x3f4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 23:10:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x3f4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 23:10:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x3f4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 23:10:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x3f4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-10 23:10:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x3f4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-10 23:10:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4904: An attempt was made to register a security event source. Subject : Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Process: Process ID: 0x3f4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe Event Source: Source Name: VSSAudit Event Source ID: 0x193ffcf
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-10 23:10:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4905: An attempt was made to unregister a security event source. Subject Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Process: Process ID: 0x3f4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe Event Source: Source Name: VSSAudit Event Source ID: 0x193ffcf
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-10 23:10:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4904: An attempt was made to register a security event source. Subject : Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Process: Process ID: 0x3f4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe Event Source: Source Name: VSSAudit Event Source ID: 0x194b8c5
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-10 23:10:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4905: An attempt was made to unregister a security event source. Subject Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Process: Process ID: 0x3f4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe Event Source: Source Name: VSSAudit Event Source ID: 0x194b8c5
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 23:10:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 23:10:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 23:15:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-3 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1770 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 23:15:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-3 Account Name: DWM-3 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x1aba159 Linked Logon ID: 0x1aba17b Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1770 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-10 23:15:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-3 Account Name: DWM-3 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x1aba17b Linked Logon ID: 0x1aba159 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1770 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 23:15:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-3 Account Name: DWM-3 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x1aba159 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-10 23:15:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-3 Account Name: DWM-3 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x1aba17b Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-10 23:15:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4647: User initiated logoff: Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x10a6973 This event is generated when a logoff is initiated. No further user-initiated activity can occur. This event can be interpreted as a logoff event.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:16:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x854 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:16:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:16:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:16:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:16:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:17:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1fdc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:17:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1fdc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:17:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1fdc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:17:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1fdc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:19:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1580 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:19:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1580 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:19:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-501 Account Name: Guest Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x9ac Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\CompatTelRunner.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:19:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 07:19:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:20:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1580 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:20:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1580 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:21:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:21:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x1ba3e3f Linked Logon ID: 0x1ba3e6e Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:21:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x1ba3e6e Linked Logon ID: 0x1ba3e3f Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:21:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:21:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x1ba40cb Linked Logon ID: 0x1ba40f9 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:21:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x1ba40f9 Linked Logon ID: 0x1ba40cb Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-11 07:21:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1ba40f9 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-11 07:21:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1ba40cb Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 07:21:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x1ba3e3f Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 07:21:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x1ba40cb Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:21:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:21:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 07:21:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:21:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1ba3e6e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:21:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1ba3e6e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x320 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:21:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1ba3e6e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x320 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:21:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2300 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:21:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2300 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:21:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2300 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:21:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2300 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:21:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-4 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x51c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:21:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-4 Account Name: DWM-4 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x1be144c Linked Logon ID: 0x1be146f Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x51c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:21:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-4 Account Name: DWM-4 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x1be146f Linked Logon ID: 0x1be144c Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x51c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 07:21:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-4 Account Name: DWM-4 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x1be144c Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 07:21:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-4 Account Name: DWM-4 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x1be146f Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-11 07:21:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4647: User initiated logoff: Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1ba3e6e This event is generated when a logoff is initiated. No further user-initiated activity can occur. This event can be interpreted as a logoff event.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:25:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x460 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:26:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x334 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:26:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x334 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:26:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x334 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:26:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x334 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:26:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:26:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x1c09e84 Linked Logon ID: 0x1c09eb3 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:26:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x1c09eb3 Linked Logon ID: 0x1c09e84 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:26:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:26:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x1c0a06a Linked Logon ID: 0x1c0a0b2 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:26:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x1c0a0b2 Linked Logon ID: 0x1c0a06a Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:26:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1c09eb3 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-11 07:26:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1c0a0b2 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-11 07:26:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1c0a06a Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 07:26:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x1c09e84 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 07:26:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x1c0a06a Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:26:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:26:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 07:26:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:26:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1c09eb3 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x320 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:26:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1c09eb3 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: wdmycloud Additional Information: wdmycloud Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.23 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:26:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1c09eb3 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.5 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:26:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1c09eb3 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x320 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:26:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:26:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:26:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:26:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:26:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:26:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:26:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:26:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:26:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:26:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:26:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:26:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:26:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:26:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:26:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:26:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:26:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:26:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:26:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:26:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:26:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:26:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:26:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:26:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:26:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:27:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1c09e84 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:27:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1c09e84 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x320 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:27:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1c09e84 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x320 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:31:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1c09eb3 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x648 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:31:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 07:31:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:34:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1c09eb3 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:34:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1c09eb3 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:34:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1c09eb3 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:34:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1c09eb3 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x320 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:34:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1c09eb3 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x320 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:34:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1c09eb3 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x320 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:36:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1c09eb3 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:36:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1c09eb3 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 07:36:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1c09eb3 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:41:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1c09eb3 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x214c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 07:41:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1c09eb3 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x214c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 07:45:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 07:45:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 08:03:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 08:03:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 08:21:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1c09eb3 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 08:21:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1c09eb3 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 08:39:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 08:39:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13569  2017-01-11 08:39:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4717: System security access was granted to an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Account Modified: Account Name: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1002 Access Granted: Access Right: SeInteractiveLogonRight
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 08:39:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4731: A security-enabled local group was created. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 New Group: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1002 Group Name: __vmware__ Group Domain: RAZER Attributes: SAM Account Name: __vmware__ SID History: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 08:39:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4735: A security-enabled local group was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1002 Group Name: __vmware__ Group Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - SID History: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 08:40:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 08:40:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 08:40:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 08:40:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 09:33:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d64 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 09:33:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d64 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 09:33:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x84c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 09:34:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d64 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 09:34:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d64 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 09:37:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 09:37:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x24d457c Linked Logon ID: 0x24d45af Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 09:37:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x24d45af Linked Logon ID: 0x24d457c Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 09:37:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 09:37:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x24d4c17 Linked Logon ID: 0x24d4c70 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 09:37:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x24d4c70 Linked Logon ID: 0x24d4c17 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-11 09:37:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x24d4c70 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-11 09:37:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x24d4c17 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-11 09:37:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x24d45af Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-11 09:37:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x24d457c Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 09:37:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x24d457c Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 09:37:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x24d4c17 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 09:37:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 09:37:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 09:37:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2768 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 09:37:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2768 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 09:37:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2768 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 09:37:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2768 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 09:41:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 09:41:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 09:54:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 09:54:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 09:56:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1c09eb3 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1adc Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-11 10:20:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4647: User initiated logoff: Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1c09eb3 This event is generated when a logoff is initiated. No further user-initiated activity can occur. This event can be interpreted as a logoff event.
Security  Audit Success  103  2017-01-11 10:20:57    Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog  1100: The event logging service has shut down.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-11 10:21:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1ac New Process Name: ??????????????-??6?4?????? ? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x4 Creator Process Name: ??????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-11 10:21:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x21c New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1ac Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13573  2017-01-11 10:21:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4826: Boot Configuration Data loaded. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 General Settings: Load Options: - Advanced Options: %%1843 Configuration Access Policy: %%1846 System Event Logging: %%1843 Kernel Debugging: %%1843 VSM Launch Type: %%1848 Signature Settings: Test Signing: %%1843 Flight Signing: %%1843 Disable Integrity Checks: %%1843 HyperVisor Settings: HyperVisor Load Options: - HyperVisor Launch Type: %%1848 HyperVisor Debugging: %%1843
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-11 10:21:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x29c New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??c?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1ac Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-11 10:21:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x33c New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x29c Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-11 10:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4608: Windows is starting up. This event is logged when LSASS.EXE starts and the auditing subsystem is initialized.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 0 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: - New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Workstation Name: - Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: - Authentication Package: - Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 10:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 10:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-11 10:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x398 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??c?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1ac Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-11 10:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3d4 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x29c Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-11 10:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x13c New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x398 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-11 10:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x200 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??8?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x398 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-11 10:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1c4 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??4?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x3d4 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-11 10:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1bc New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x3d4 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 10:21:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4902: The Per-user audit policy table was created. Number of Elements: 0 Policy ID: 0x9bd3
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:21:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x200 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:21:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x106ad Linked Logon ID: 0x106c9 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x200 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:21:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x106c9 Linked Logon ID: 0x106ad Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x200 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:21:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:21:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:21:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:21:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:21:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 10:21:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x106ad Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 10:21:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x106c9 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 10:21:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 10:21:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 10:21:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 10:21:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 10:21:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-11 10:21:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5033: The Windows Firewall Driver started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-11 10:21:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5024: The Windows Firewall service started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:21:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:21:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 10:21:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 10:21:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:21:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x454 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 10:21:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x67c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 10:21:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x67c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 10:21:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 10:21:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:21:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 3 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-7 Account Name: ANONYMOUS LOGON Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x28764 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x0 Process Name: - Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: NtLmSsp Authentication Package: NTLM Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): NTLM V1 Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:21:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 10:21:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:21:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x7fc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:21:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x7fc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-11 10:21:28    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  6406: Kaspersky Endpoint Security 10 for Windows registered to Windows Firewall to control filtering for the following: BootTimeRuleCategory, StealthRuleCategory, FirewallRuleCategory.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:21:28    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x7fc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:21:28    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x7fc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12290  2017-01-11 10:23:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5061: Cryptographic operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: ECDSA_P256 Key Name: Microsoft Connected Devices Platform device certificate Key Type: %%2500 Cryptographic Operation: Operation: %%2480 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-11 10:23:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5058: Key file operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: UNKNOWN Key Name: Microsoft Connected Devices Platform device certificate Key Type: %%2500 Key File Operation Information: File Path: C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\LocalService\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Crypto\Keys\de7cf8a7901d2ad13e5c67c29e5d1662_515b10cc-5648-4ef1-85cd-ec69792150a2 Operation: %%2458 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-11 10:23:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5059: Key migration operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: ECDSA_P256 Key Name: Microsoft Connected Devices Platform device certificate Key Type: %%2500 Additional Information: Operation: %%2464 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:23:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 10:23:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 10:23:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x1730 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 10:23:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x1730 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:23:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:23:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:23:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x6b9f9 Linked Logon ID: 0x6ba37 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:23:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x6ba37 Linked Logon ID: 0x6b9f9 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:23:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:23:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x6be99 Linked Logon ID: 0x6bee5 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:23:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x6bee5 Linked Logon ID: 0x6be99 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:23:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6ba37 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:23:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-11 10:23:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6bee5 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-11 10:23:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6be99 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 10:23:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 10:23:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x6b9f9 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 10:23:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x6be99 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 10:23:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:23:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:23:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 10:23:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 10:23:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 10:23:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:23:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6ba37 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x338 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:23:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6ba37 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x338 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:23:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6ba37 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: wdmycloud Additional Information: wdmycloud Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.23 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:23:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6ba37 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.5 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:23:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:23:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:23:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:23:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:23:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:23:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:23:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:23:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:23:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:23:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:23:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:23:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:23:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:23:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:23:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:23:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:23:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:23:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:23:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:23:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:23:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:23:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:23:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:23:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:23:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:23:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6b9f9 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:23:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6b9f9 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x338 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:23:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6b9f9 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x338 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:24:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2070 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:24:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2070 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:24:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2070 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:24:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2070 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:24:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6ba37 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e28 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:25:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 10:25:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 10:25:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 10:25:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:25:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 10:25:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:26:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 10:26:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:31:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1bcc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:31:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1bcc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:31:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1bcc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:31:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1bcc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:33:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 10:33:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:38:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6ba37 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x11ac Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 10:38:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6ba37 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x11ac Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 10:48:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 10:48:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 11:32:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6ba37 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 11:32:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6ba37 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 11:49:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2458 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 11:49:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2458 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 11:49:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2458 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 11:49:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2458 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 11:49:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x4bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 11:49:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x4bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 11:49:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x4bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 11:49:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x4bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 11:49:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6ba37 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 11:49:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6ba37 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 11:51:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6ba37 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 11:51:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d2c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 11:51:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d2c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 11:51:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d2c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 11:51:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d2c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 11:51:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xa20 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 11:51:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xa20 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 11:51:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xa20 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 11:51:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xa20 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 11:57:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2348 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 11:57:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2348 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 11:57:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2348 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 11:57:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2348 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 11:57:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2154 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 12:47:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1918 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 12:47:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1918 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 12:47:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1918 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 12:47:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1918 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 12:56:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 12:56:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xbe6764 Linked Logon ID: 0xbe6797 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 12:56:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xbe6797 Linked Logon ID: 0xbe6764 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 12:56:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 12:56:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xbe6ccc Linked Logon ID: 0xbe6e88 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 12:56:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xbe6e88 Linked Logon ID: 0xbe6ccc Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-11 12:56:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xbe6e88 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-11 12:56:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xbe6ccc Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-11 12:56:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xbe6797 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-11 12:56:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xbe6764 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 12:56:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xbe6764 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 12:56:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xbe6ccc Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 12:56:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 12:56:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 12:56:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x277c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 12:56:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x277c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 12:56:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x277c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 12:56:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x277c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 13:33:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6ba37 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 13:33:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6ba37 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 13:33:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6ba37 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 13:34:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6ba37 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x338 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 13:34:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6ba37 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x338 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 13:34:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6ba37 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x338 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 14:36:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1630 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 14:36:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1630 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 14:36:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1630 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 14:36:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1630 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 15:03:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6ba37 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.5 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 15:03:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6ba37 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: wdmycloud Additional Information: wdmycloud Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.23 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 15:03:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6ba37 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 15:03:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6ba37 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x338 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 15:03:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6ba37 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 15:03:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6ba37 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 15:03:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6ba37 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 15:03:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6ba37 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x338 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 15:03:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6ba37 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x338 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 15:05:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2550 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 15:05:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2550 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 15:05:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x588 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 15:05:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2550 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 15:05:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2550 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 15:29:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 15:29:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x118d91c Linked Logon ID: 0x118d94f Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 15:29:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x118d94f Linked Logon ID: 0x118d91c Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 15:29:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 15:29:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x118dd28 Linked Logon ID: 0x118dde4 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 15:29:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x118dde4 Linked Logon ID: 0x118dd28 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-11 15:29:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x118dde4 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-11 15:29:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x118d94f Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-11 15:29:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x118dd28 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-11 15:29:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x118d91c Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 15:29:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x118d91c Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 15:29:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x118dd28 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 15:29:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 15:29:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 15:29:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2018 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 15:29:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2018 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 15:29:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2018 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 15:29:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2018 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 15:38:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 15:38:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 15:41:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x27ac Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 15:41:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x27ac Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 15:41:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x27ac Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 15:41:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x27ac Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 15:41:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2628 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 16:15:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 16:15:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x1353310 Linked Logon ID: 0x1353343 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 16:15:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x1353343 Linked Logon ID: 0x1353310 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 16:15:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 16:15:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x1353788 Linked Logon ID: 0x135389d Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 16:15:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x135389d Linked Logon ID: 0x1353788 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-11 16:15:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x135389d Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-11 16:15:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1353788 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-11 16:15:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1353343 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-11 16:15:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1353310 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 16:15:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x1353310 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 16:15:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x1353788 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 16:15:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 16:15:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 16:15:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x24c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 16:15:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x24c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 16:15:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x24c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 16:15:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x24c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 16:37:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-2 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x7b0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 16:37:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-2 Account Name: DWM-2 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x144e462 Linked Logon ID: 0x144e48d Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x7b0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 16:37:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-2 Account Name: DWM-2 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x144e48d Linked Logon ID: 0x144e462 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x7b0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 16:37:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-2 Account Name: DWM-2 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x144e462 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 16:37:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-2 Account Name: DWM-2 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x144e48d Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-11 16:37:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4647: User initiated logoff: Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6ba37 This event is generated when a logoff is initiated. No further user-initiated activity can occur. This event can be interpreted as a logoff event.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:16:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x16c0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 19:17:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 19:17:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 19:19:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 19:19:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x14caa21 Linked Logon ID: 0x14caa50 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 19:19:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x14caa50 Linked Logon ID: 0x14caa21 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 19:19:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 19:19:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x14cac96 Linked Logon ID: 0x14cacc4 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 19:19:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x14cacc4 Linked Logon ID: 0x14cac96 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-11 19:19:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x14cacc4 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-11 19:19:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x14cac96 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 19:19:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x14caa21 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 19:19:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x14cac96 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:19:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:19:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 19:19:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:19:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1794 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:19:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1794 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:19:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1794 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:19:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1794 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:19:59    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x14caa50 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x19d8 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:32:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x24b4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:32:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x24b4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:32:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x24b4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:32:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x24b4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:34:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x14caa50 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x354 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:34:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x14caa50 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x354 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:35:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x19d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:35:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x19d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:35:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x19d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 19:35:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x19d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 19:42:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 19:42:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 19:42:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 19:42:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 19:42:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 19:42:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 19:42:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\_0000000000000000.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x560 Process Information: Process ID: 0x22dc Process Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.14393.350_none_43278ee965418581\TiWorker.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 19:42:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x320 Process Information: Process ID: 0x22dc Process Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.14393.350_none_43278ee965418581\TiWorker.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 19:42:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_syswow64_21ffbdd2a2dd92e0.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x684 Process Information: Process ID: 0x22dc Process Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.14393.350_none_43278ee965418581\TiWorker.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 19:42:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_syswow64_macromed_flash_853cbcf10f17f618.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x62c Process Information: Process ID: 0x22dc Process Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.14393.350_none_43278ee965418581\TiWorker.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 19:42:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_system32_21f9a9c4a2f8b514.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x320 Process Information: Process ID: 0x22dc Process Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.14393.350_none_43278ee965418581\TiWorker.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 19:42:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_system32_macromed_flash_5ff3bc7496f0271e.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x560 Process Information: Process ID: 0x22dc Process Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.14393.350_none_43278ee965418581\TiWorker.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 19:42:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\Macromed\Flash\activex.vch Handle ID: 0x62c Process Information: Process ID: 0x22dc Process Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.14393.350_none_43278ee965418581\TiWorker.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 19:42:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\Macromed\Flash\Flash.ocx Handle ID: 0x684 Process Information: Process ID: 0x22dc Process Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.14393.350_none_43278ee965418581\TiWorker.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 19:42:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\Macromed\Flash\FlashUtil_ActiveX.dll Handle ID: 0x680 Process Information: Process ID: 0x22dc Process Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.14393.350_none_43278ee965418581\TiWorker.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 19:42:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\Macromed\Flash\FlashUtil_ActiveX.exe Handle ID: 0x5e0 Process Information: Process ID: 0x22dc Process Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.14393.350_none_43278ee965418581\TiWorker.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 19:42:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Macromed\Flash\activex.vch Handle ID: 0x624 Process Information: Process ID: 0x22dc Process Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.14393.350_none_43278ee965418581\TiWorker.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 19:42:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Macromed\Flash\Flash.ocx Handle ID: 0x640 Process Information: Process ID: 0x22dc Process Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.14393.350_none_43278ee965418581\TiWorker.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 19:42:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Macromed\Flash\FlashUtil_ActiveX.dll Handle ID: 0x678 Process Information: Process ID: 0x22dc Process Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.14393.350_none_43278ee965418581\TiWorker.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 19:42:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Macromed\Flash\FlashUtil_ActiveX.exe Handle ID: 0x568 Process Information: Process ID: 0x22dc Process Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.14393.350_none_43278ee965418581\TiWorker.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 19:42:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 19:42:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 19:42:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 19:42:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 19:42:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0xb10 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 19:42:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0xb10 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 19:42:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0xb10 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 19:42:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0xb10 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 19:42:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0xb10 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 19:42:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0xb10 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 19:42:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0xb10 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 19:42:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0xb10 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 19:45:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 19:45:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 19:47:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 19:47:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 19:47:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 19:47:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 19:48:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 19:48:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 19:48:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 19:48:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 19:48:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x19a0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 19:48:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x19a0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 19:48:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x19a0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 19:48:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x19a0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 19:48:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x19a0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 19:48:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x19a0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 19:48:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x19a0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 19:48:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x19a0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 20:13:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x104c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 20:13:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x104c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 20:13:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x104c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 20:13:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x104c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 20:14:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 20:14:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 20:17:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x694 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 20:17:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x694 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 20:18:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x694 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 20:18:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x694 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 20:18:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c50 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 20:18:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c50 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 20:21:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c50 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 20:21:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c50 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 20:21:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x27c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 20:21:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x27c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 20:22:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 20:22:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-11 20:22:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4616: The system time was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Process Information: Process ID: 0x5cc Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Previous Time: 2017-01-11T13:22:53.677670500Z New Time: 2017-01-11T13:22:55.849286100Z This event is generated when the system time is changed. It is normal for the Windows Time Service, which runs with System privilege, to change the system time on a regular basis. Other system time changes may be indicative of attempts to tamper with the computer.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-11 20:22:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4616: The system time was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Process Information: Process ID: 0x5cc Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Previous Time: 2017-01-11T13:22:55.849072400Z New Time: 2017-01-11T13:22:55.848000000Z This event is generated when the system time is changed. It is normal for the Windows Time Service, which runs with System privilege, to change the system time on a regular basis. Other system time changes may be indicative of attempts to tamper with the computer.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-11 20:22:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4616: The system time was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Process Information: Process ID: 0x5cc Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Previous Time: 2017-01-11T13:22:55.849812300Z New Time: 2017-01-11T13:22:55.847000000Z This event is generated when the system time is changed. It is normal for the Windows Time Service, which runs with System privilege, to change the system time on a regular basis. Other system time changes may be indicative of attempts to tamper with the computer.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 20:24:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x27c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 20:24:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x27c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 21:34:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1ce0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 21:34:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1ce0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 21:34:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1ce0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-11 21:34:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1ce0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 22:12:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-11 22:12:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4647: User initiated logoff: Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x14caa50 This event is generated when a logoff is initiated. No further user-initiated activity can occur. This event can be interpreted as a logoff event.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 22:12:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 22:14:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-11 22:14:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 22:14:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-11 22:14:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 22:14:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x2310 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 22:14:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x2310 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 22:14:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x2310 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 22:14:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x2310 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 22:14:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x2310 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 22:14:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x2310 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 22:14:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x2310 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-11 22:14:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x2310 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\Boot\PCAT\bootmgr Handle ID: 0x5c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\AppVClient.exe Handle ID: 0x68 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsasrv.dll Handle ID: 0x6c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\ntoskrnl.exe Handle ID: 0x70 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\securekernel.exe Handle ID: 0x74 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\cng.sys Handle ID: 0x78 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\_0000000000000000.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x78 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x78 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_syswow64_21ffbdd2a2dd92e0.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x7c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_syswow64_windowspowershell_v1.0_19ae85881f1c4f2d.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x80 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_syswow64_windowspowershell_v1.0_modules_b001352a7f7811a4.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x84 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_syswow64_windowspowershell_v1.0_modules_netswitchteam_11ad3eda0a2aa874.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x88 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_syswow64_windowspowershell_v1.0_modules_netlbfo_80fc9ece463f45fa.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x8c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_syswow64_windowspowershell_v1.0_modules_appvclient_6909a212b041e3a8.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x8c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_syswow64_drivers_193c6528ad70a5e7.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x8c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemresources_0307ca33e1cd9708.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x90 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemresources_windows.ui.shellcommon_0eb1b891774fd848.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x90 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemresources_windows.ui.shell_ed9cce24fb22aa2f.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x94 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemresources_windows.ui.settingshandlers-nt_7298028ee386990a.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x98 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemresources_windows.ui.settingshandlers-nt_pris_71a69ceed5129daa.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x9c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemresources_windows.ui.settingsappthreshold_0b97cbddb6bef8ee.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x6c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemresources_windows.ui.settingsappthreshold_systemsettings_6f826ed139dc38ac.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xa0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemresources_windows.ui.settingsappthreshold_systemsettings_assets_b04b2dbada91ba13.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xa4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemresources_windows.ui.settingsappthreshold_systemsettings_assets_fonts_e1429b15bb7a603f.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xa8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemresources_windows.ui.settingsappthreshold_pris_c69f4420e8b9ac96.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xac Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemresources_windows.ui.pcshell_f32245a82a039128.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xa4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemresources_windows.ui.logon_ed8ece16fb61b4e6.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xb0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemresources_windows.ui.devicesflow_ec484b3fd5ac3a18.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xb0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemresources_windows.ui.devicesflow_pris_adf81a7b08cd359a.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xb4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemresources_windows.ui.cred_bcedbcd156367aa9.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xb8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemresources_windows.ui.blockedshutdown_d158b688ceb68e8d.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xbc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemresources_windows.ui.biofeedback_43050837db14ffaa.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x60 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemresources_windows.applicationmodel.lockscreen_d0e0107729c97a93.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xbc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_shellexperiencehost_cw5n1h2txyewy_e21c90d9487ed242.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xbc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_shellexperiencehost_cw5n1h2txyewy_pris_3818bc2422f945c8.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xbc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_shellexperiencehost_cw5n1h2txyewy_assets_7b05f0549cbec22d.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xbc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_microsoft.windows.secureassessmentbrowser_cw5n1h2txyewy_5c9bcd2fbb5568e6.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xc0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_microsoft.windows.secureassessmentbrowser_cw5n1h2txyewy_pris_4411c1f8ffbde214.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xc4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_microsoft.windows.secureassessmentbrowser_cw5n1h2txyewy_assets_2482c5a7df075309.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xcc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_microsoft.windows.secondarytileexperience_cw5n1h2txyewy_feeb4934c04ce9fd.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xcc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_microsoft.windows.cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy_2d6b8920d3f31e0d.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xd0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_microsoft.windows.cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy_views_a56f518aba6f0a4b.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xd0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_microsoft.windows.cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy_views_reactivecat1_9c058eadb68b9deb.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xd4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_microsoft.windows.cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy_remindersui_b209622a1e713dc6.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xd8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_microsoft.windows.cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy_remindersui_views_d0db2406281bb392.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xdc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_microsoft.windows.cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy_places_views_57c50445e88e53df.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xe0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_microsoft.windows.cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy_places_usercontrols_2a3573c7d77db6a8.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xe4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_microsoft.windows.cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy_places_usercontrols_view_1e6f83bb23e0c6c9.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xe4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_microsoft.windows.cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy_personpicture_themes_61d9e2a6d178d0d8.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xe8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_microsoft.windows.assignedaccesslockapp_cw5n1h2txyewy_29da24b0fd93bf69.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xec Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_microsoft.windows.assignedaccesslockapp_cw5n1h2txyewy_pris_739c1e49050f5c39.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xec Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_microsoft.windows.assignedaccesslockapp_cw5n1h2txyewy_assets_c21827d4b5b1e098.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xf0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_microsoft.ppiprojection_cw5n1h2txyewy_ffa89c1a94ba2c74.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xf0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_microsoft.ppiprojection_cw5n1h2txyewy_pris_876d294ca326b93c.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xf4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_microsoft.ppiprojection_cw5n1h2txyewy_assets_9a1e058120f82961.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xf8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_microsoft.microsoftedge_8wekyb3d8bbwe_43d095bdcce4e130.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xf8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_microsoft.microsoftedge_8wekyb3d8bbwe_pris_4719a634d2c04eec.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xf8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_microsoft.microsoftedge_8wekyb3d8bbwe_assets_f8075bc7ad02362b.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xfc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_microsoft.microsoftedge_8wekyb3d8bbwe_assets_webnotes_febc6b7abccb2874.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x100 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_microsoft.microsoftedge_8wekyb3d8bbwe_assets_persona_4fd2132d4ad15439.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x100 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_microsoft.microsoftedge_8wekyb3d8bbwe_assets_fonts_206f147a74e786c9.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x100 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_microsoft.microsoftedge_8wekyb3d8bbwe_assets_errorpages_73ec08ffb6105e23.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x100 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_microsoft.lockapp_cw5n1h2txyewy_6f26550558264bb4.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x104 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_microsoft.lockapp_cw5n1h2txyewy_assets_e61eed4a8582e20d.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x108 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_microsoft.accountscontrol_cw5n1h2txyewy_fc38de406c5c8223.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x10c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_microsoft.aad.brokerplugin_cw5n1h2txyewy_d48a5fb790740a92.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x10c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_microsoft.aad.brokerplugin_cw5n1h2txyewy_css_af32787f971fc4dd.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x10c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_systemapps_microsoft.aad.brokerplugin_cw5n1h2txyewy_assets_4318eb5d347aa2b1.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x110 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_system32_21f9a9c4a2f8b514.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xd8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_system32_windowspowershell_v1.0_3f102d555ee05d33.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x110 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_system32_windowspowershell_v1.0_modules_a349059b05097caa.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x110 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_system32_windowspowershell_v1.0_modules_netswitchteam_c23a4af35d296eac.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x110 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_system32_windowspowershell_v1.0_modules_netlbfo_dfa61a2ec6bf8e00.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x110 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_system32_windowspowershell_v1.0_modules_appvclient_f101ca87a5fad6fc.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x114 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_system32_winbioplugins_071a28c5b510fb6a.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x114 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_system32_wbem_06656d9fdf2f8577.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x118 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_system32_spp_plugin-manifests-signed_d1e9d31c180bebd2.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x11c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_system32_smi_06656483d047b9b9.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x128 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_system32_smi_schema_b445cd341d59fadc.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x11c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_system32_smi_manifests_0e3cdef1f9ad7c5f.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x120 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_system32_oobe_06655c95df2fa06f.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x120 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_system32_migwiz_2650d8d30fee1fe9.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x120 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_system32_migwiz_dlmanifests_f1386c432966667b.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x124 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_system32_migwiz_dlmanifests_microsoft-windows-msmq-messagingcoreservice_a2ca72db0bdebee3.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x128 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_system32_migwiz_dlmanifests_microsoft-windows-iis-dl_8822f736d253acda.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x12c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_system32_drivers_dc1b782427b5ee1b.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x130 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_shellexperiences_2912c63bd045ac45.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x130 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_provisioning_cc9458acec1840ff.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x124 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_provisioning_packages_e07c8f8a91f541c4.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x134 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_policydefinitions_89130cdfc4d9c27c.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x134 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_policydefinitions_en-us_3b1c5b998da0d4ae.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x134 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_inf_3f581daba4c8c835.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x134 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_immersivecontrolpanel_1e6ccf0e6a91b570.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x134 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_immersivecontrolpanel_systemsettings_d76332102e6a9a22.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xc4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_immersivecontrolpanel_systemsettings_view_34ee44a07ef70449.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x134 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_immersivecontrolpanel_systemsettings_assets_6ba5b2461d9725af.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x134 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_immersivecontrolpanel_pris_a05890fcf353f1d8.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x134 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_immersivecontrolpanel_images_2e6232377292b2dc.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x134 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_boot_40104b85a18bfcb2.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x134 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_boot_pcat_0f8924c0debe64e4.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0xc4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_boot_pcat_sr-latn-cs_958c186763eec988.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x138 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_boot_pcat_qps-ploc_109d95b40d3e11cb.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x138 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_boot_efi_0f890f82be247f42.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x138 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_boot_efi_sr-latn-cs_175a53dc497f4774.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x13c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_boot_efi_qps-ploc_24e8203102ababf9.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x140 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_boot_dvd_efi_de3c4ceb52549e1c.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x140 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\$$_boot_dvd_efi_en-us_8245c3aed97c0844.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x64 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\users.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x144 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\users_public_8c076a3be22985a1.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x144 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\users_default_73615b64075aa65f.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x144 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\users_default_appdata_roaming_microsoft_windows_sendto_cc2b2363b7303311.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x144 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\programdata.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x148 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\programdata_microsoft_windows_start_menu_programs_d672ba09d81e87ff.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x148 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\programdata_microsoft_provisioning_929be8282aecbf17.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x14c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\programdata_microsoft_appv_setup_c6b9e738c86ef84a.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x150 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\program_files_x86_internet_explorer_cafab575245eacb0.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x150 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\program_files_windows_defender_3e33901162166ae9.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x154 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\program_files_internet_explorer_a421d1bfaf856e2b.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x158 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\program_files_common_files_d7a65bb2f0e854e7.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x64 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\program_files_common_files_microsoft_shared_818c5a0e45020fba.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x64 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\program_files_common_files_microsoft_shared_ink_3c86e3db0b3b254c.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x64 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\program_files_common_files_microsoft_shared_ink_languagemodel_ccceb944834c6c97.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x160 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\program_files_common_files_microsoft_shared_ink_fsdefinitions_92b215ec670a7f35.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x160 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\program_files_common_files_microsoft_shared_ink_fsdefinitions_symbols_4eaf815d64e8ecbc.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x164 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\program_files_common_files_microsoft_shared_ink_fsdefinitions_oskpred_4ada71c56aba89ef.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x164 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\program_files_common_files_microsoft_shared_ink_fsdefinitions_osknumpad_ee37ed195958108b.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x164 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\program_files_common_files_microsoft_shared_ink_fsdefinitions_osknav_bb31da33c2376c77.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x168 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\program_files_common_files_microsoft_shared_ink_fsdefinitions_oskmenu_4ada925d6aba5911.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x16c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\program_files_common_files_microsoft_shared_ink_fsdefinitions_oskclearui_efb22b63342a179d.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x16c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\program_files_common_files_microsoft_shared_ink_fsdefinitions_main_992db4c6307e339e.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x170 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\program_files_common_files_microsoft_shared_ink_fsdefinitions_keypad_bb29f287c24d4a93.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x170 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\program_files_common_files_microsoft_shared_ink_fsdefinitions_insert_bb25e7d5c2685e4a.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x170 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\WinSxS\FileMaps\program_files_common_files_microsoft_shared_ink_fsdefinitions_auxpad_bb15ebb5c2b76782.cdf-ms Handle ID: 0x170 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;0x1f0116;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ink\tabskb.dll Handle ID: 0xc8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\IEShims.dll Handle ID: 0x17c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\Internet Explorer\IEShims.dll Handle ID: 0x17c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\Boot\DVD\EFI\en-US\efisys.bin Handle ID: 0x174 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\Boot\DVD\EFI\en-US\efisys_noprompt.bin Handle ID: 0x17c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\Boot\EFI\qps-ploc\memtest.efi.mui Handle ID: 0x180 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\Boot\EFI\sr-Latn-CS\memtest.efi.mui Handle ID: 0x184 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\Boot\PCAT\qps-ploc\bootmgr.exe.mui Handle ID: 0x188 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\Boot\PCAT\qps-ploc\memtest.exe.mui Handle ID: 0x18c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\Boot\PCAT\sr-Latn-CS\bootmgr.exe.mui Handle ID: 0x190 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\Boot\PCAT\sr-Latn-CS\memtest.exe.mui Handle ID: 0x194 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\ImmersiveControlPanel\SystemSettings.dll Handle ID: 0x198 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\ImmersiveControlPanel\SystemSettingsViewModel.Desktop.dll Handle ID: 0x1a0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\ImmersiveControlPanel\Telemetry.Desktop.dll Handle ID: 0x1a0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\INF\apps.inf Handle ID: 0x1a0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\PolicyDefinitions\WindowsUpdate.admx Handle ID: 0x1a0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\PolicyDefinitions\en-US\WindowsUpdate.adml Handle ID: 0x1a4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\Provisioning\Microsoft-Common-Provisioning.dat Handle ID: 0x1a8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\Provisioning\Microsoft-Desktop-Provisioning.dat Handle ID: 0x1b0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\Provisioning\Packages\Power.EnergyEstimationEngine.Control.ppkg Handle ID: 0x1b4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\Provisioning\Packages\Power.EnergyEstimationEngine.CPU.ppkg Handle ID: 0x1bc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\Provisioning\Packages\Power.EnergyEstimationEngine.Display.ppkg Handle ID: 0x1c0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\Provisioning\Packages\Power.EnergyEstimationEngine.MBB.ppkg Handle ID: 0x1b0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\Provisioning\Packages\Power.EnergyEstimationEngine.StandbyActivation.ppkg Handle ID: 0x1c0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\Provisioning\Packages\Power.EnergyEstimationEngine.Storage.ppkg Handle ID: 0x1c0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\Provisioning\Packages\Power.EnergyEstimationEngine.Telemetry.ppkg Handle ID: 0x1c4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\Provisioning\Packages\Power.EnergyEstimationEngine.Wifi.ppkg Handle ID: 0x1c4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\Provisioning\Packages\Power.Settings.Battery.ppkg Handle ID: 0x1c4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\Provisioning\Packages\Power.Settings.Button.ppkg Handle ID: 0x1c8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\Provisioning\Packages\Power.Settings.Disk.ppkg Handle ID: 0x1c8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\Provisioning\Packages\Power.Settings.Display.ppkg Handle ID: 0x1c8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\Provisioning\Packages\Power.Settings.EnergySaver.ppkg Handle ID: 0x1cc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\Provisioning\Packages\Power.Settings.IdleResiliency.ppkg Handle ID: 0x1cc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\Provisioning\Packages\Power.Settings.PCIExpress.ppkg Handle ID: 0x1cc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\Provisioning\Packages\Power.Settings.Processor.ppkg Handle ID: 0x1d0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\Provisioning\Packages\Power.Settings.Sleep.ppkg Handle ID: 0x1d4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\ShellExperiences\ClockFlyoutExperience.dll Handle ID: 0x1d4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\ShellExperiences\InputDial.dll Handle ID: 0x1dc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\ShellExperiences\JumpViewUI.dll Handle ID: 0x1e0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\ShellExperiences\MtcUvc.dll Handle ID: 0x1e0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\ShellExperiences\PenWorkspace.dll Handle ID: 0x1ec Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\ShellExperiences\QuickActions.dll Handle ID: 0x1e4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\ShellExperiences\QuickConnectUI.dll Handle ID: 0x1e8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\ShellExperiences\SharePickerUI.dll Handle ID: 0x1ec Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\ShellExperiences\StartUI.dll Handle ID: 0x1f0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\ShellExperiences\Windows.UI.ActionCenter.dll Handle ID: 0x1f0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\aadcloudap.dll Handle ID: 0x1ec Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\aadtb.dll Handle ID: 0x1f4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\aclui.dll Handle ID: 0x1ec Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\aeinv.dll Handle ID: 0x1ec Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\AppVCatalog.dll Handle ID: 0x1f4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\AppVDllSurrogate.exe Handle ID: 0x1f0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\AppVEntStreamingManager.dll Handle ID: 0x1ec Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\AppVEntSubsystemController.dll Handle ID: 0x1e4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\AppVEntSubsystems64.dll Handle ID: 0x1e4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\AppVEntVirtualization.dll Handle ID: 0x1ec Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\AppVIntegration.dll Handle ID: 0x1d4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\AppVManifest.dll Handle ID: 0x1d4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\AppVOrchestration.dll Handle ID: 0x1d4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\AppVPolicy.dll Handle ID: 0x1d4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\AppVPublishing.dll Handle ID: 0x1f8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\AppVReporting.dll Handle ID: 0x1d8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\AppVScripting.dll Handle ID: 0x1fc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\AppVShNotify.exe Handle ID: 0x1fc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\AppXDeploymentExtensions.onecore.dll Handle ID: 0x1fc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\AppXDeploymentServer.dll Handle ID: 0x1d8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\AudioEndpointBuilder.dll Handle ID: 0x1d0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\AudioEng.dll Handle ID: 0x1d0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\AUDIOKSE.dll Handle ID: 0x1d0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\AudioSes.dll Handle ID: 0x1d0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\audiosrv.dll Handle ID: 0x200 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\AzureSettingSyncProvider.dll Handle ID: 0x1cc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\certprop.dll Handle ID: 0x210 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\Chakra.dll Handle ID: 0x210 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\ClipUp.exe Handle ID: 0x1c8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\cloudAP.dll Handle ID: 0x1c0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\CloudBackupSettings.dll Handle ID: 0x1bc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\CloudExperienceHost.dll Handle ID: 0x1b8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\ConsoleLogon.dll Handle ID: 0x1b4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\cryptui.dll Handle ID: 0x1c4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\d2d1.dll Handle ID: 0x1c4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\D3D12.dll Handle ID: 0x1a0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\D3DCompiler_47.dll Handle ID: 0x1c4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\DeveloperOptionsSettingsHandlers.dll Handle ID: 0x1a8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\domgmt.dll Handle ID: 0x1ac Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\dosvc.dll Handle ID: 0x204 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\edgehtml.dll Handle ID: 0x194 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\fhcfg.dll Handle ID: 0x204 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\fhsettingsprovider.dll Handle ID: 0x208 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\ie4uinit.exe Handle ID: 0x204 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\ImplatSetup.dll Handle ID: 0x1ac Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\indexeddbserver.dll Handle ID: 0x198 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\InstallAgent.exe Handle ID: 0x1ac Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\InstallAgentUserBroker.exe Handle ID: 0x208 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\kerberos.dll Handle ID: 0x20c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\KnobsCore.dll Handle ID: 0x20c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\KnobsCsp.dll Handle ID: 0x194 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\LaunchWinApp.exe Handle ID: 0x194 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonController.dll Handle ID: 0x194 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\MCRecvSrc.dll Handle ID: 0x218 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\mfasfsrcsnk.dll Handle ID: 0x208 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\mfcore.dll Handle ID: 0x220 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\mfmp4srcsnk.dll Handle ID: 0x228 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\mfmpeg2srcsnk.dll Handle ID: 0x228 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\mfnetcore.dll Handle ID: 0x22c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\mfnetsrc.dll Handle ID: 0x230 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\mshtml.dll Handle ID: 0x234 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\msmpeg2vdec.dll Handle ID: 0x234 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\mspaint.exe Handle ID: 0x238 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\mstscax.dll Handle ID: 0x238 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\msv1_0.dll Handle ID: 0x238 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\MSVP9DEC.dll Handle ID: 0x238 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\MSVPXENC.dll Handle ID: 0x238 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\offlinesam.dll Handle ID: 0x234 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\OneBackupHandler.dll Handle ID: 0x23c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\provengine.dll Handle ID: 0x23c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\ProvPluginEng.dll Handle ID: 0x23c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\rdpcore.dll Handle ID: 0x23c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\rdpcorets.dll Handle ID: 0x198 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\rdpencom.dll Handle ID: 0x244 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\rdpudd.dll Handle ID: 0x244 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\remoteaudioendpoint.dll Handle ID: 0x198 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\samsrv.dll Handle ID: 0x240 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\ScDeviceEnum.dll Handle ID: 0x248 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\SettingsHandlers_nt.dll Handle ID: 0x240 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\SettingSyncCore.dll Handle ID: 0x248 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\SettingSyncHost.exe Handle ID: 0x248 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\shell32.dll Handle ID: 0x250 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\sppobjs.dll Handle ID: 0x250 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\SRH.dll Handle ID: 0x25c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\SRHInproc.dll Handle ID: 0x240 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\StoreAgent.dll Handle ID: 0x204 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\SyncSettings.dll Handle ID: 0x240 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\TransportDSA.dll Handle ID: 0x258 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\twinui.dll Handle ID: 0x260 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\updatehandlers.dll Handle ID: 0x264 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\updatepolicy.dll Handle ID: 0x264 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\usocore.dll Handle ID: 0x258 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\wbiosrvc.dll Handle ID: 0x274 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\win32k.sys Handle ID: 0x274 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\win32kbase.sys Handle ID: 0x27c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\win32kfull.sys Handle ID: 0x278 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\Windows.ApplicationModel.LockScreen.dll Handle ID: 0x280 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\Windows.Internal.UI.Logon.ProxyStub.dll Handle ID: 0x284 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\Windows.Media.dll Handle ID: 0x288 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\Windows.Storage.ApplicationData.dll Handle ID: 0x288 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\Windows.UI.BioFeedback.dll Handle ID: 0x290 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\Windows.UI.BlockedShutdown.dll Handle ID: 0x298 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\Windows.UI.CredDialogController.dll Handle ID: 0x2a0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\Windows.UI.Logon.dll Handle ID: 0x2a4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\Windows.UI.Shell.dll Handle ID: 0x2b0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\Windows.UI.Xaml.dll Handle ID: 0x2b0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\Windows.UI.Xaml.Resources.dll Handle ID: 0x2b8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Handle ID: 0x274 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\winmde.dll Handle ID: 0x2b4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\WinSCard.dll Handle ID: 0x2c0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\winsrv.dll Handle ID: 0x2c0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\wow64.dll Handle ID: 0x2cc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\wuapi.dll Handle ID: 0x2cc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\wuaueng.dll Handle ID: 0x2d0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\wuuhext.dll Handle ID: 0x2dc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\migwiz\dlmanifests\Microsoft-Windows-IIS-DL\iismig.dll Handle ID: 0x2e4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\oobe\msoobe.exe Handle ID: 0x2e8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\oobe\msoobedui.dll Handle ID: 0x2ec Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\spp\plugin-manifests-signed\sppobjs-spp-plugin-manifest-signed.xrm-ms Handle ID: 0x2f4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\wbem\DMWmiBridgeProv.dll Handle ID: 0x2f4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\wbem\DMWmiBridgeProv.mof Handle ID: 0x2fc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\wbem\ndisimplatcim.dll Handle ID: 0x304 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\wbem\netswitchteamcim.dll Handle ID: 0x304 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\WinBioPlugIns\FaceRecognitionEngineAdapter.dll Handle ID: 0x308 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\WinBioPlugIns\FaceRecognitionEngineAdapterResources.dll Handle ID: 0x30c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\WinBioPlugIns\FaceRecognitionSensorAdapter.dll Handle ID: 0x310 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\Modules\AppvClient\Microsoft.AppV.AppvClientComConsumer.dll Handle ID: 0x314 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.AAD.BrokerPlugin_cw5n1h2txyewy\AAD.Core.dll Handle ID: 0x304 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.AAD.BrokerPlugin_cw5n1h2txyewy\Microsoft.AAD.BrokerPlugin.exe Handle ID: 0x314 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.AccountsControl_cw5n1h2txyewy\AppxBlockMap.xml Handle ID: 0x310 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.AccountsControl_cw5n1h2txyewy\AppxManifest.xml Handle ID: 0x318 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.AccountsControl_cw5n1h2txyewy\AppxSignature.p7x Handle ID: 0x31c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.LockApp_cw5n1h2txyewy\resources.pri Handle ID: 0x320 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe\eData.dll Handle ID: 0x300 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe\EdgeContent.dll Handle ID: 0x324 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe\eModel.dll Handle ID: 0x328 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe\eView.dll Handle ID: 0x32c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe\MicrosoftEdge.exe Handle ID: 0x330 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe\resources.pri Handle ID: 0x324 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.PPIProjection_cw5n1h2txyewy\resources.pri Handle ID: 0x324 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.AssignedAccessLockApp_cw5n1h2txyewy\App.xbf Handle ID: 0x330 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.AssignedAccessLockApp_cw5n1h2txyewy\MainPage.xbf Handle ID: 0x334 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.AssignedAccessLockApp_cw5n1h2txyewy\resources.pri Handle ID: 0x338 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\ActionUriServer.exe Handle ID: 0x33c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\App.xbf Handle ID: 0x33c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\AppxBlockMap.xml Handle ID: 0x340 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\AppxManifest.xml Handle ID: 0x344 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\AppxSignature.p7x Handle ID: 0x324 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\BingLocalSearchService.dll Handle ID: 0x348 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\CGSVCBackgroundTask.dll Handle ID: 0x34c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\ContactPermissionsActionUriHandlers.dll Handle ID: 0x34c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Cortana.Actions.dll Handle ID: 0x34c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Cortana.ActionUriHandlers.dll Handle ID: 0x34c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Cortana.AppToApp.dll Handle ID: 0x2f4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Cortana.BackgroundTask.dll Handle ID: 0x350 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Cortana.ContactPermissions.dll Handle ID: 0x350 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Cortana.Core.dll Handle ID: 0x354 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Cortana.DoNotDisturb.dll Handle ID: 0x354 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Cortana.Dss.BackgroundTask.dll Handle ID: 0x354 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Cortana.IntentExtraction.dll Handle ID: 0x358 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Cortana.LocalSearch.dll Handle ID: 0x35c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Cortana.Nodewinrtwrap.dll Handle ID: 0x358 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Cortana.Places.ViewModels.dll Handle ID: 0x358 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Cortana.Signals.dll Handle ID: 0x358 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Cortana.SPA.dll Handle ID: 0x358 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\CortanaApi.dll Handle ID: 0x358 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\CortanaMusicSearch.dll Handle ID: 0x35c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\CortanaSpeechux.dll Handle ID: 0x360 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\CSGSuggestLib.dll Handle ID: 0x364 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\DeviceSideServicesActionUriHandler.dll Handle ID: 0x364 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Dictionary.devicefamily-desktop.xbf Handle ID: 0x368 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Dictionary.devicefamily-xbox.xbf Handle ID: 0x368 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Dictionary.xbf Handle ID: 0x36c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\DNDActionUriHandlers.dll Handle ID: 0x36c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\microsoft.bing.client.graph.dll Handle ID: 0x368 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\node.dll Handle ID: 0x36c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\OnlineServices.dll Handle ID: 0x370 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\PhonePCVoiceAgents.dll Handle ID: 0x370 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\PlacesServer.exe Handle ID: 0x370 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\ReactiveAgentsCommon.dll Handle ID: 0x370 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\ReminderActionUriHandlers.dll Handle ID: 0x374 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\RemindersServer.exe Handle ID: 0x378 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\RemindersUI.dll Handle ID: 0x374 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\RulesBackgroundTasks.dll Handle ID: 0x378 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\RulesService.dll Handle ID: 0x364 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\SAPIBackgroundTask.dll Handle ID: 0x37c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\SearchUI.exe Handle ID: 0x380 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\SharedVoiceAgents.dll Handle ID: 0x378 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\ShellActionUriHandlers.dll Handle ID: 0x384 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\TextEntityExtractorProxy.dll Handle ID: 0x384 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\tws.dll Handle ID: 0x388 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\VadSharedVoiceAgents.dll Handle ID: 0x388 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\VoiceAgentsCommon.dll Handle ID: 0x388 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\PersonPicture\Themes\Generic.xbf Handle ID: 0x38c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Places\UserControls\FavoriteAddEditForm.xbf Handle ID: 0x390 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Places\UserControls\SearchResultCompactCard.xbf Handle ID: 0x394 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Places\UserControls\View\FavoritesCompactCard.xbf Handle ID: 0x360 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Places\Views\AddFavoritePage.xbf Handle ID: 0x398 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Places\Views\EditFavoritePage.xbf Handle ID: 0x39c Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Places\Views\PlacesExperiencePage.xbf Handle ID: 0x3a0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Places\Views\PlacesPage.xbf Handle ID: 0x3a4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\RemindersUI\Reminders.Dictionary.xbf Handle ID: 0x3a8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\RemindersUI\Views\InkNotesItemPage.xbf Handle ID: 0x3ac Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\RemindersUI\Views\LocationTriggerEditor.xbf Handle ID: 0x3ac Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\RemindersUI\Views\ReminderDebugInfoPage.xbf Handle ID: 0x3b0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\RemindersUI\Views\ReminderItemPage.xbf Handle ID: 0x3b4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\RemindersUI\Views\ReminderListItem.Dictionary.xbf Handle ID: 0x3b8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\RemindersUI\Views\RemindersHistoryPage.xbf Handle ID: 0x3bc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\RemindersUI\Views\RemindersHomePage.xbf Handle ID: 0x3c0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\RemindersUI\Views\RemindersShareTargetPage.xbf Handle ID: 0x3c4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\RemindersUI\Views\TimeTriggerEditor.xbf Handle ID: 0x3b8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\AboutMePage.xbf Handle ID: 0x3c8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\AnimatedImage.xbf Handle ID: 0x3cc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\BreakThroughListPage.xbf Handle ID: 0x3cc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\CapabilitiesPrompt.xbf Handle ID: 0x3d0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\Chrome.xbf Handle ID: 0x3d4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\ChromeVisualStates.xbf Handle ID: 0x3d4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\COOBEPage.xbf Handle ID: 0x354 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\COOBEPage_Xbox.xbf Handle ID: 0x3d4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\CortanaWindow.xbf Handle ID: 0x3d8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\ErrorPage.xbf Handle ID: 0x3d8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\FamilyHostPage.xbf Handle ID: 0x3dc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\FamilyMemberPage.xbf Handle ID: 0x3e0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\FamilyNotificationCreationPage.xbf Handle ID: 0x3e4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\FamilyPage.xbf Handle ID: 0x274 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\FlyoutPage.xbf Handle ID: 0x3e8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\FrameHostPage.xbf Handle ID: 0x3ec Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\GreetingsControl.xbf Handle ID: 0x3f0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\HomeburgerMenuControl.xbf Handle ID: 0x3f0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\HostedWebViewControl.xbf Handle ID: 0x3f0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\InkNotesHostPage.xbf Handle ID: 0x3f4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\MusicRecoPage.xbf Handle ID: 0x3f8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\NamePronunciationPage.xbf Handle ID: 0x258 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\NotebookOfflinePage.xbf Handle ID: 0x3fc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\PrivacySettingsPage.xbf Handle ID: 0x3fc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\QuietHoursPage.xbf Handle ID: 0x3fc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\ReactiveCat1Control.xbf Handle ID: 0x3fc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\ReactiveCat1ThemeResources.xbf Handle ID: 0x3fc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\RemindersHostPage.xbf Handle ID: 0x3fc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\RichSearchBoxControl.xbf Handle ID: 0x3fc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\SearchBoxAnimationControl.xbf Handle ID: 0x3fc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\SearchBoxControl.xbf Handle ID: 0x3fc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\SettingsPage.xbf Handle ID: 0x258 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\SpeechHelpCategoryDetailPage.xbf Handle ID: 0x258 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\SpeechHelpPage.xbf Handle ID: 0x258 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\SpeechTextInputControl.xbf Handle ID: 0x258 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\SpeechTextInputThemeResources.xbf Handle ID: 0x3f8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\XDeviceSettingsDetailPage.xbf Handle ID: 0x3f8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\XDeviceSettingsMasterPage.xbf Handle ID: 0x3f8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\XDeviceSettingsNotificationForwardingPage.xbf Handle ID: 0x3f8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\ReactiveCat1\GuiFormDatePicker.xbf Handle ID: 0x3f8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\ReactiveCat1\GuiFormDatePickerFlyout.xbf Handle ID: 0x3fc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\ReactiveCat1\GuiFormDaysOfWeekPickerFlyout.xbf Handle ID: 0x258 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\ReactiveCat1\GuiFormImage.xbf Handle ID: 0x3fc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\ReactiveCat1\GuiFormLabel.xbf Handle ID: 0x258 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\ReactiveCat1\GuiFormListAppLaunch.xbf Handle ID: 0x3f4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\ReactiveCat1\GuiFormLocationPicker.xbf Handle ID: 0x3f4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\ReactiveCat1\GuiFormTimePickerFlyout.xbf Handle ID: 0x3f0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\ReactiveCat1\GuiInkImage.xbf Handle ID: 0x3f0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\Views\ReactiveCat1\GuiReminderEntityListView.xbf Handle ID: 0x3f0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.SecondaryTileExperience_cw5n1h2txyewy\resources.pri Handle ID: 0x3f4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.SecureAssessmentBrowser_cw5n1h2txyewy\AddressBoxControl.xbf Handle ID: 0x3f0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.SecureAssessmentBrowser_cw5n1h2txyewy\App.xbf Handle ID: 0x3ec Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.SecureAssessmentBrowser_cw5n1h2txyewy\AssessmentPage.xbf Handle ID: 0x3e8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.SecureAssessmentBrowser_cw5n1h2txyewy\ErrorPage.xbf Handle ID: 0x3f4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.SecureAssessmentBrowser_cw5n1h2txyewy\LockdownDialog.xbf Handle ID: 0x258 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.SecureAssessmentBrowser_cw5n1h2txyewy\NavigationLandingPage.xbf Handle ID: 0x274 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.SecureAssessmentBrowser_cw5n1h2txyewy\NetworkConnectivityErrorPage.xbf Handle ID: 0x274 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.SecureAssessmentBrowser_cw5n1h2txyewy\ProgressPage.xbf Handle ID: 0x3e4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.SecureAssessmentBrowser_cw5n1h2txyewy\SchemaActivationEmptyPage.xbf Handle ID: 0x3e0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.SecureAssessmentBrowser_cw5n1h2txyewy\SecureAssessment_JSBridge.dll Handle ID: 0x3e0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.SecureAssessmentBrowser_cw5n1h2txyewy\SecureAssessment_Telemetry.dll Handle ID: 0x3e0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\ShellExperienceHost_cw5n1h2txyewy\AppxBlockMap.xml Handle ID: 0x3e0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\ShellExperienceHost_cw5n1h2txyewy\AppxManifest.xml Handle ID: 0x3e0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\ShellExperienceHost_cw5n1h2txyewy\AppxSignature.p7x Handle ID: 0x274 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemApps\ShellExperienceHost_cw5n1h2txyewy\resources.pri Handle ID: 0x274 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemResources\Windows.ApplicationModel.LockScreen\Windows.ApplicationModel.LockScreen.pri Handle ID: 0x274 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemResources\Windows.UI.BioFeedback\Windows.UI.BioFeedback.pri Handle ID: 0x274 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemResources\Windows.UI.BlockedShutdown\Windows.UI.BlockedShutdown.pri Handle ID: 0x274 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemResources\Windows.UI.Cred\Windows.UI.Cred.pri Handle ID: 0x274 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemResources\Windows.UI.DevicesFlow\Windows.UI.DevicesFlow.pri Handle ID: 0x274 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemResources\Windows.UI.Logon\Windows.UI.Logon.pri Handle ID: 0x274 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemResources\Windows.UI.PCShell\Windows.UI.PCShell.pri Handle ID: 0x274 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemResources\Windows.UI.SettingsAppThreshold\Windows.UI.SettingsAppThreshold.pri Handle ID: 0x274 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemResources\Windows.UI.Shell\Windows.UI.Shell.pri Handle ID: 0x3dc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SystemResources\Windows.UI.ShellCommon\Windows.UI.ShellCommon.pri Handle ID: 0x3dc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\aadtb.dll Handle ID: 0x258 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\aclui.dll Handle ID: 0x3dc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\AppVEntSubsystems32.dll Handle ID: 0x3e4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\AUDIOKSE.dll Handle ID: 0x3e4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\AudioSes.dll Handle ID: 0x3dc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\AzureSettingSyncProvider.dll Handle ID: 0x3dc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Chakra.dll Handle ID: 0x274 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Chakradiag.dll Handle ID: 0x3e0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\CloudBackupSettings.dll Handle ID: 0x3e4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cryptui.dll Handle ID: 0x3e4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\d2d1.dll Handle ID: 0x258 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\D3D12.dll Handle ID: 0x3e4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\D3DCompiler_47.dll Handle ID: 0x3e0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\edgehtml.dll Handle ID: 0x3dc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\indexeddbserver.dll Handle ID: 0x3dc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\InstallAgent.exe Handle ID: 0x3dc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\InstallAgentUserBroker.exe Handle ID: 0x3dc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\kerberos.dll Handle ID: 0x3dc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\LaunchWinApp.exe Handle ID: 0x3dc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\LogonController.dll Handle ID: 0x3e0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\MCRecvSrc.dll Handle ID: 0x3e0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mfasfsrcsnk.dll Handle ID: 0x3e0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mfcore.dll Handle ID: 0x3dc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mfmp4srcsnk.dll Handle ID: 0x274 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mfmpeg2srcsnk.dll Handle ID: 0x3e4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mfnetcore.dll Handle ID: 0x3e4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mfnetsrc.dll Handle ID: 0x3e4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mshtml.dll Handle ID: 0x3e4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msmpeg2vdec.dll Handle ID: 0x3dc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe Handle ID: 0x3d8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mstscax.dll Handle ID: 0x354 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msv1_0.dll Handle ID: 0x3d0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\MSVP9DEC.dll Handle ID: 0x3cc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\MSVPXENC.dll Handle ID: 0x3d0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\offlinesam.dll Handle ID: 0x3c8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rdpcore.dll Handle ID: 0x274 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rdpencom.dll Handle ID: 0x3c4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\remoteaudioendpoint.dll Handle ID: 0x3c8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\SettingSyncCore.dll Handle ID: 0x3c0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\SettingSyncHost.exe Handle ID: 0x3bc Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\shell32.dll Handle ID: 0x3b4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\StoreAgent.dll Handle ID: 0x3b0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\SyncSettings.dll Handle ID: 0x3a8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\twinui.dll Handle ID: 0x3ac Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\updatepolicy.dll Handle ID: 0x3a4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\win32k.sys Handle ID: 0x3ac Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\win32kfull.sys Handle ID: 0x274 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Windows.ApplicationModel.LockScreen.dll Handle ID: 0x3a4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Windows.Internal.UI.Logon.ProxyStub.dll Handle ID: 0x3a0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Windows.Media.dll Handle ID: 0x3d4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Windows.Storage.ApplicationData.dll Handle ID: 0x3a0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Windows.UI.BioFeedback.dll Handle ID: 0x3a0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Windows.UI.BlockedShutdown.dll Handle ID: 0x3d4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Windows.UI.Cred.dll Handle ID: 0x3a0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Windows.UI.CredDialogController.dll Handle ID: 0x3d4 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Windows.UI.Logon.dll Handle ID: 0x3b8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Windows.UI.Xaml.dll Handle ID: 0x398 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Windows.UI.Xaml.Resources.dll Handle ID: 0x3b8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\winmde.dll Handle ID: 0x360 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WinSCard.dll Handle ID: 0x3b8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\wuapi.dll Handle ID: 0x394 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-11 22:14:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4907: Auditing settings on object were changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\Modules\AppvClient\Microsoft.AppV.AppvClientComConsumer.dll Handle ID: 0x3b8 Process Information: Process ID: 0xcb4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Auditing Settings: Original Security Descriptor: S:AI New Security Descriptor: S:ARAI(AU;SAFA;DCLCRPCRSDWDWO;;;WD)
Security  Audit Success  103  2017-01-11 22:15:03    Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog  1100: The event logging service has shut down.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 07:19:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1b4 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6?4?????? ? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x4 Creator Process Name: ??????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 07:19:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x224 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b4 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13573  2017-01-12 07:19:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4826: Boot Configuration Data loaded. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 General Settings: Load Options: - Advanced Options: %%1843 Configuration Access Policy: %%1846 System Event Logging: %%1843 Kernel Debugging: %%1843 VSM Launch Type: %%1848 Signature Settings: Test Signing: %%1843 Flight Signing: %%1843 Disable Integrity Checks: %%1843 HyperVisor Settings: HyperVisor Load Options: - HyperVisor Launch Type: %%1848 HyperVisor Debugging: %%1843
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 07:19:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x298 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??4?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b4 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 07:19:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x334 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x298 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 07:19:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x388 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??4?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b4 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 07:19:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x39c New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x298 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 07:19:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3fc New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x388 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 07:19:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x218 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??8?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x388 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-12 07:19:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4608: Windows is starting up. This event is logged when LSASS.EXE starts and the auditing subsystem is initialized.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:19:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 0 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: - New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Workstation Name: - Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: - Authentication Package: - Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:19:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 07:19:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 07:19:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1e4 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??c?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x39c Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 07:19:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1dc New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x39c Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-12 07:19:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4902: The Per-user audit policy table was created. Number of Elements: 0 Policy ID: 0x9ed1
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:19:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:19:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x218 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:19:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10571 Linked Logon ID: 0x10595 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x218 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:19:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10595 Linked Logon ID: 0x10571 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x218 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:19:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:19:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:19:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:19:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 07:19:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 07:19:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10571 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 07:19:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10595 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 07:19:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 07:19:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 07:19:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 07:19:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-12 07:19:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5033: The Windows Firewall Driver started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:19:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:19:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 07:19:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 07:19:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-12 07:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5024: The Windows Firewall service started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 3 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-7 Account Name: ANONYMOUS LOGON Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x209b8 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x0 Process Name: - Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: NtLmSsp Authentication Package: NTLM Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): NTLM V1 Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 07:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 07:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 07:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x608 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 07:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x608 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 07:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x454 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 07:19:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x454 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:19:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 07:19:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-12 07:19:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  6406: Kaspersky Endpoint Security 10 for Windows registered to Windows Firewall to control filtering for the following: BootTimeRuleCategory, StealthRuleCategory, FirewallRuleCategory.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 07:19:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x644 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 07:19:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x644 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 07:19:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x644 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 07:19:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x644 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 07:19:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x15a8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 07:19:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x15a8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 07:19:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x15a8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 07:19:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x15a8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:20:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 07:20:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 07:20:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x434 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:20:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x454 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:20:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xf8820 Linked Logon ID: 0xf884e Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x454 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:20:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xf884e Linked Logon ID: 0xf8820 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x454 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:20:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:20:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xf8a9d Linked Logon ID: 0xf8ace Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:20:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xf8ace Linked Logon ID: 0xf8a9d Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-12 07:20:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf8ace Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-12 07:20:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf8a9d Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 07:20:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xf8820 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 07:20:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xf8a9d Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 07:20:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 07:20:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 07:20:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x454 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:20:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:20:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: wdmycloud Additional Information: wdmycloud Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.23 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:20:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.5 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:20:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x7ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:20:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 07:20:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:20:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x7ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:20:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 07:20:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 07:20:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x1b5c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 07:20:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x1b5c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 07:20:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x454 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 07:20:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x454 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:20:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: EC2AMAZ-8MGC7TQ Additional Information: EC2AMAZ-8MGC7TQ Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:20:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: EC2AMAZ-8MGC7TQ Additional Information: EC2AMAZ-8MGC7TQ Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:20:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf8820 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:20:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf8820 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x7ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:20:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf8820 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x7ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:21:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:21:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 07:21:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:21:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 07:21:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 07:21:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x21b8 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 07:22:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1b70 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 07:22:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1b70 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 07:22:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1b70 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 07:22:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1b70 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:23:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 07:23:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:25:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 07:25:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 07:25:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-501 Account Name: Guest Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2504 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\CompatTelRunner.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:29:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:29:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:29:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:29:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x7ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:29:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x7ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 07:29:28    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x25ac Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 07:29:28    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x25ac Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 07:29:28    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x25ac Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 07:29:28    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x25ac Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 07:30:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x454 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 07:30:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x454 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:35:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:35:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:35:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:35:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x7ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:35:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x7ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 07:35:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dd0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 07:35:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dd0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:35:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:35:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 07:42:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 07:42:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 07:42:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 07:42:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 07:42:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x17ec Process Name: C:\Windows\explorer.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:43:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: EC2AMAZ-8MGC7TQ Additional Information: EC2AMAZ-8MGC7TQ Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:43:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: EC2AMAZ-8MGC7TQ Additional Information: EC2AMAZ-8MGC7TQ Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:43:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:43:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x7ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:43:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x7ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:50:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 07:50:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:50:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 07:50:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 07:58:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 07:58:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 08:01:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 08:01:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 08:20:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1b88 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 08:20:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1b88 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 08:20:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xef0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 08:20:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1b88 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 08:20:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1b88 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 08:20:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x454 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 08:20:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x825c84 Linked Logon ID: 0x825cb7 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x454 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 08:20:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x825cb7 Linked Logon ID: 0x825c84 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x454 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 08:20:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 08:20:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x826387 Linked Logon ID: 0x8263ea Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 08:20:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x8263ea Linked Logon ID: 0x826387 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-12 08:20:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8263ea Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-12 08:20:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x826387 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-12 08:20:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x825cb7 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-12 08:20:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x825c84 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 08:20:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x825c84 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 08:20:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x826387 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 08:20:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 08:20:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 08:20:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xa34 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 08:20:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xa34 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 08:20:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xa34 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 08:20:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xa34 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 08:20:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 08:20:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x7ec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 08:29:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 08:29:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 08:29:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 08:29:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 08:29:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 08:29:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 08:29:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x1980 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 08:29:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x1980 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 08:29:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x1980 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 08:29:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x1980 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 08:29:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x1980 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 08:29:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x1980 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 08:29:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x1980 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 08:29:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x1980 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-12 08:29:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4904: An attempt was made to register a security event source. Subject : Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Process: Process ID: 0x1980 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe Event Source: Source Name: VSSAudit Event Source ID: 0x91d094
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-12 08:29:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4905: An attempt was made to unregister a security event source. Subject Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Process: Process ID: 0x1980 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe Event Source: Source Name: VSSAudit Event Source ID: 0x91d094
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 08:29:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 08:29:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 09:20:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x26e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 09:20:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x26e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 09:20:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x10b4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 09:20:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x26e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 09:20:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x26e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 09:20:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x454 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 09:20:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xca8b52 Linked Logon ID: 0xca8b85 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x454 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 09:20:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xca8b85 Linked Logon ID: 0xca8b52 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x454 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 09:20:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xca8b52 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 09:20:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 09:20:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 09:20:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xca9274 Linked Logon ID: 0xca92f5 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 09:20:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xca92f5 Linked Logon ID: 0xca9274 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-12 09:20:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xca92f5 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-12 09:20:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xca9274 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-12 09:20:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xca8b85 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-12 09:20:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xca8b52 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 09:20:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xca9274 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 09:20:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 09:20:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x938 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 09:20:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x938 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 09:20:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x938 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 09:20:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x938 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 09:27:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xa54 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 09:27:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xa54 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 09:27:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xa54 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 09:27:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xa54 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 09:27:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1998 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 09:32:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 09:32:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 10:13:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x454 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 10:13:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xedcd78 Linked Logon ID: 0xedcdab Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x454 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 10:13:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xedcdab Linked Logon ID: 0xedcd78 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x454 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 10:13:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 10:13:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xedd539 Linked Logon ID: 0xedd5b9 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 10:13:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xedd5b9 Linked Logon ID: 0xedd539 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-12 10:13:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xedd5b9 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-12 10:13:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xedd539 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-12 10:13:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xedcdab Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-12 10:13:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xedcd78 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 10:13:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xedcd78 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 10:13:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xedd539 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 10:13:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 10:13:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 10:13:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2874 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 10:13:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2874 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 10:13:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2874 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 10:13:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2874 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-12 10:21:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4647: User initiated logoff: Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xf884e This event is generated when a logoff is initiated. No further user-initiated activity can occur. This event can be interpreted as a logoff event.
Security  Audit Success  103  2017-01-12 10:21:10    Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog  1100: The event logging service has shut down.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 11:44:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1b0 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6?4?????? ? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x4 Creator Process Name: ??????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 11:44:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x220 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13573  2017-01-12 11:44:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4826: Boot Configuration Data loaded. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 General Settings: Load Options: - Advanced Options: %%1843 Configuration Access Policy: %%1846 System Event Logging: %%1843 Kernel Debugging: %%1843 VSM Launch Type: %%1848 Signature Settings: Test Signing: %%1843 Flight Signing: %%1843 Disable Integrity Checks: %%1843 HyperVisor Settings: HyperVisor Load Options: - HyperVisor Launch Type: %%1848 HyperVisor Debugging: %%1843
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 11:44:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x294 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??0?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 11:44:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x334 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x294 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-12 11:44:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4608: Windows is starting up. This event is logged when LSASS.EXE starts and the auditing subsystem is initialized.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:44:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 0 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: - New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Workstation Name: - Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: - Authentication Package: - Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:44:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:44:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 11:44:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 11:44:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 11:44:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x384 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??0?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 11:44:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x398 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x294 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 11:44:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3f8 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x384 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 11:44:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x214 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??4?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x384 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 11:44:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1d8 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??8?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x398 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 11:44:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1d0 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x398 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-12 11:44:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4902: The Per-user audit policy table was created. Number of Elements: 0 Policy ID: 0xa495
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:44:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x214 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:44:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x110a6 Linked Logon ID: 0x110bd Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x214 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:44:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x110bd Linked Logon ID: 0x110a6 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x214 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:44:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:44:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:44:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 11:44:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x110a6 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 11:44:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x110bd Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 11:44:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 11:44:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 11:44:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-12 11:44:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5033: The Windows Firewall Driver started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:44:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:44:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:44:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:44:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 11:44:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 11:44:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 11:44:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 11:44:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 11:44:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x448 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 11:44:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x628 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 11:44:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x628 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 11:44:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 11:44:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-12 11:44:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5024: The Windows Firewall service started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:44:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 3 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-7 Account Name: ANONYMOUS LOGON Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x2925c Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x0 Process Name: - Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: NtLmSsp Authentication Package: NTLM Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): NTLM V1 Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:44:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 11:44:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:45:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:45:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x4ad63 Linked Logon ID: 0x4ad9f Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:45:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x4ad9f Linked Logon ID: 0x4ad63 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:45:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:45:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x4b23c Linked Logon ID: 0x4b2a5 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:45:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x4b2a5 Linked Logon ID: 0x4b23c Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-12 11:45:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4b2a5 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-12 11:45:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4b23c Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 11:45:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x4ad63 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 11:45:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x4b23c Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 11:45:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x120c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 11:45:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x120c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 11:45:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 11:45:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 11:45:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:45:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 11:45:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 11:45:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x1a60 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 11:45:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x1a60 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-12 11:45:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  6406: Kaspersky Endpoint Security 10 for Windows registered to Windows Firewall to control filtering for the following: BootTimeRuleCategory, StealthRuleCategory, FirewallRuleCategory.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:45:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4ad9f Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:45:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4ad9f Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: wdmycloud Additional Information: wdmycloud Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.23 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:45:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 11:45:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:45:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4ad9f Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.5 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:45:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 11:45:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 11:45:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4ad9f Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 11:45:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4ad9f Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 11:45:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4ad9f Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 11:45:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4ad9f Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 11:45:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4ad9f User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1678 Process Name: C:\Windows\explorer.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:46:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4ad63 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 11:46:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x120c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 11:46:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x120c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:46:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4ad9f Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x80c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:46:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4ad63 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x80c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12290  2017-01-12 11:46:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5061: Cryptographic operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: ECDSA_P256 Key Name: Microsoft Connected Devices Platform device certificate Key Type: %%2500 Cryptographic Operation: Operation: %%2480 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-12 11:46:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5058: Key file operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: UNKNOWN Key Name: Microsoft Connected Devices Platform device certificate Key Type: %%2500 Key File Operation Information: File Path: C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\LocalService\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Crypto\Keys\de7cf8a7901d2ad13e5c67c29e5d1662_515b10cc-5648-4ef1-85cd-ec69792150a2 Operation: %%2458 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-12 11:46:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5059: Key migration operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: ECDSA_P256 Key Name: Microsoft Connected Devices Platform device certificate Key Type: %%2500 Additional Information: Operation: %%2464 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:46:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 11:46:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:46:59    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 11:46:59    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 11:46:59    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 11:46:59    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:47:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4ad9f Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: wdmycloud Additional Information: wdmycloud Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.23 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:47:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 11:47:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 11:47:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 11:47:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-12 11:47:28    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4647: User initiated logoff: Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4ad9f This event is generated when a logoff is initiated. No further user-initiated activity can occur. This event can be interpreted as a logoff event.
Security  Audit Success  103  2017-01-12 11:47:29    Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog  1100: The event logging service has shut down.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 15:41:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1ac New Process Name: ??????????????-??6?4?????? ? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x4 Creator Process Name: ??????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 15:41:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x21c New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1ac Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13573  2017-01-12 15:41:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4826: Boot Configuration Data loaded. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 General Settings: Load Options: - Advanced Options: %%1843 Configuration Access Policy: %%1846 System Event Logging: %%1843 Kernel Debugging: %%1843 VSM Launch Type: %%1848 Signature Settings: Test Signing: %%1843 Flight Signing: %%1843 Disable Integrity Checks: %%1843 HyperVisor Settings: HyperVisor Load Options: - HyperVisor Launch Type: %%1848 HyperVisor Debugging: %%1843
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 15:41:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x288 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??c?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1ac Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 15:41:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x324 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x288 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-12 15:41:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4608: Windows is starting up. This event is logged when LSASS.EXE starts and the auditing subsystem is initialized.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:41:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 0 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: - New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Workstation Name: - Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: - Authentication Package: - Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:41:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:41:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:41:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:41:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 15:41:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x374 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??c?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1ac Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 15:41:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3b0 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x288 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 15:41:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3e8 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x374 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 15:41:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x244 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??4?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x374 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 15:41:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1e0 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??0?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x3b0 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 15:41:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1d8 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x3b0 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-12 15:41:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4902: The Per-user audit policy table was created. Number of Elements: 0 Policy ID: 0xa20c
Security  Audit Success  101  2017-01-12 15:41:19    Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog  1101: Audit events have been dropped by the transport. 0
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:41:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x244 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:41:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10dd5 Linked Logon ID: 0x10df2 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x244 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:41:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10df2 Linked Logon ID: 0x10dd5 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x244 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:41:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:41:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:41:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:41:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:41:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10dd5 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:41:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10df2 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:41:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:41:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:41:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:41:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-12 15:41:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5033: The Windows Firewall Driver started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:41:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:41:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:41:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:41:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 3 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-7 Account Name: ANONYMOUS LOGON Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x24df2 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x0 Process Name: - Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: NtLmSsp Authentication Package: NTLM Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): NTLM V1 Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:41:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:41:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:41:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 15:41:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x43c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 15:41:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x62c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 15:41:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x62c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 15:41:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 15:41:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-12 15:41:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5024: The Windows Firewall service started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:41:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:41:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:41:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:41:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x430e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x43173 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:41:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x43173 Linked Logon ID: 0x430e7 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:41:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:41:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x4396d Linked Logon ID: 0x439ba Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:41:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x439ba Linked Logon ID: 0x4396d Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-12 15:41:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x439ba Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-12 15:41:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4396d Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:41:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x430e7 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:41:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x4396d Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 15:41:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x6d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 15:41:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x6d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 15:41:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 15:41:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 15:41:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:41:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x43173 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:41:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x43173 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: wdmycloud Additional Information: wdmycloud Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.23 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:41:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x43173 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x830 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:41:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x43173 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x830 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:41:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x43173 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x830 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:41:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x43173 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.5 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:41:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x43173 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x830 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:41:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:41:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 15:41:28    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x15e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 15:41:28    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x15e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-12 15:41:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  6406: Kaspersky Endpoint Security 10 for Windows registered to Windows Firewall to control filtering for the following: BootTimeRuleCategory, StealthRuleCategory, FirewallRuleCategory.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 15:41:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x6d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 15:41:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x6d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:41:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:41:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  103  2017-01-12 15:41:47    Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog  1100: The event logging service has shut down.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-12 15:41:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4647: User initiated logoff: Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x43173 This event is generated when a logoff is initiated. No further user-initiated activity can occur. This event can be interpreted as a logoff event.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 15:42:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1b0 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6?4?????? ? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x4 Creator Process Name: ??????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 15:42:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x220 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13573  2017-01-12 15:42:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4826: Boot Configuration Data loaded. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 General Settings: Load Options: - Advanced Options: %%1843 Configuration Access Policy: %%1846 System Event Logging: %%1843 Kernel Debugging: %%1843 VSM Launch Type: %%1848 Signature Settings: Test Signing: %%1843 Flight Signing: %%1843 Disable Integrity Checks: %%1843 HyperVisor Settings: HyperVisor Load Options: - HyperVisor Launch Type: %%1848 HyperVisor Debugging: %%1843
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 15:42:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x28c New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??0?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 15:42:59    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x328 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x28c Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-12 15:43:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4608: Windows is starting up. This event is logged when LSASS.EXE starts and the auditing subsystem is initialized.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:43:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 0 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: - New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Workstation Name: - Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: - Authentication Package: - Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:43:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:43:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:43:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:43:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 15:43:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x378 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??0?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 15:43:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x394 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x28c Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 15:43:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3ec New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x378 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 15:43:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x244 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??8?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x378 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 15:43:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1e8 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??4?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x394 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 15:43:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1d8 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x394 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-12 15:43:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4902: The Per-user audit policy table was created. Number of Elements: 0 Policy ID: 0x9f7c
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:43:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x244 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:43:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10b1d Linked Logon ID: 0x10b34 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x244 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:43:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10b34 Linked Logon ID: 0x10b1d Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x244 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:43:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:43:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:43:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:43:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:43:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10b1d Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:43:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10b34 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:43:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:43:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:43:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:43:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-12 15:43:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5033: The Windows Firewall Driver started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-12 15:43:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5024: The Windows Firewall service started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:43:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:43:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:43:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:43:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:43:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:43:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 15:43:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x448 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 15:43:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x648 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 15:43:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x648 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 15:43:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x484 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 15:43:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x484 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:43:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 3 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-7 Account Name: ANONYMOUS LOGON Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x2753d Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x0 Process Name: - Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: NtLmSsp Authentication Package: NTLM Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): NTLM V1 Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:43:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:43:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-12 15:43:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  6406: Kaspersky Endpoint Security 10 for Windows registered to Windows Firewall to control filtering for the following: BootTimeRuleCategory, StealthRuleCategory, FirewallRuleCategory.
Security  Audit Success  103  2017-01-12 15:43:17    Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog  1100: The event logging service has shut down.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 15:44:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1b0 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6?4?????? ? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x4 Creator Process Name: ??????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 15:44:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x220 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13573  2017-01-12 15:44:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4826: Boot Configuration Data loaded. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 General Settings: Load Options: - Advanced Options: %%1843 Configuration Access Policy: %%1846 System Event Logging: %%1843 Kernel Debugging: %%1843 VSM Launch Type: %%1848 Signature Settings: Test Signing: %%1843 Flight Signing: %%1843 Disable Integrity Checks: %%1843 HyperVisor Settings: HyperVisor Load Options: - HyperVisor Launch Type: %%1848 HyperVisor Debugging: %%1843
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 15:44:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x288 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??0?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 15:44:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x324 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x288 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-12 15:44:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4608: Windows is starting up. This event is logged when LSASS.EXE starts and the auditing subsystem is initialized.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:44:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 0 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: - New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Workstation Name: - Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: - Authentication Package: - Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:44:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:44:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:44:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:44:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 15:44:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x374 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??0?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 15:44:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x390 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x288 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 15:44:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3e8 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x374 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 15:44:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x248 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??4?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x374 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 15:44:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1e4 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??0?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x390 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 15:44:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1dc New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x390 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-12 15:44:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4902: The Per-user audit policy table was created. Number of Elements: 0 Policy ID: 0x9f7b
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:44:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x248 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:44:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10b12 Linked Logon ID: 0x10b35 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x248 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:44:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10b35 Linked Logon ID: 0x10b12 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x248 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:44:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:44:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:44:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:44:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:44:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:44:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10b12 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:44:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10b35 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:44:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:44:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:44:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:44:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:44:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-12 15:44:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5033: The Windows Firewall Driver started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-12 15:44:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5024: The Windows Firewall service started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:44:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:44:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:44:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:44:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 15:44:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x440 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 15:44:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x648 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 15:44:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x648 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 15:44:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x470 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 15:44:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x470 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:44:28    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 3 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-7 Account Name: ANONYMOUS LOGON Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x275a4 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x0 Process Name: - Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: NtLmSsp Authentication Package: NTLM Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): NTLM V1 Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 15:44:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 15:44:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-12 15:44:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  6406: Kaspersky Endpoint Security 10 for Windows registered to Windows Firewall to control filtering for the following: BootTimeRuleCategory, StealthRuleCategory, FirewallRuleCategory.
Security  Audit Success  103  2017-01-12 15:44:36    Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog  1100: The event logging service has shut down.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 19:12:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1b0 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6?4?????? ? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x4 Creator Process Name: ??????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 19:12:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x220 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13573  2017-01-12 19:12:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4826: Boot Configuration Data loaded. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 General Settings: Load Options: - Advanced Options: %%1843 Configuration Access Policy: %%1846 System Event Logging: %%1843 Kernel Debugging: %%1843 VSM Launch Type: %%1848 Signature Settings: Test Signing: %%1843 Flight Signing: %%1843 Disable Integrity Checks: %%1843 HyperVisor Settings: HyperVisor Load Options: - HyperVisor Launch Type: %%1848 HyperVisor Debugging: %%1843
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 19:12:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x28c New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??0?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 19:12:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x32c New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x28c Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-12 19:12:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4608: Windows is starting up. This event is logged when LSASS.EXE starts and the auditing subsystem is initialized.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 19:12:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 0 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: - New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Workstation Name: - Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: - Authentication Package: - Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 19:12:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 19:12:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 19:12:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x37c New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??0?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 19:12:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3b0 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x28c Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 19:12:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3f4 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x37c Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 19:12:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x218 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??c?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x37c Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 19:12:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1dc New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??0?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x3b0 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 19:12:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1d4 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x3b0 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-12 19:12:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4902: The Per-user audit policy table was created. Number of Elements: 0 Policy ID: 0xa1d5
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 19:12:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 19:12:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 19:12:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x218 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 19:12:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10da7 Linked Logon ID: 0x10dc7 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x218 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 19:12:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10dc7 Linked Logon ID: 0x10da7 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x218 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 19:12:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 19:12:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 19:12:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 19:12:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10da7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 19:12:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10dc7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 19:12:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 19:12:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 19:12:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-12 19:12:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5033: The Windows Firewall Driver started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 19:12:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 19:12:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 19:12:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 19:12:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 19:12:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 19:12:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 19:12:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x440 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 19:12:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x644 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 19:12:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x644 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-12 19:12:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5024: The Windows Firewall service started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 19:12:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 19:12:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 3 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-7 Account Name: ANONYMOUS LOGON Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x27e78 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x0 Process Name: - Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: NtLmSsp Authentication Package: NTLM Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): NTLM V1 Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 19:12:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 19:12:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x474 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 19:12:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x474 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 19:12:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 19:12:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-12 19:12:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  6406: Kaspersky Endpoint Security 10 for Windows registered to Windows Firewall to control filtering for the following: BootTimeRuleCategory, StealthRuleCategory, FirewallRuleCategory.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 19:12:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x10b4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 19:12:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x10b4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 19:13:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x10b4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 19:13:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x10b4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 19:13:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 19:13:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 19:14:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x474 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 19:14:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x81c30 Linked Logon ID: 0x81c5f Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x474 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 19:14:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x81c5f Linked Logon ID: 0x81c30 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x474 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 19:14:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 19:14:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x81ed3 Linked Logon ID: 0x81f04 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 19:14:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x81f04 Linked Logon ID: 0x81ed3 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-12 19:14:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x81f04 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-12 19:14:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x81ed3 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 19:14:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x81c30 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 19:14:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x81ed3 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 19:14:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 19:14:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 19:14:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x474 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 19:14:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 19:14:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 19:14:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x45c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 19:14:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x45c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  12290  2017-01-12 19:14:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5061: Cryptographic operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: ECDSA_P256 Key Name: Microsoft Connected Devices Platform device certificate Key Type: %%2500 Cryptographic Operation: Operation: %%2480 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-12 19:14:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5058: Key file operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: UNKNOWN Key Name: Microsoft Connected Devices Platform device certificate Key Type: %%2500 Key File Operation Information: File Path: C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\LocalService\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Crypto\Keys\de7cf8a7901d2ad13e5c67c29e5d1662_515b10cc-5648-4ef1-85cd-ec69792150a2 Operation: %%2458 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-12 19:14:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5059: Key migration operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: ECDSA_P256 Key Name: Microsoft Connected Devices Platform device certificate Key Type: %%2500 Additional Information: Operation: %%2464 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 19:14:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 19:14:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 19:14:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 19:14:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 19:14:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x474 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 19:14:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x474 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-12 19:15:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4647: User initiated logoff: Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x81c5f This event is generated when a logoff is initiated. No further user-initiated activity can occur. This event can be interpreted as a logoff event.
Security  Audit Success  103  2017-01-12 19:15:33    Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog  1100: The event logging service has shut down.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 20:29:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1b0 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6?4?????? ? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x4 Creator Process Name: ??????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 20:29:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x220 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13573  2017-01-12 20:29:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4826: Boot Configuration Data loaded. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 General Settings: Load Options: - Advanced Options: %%1843 Configuration Access Policy: %%1846 System Event Logging: %%1843 Kernel Debugging: %%1843 VSM Launch Type: %%1848 Signature Settings: Test Signing: %%1843 Flight Signing: %%1843 Disable Integrity Checks: %%1843 HyperVisor Settings: HyperVisor Load Options: - HyperVisor Launch Type: %%1848 HyperVisor Debugging: %%1843
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 20:29:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x28c New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??0?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 20:29:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x328 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x28c Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-12 20:29:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4608: Windows is starting up. This event is logged when LSASS.EXE starts and the auditing subsystem is initialized.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 20:29:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 0 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: - New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Workstation Name: - Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: - Authentication Package: - Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 20:29:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 20:29:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 20:29:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 20:29:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 20:29:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x378 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??0?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 20:29:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3b4 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x28c Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 20:29:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3ec New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x378 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 20:29:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x244 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??8?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x378 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 20:29:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1e0 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??4?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x3b4 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-12 20:29:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1d8 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x3b4 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-12 20:29:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4902: The Per-user audit policy table was created. Number of Elements: 0 Policy ID: 0xa004
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 20:30:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x244 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 20:30:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10ba8 Linked Logon ID: 0x10bc5 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x244 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 20:30:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10bc5 Linked Logon ID: 0x10ba8 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x244 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 20:30:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 20:30:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 20:30:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 20:30:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 20:30:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 20:30:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10ba8 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 20:30:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10bc5 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 20:30:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 20:30:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 20:30:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 20:30:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 20:30:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-12 20:30:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5033: The Windows Firewall Driver started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-12 20:30:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5024: The Windows Firewall service started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 20:30:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 20:30:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 20:30:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 20:30:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 20:30:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x43c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 20:30:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x65c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 20:30:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x65c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 20:30:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 20:30:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 20:30:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 3 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-7 Account Name: ANONYMOUS LOGON Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x27a98 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x0 Process Name: - Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: NtLmSsp Authentication Package: NTLM Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): NTLM V1 Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 20:30:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 20:30:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-12 20:30:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  6406: Kaspersky Endpoint Security 10 for Windows registered to Windows Firewall to control filtering for the following: BootTimeRuleCategory, StealthRuleCategory, FirewallRuleCategory.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 20:30:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xea4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 20:30:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xea4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 20:30:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 20:30:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x5f2d4 Linked Logon ID: 0x5f302 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 20:30:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x5f302 Linked Logon ID: 0x5f2d4 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 20:30:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 20:30:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x5f53f Linked Logon ID: 0x5f56d Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 20:30:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x5f56d Linked Logon ID: 0x5f53f Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-12 20:30:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x5f56d Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-12 20:30:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x5f53f Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 20:30:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x5f2d4 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 20:30:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x5f53f Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 20:30:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 20:30:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 20:30:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 20:30:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 20:30:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 20:30:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x1934 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 20:30:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x1934 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 20:30:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 20:30:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 20:30:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xea4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 20:30:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xea4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12290  2017-01-12 20:32:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5061: Cryptographic operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: ECDSA_P256 Key Name: Microsoft Connected Devices Platform device certificate Key Type: %%2500 Cryptographic Operation: Operation: %%2480 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-12 20:32:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5058: Key file operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: UNKNOWN Key Name: Microsoft Connected Devices Platform device certificate Key Type: %%2500 Key File Operation Information: File Path: C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\LocalService\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Crypto\Keys\de7cf8a7901d2ad13e5c67c29e5d1662_515b10cc-5648-4ef1-85cd-ec69792150a2 Operation: %%2458 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-12 20:32:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5059: Key migration operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: ECDSA_P256 Key Name: Microsoft Connected Devices Platform device certificate Key Type: %%2500 Additional Information: Operation: %%2464 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 20:32:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 20:32:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 20:32:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 20:32:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 20:32:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-12 20:32:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x480 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 20:32:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 20:32:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 20:34:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x13e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 20:34:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x13e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 20:34:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 20:34:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 20:34:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x13e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 20:34:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x13e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 20:39:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 20:39:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 20:40:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x206c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 20:40:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x206c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 20:40:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x206c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 20:40:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x206c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 20:45:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x5f302 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2354 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 20:45:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x5f302 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2354 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 20:48:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 20:48:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 20:50:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 20:50:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 20:50:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 20:50:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 21:26:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x5f302 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x18bc Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 21:31:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x5f302 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 21:31:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x5f302 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 21:32:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x5f302 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 21:32:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x5f302 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 21:32:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x5f302 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 21:32:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x5f302 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-12 21:32:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x5f302 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1544 Process Name: C:\Windows\explorer.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-12 21:33:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-12 21:33:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-12 21:39:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4647: User initiated logoff: Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x5f302 This event is generated when a logoff is initiated. No further user-initiated activity can occur. This event can be interpreted as a logoff event.
Security  Audit Success  103  2017-01-12 21:39:25    Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog  1100: The event logging service has shut down.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 04:34:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1b0 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6?4?????? ? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x4 Creator Process Name: ??????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 04:34:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x220 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13573  2017-01-13 04:34:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4826: Boot Configuration Data loaded. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 General Settings: Load Options: - Advanced Options: %%1843 Configuration Access Policy: %%1846 System Event Logging: %%1843 Kernel Debugging: %%1843 VSM Launch Type: %%1848 Signature Settings: Test Signing: %%1843 Flight Signing: %%1843 Disable Integrity Checks: %%1843 HyperVisor Settings: HyperVisor Load Options: - HyperVisor Launch Type: %%1848 HyperVisor Debugging: %%1843
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 04:34:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x288 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??0?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 04:34:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x328 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x288 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-13 04:34:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4608: Windows is starting up. This event is logged when LSASS.EXE starts and the auditing subsystem is initialized.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:34:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 0 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: - New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Workstation Name: - Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: - Authentication Package: - Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:34:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:34:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:34:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:34:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 04:34:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x378 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??0?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 04:34:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x38c New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x288 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 04:34:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3ec New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x378 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 04:34:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x244 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??8?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x378 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 04:34:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1e0 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??c?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x38c Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 04:34:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1d8 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x38c Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-13 04:34:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4902: The Per-user audit policy table was created. Number of Elements: 0 Policy ID: 0x9cc3
Security  Audit Success  101  2017-01-13 04:34:35    Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog  1101: Audit events have been dropped by the transport. 0
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-13 04:34:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5033: The Windows Firewall Driver started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:34:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x244 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:34:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10488 Linked Logon ID: 0x104aa Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x244 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:34:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x104aa Linked Logon ID: 0x10488 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x244 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:34:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:34:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:34:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:34:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:34:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:34:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10488 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:34:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x104aa Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:34:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:34:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:34:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:34:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:34:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:34:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:34:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:34:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:34:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 04:34:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x640 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 04:34:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x640 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 04:34:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x47c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 04:34:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x47c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-13 04:34:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5024: The Windows Firewall service started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:34:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 3 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-7 Account Name: ANONYMOUS LOGON Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x2451c Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x0 Process Name: - Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: NtLmSsp Authentication Package: NTLM Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): NTLM V1 Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 04:34:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x44c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:34:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:34:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 04:34:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1170 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 04:34:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1170 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 04:34:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1170 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 04:34:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1170 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:34:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x47c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:34:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x4e844 Linked Logon ID: 0x4e872 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x47c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:34:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x4e872 Linked Logon ID: 0x4e844 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x47c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:34:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:34:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x4eac3 Linked Logon ID: 0x4eaf1 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:34:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x4eaf1 Linked Logon ID: 0x4eac3 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:34:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4e872 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:34:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4e872 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: wdmycloud Additional Information: wdmycloud Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.23 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:34:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4e872 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x5d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:34:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4e872 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.5 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-13 04:34:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4eaf1 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-13 04:34:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4eac3 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:34:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x4e844 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:34:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x4eac3 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 04:34:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 04:34:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 04:34:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x47c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:34:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4e872 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x5d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:34:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4e872 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x5d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:34:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4e872 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x5d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-13 04:34:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  6406: Kaspersky Endpoint Security 10 for Windows registered to Windows Firewall to control filtering for the following: BootTimeRuleCategory, StealthRuleCategory, FirewallRuleCategory.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:34:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:34:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 04:34:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x1794 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 04:34:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x1794 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 04:35:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x47c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 04:35:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x47c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:35:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4e844 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:35:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4e844 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x5d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:35:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4e844 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x5d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:35:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4e844 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x5d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-13 04:35:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4647: User initiated logoff: Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4e872 This event is generated when a logoff is initiated. No further user-initiated activity can occur. This event can be interpreted as a logoff event.
Security  Audit Success  103  2017-01-13 04:35:14    Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog  1100: The event logging service has shut down.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 04:35:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1b0 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6?4?????? ? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x4 Creator Process Name: ??????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 04:35:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x220 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13573  2017-01-13 04:35:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4826: Boot Configuration Data loaded. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 General Settings: Load Options: - Advanced Options: %%1843 Configuration Access Policy: %%1846 System Event Logging: %%1843 Kernel Debugging: %%1843 VSM Launch Type: %%1848 Signature Settings: Test Signing: %%1843 Flight Signing: %%1843 Disable Integrity Checks: %%1843 HyperVisor Settings: HyperVisor Load Options: - HyperVisor Launch Type: %%1848 HyperVisor Debugging: %%1843
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 04:35:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x28c New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??0?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 04:35:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x328 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x28c Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 04:35:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x378 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??0?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 04:35:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3a0 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x28c Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 04:35:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3ec New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x378 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-13 04:35:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4608: Windows is starting up. This event is logged when LSASS.EXE starts and the auditing subsystem is initialized.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:35:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 0 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: - New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Workstation Name: - Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: - Authentication Package: - Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:35:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:35:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:35:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:35:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 04:35:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x244 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??8?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x378 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 04:35:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1e8 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??0?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x3a0 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 04:35:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1d8 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x3a0 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-13 04:35:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4902: The Per-user audit policy table was created. Number of Elements: 0 Policy ID: 0xa001
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-13 04:35:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5033: The Windows Firewall Driver started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:35:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x244 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:35:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10bc7 Linked Logon ID: 0x10be2 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x244 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:35:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10be2 Linked Logon ID: 0x10bc7 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x244 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:35:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:35:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:35:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:35:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:35:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:35:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10bc7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:35:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10be2 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:35:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:35:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:35:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:35:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:35:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-13 04:35:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5024: The Windows Firewall service started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:35:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:35:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:35:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 3 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-7 Account Name: ANONYMOUS LOGON Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x22b6b Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x0 Process Name: - Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: NtLmSsp Authentication Package: NTLM Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): NTLM V1 Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:35:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:35:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 04:35:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x444 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 04:35:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x668 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 04:35:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x668 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 04:35:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x460 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 04:35:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x460 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:35:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:35:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:35:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x460 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:35:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x3bf5a Linked Logon ID: 0x3bfb9 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x460 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:35:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x3bfb9 Linked Logon ID: 0x3bf5a Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x460 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:35:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:35:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x3c672 Linked Logon ID: 0x3c6a4 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:35:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x3c6a4 Linked Logon ID: 0x3c672 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-13 04:35:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3c6a4 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-13 04:35:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3c672 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:35:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x3bf5a Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:35:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x3c672 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 04:35:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 04:35:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 04:35:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x460 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:35:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:35:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 04:35:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x150c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 04:35:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x150c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 04:35:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x1654 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 04:35:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x1654 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 04:35:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x150c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 04:35:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x150c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-13 04:35:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  6406: Kaspersky Endpoint Security 10 for Windows registered to Windows Firewall to control filtering for the following: BootTimeRuleCategory, StealthRuleCategory, FirewallRuleCategory.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:36:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3bf5a Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:36:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3bf5a Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x83c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:36:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3bf5a Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x83c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 04:36:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x460 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 04:36:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x460 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-13 04:36:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4647: User initiated logoff: Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x3bfb9 This event is generated when a logoff is initiated. No further user-initiated activity can occur. This event can be interpreted as a logoff event.
Security  Audit Success  103  2017-01-13 04:36:19    Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog  1100: The event logging service has shut down.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 04:51:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1b0 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6?4?????? ? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x4 Creator Process Name: ??????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 04:51:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x220 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13573  2017-01-13 04:51:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4826: Boot Configuration Data loaded. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 General Settings: Load Options: - Advanced Options: %%1843 Configuration Access Policy: %%1846 System Event Logging: %%1843 Kernel Debugging: %%1843 VSM Launch Type: %%1848 Signature Settings: Test Signing: %%1843 Flight Signing: %%1843 Disable Integrity Checks: %%1843 HyperVisor Settings: HyperVisor Load Options: - HyperVisor Launch Type: %%1848 HyperVisor Debugging: %%1843
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 04:51:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x290 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??0?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 04:51:28    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x330 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x290 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-13 04:51:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4608: Windows is starting up. This event is logged when LSASS.EXE starts and the auditing subsystem is initialized.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:51:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 0 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: - New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Workstation Name: - Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: - Authentication Package: - Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:51:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:51:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:51:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:51:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 04:51:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x380 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??0?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 04:51:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3b4 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x290 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 04:51:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3f4 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x380 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 04:51:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x214 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??0?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x380 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 04:51:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1d8 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??4?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x3b4 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 04:51:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1d0 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x3b4 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-13 04:51:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4902: The Per-user audit policy table was created. Number of Elements: 0 Policy ID: 0x9fdc
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:51:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x214 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:51:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10bd8 Linked Logon ID: 0x10bfb Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x214 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:51:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10bfb Linked Logon ID: 0x10bd8 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x214 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:51:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:51:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:51:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:51:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:51:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:51:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10bd8 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:51:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10bfb Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:51:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:51:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:51:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:51:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:51:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-13 04:51:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5033: The Windows Firewall Driver started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-13 04:51:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5024: The Windows Firewall service started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:51:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:51:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:51:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 3 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-7 Account Name: ANONYMOUS LOGON Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x236d4 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x0 Process Name: - Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: NtLmSsp Authentication Package: NTLM Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): NTLM V1 Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:51:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:51:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 04:51:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x444 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 04:51:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x6b0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 04:51:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x6b0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 04:51:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x47c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 04:51:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x47c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:51:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:51:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:51:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x47c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:51:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x48b16 Linked Logon ID: 0x48b44 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x47c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:51:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x48b44 Linked Logon ID: 0x48b16 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x47c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:51:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:51:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x48dc0 Linked Logon ID: 0x48dee Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:51:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x48dee Linked Logon ID: 0x48dc0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-13 04:51:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x48dee Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-13 04:51:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x48dc0 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:51:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x48b16 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:51:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x48dc0 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 04:51:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 04:51:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 04:51:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x47c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-13 04:51:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  6406: Kaspersky Endpoint Security 10 for Windows registered to Windows Firewall to control filtering for the following: BootTimeRuleCategory, StealthRuleCategory, FirewallRuleCategory.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:51:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:51:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 04:51:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x1730 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 04:51:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x1730 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 04:51:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x470 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 04:51:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x470 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 04:51:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x470 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 04:51:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x470 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 04:51:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x548 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 04:51:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x548 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 04:51:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x548 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 04:51:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x548 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:51:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x48b44 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:51:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x48b44 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.5 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:52:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x48b16 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:52:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x48b16 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:52:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x48b16 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x6d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 04:52:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x48b44 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x778 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 04:53:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x47c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 04:53:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x47c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12290  2017-01-13 04:53:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5061: Cryptographic operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: ECDSA_P256 Key Name: Microsoft Connected Devices Platform device certificate Key Type: %%2500 Cryptographic Operation: Operation: %%2480 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-13 04:53:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5058: Key file operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: UNKNOWN Key Name: Microsoft Connected Devices Platform device certificate Key Type: %%2500 Key File Operation Information: File Path: C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\LocalService\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Crypto\Keys\de7cf8a7901d2ad13e5c67c29e5d1662_515b10cc-5648-4ef1-85cd-ec69792150a2 Operation: %%2458 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-13 04:53:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5059: Key migration operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: ECDSA_P256 Key Name: Microsoft Connected Devices Platform device certificate Key Type: %%2500 Additional Information: Operation: %%2464 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:53:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:53:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 04:55:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 04:55:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 04:58:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x87c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 04:58:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x87c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 04:58:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x87c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 04:58:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x87c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 04:58:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x57c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 05:01:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1fa0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 05:01:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1fa0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 05:01:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1fa0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 05:01:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1fa0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 05:06:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x48b44 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1f18 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 05:06:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x48b44 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1f18 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 05:57:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x47c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 05:57:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x45d863 Linked Logon ID: 0x45d896 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x47c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 05:57:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x45d896 Linked Logon ID: 0x45d863 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x47c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 05:57:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 05:57:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x45e003 Linked Logon ID: 0x45e05b Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 05:57:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x45e05b Linked Logon ID: 0x45e003 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-13 05:57:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x45e05b Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-13 05:57:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x45e003 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-13 05:57:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x45d896 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-13 05:57:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x45d863 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 05:57:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x45d863 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 05:57:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x45e003 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 05:57:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 05:57:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 05:57:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x19dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 05:57:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x19dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 05:57:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x19dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 05:57:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x19dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 06:17:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x48b44 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: wdmycloud Additional Information: wdmycloud Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.23 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-13 06:38:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4647: User initiated logoff: Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x48b44 This event is generated when a logoff is initiated. No further user-initiated activity can occur. This event can be interpreted as a logoff event.
Security  Audit Success  103  2017-01-13 06:38:42    Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog  1100: The event logging service has shut down.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 07:07:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1b0 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6?4?????? ? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x4 Creator Process Name: ??????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 07:07:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x220 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13573  2017-01-13 07:07:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4826: Boot Configuration Data loaded. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 General Settings: Load Options: - Advanced Options: %%1843 Configuration Access Policy: %%1846 System Event Logging: %%1843 Kernel Debugging: %%1843 VSM Launch Type: %%1848 Signature Settings: Test Signing: %%1843 Flight Signing: %%1843 Disable Integrity Checks: %%1843 HyperVisor Settings: HyperVisor Load Options: - HyperVisor Launch Type: %%1848 HyperVisor Debugging: %%1843
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 07:07:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x28c New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??0?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 07:07:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x328 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x28c Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-13 07:07:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4608: Windows is starting up. This event is logged when LSASS.EXE starts and the auditing subsystem is initialized.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:07:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 0 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: - New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Workstation Name: - Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: - Authentication Package: - Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:07:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:07:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:07:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:07:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 07:07:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x378 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??0?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 07:07:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3a4 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x28c Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 07:07:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3ec New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x378 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 07:07:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x244 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??8?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x378 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 07:07:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1e0 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??4?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x3a4 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 07:07:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1d8 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x3a4 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-13 07:07:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4902: The Per-user audit policy table was created. Number of Elements: 0 Policy ID: 0x9fd9
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:07:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x244 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:07:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10bc1 Linked Logon ID: 0x10be1 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x244 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:07:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10be1 Linked Logon ID: 0x10bc1 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x244 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:07:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:07:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:07:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:07:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:07:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:07:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10bc1 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:07:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10be1 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:07:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:07:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:07:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:07:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:07:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-13 07:07:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5033: The Windows Firewall Driver started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-13 07:07:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5024: The Windows Firewall service started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:07:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:07:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:07:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:07:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:07:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x43c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 07:07:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x6ac Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 07:07:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x6ac Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:07:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 3 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-7 Account Name: ANONYMOUS LOGON Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x288b5 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x0 Process Name: - Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: NtLmSsp Authentication Package: NTLM Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): NTLM V1 Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 07:07:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 07:07:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:07:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:07:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:07:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:07:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x47117 Linked Logon ID: 0x47149 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:07:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x47149 Linked Logon ID: 0x47117 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:07:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:07:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x473b5 Linked Logon ID: 0x473e3 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:07:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x473e3 Linked Logon ID: 0x473b5 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-13 07:07:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x473e3 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-13 07:07:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x473b5 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:07:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x47117 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:07:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x473b5 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:07:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:07:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 07:07:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:08:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:08:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 07:08:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x189c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 07:08:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x189c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-13 07:08:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  6406: Kaspersky Endpoint Security 10 for Windows registered to Windows Firewall to control filtering for the following: BootTimeRuleCategory, StealthRuleCategory, FirewallRuleCategory.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:08:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x15bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:08:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x15bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:08:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x15bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:08:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x15bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:08:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x117c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:08:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x117c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:08:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x117c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:08:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x117c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:08:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x47117 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:08:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x47117 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x80c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:08:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x47117 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x80c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:08:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x47117 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x80c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 07:08:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 07:08:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:09:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:09:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:09:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x47149 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x4dc Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 07:11:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1b0 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6?4?????? ? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x4 Creator Process Name: ??????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 07:11:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x220 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13573  2017-01-13 07:11:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4826: Boot Configuration Data loaded. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 General Settings: Load Options: - Advanced Options: %%1843 Configuration Access Policy: %%1846 System Event Logging: %%1843 Kernel Debugging: %%1843 VSM Launch Type: %%1848 Signature Settings: Test Signing: %%1843 Flight Signing: %%1843 Disable Integrity Checks: %%1843 HyperVisor Settings: HyperVisor Load Options: - HyperVisor Launch Type: %%1848 HyperVisor Debugging: %%1843
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 07:11:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x288 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??0?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-13 07:11:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4608: Windows is starting up. This event is logged when LSASS.EXE starts and the auditing subsystem is initialized.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:11:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 0 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: - New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Workstation Name: - Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: - Authentication Package: - Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:11:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:11:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 07:11:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x328 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x288 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 07:11:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x378 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??0?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 07:11:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x394 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x288 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 07:11:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3ec New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x378 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 07:11:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x244 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??8?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x378 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 07:11:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1e8 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??4?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x394 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 07:11:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1d8 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x394 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-13 07:11:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4902: The Per-user audit policy table was created. Number of Elements: 0 Policy ID: 0x9bd5
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:11:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:11:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:11:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x244 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:11:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x1018d Linked Logon ID: 0x101ad Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x244 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:11:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x101ad Linked Logon ID: 0x1018d Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x244 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:11:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:11:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:11:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:11:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x1018d Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:11:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x101ad Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:11:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:11:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:11:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-13 07:11:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5033: The Windows Firewall Driver started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:11:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:11:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:11:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:11:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:11:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:11:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:11:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x440 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-13 07:11:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5024: The Windows Firewall service started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:11:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 3 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-7 Account Name: ANONYMOUS LOGON Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x23378 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x0 Process Name: - Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: NtLmSsp Authentication Package: NTLM Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): NTLM V1 Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:11:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:11:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 07:11:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x640 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 07:11:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x640 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 07:11:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x464 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 07:11:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x464 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:11:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:11:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-13 07:11:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  6406: Kaspersky Endpoint Security 10 for Windows registered to Windows Firewall to control filtering for the following: BootTimeRuleCategory, StealthRuleCategory, FirewallRuleCategory.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:11:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x464 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:11:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x4f978 Linked Logon ID: 0x4f9bc Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x464 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:11:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x4f9bc Linked Logon ID: 0x4f978 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x464 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:11:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x4f978 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:11:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:11:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:11:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:11:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x4fdea Linked Logon ID: 0x4fe2c Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:11:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x4fe2c Linked Logon ID: 0x4fdea Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-13 07:11:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4fe2c Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-13 07:11:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4fdea Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:11:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x4fdea Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 07:11:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x464 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:11:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1774 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:11:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1774 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:11:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:11:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 07:11:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x19f0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 07:11:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x19f0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:11:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1774 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:11:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1774 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:12:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:12:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:12:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4f9bc Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:12:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4f9bc Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.5 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:12:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4f978 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:12:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4f978 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:12:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4f978 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x740 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:12:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4f9bc Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: wdmycloud Additional Information: wdmycloud Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.23 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:13:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4f9bc User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1cf4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:13:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:13:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:13:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:13:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:18:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:18:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:18:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:18:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:18:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x20a4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:18:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x20a4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:18:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x20a4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:18:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x20a4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 07:18:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x464 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 07:18:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x464 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:18:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-501 Account Name: Guest Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2424 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\CompatTelRunner.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:20:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4f9bc Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:20:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4f9bc Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:20:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4f9bc Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:21:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2620 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:21:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2620 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:21:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2620 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:21:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2620 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:26:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4f9bc User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x26f0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:26:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4f9bc User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x26f0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:29:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x27c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:29:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x27c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:29:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1f20 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:29:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x27c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:29:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x27c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:36:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x464 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:36:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x456177 Linked Logon ID: 0x4561aa Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x464 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:36:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x4561aa Linked Logon ID: 0x456177 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x464 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:36:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x456177 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:36:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:36:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:36:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x456900 Linked Logon ID: 0x456955 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:36:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x456955 Linked Logon ID: 0x456900 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-13 07:36:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x456955 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-13 07:36:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x456900 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-13 07:36:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4561aa Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-13 07:36:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x456177 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:36:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x456900 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:36:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:36:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x20b8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:36:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x20b8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:36:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x20b8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 07:36:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x20b8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:43:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:43:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:43:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:43:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:43:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:43:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:43:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 07:43:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 07:43:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x21f0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 07:43:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x21f0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 07:43:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x21f0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 07:43:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x21f0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 07:43:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x21f0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 07:43:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x21f0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 07:43:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x21f0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 07:43:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x21f0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-13 07:43:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4616: The system time was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Process Information: Process ID: 0x580 Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Previous Time: 2017-01-13T00:43:48.324337700Z New Time: 2017-01-13T00:43:52.398044100Z This event is generated when the system time is changed. It is normal for the Windows Time Service, which runs with System privilege, to change the system time on a regular basis. Other system time changes may be indicative of attempts to tamper with the computer.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-13 07:43:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4616: The system time was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Process Information: Process ID: 0x580 Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Previous Time: 2017-01-13T00:43:52.398602500Z New Time: 2017-01-13T00:43:52.398000000Z This event is generated when the system time is changed. It is normal for the Windows Time Service, which runs with System privilege, to change the system time on a regular basis. Other system time changes may be indicative of attempts to tamper with the computer.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-13 07:43:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4616: The system time was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Process Information: Process ID: 0x580 Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Previous Time: 2017-01-13T00:43:52.398891000Z New Time: 2017-01-13T00:43:52.398000000Z This event is generated when the system time is changed. It is normal for the Windows Time Service, which runs with System privilege, to change the system time on a regular basis. Other system time changes may be indicative of attempts to tamper with the computer.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:45:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4f9bc Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:46:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4f9bc Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 07:46:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4f9bc Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 08:10:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 08:10:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 08:11:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 08:11:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 08:14:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 08:14:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 08:14:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 08:14:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 08:14:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x2bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 08:14:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x2bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 08:14:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x2bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 08:14:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x2bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 08:14:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x2bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 08:14:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x2bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 08:14:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x2bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 08:14:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x2bc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 08:31:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 08:31:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12290  2017-01-13 08:31:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5061: Cryptographic operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: RSA Key Name: 8d3706cf-a4bf-25a3-466a-ba28678e314b Key Type: %%2500 Cryptographic Operation: Operation: %%2480 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-13 08:31:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5058: Key file operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: UNKNOWN Key Name: 8d3706cf-a4bf-25a3-466a-ba28678e314b Key Type: %%2500 Key File Operation Information: File Path: C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Crypto\SystemKeys\23e8a7fb877a6c9eb54ca64f9502f8df_515b10cc-5648-4ef1-85cd-ec69792150a2 Operation: %%2458 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12290  2017-01-13 08:31:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5061: Cryptographic operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: RSA Key Name: 8d3706cf-a4bf-25a3-466a-ba28678e314b Key Type: %%2500 Cryptographic Operation: Operation: %%2480 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-13 08:31:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5058: Key file operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: UNKNOWN Key Name: 8d3706cf-a4bf-25a3-466a-ba28678e314b Key Type: %%2500 Key File Operation Information: File Path: C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Crypto\SystemKeys\23e8a7fb877a6c9eb54ca64f9502f8df_515b10cc-5648-4ef1-85cd-ec69792150a2 Operation: %%2458 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12290  2017-01-13 08:31:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5061: Cryptographic operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: RSA Key Name: 8d3706cf-a4bf-25a3-466a-ba28678e314b Key Type: %%2500 Cryptographic Operation: Operation: %%2480 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-13 08:31:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5058: Key file operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: UNKNOWN Key Name: 8d3706cf-a4bf-25a3-466a-ba28678e314b Key Type: %%2500 Key File Operation Information: File Path: C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Crypto\SystemKeys\23e8a7fb877a6c9eb54ca64f9502f8df_515b10cc-5648-4ef1-85cd-ec69792150a2 Operation: %%2458 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12290  2017-01-13 08:31:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5061: Cryptographic operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: RSA Key Name: 8d3706cf-a4bf-25a3-466a-ba28678e314b Key Type: %%2500 Cryptographic Operation: Operation: %%2480 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-13 08:31:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5058: Key file operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: UNKNOWN Key Name: 8d3706cf-a4bf-25a3-466a-ba28678e314b Key Type: %%2500 Key File Operation Information: File Path: C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Crypto\SystemKeys\23e8a7fb877a6c9eb54ca64f9502f8df_515b10cc-5648-4ef1-85cd-ec69792150a2 Operation: %%2458 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-13 08:59:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4647: User initiated logoff: Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x4f9bc This event is generated when a logoff is initiated. No further user-initiated activity can occur. This event can be interpreted as a logoff event.
Security  Audit Success  103  2017-01-13 08:59:58    Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog  1100: The event logging service has shut down.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-13 13:08:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4616: The system time was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Process Information: Process ID: 0x5c4 Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Previous Time: 2017-01-13T00:09:52.281370700Z New Time: 2017-01-13T06:08:04.231000000Z This event is generated when the system time is changed. It is normal for the Windows Time Service, which runs with System privilege, to change the system time on a regular basis. Other system time changes may be indicative of attempts to tamper with the computer.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-13 14:09:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4616: The system time was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Process Information: Process ID: 0x5c4 Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Previous Time: 2017-01-13T06:08:04.746790000Z New Time: 2017-01-13T07:09:52.721458900Z This event is generated when the system time is changed. It is normal for the Windows Time Service, which runs with System privilege, to change the system time on a regular basis. Other system time changes may be indicative of attempts to tamper with the computer.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-13 14:09:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4616: The system time was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Process Information: Process ID: 0x5c4 Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Previous Time: 2017-01-13T07:09:52.722016000Z New Time: 2017-01-13T07:09:52.721000000Z This event is generated when the system time is changed. It is normal for the Windows Time Service, which runs with System privilege, to change the system time on a regular basis. Other system time changes may be indicative of attempts to tamper with the computer.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 14:09:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x47149 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2788 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 14:09:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x47149 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2788 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 14:09:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2658 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 14:09:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2658 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 14:09:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2658 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 14:09:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2658 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12290  2017-01-13 14:09:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5061: Cryptographic operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: ECDSA_P256 Key Name: Microsoft Connected Devices Platform device certificate Key Type: %%2500 Cryptographic Operation: Operation: %%2480 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-13 14:09:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5058: Key file operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: UNKNOWN Key Name: Microsoft Connected Devices Platform device certificate Key Type: %%2500 Key File Operation Information: File Path: C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\LocalService\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Crypto\Keys\de7cf8a7901d2ad13e5c67c29e5d1662_515b10cc-5648-4ef1-85cd-ec69792150a2 Operation: %%2458 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-13 14:09:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5059: Key migration operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: ECDSA_P256 Key Name: Microsoft Connected Devices Platform device certificate Key Type: %%2500 Additional Information: Operation: %%2464 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 14:10:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 14:10:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 14:10:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 14:10:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 14:11:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 14:11:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 14:11:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 14:11:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 14:13:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 14:13:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 14:27:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x47149 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: wdmycloud Additional Information: wdmycloud Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.23 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 14:27:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x47149 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.5 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 14:29:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x47149 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.5 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 14:29:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x47149 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.5 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 14:29:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x47149 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: wdmycloud Additional Information: wdmycloud Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.23 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 14:29:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x47149 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.5 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 14:29:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x47149 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 14:29:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x47149 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 14:29:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x47149 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 14:29:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x47149 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 14:29:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x47149 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1484 Process Name: C:\Windows\explorer.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 14:39:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 14:39:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 14:47:59    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 14:47:59    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 14:48:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 14:48:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 15:09:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 15:09:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 15:26:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2b8c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 15:26:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2b8c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 15:26:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x24f0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 15:26:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2b8c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 15:26:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2b8c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 15:57:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 15:57:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x8abc40 Linked Logon ID: 0x8abc73 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 15:57:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x8abc73 Linked Logon ID: 0x8abc40 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 15:57:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 15:57:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x8ac453 Linked Logon ID: 0x8ac4cc Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 15:57:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x8ac4cc Linked Logon ID: 0x8ac453 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-13 15:57:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8ac4cc Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-13 15:57:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8ac453 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-13 15:57:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8abc73 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-13 15:57:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x8abc40 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 15:57:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x8abc40 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 15:57:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x8ac453 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 15:57:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 15:57:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 15:57:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xcec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 15:57:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xcec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 15:58:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xcec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 15:58:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xcec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 16:51:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 16:51:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 16:53:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 16:53:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 16:53:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 16:53:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  103  2017-01-13 17:18:31    Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog  1100: The event logging service has shut down.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-13 17:18:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4616: The system time was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Process Information: Process ID: 0x5c4 Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Previous Time: 2017-01-13T10:18:31.932370800Z New Time: 2017-01-13T10:18:31.906000000Z This event is generated when the system time is changed. It is normal for the Windows Time Service, which runs with System privilege, to change the system time on a regular basis. Other system time changes may be indicative of attempts to tamper with the computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-13 17:18:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4647: User initiated logoff: Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x47149 This event is generated when a logoff is initiated. No further user-initiated activity can occur. This event can be interpreted as a logoff event.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 19:13:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1b0 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6?4?????? ? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x4 Creator Process Name: ??????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 19:13:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x220 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13573  2017-01-13 19:13:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4826: Boot Configuration Data loaded. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 General Settings: Load Options: - Advanced Options: %%1843 Configuration Access Policy: %%1846 System Event Logging: %%1843 Kernel Debugging: %%1843 VSM Launch Type: %%1848 Signature Settings: Test Signing: %%1843 Flight Signing: %%1843 Disable Integrity Checks: %%1843 HyperVisor Settings: HyperVisor Load Options: - HyperVisor Launch Type: %%1848 HyperVisor Debugging: %%1843
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 19:13:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x290 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??0?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 19:13:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x32c New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x290 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-13 19:13:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4608: Windows is starting up. This event is logged when LSASS.EXE starts and the auditing subsystem is initialized.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 19:13:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 0 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: - New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Workstation Name: - Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: - Authentication Package: - Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 19:13:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 19:13:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 19:13:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 19:13:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 19:13:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x37c New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??0?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 19:13:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x39c New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x290 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 19:13:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3f0 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x37c Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 19:13:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x218 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??c?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x37c Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 19:13:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1dc New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??c?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x39c Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-13 19:13:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1d4 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x39c Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-13 19:13:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4902: The Per-user audit policy table was created. Number of Elements: 0 Policy ID: 0x9d57
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 19:13:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x218 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 19:13:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10425 Linked Logon ID: 0x10441 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x218 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 19:13:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10441 Linked Logon ID: 0x10425 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x218 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 19:13:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 19:13:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 19:13:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 19:13:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 19:13:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 19:13:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10425 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 19:13:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10441 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 19:13:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 19:13:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 19:13:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 19:13:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 19:13:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-13 19:13:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5033: The Windows Firewall Driver started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-13 19:13:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5024: The Windows Firewall service started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 19:13:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 19:13:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 19:13:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 19:13:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 19:13:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x448 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 19:13:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x648 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 19:13:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x648 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 19:13:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 19:13:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 19:13:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 3 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-7 Account Name: ANONYMOUS LOGON Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x27809 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x0 Process Name: - Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: NtLmSsp Authentication Package: NTLM Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): NTLM V1 Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 19:13:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 19:13:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 19:13:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x11d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 19:13:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x11d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-13 19:13:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  6406: Kaspersky Endpoint Security 10 for Windows registered to Windows Firewall to control filtering for the following: BootTimeRuleCategory, StealthRuleCategory, FirewallRuleCategory.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 19:14:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 19:14:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x68336 Linked Logon ID: 0x68364 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 19:14:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x68364 Linked Logon ID: 0x68336 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 19:14:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x68336 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 19:14:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 19:14:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 19:14:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x6859f Linked Logon ID: 0x685cd Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 19:14:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x685cd Linked Logon ID: 0x6859f Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-13 19:14:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x685cd Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-13 19:14:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6859f Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 19:14:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x6859f Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 19:14:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 19:14:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 19:14:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 19:14:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 19:14:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x19dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 19:14:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x19dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 19:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x11d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 19:14:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x11d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 19:15:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 19:15:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 19:15:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-13 19:15:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 19:15:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 19:15:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 19:16:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x68364 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1c8 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 19:16:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1298 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 19:16:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1298 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 19:17:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1298 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 19:17:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1298 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 19:17:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 19:17:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 19:22:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x68364 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 19:22:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x68364 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 19:23:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d74 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 19:23:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d74 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 19:24:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d74 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 19:24:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d74 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 19:29:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x68364 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x22a8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 19:29:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x68364 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x22a8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 19:44:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 19:44:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 20:14:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 20:14:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 20:46:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 20:46:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 20:47:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x68364 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 20:47:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x68364 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x9a8 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 20:54:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 20:54:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 20:59:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x68364 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1f0c Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-13 21:13:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-13 21:13:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 21:18:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d44 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 21:18:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d44 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 21:19:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d44 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-13 21:19:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d44 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 00:58:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-14 00:58:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 01:04:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-2 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x12a4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 01:04:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-2 Account Name: DWM-2 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0xc0dace Linked Logon ID: 0xc0db0c Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x12a4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 01:04:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-2 Account Name: DWM-2 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0xc0db0c Linked Logon ID: 0xc0dace Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x12a4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-14 01:04:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-2 Account Name: DWM-2 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0xc0dace Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-14 01:04:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-2 Account Name: DWM-2 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0xc0db0c Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 01:04:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-14 01:04:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4647: User initiated logoff: Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x68364 This event is generated when a logoff is initiated. No further user-initiated activity can occur. This event can be interpreted as a logoff event.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-14 01:04:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 07:17:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2278 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 07:17:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 07:17:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xc41710 Linked Logon ID: 0xc41742 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 07:17:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xc41742 Linked Logon ID: 0xc41710 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 07:17:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 07:17:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xc4199d Linked Logon ID: 0xc419e6 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 07:17:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xc419e6 Linked Logon ID: 0xc4199d Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-14 07:17:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc419e6 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-14 07:17:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc4199d Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-14 07:17:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xc41710 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-14 07:17:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0xc4199d Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 07:17:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 07:17:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-14 07:17:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 07:17:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x206c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 07:17:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x206c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 07:17:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 07:17:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.5 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 07:17:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41710 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 07:17:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x206c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 07:17:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x206c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 07:17:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41710 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 07:17:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41710 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x324 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 07:17:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41710 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x324 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 07:18:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: wdmycloud Additional Information: wdmycloud Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.23 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 07:19:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d94 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 07:20:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x13b0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 07:20:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x13b0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 07:20:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-501 Account Name: Guest Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1a64 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\CompatTelRunner.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 07:20:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-14 07:20:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 07:20:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-14 07:20:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 07:20:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.5 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 07:20:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 07:20:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 07:20:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 07:20:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 07:20:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 07:20:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 07:20:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 07:20:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 07:20:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 07:20:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 07:20:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 07:20:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 07:20:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x13b0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 07:20:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x13b0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 07:25:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 07:25:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 07:26:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 07:26:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x324 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 07:26:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x324 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 07:26:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x324 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 07:32:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x10a0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 07:32:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x10a0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 08:00:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 08:00:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 08:00:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 08:05:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-14 08:05:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 08:05:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 08:05:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-14 08:05:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-14 08:05:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-14 08:05:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x2638 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-14 08:05:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x2638 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-14 08:05:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x2638 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-14 08:05:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x2638 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-14 08:05:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x2638 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-14 08:05:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x2638 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-14 08:05:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x2638 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-14 08:05:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x2638 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 08:09:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x22b4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 08:09:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x22b4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 08:09:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1858 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 08:09:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x22b4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 08:09:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x22b4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 09:01:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2694 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 09:01:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2694 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 09:02:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2694 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 09:02:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2694 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 10:09:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 10:09:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x15e20ff Linked Logon ID: 0x15e2132 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 10:09:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x15e2132 Linked Logon ID: 0x15e20ff Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-14 10:09:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x15e20ff Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 10:09:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 10:09:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 10:09:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x15e27c6 Linked Logon ID: 0x15e2847 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 10:09:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x15e2847 Linked Logon ID: 0x15e27c6 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-14 10:09:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x15e2847 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-14 10:09:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x15e27c6 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-14 10:09:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x15e2132 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-14 10:09:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x15e20ff Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-14 10:09:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x15e27c6 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 10:09:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 10:09:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1bf8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 10:09:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1bf8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 10:09:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1bf8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 10:09:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1bf8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 10:10:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 10:10:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 10:22:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-14 10:22:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 10:27:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 10:27:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 10:27:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 10:30:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 10:30:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 10:30:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 10:30:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x324 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 10:32:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: ie.ama@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 10:32:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: ie.ama@hff-group.com Account Domain: RAZER Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 10:32:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 10:32:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 10:33:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: ie.ama@hff-group.com Account Domain: RAZER Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 10:33:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: ie.ama@hff-group.com Account Domain: RAZER Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 10:33:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 10:39:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: wdmycloud Additional Information: wdmycloud Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.23 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 10:39:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 10:48:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 10:49:28    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: ie.ama@hff-group.com Account Domain: RAZER Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 10:49:28    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: ie.ama@hff-group.com Account Domain: RAZER Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 10:49:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 11:06:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xa04 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 11:06:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xa04 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 11:06:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xf4c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 11:07:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xa04 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 11:07:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xa04 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 11:08:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xf4c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 11:13:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 11:13:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x18868d4 Linked Logon ID: 0x1886907 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 11:13:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x1886907 Linked Logon ID: 0x18868d4 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 11:13:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 11:13:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x1886f63 Linked Logon ID: 0x1886fdb Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 11:13:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x1886fdb Linked Logon ID: 0x1886f63 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-14 11:13:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1886fdb Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-14 11:13:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1886f63 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-14 11:13:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1886907 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-14 11:13:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x18868d4 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-14 11:13:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x18868d4 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-14 11:13:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x1886f63 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 11:13:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 11:13:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 11:13:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd84 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 11:13:33    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd84 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 11:14:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: ie.ama@hff-group.com Account Domain: RAZER Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 11:14:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: ie.ama@hff-group.com Account Domain: RAZER Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 11:14:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd84 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 11:14:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd84 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 11:14:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 11:49:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: wdmycloud Additional Information: wdmycloud Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.23 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 11:56:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1f8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 11:56:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1f8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 11:56:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x23d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 11:57:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1f8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 11:57:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1f8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 12:57:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 12:57:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x1be201a Linked Logon ID: 0x1be204d Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 12:57:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x1be204d Linked Logon ID: 0x1be201a Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 12:57:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 12:57:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x1be2572 Linked Logon ID: 0x1be269d Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 12:57:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x1be269d Linked Logon ID: 0x1be2572 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-14 12:57:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1be269d Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-14 12:57:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1be2572 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-14 12:57:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1be204d Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-14 12:57:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1be201a Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-14 12:57:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x1be201a Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-14 12:57:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x1be2572 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 12:57:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 12:57:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 12:57:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xfec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 12:57:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xfec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 12:58:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xfec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 12:58:05    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xfec Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 13:57:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x11b4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 13:57:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x11b4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 13:57:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2414 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 13:58:28    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x11b4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 13:58:28    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x11b4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 14:32:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 14:32:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x1f04d14 Linked Logon ID: 0x1f04d47 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 14:32:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x1f04d47 Linked Logon ID: 0x1f04d14 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 14:32:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 14:32:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x1f05349 Linked Logon ID: 0x1f053aa Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 14:32:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x1f053aa Linked Logon ID: 0x1f05349 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-14 14:32:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1f053aa Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-14 14:32:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1f05349 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-14 14:32:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1f04d47 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-14 14:32:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x1f04d14 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-14 14:32:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x1f04d14 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-14 14:32:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x1f05349 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 14:32:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 14:32:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 14:32:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x11d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 14:32:49    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x11d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 14:33:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x11d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 14:33:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x11d0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 14:45:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-14 14:45:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12290  2017-01-14 14:45:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5061: Cryptographic operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: RSA Key Name: 8d3706cf-a4bf-25a3-466a-ba28678e314b Key Type: %%2500 Cryptographic Operation: Operation: %%2480 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-14 14:45:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5058: Key file operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: UNKNOWN Key Name: 8d3706cf-a4bf-25a3-466a-ba28678e314b Key Type: %%2500 Key File Operation Information: File Path: C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Crypto\SystemKeys\23e8a7fb877a6c9eb54ca64f9502f8df_515b10cc-5648-4ef1-85cd-ec69792150a2 Operation: %%2458 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-14 14:46:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4616: The system time was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Process Information: Process ID: 0x560 Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Previous Time: 2017-01-14T07:46:01.224688600Z New Time: 2017-01-14T07:46:01.221000000Z This event is generated when the system time is changed. It is normal for the Windows Time Service, which runs with System privilege, to change the system time on a regular basis. Other system time changes may be indicative of attempts to tamper with the computer.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 14:56:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1968 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 14:56:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1968 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 14:56:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1978 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 14:57:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1968 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 14:57:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1968 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 14:59:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 14:59:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2061c0d Linked Logon ID: 0x2061c40 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 14:59:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2061c40 Linked Logon ID: 0x2061c0d Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 14:59:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 14:59:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x20622eb Linked Logon ID: 0x2062354 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 14:59:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2062354 Linked Logon ID: 0x20622eb Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-14 14:59:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x2062354 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-14 14:59:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x20622eb Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-14 14:59:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x2061c40 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-14 14:59:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x2061c0d Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-14 14:59:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2061c0d Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-14 14:59:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x20622eb Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 14:59:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 14:59:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 14:59:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2334 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 14:59:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2334 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 15:00:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2334 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 15:00:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2334 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 15:11:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 15:11:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 15:28:58    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.5 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 15:58:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1498 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 15:58:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: wdmycloud Additional Information: wdmycloud Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.23 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 15:59:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2160 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 15:59:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2160 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 15:59:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2754 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 16:00:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2160 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 16:00:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2160 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 16:03:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 16:03:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x22a5732 Linked Logon ID: 0x22a5765 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 16:03:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x22a5765 Linked Logon ID: 0x22a5732 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 16:03:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 16:03:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x22a5c91 Linked Logon ID: 0x22a5ce4 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 16:03:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x22a5ce4 Linked Logon ID: 0x22a5c91 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-14 16:03:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x22a5ce4 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-14 16:03:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x22a5c91 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-14 16:03:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x22a5765 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-14 16:03:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x22a5732 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-14 16:03:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x22a5732 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-14 16:03:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x22a5c91 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 16:03:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 16:03:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 16:03:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1560 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 16:03:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1560 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 16:03:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1560 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 16:03:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1560 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 16:18:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 16:18:09    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 16:27:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-3 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1ff8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 16:27:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-3 Account Name: DWM-3 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x23779c0 Linked Logon ID: 0x23779df Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1ff8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 16:27:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-3 Account Name: DWM-3 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x23779df Linked Logon ID: 0x23779c0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1ff8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-14 16:27:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-3 Account Name: DWM-3 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x23779c0 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-14 16:27:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-3 Account Name: DWM-3 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x23779df Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-14 16:27:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4647: User initiated logoff: Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0xc41742 This event is generated when a logoff is initiated. No further user-initiated activity can occur. This event can be interpreted as a logoff event.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:27:56    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x598 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:28:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x6f8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:28:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x6f8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 19:28:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 19:28:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x23d6ef1 Linked Logon ID: 0x23d6f23 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 19:28:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x23d6f23 Linked Logon ID: 0x23d6ef1 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 19:28:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 19:28:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x23d717d Linked Logon ID: 0x23d71c6 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 19:28:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x23d71c6 Linked Logon ID: 0x23d717d Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-14 19:28:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x23d71c6 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-14 19:28:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x23d717d Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-14 19:28:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x23d6ef1 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-14 19:28:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x23d717d Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:28:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:28:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-14 19:28:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:28:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:28:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:28:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:28:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:28:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:28:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:28:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:28:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:28:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:28:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:28:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:28:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:28:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:28:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:28:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:28:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:28:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:28:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:28:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:28:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:28:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:28:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:28:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:28:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:28:20    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:29:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x6f8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:29:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x6f8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:30:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:30:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:31:04    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x23d6f23 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x728 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:31:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:31:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:43:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x23d6f23 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1154 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 19:43:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x23d6f23 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1154 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 20:09:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-14 20:09:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 20:27:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x23d6f23 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x27b4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 21:17:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1318 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 21:17:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1318 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 21:17:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1318 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-14 21:17:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1318 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-14 21:37:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-14 21:37:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 21:37:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-4 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d58 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 21:37:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-4 Account Name: DWM-4 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x28eb4d3 Linked Logon ID: 0x28eb4f2 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d58 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 21:37:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-4 Account Name: DWM-4 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x28eb4f2 Linked Logon ID: 0x28eb4d3 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d58 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-14 21:37:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-4 Account Name: DWM-4 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x28eb4d3 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-14 21:37:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-4 Account Name: DWM-4 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x28eb4f2 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-14 21:37:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-14 21:37:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-14 21:37:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4647: User initiated logoff: Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x23d6f23 This event is generated when a logoff is initiated. No further user-initiated activity can occur. This event can be interpreted as a logoff event.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:49:54    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2528 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:49:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dfc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:49:55    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dfc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:49:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dfc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:49:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dfc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:50:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d44 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:50:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d44 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 10:50:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 10:50:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2944b2b Linked Logon ID: 0x2944b5a Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 10:50:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2944b5a Linked Logon ID: 0x2944b2b Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 10:50:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 10:50:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2944dc5 Linked Logon ID: 0x2944df3 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 10:50:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2944df3 Linked Logon ID: 0x2944dc5 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-15 10:50:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x2944df3 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-15 10:50:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x2944dc5 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-15 10:50:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2944b2b Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-15 10:50:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x2944dc5 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:50:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:50:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-15 10:50:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x46c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:50:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:50:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:50:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:50:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:50:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:50:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:50:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:50:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:50:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:50:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:50:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:50:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:50:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:50:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:50:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:50:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:50:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:50:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:50:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:50:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Administrator Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:50:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:50:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: DefaultAccount Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:50:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: defaultuser0 Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:50:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Guest Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:50:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4797: An attempt was made to query the existence of a blank password for an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Additional Information: Caller Workstation: RAZER Target Account Name: Deathadder™ Target Account Domain: RAZER
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 10:51:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-15 10:51:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:51:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d44 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:51:52    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1d44 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:52:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2558 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:52:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2558 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 10:53:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-15 10:53:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:53:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-501 Account Name: Guest Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1810 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\CompatTelRunner.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:53:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2558 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 10:53:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2558 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 11:05:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x2944b5a User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x8f8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 11:05:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x2944b5a User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x8f8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 11:21:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-15 11:21:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 11:26:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-15 11:26:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 11:51:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-15 11:51:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 12:19:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 12:19:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-15 12:19:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-15 12:19:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-15 12:19:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x19a8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-15 12:19:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x19a8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-15 12:19:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x19a8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-15 12:19:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x19a8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-15 12:19:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x19a8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-15 12:19:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x19a8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-15 12:19:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x19a8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-15 12:19:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x19a8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 12:19:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-15 12:19:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 12:19:28    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-15 12:19:28    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 12:21:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-15 12:21:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 12:50:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-15 12:50:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 12:50:44    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x2944b5a User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xeb4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 14:03:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-15 14:03:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-15 14:04:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4616: The system time was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Process Information: Process ID: 0x560 Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Previous Time: 2017-01-15T07:04:04.338191200Z New Time: 2017-01-15T07:04:06.900651200Z This event is generated when the system time is changed. It is normal for the Windows Time Service, which runs with System privilege, to change the system time on a regular basis. Other system time changes may be indicative of attempts to tamper with the computer.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-15 14:04:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4616: The system time was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Process Information: Process ID: 0x560 Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Previous Time: 2017-01-15T07:04:06.900838400Z New Time: 2017-01-15T07:04:06.900000000Z This event is generated when the system time is changed. It is normal for the Windows Time Service, which runs with System privilege, to change the system time on a regular basis. Other system time changes may be indicative of attempts to tamper with the computer.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-15 14:04:06    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4616: The system time was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Process Information: Process ID: 0x560 Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Previous Time: 2017-01-15T07:04:06.901139200Z New Time: 2017-01-15T07:04:06.899000000Z This event is generated when the system time is changed. It is normal for the Windows Time Service, which runs with System privilege, to change the system time on a regular basis. Other system time changes may be indicative of attempts to tamper with the computer.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-15 19:08:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1b0 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6?4?????? ? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x4 Creator Process Name: ??????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-15 19:08:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x220 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13573  2017-01-15 19:08:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4826: Boot Configuration Data loaded. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 General Settings: Load Options: - Advanced Options: %%1843 Configuration Access Policy: %%1846 System Event Logging: %%1843 Kernel Debugging: %%1843 VSM Launch Type: %%1848 Signature Settings: Test Signing: %%1843 Flight Signing: %%1843 Disable Integrity Checks: %%1843 HyperVisor Settings: HyperVisor Load Options: - HyperVisor Launch Type: %%1848 HyperVisor Debugging: %%1843
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-15 19:08:26    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x2ac New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??0?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-15 19:08:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4608: Windows is starting up. This event is logged when LSASS.EXE starts and the auditing subsystem is initialized.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 19:08:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 0 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: - New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Workstation Name: - Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: - Authentication Package: - Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-15 19:08:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x324 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x2ac Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-15 19:08:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x380 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??0?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b0 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-15 19:08:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3a4 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x2ac Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-15 19:08:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3f4 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x380 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-15 19:08:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x248 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??0?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x380 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-15 19:08:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1e4 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??4?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x3a4 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-15 19:08:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1dc New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x3a4 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-15 19:08:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4902: The Per-user audit policy table was created. Number of Elements: 0 Policy ID: 0x9d8b
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 19:08:28    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 19:08:28    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-15 19:08:28    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-15 19:08:28    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 19:08:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x248 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 19:08:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10406 Linked Logon ID: 0x1042f Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x248 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 19:08:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x1042f Linked Logon ID: 0x10406 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x248 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 19:08:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 19:08:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 19:08:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-15 19:08:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10406 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-15 19:08:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x1042f Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-15 19:08:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-15 19:08:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-15 19:08:29    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  101  2017-01-15 19:08:30    Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog  1101: Audit events have been dropped by the transport. 0
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-15 19:08:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5033: The Windows Firewall Driver started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 19:08:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 19:08:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-15 19:08:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-15 19:08:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-15 19:08:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5024: The Windows Firewall service started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 19:08:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 19:08:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 3 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-7 Account Name: ANONYMOUS LOGON Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x2030d Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x0 Process Name: - Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: NtLmSsp Authentication Package: NTLM Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): NTLM V1 Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 19:08:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-15 19:08:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-15 19:08:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-15 19:08:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x660 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-15 19:08:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x660 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-15 19:08:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-15 19:08:31    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 19:08:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x434 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 19:08:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-15 19:08:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 19:08:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xc64 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 19:08:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xc64 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-15 19:08:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  6406: Kaspersky Endpoint Security 10 for Windows registered to Windows Firewall to control filtering for the following: BootTimeRuleCategory, StealthRuleCategory, FirewallRuleCategory.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 19:08:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xc64 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 19:08:43    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xc64 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 19:08:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 19:08:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x6134a Linked Logon ID: 0x61378 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 19:08:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x61378 Linked Logon ID: 0x6134a Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-15 19:08:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x6134a Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 19:08:45    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 19:08:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 19:08:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x615e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x61615 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 19:08:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x61615 Linked Logon ID: 0x615e7 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1dc Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-15 19:08:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x61615 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-15 19:08:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x615e7 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-15 19:08:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x615e7 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 19:08:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 19:08:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1684 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 19:08:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1684 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-15 19:08:46    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 19:08:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-15 19:08:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-15 19:08:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x1a00 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-15 19:08:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x1a00 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 19:09:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1684 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 19:09:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1684 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 19:10:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-15 19:10:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-15 19:10:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-15 19:10:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 19:10:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-15 19:10:36    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 19:11:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xa54 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 19:11:30    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xa54 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 19:12:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xa54 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 19:12:00    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xa54 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 19:12:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-15 19:12:35    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 19:14:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x61378 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1aa8 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-15 19:17:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-15 19:17:48    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x468 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 19:18:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2310 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 19:18:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2310 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 19:19:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2310 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 19:19:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2310 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 19:23:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x61378 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2128 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-15 19:23:47    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x61378 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2128 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-15 20:06:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-15 20:06:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-16 07:29:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1b4 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6?4?????? ? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x4 Creator Process Name: ??????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-16 07:29:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x224 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b4 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13573  2017-01-16 07:29:10    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4826: Boot Configuration Data loaded. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 General Settings: Load Options: - Advanced Options: %%1843 Configuration Access Policy: %%1846 System Event Logging: %%1843 Kernel Debugging: %%1843 VSM Launch Type: %%1848 Signature Settings: Test Signing: %%1843 Flight Signing: %%1843 Disable Integrity Checks: %%1843 HyperVisor Settings: HyperVisor Load Options: - HyperVisor Launch Type: %%1848 HyperVisor Debugging: %%1843
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-16 07:29:11    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x290 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??4?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b4 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-16 07:29:12    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x32c New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x290 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  12288  2017-01-16 07:29:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4608: Windows is starting up. This event is logged when LSASS.EXE starts and the auditing subsystem is initialized.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:29:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 0 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: - New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Workstation Name: - Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: - Authentication Package: - Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:29:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-16 07:29:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-16 07:29:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x388 New Process Name: ??????????????-??6??4?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x1b4 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-16 07:29:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3b8 New Process Name: ???????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x290 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-16 07:29:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x3fc New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x388 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-16 07:29:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x218 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??8?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x388 Creator Process Name: ????????????????????4 Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????e?????? Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-16 07:29:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1e8 New Process Name: ????????????????-??6??8?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x3b8 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13312  2017-01-16 07:29:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4688: A new process has been created. Creator Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Process Information: New Process ID: 0x1e4 New Process Name: ??????????????e??? ?? Token Elevation Type: %%1936 Mandatory Label: S-1-16-16384 Creator Process ID: 0x3b8 Creator Process Name: ???????????????e?????? Process Command Line: ?????? ???????????????????????4 Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy. Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account. Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group. Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
Security  Audit Success  13568  2017-01-16 07:29:13    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4902: The Per-user audit policy table was created. Number of Elements: 0 Policy ID: 0x9c43
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:29:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-16 07:29:14    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: NETWORK SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e4 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  101  2017-01-16 07:29:15    Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog  1101: Audit events have been dropped by the transport. 0
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:29:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x218 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:29:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10885 Linked Logon ID: 0x108a7 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x218 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:29:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 2 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1842 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x108a7 Linked Logon ID: 0x10885 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x218 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:29:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:29:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:29:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-16 07:29:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x10885 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-16 07:29:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-90-0-1 Account Name: DWM-1 Account Domain: Window Manager Logon ID: 0x108a7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-16 07:29:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-16 07:29:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-16 07:29:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-16 07:29:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5033: The Windows Firewall Driver started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:29:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:29:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:29:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 3 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-7 Account Name: ANONYMOUS LOGON Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x1f7ea Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x0 Process Name: - Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: NtLmSsp Authentication Package: NTLM Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): NTLM V1 Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:29:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:29:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-16 07:29:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-16 07:29:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-16 07:29:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-16 07:29:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-16 07:29:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x644 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-16 07:29:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-20 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e4 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x644 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-16 07:29:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5024: The Windows Firewall service started successfully.
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-16 07:29:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x478 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-16 07:29:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x478 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 07:29:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x444 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:29:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-16 07:29:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 07:29:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x12c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 07:29:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x12c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-16 07:29:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  6406: Kaspersky Endpoint Security 10 for Windows registered to Windows Firewall to control filtering for the following: BootTimeRuleCategory, StealthRuleCategory, FirewallRuleCategory.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 07:29:28    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x12c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 07:29:28    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x12c8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:29:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x478 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:29:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x6601e Linked Logon ID: 0x6604c Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x478 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:29:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x6604c Linked Logon ID: 0x6601e Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x478 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:29:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:29:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x66297 Linked Logon ID: 0x662c5 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:29:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x662c5 Linked Logon ID: 0x66297 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:29:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6604c Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-16 07:29:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x662c5 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-16 07:29:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x66297 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-16 07:29:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x6601e Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-16 07:29:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x66297 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 07:29:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 07:29:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-16 07:29:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x478 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:29:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6604c Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: wdmycloud Additional Information: wdmycloud Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.23 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:29:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6604c Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x77c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:29:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6604c Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x77c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:29:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6604c Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.5 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:29:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6604c Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x77c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:29:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-16 07:29:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-16 07:29:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x19b4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-16 07:29:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x19b4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:30:07    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:30:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x77c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:30:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x77c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 07:30:25    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6604c User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1588 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
Security  Audit Success  12290  2017-01-16 07:31:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5061: Cryptographic operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: ECDSA_P256 Key Name: Microsoft Connected Devices Platform device certificate Key Type: %%2500 Cryptographic Operation: Operation: %%2480 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-16 07:31:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5058: Key file operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: UNKNOWN Key Name: Microsoft Connected Devices Platform device certificate Key Type: %%2500 Key File Operation Information: File Path: C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\LocalService\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Crypto\Keys\de7cf8a7901d2ad13e5c67c29e5d1662_515b10cc-5648-4ef1-85cd-ec69792150a2 Operation: %%2458 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12292  2017-01-16 07:31:19    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  5059: Key migration operation. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-19 Account Name: LOCAL SERVICE Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e5 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: ECDSA_P256 Key Name: Microsoft Connected Devices Platform device certificate Key Type: %%2500 Additional Information: Operation: %%2464 Return Code: 0x0
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:31:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:31:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-16 07:31:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-16 07:31:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-16 07:31:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x478 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-16 07:31:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x478 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:31:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6604c Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: RAZER Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:31:57    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6604c Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: RAZER Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-TS-ML-0-15.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:32:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6604c Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:32:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6604c Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x77c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:32:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6604c Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x77c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:33:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-16 07:33:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:34:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-16 07:34:21    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:34:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-16 07:34:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:35:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6604c Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:35:17    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6604c Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:35:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6604c Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:35:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6604c Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x77c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:35:27    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6604c Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x77c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 07:36:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x5c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 07:36:15    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x5c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 07:36:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x5c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 07:36:16    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x5c4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 07:36:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-501 Account Name: Guest Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1390 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\CompatTelRunner.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-16 07:36:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x478 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-16 07:36:18    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x478 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 07:39:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1f10 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 07:39:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1f10 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 07:39:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1f10 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 07:39:24    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1f10 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 07:44:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6604c User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x205c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 07:44:38    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6604c User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x205c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-16 07:48:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x478 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-16 07:48:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0x478 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:56:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:56:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6604c Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-16 07:56:22    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:56:23    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6604c Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:56:39    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6604c Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 07:56:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6604c Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x77c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 08:13:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xe48 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 08:13:32    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xe48 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 08:13:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xe48 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 08:13:34    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xe48 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 08:25:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1a08 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 08:25:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1a08 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 08:25:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1a08 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 08:25:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x1a08 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 08:25:37    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x2054 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 08:47:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x478 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Port: 0 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 08:47:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x5ed132 Linked Logon ID: 0x5ed165 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x478 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 08:47:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 11 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x5ed165 Linked Logon ID: 0x5ed132 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x478 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 08:47:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: localhost Additional Information: localhost Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 08:47:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x5ed653 Linked Logon ID: 0x5ed7b1 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 08:47:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 7 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1843 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x5ed7b1 Linked Logon ID: 0x5ed653 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: RAZER Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Negotiat Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-16 08:47:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x5ed7b1 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-16 08:47:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x5ed653 Logon Type: 7 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-16 08:47:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x5ed165 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12545  2017-01-16 08:47:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4634: An account was logged off. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x5ed132 Logon Type: 2 This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-16 08:47:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x5ed132 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-16 08:47:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: thangduong.dev@gmail.com Account Domain: MicrosoftAccount Logon ID: 0x5ed653 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 08:47:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 08:47:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4738: A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: - Display Name: Th?ng Duong User Principal Name: - Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: - Old UAC Value: - New UAC Value: - User Account Control: - User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 08:47:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x774 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 08:47:40    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x774 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 08:47:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x774 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 08:47:42    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x774 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 08:52:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6604c Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.5 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 08:52:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6604c Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: wdmycloud Additional Information: wdmycloud Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.23 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 08:56:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x14f8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 08:56:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x14f8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 08:56:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x14f8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 08:56:03    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x14f8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 08:57:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6604c Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.5 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 08:57:50    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6604c Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: wdmycloud Additional Information: wdmycloud Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.23 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:02:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xc84 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:02:51    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xc84 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:02:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xc84 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:02:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xc84 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:03:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x27c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:03:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x27c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:03:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x27c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:03:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0x27c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 09:04:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6604c Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: wdmycloud Additional Information: wdmycloud Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.23 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 09:04:08    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6604c Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-FS-0-5.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.5 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 09:06:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4624: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: RAZER$ Account Domain: WORKGROUP Logon ID: 0x3e7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 5 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: %%1843 Elevated Token: %%1842 Impersonation Level: %%1833 New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x1e8 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: Source Network Address: - Source Port: - Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: Advapi Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Security  Audit Success  12548  2017-01-16 09:06:01    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4672: Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: SYSTEM Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e7 Privileges: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeTcbPrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 09:06:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 09:06:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x77c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 09:06:02    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x77c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-503 Account Name: DefaultAccount Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1000 Account Name: defaultuser0 Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-501 Account Name: Guest Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-503 Account Name: DefaultAccount Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1000 Account Name: defaultuser0 Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-501 Account Name: Guest Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-503 Account Name: DefaultAccount Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-503 Account Name: DefaultAccount Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1000 Account Name: defaultuser0 Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1000 Account Name: defaultuser0 Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-501 Account Name: Guest Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-501 Account Name: Guest Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-501 Account Name: Guest Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-501 Account Name: Guest Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-503 Account Name: DefaultAccount Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-503 Account Name: DefaultAccount Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-500 Account Name: Administrator Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-501 Account Name: Guest Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-501 Account Name: Guest Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-503 Account Name: DefaultAccount Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-503 Account Name: DefaultAccount Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1000 Account Name: defaultuser0 Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1000 Account Name: defaultuser0 Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13824  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4798: A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e Group: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1002 Group Name: __vmware__ Group Domain: RAZER Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-579 Group Name: Access Control Assistance Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-544 Group Name: Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-551 Group Name: Backup Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-569 Group Name: Cryptographic Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-562 Group Name: Distributed COM Users Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-573 Group Name: Event Log Readers Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-546 Group Name: Guests Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-578 Group Name: Hyper-V Administrators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-568 Group Name: IIS_IUSRS Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-556 Group Name: Network Configuration Operators Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-559 Group Name: Performance Log Users Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-558 Group Name: Performance Monitor Users Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-547 Group Name: Power Users Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-555 Group Name: Remote Desktop Users Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-580 Group Name: Remote Management Users Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-552 Group Name: Replicator Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-581 Group Name: System Managed Accounts Group Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  13826  2017-01-16 09:06:41    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e Group: Security ID: S-1-5-32-545 Group Name: Users Group Domain: Builtin Process Information: Process ID: 0xd4 Process Name: C:\Program Files (x86)\FinalWire\AIDA64 Extreme\aida64.exe
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 09:06:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x4 Process Name: Network Information: Network Address: 10.26.0.7 Port: 445 This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
Security  Audit Success  12544  2017-01-16 09:06:53    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing  4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2377419948-2109103339-2207952465-1001 Account Name: Deathadder™ Account Domain: RAZER Logon ID: 0x6601e Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Account Whose Credentials Were Used: Account Name: thangduong.dev@hff-group.com Account Domain: Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Target Server: Target Server Name: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Additional Information: AMA-DHCPRN-0-7.hff-group.com Process Information: Process ID: 0x77c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe Network Information: Network Address: - Port: - This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account’s credentials. This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-09 09:11:23  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name pqbhvyzl timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-09 09:12:59  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name eschqfon timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-09 09:15:53  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name pnpoqllth timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-09 09:17:03  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name caskvlqsdxzu timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-09 09:18:41  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name lqmnqyfalp timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-09 09:19:28  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name ggytpkzxy timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Error  None  2017-01-09 09:31:41  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-09 09:38:39  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name rcwaouehyikcdx timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-09 09:47:46  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name qvpbfzuo timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-09 10:14:57  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name lauhdweuzehr timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-09 10:16:20  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name ccyogcprhnggkh timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Error  None  2017-01-09 11:36:06  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Error  None  2017-01-09 11:59:09  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Error  None  2017-01-09 13:21:35  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Error  None  2017-01-09 14:44:47  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-09 15:23:58  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name ywkasqmzmakiguf timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-09 15:28:43  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name ygmhpqsfisn timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-09 16:56:53  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name trqwcqwl timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Error  None  2017-01-09 17:00:23  Deathadder™  DCOM  10010: The server {0002DF02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046} did not register with DCOM within the required timeout.
System  Error  2  2017-01-09 17:00:34    Microsoft-Windows-NDIS  10317: Miniport Qualcomm Atheros AR9485 802.11b|g|n WiFi Adapter, {31436C31-1332-44CA-B5AA-792AF0C03CE3}, had event 74
System  Error  None  2017-01-09 17:00:45    Service Control Manager  7023: The CDPUserSvc_2332d814 service terminated with the following error: %%2147500037
System  Warning  7  2017-01-09 17:01:05  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Processor-Power  37: The speed of Hyper-V logical processor 3 is being limited by system firmware. The processor has been in this reduced performance state for 156124 seconds since the last report.
System  Warning  7  2017-01-09 17:01:05  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Processor-Power  37: The speed of Hyper-V logical processor 2 is being limited by system firmware. The processor has been in this reduced performance state for 156124 seconds since the last report.
System  Warning  7  2017-01-09 17:01:05  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Processor-Power  37: The speed of Hyper-V logical processor 0 is being limited by system firmware. The processor has been in this reduced performance state for 156124 seconds since the last report.
System  Warning  7  2017-01-09 17:01:05  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Processor-Power  37: The speed of Hyper-V logical processor 1 is being limited by system firmware. The processor has been in this reduced performance state for 156124 seconds since the last report.
System  Error  None  2017-01-09 19:35:05  Deathadder™  DCOM  10010: The server {9BA05972-F6A8-11CF-A442-00A0C90A8F39} did not register with DCOM within the required timeout.
System  Error  None  2017-01-09 19:39:10    iaStorA  4102: Error log: Smart event occured on disk :S2UQJ9KCB01231
System  Error  None  2017-01-09 19:39:16    Service Control Manager  7023: The CDPUserSvc_23522d14 service terminated with the following error: %%2147500037
System  Warning  None  2017-01-09 19:40:06    disk  51: An error was detected on device \Device\Harddisk2\DR2 during a paging operation.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-09 19:40:06    disk  51: An error was detected on device \Device\Harddisk2\DR2 during a paging operation.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-09 19:40:06    disk  51: An error was detected on device \Device\Harddisk2\DR2 during a paging operation.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-09 19:40:06    disk  51: An error was detected on device \Device\Harddisk2\DR2 during a paging operation.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-09 19:40:06    disk  51: An error was detected on device \Device\Harddisk2\DR2 during a paging operation.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-09 19:40:06    disk  51: An error was detected on device \Device\Harddisk2\DR2 during a paging operation.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-09 19:40:06    disk  51: An error was detected on device \Device\Harddisk2\DR2 during a paging operation.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-09 19:40:06    disk  51: An error was detected on device \Device\Harddisk2\DR2 during a paging operation.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-09 19:40:06    disk  51: An error was detected on device \Device\Harddisk2\DR2 during a paging operation.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-09 19:40:06    disk  51: An error was detected on device \Device\Harddisk2\DR2 during a paging operation.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-09 19:40:06    disk  51: An error was detected on device \Device\Harddisk2\DR2 during a paging operation.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-09 19:40:06    disk  51: An error was detected on device \Device\Harddisk2\DR2 during a paging operation.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-09 19:40:06    disk  51: An error was detected on device \Device\Harddisk2\DR2 during a paging operation.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-09 19:40:06    disk  51: An error was detected on device \Device\Harddisk2\DR2 during a paging operation.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-09 19:40:06    disk  51: An error was detected on device \Device\Harddisk2\DR2 during a paging operation.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-09 19:40:06    disk  51: An error was detected on device \Device\Harddisk2\DR2 during a paging operation.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-09 19:40:06    disk  51: An error was detected on device \Device\Harddisk2\DR2 during a paging operation.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-09 19:40:06    disk  51: An error was detected on device \Device\Harddisk2\DR2 during a paging operation.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-09 19:40:06    disk  51: An error was detected on device \Device\Harddisk2\DR2 during a paging operation.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-09 19:40:06  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Ntfs  140: The system tried to join a drive to a directory on a substituted drive.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-09 19:40:06  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Ntfs  140: The system tried to join a drive to a directory on a substituted drive.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-09 19:40:07    disk  157: Disk 1 has been surprise removed.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-09 19:40:07    disk  157: Disk 2 has been surprise removed.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-09 19:40:07  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Ntfs  140: The system tried to join a drive to a directory on a substituted drive.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-09 19:40:07  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Ntfs  140: The system tried to join a drive to a directory on a substituted drive.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-09 19:40:07  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Ntfs  140: The system tried to join a drive to a directory on a substituted drive.
System  Error  None  2017-01-09 19:40:18    Service Control Manager  7023: The CDPUserSvc_2361db10 service terminated with the following error: %%2147500037
System  Error  None  2017-01-09 19:53:10    EventLog  6008: The previous system shutdown at 4:46:23 PM on ?1/?9/?2017 was unexpected.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-09 19:53:18  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Wininit  11: Custom dynamic link libraries are being loaded for every application. The system administrator should review the list of libraries to ensure they are related to trusted applications. Please visit http://support.microsoft.com/kb/197571 for more information.
System  Error  None  2017-01-09 19:53:24    Service Control Manager  7023: The CDPUserSvc_59339 service terminated with the following error: %%2147500037
System  Error  None  2017-01-09 19:57:57    EventLog  6008: The previous system shutdown at 7:57:54 PM on ?1/?9/?2017 was unexpected.
System  Error  None  2017-01-09 19:58:05    Service Control Manager  7023: The CDPUserSvc_524d7 service terminated with the following error: %%2147500037
System  Warning  None  2017-01-09 19:58:05  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Wininit  11: Custom dynamic link libraries are being loaded for every application. The system administrator should review the list of libraries to ensure they are related to trusted applications. Please visit http://support.microsoft.com/kb/197571 for more information.
System  Warning  7  2017-01-09 21:37:19  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Processor-Power  37: The speed of Hyper-V logical processor 0 is being limited by system firmware. The processor has been in this reduced performance state for 1 seconds since the last report.
System  Warning  7  2017-01-09 21:37:19  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Processor-Power  37: The speed of Hyper-V logical processor 2 is being limited by system firmware. The processor has been in this reduced performance state for 1 seconds since the last report.
System  Warning  7  2017-01-09 21:37:19  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Processor-Power  37: The speed of Hyper-V logical processor 1 is being limited by system firmware. The processor has been in this reduced performance state for 1 seconds since the last report.
System  Warning  7  2017-01-09 21:37:19  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Processor-Power  37: The speed of Hyper-V logical processor 3 is being limited by system firmware. The processor has been in this reduced performance state for 1 seconds since the last report.
System  Error  None  2017-01-10 07:11:50    Service Control Manager  7023: The CDPUserSvc_8ea2c3 service terminated with the following error: %%2147500037
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-10 07:11:51  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name inference.location.live.net timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  212  2017-01-10 09:00:34  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-PnP  219: The driver \Driver\WudfRd failed to load for the device SWD\WPDBUSENUM\_??_USBSTOR#Disk&Ven_JetFlash&Prod_Transcend_16GB&Rev_8.07#SLMJ1M50&0#{53f56307-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-10 09:00:42  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Wininit  11: Custom dynamic link libraries are being loaded for every application. The system administrator should review the list of libraries to ensure they are related to trusted applications. Please visit http://support.microsoft.com/kb/197571 for more information.
System  Error  None  2017-01-10 09:00:50    Service Control Manager  7023: The CDPUserSvc_4ba97 service terminated with the following error: %%2147500037
System  Warning  212  2017-01-10 09:29:06  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-PnP  219: The driver \Driver\WudfRd failed to load for the device SWD\WPDBUSENUM\_??_USBSTOR#Disk&Ven_JetFlash&Prod_Transcend_16GB&Rev_8.07#SLMJ1M50&0#{53f56307-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}.
System  Error  None  2017-01-10 09:29:13    Service Control Manager  7023: The CDPUserSvc_40722 service terminated with the following error: %%2147500037
System  Warning  None  2017-01-10 09:29:14  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Wininit  11: Custom dynamic link libraries are being loaded for every application. The system administrator should review the list of libraries to ensure they are related to trusted applications. Please visit http://support.microsoft.com/kb/197571 for more information.
System  Error  None  2017-01-10 09:36:53  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Error  None  2017-01-10 09:51:05    volmgr  46: Crash dump initialization failed!
System  Error  None  2017-01-10 09:51:10    EventLog  6008: The previous system shutdown at 9:29:06 AM on ?1/?10/?2017 was unexpected.
System  Error  None  2017-01-10 09:51:17    Service Control Manager  7023: The CDPUserSvc_403ce service terminated with the following error: %%2147500037
System  Warning  None  2017-01-10 09:51:18  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Wininit  11: Custom dynamic link libraries are being loaded for every application. The system administrator should review the list of libraries to ensure they are related to trusted applications. Please visit http://support.microsoft.com/kb/197571 for more information.
System  Warning  212  2017-01-10 09:52:42  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-PnP  219: The driver \Driver\WudfRd failed to load for the device SWD\WPDBUSENUM\_??_USBSTOR#Disk&Ven_Kingston&Prod_DataTraveler_3.0&Rev_PMAP#60A44C3FB294B05099680068&0#{53f56307-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}.
System  Error  None  2017-01-10 09:52:47    Service Control Manager  7023: The CDPUserSvc_38e61 service terminated with the following error: %%2147500037
System  Warning  None  2017-01-10 09:52:50  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Wininit  11: Custom dynamic link libraries are being loaded for every application. The system administrator should review the list of libraries to ensure they are related to trusted applications. Please visit http://support.microsoft.com/kb/197571 for more information.
System  Error  None  2017-01-10 10:17:46    EventLog  6008: The previous system shutdown at 9:52:42 AM on ?1/?10/?2017 was unexpected.
System  Warning  212  2017-01-10 10:17:46  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-PnP  219: The driver \Driver\WudfRd failed to load for the device SWD\WPDBUSENUM\_??_USBSTOR#Disk&Ven_Kingston&Prod_DataTraveler_3.0&Rev_PMAP#60A44C3FB294B05099680068&0#{53f56307-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-10 10:17:54  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Wininit  11: Custom dynamic link libraries are being loaded for every application. The system administrator should review the list of libraries to ensure they are related to trusted applications. Please visit http://support.microsoft.com/kb/197571 for more information.
System  Warning  212  2017-01-10 10:21:01  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-PnP  219: The driver \Driver\WudfRd failed to load for the device SWD\WPDBUSENUM\_??_USBSTOR#Disk&Ven_Kingston&Prod_DataTraveler_3.0&Rev_PMAP#60A44C3FB294B05099680068&0#{53f56307-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-10 10:21:09  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Wininit  11: Custom dynamic link libraries are being loaded for every application. The system administrator should review the list of libraries to ensure they are related to trusted applications. Please visit http://support.microsoft.com/kb/197571 for more information.
System  Error  None  2017-01-10 10:21:53    Service Control Manager  7023: The CDPUserSvc_49958 service terminated with the following error: %%2147500037
System  Error  None  2017-01-10 11:48:45  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Error  None  2017-01-10 11:57:42  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Error  None  2017-01-10 14:31:58  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Error  None  2017-01-10 14:58:58  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Error  None  2017-01-10 15:45:00  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Error  None  2017-01-10 15:52:29  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Error  None  2017-01-10 19:32:27    Service Control Manager  7023: The CDPUserSvc_10a7c49 service terminated with the following error: %%2147500037
System  Warning  7  2017-01-10 19:33:32  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Processor-Power  37: The speed of Hyper-V logical processor 0 is being limited by system firmware. The processor has been in this reduced performance state for 71 seconds since the last report.
System  Warning  7  2017-01-10 19:33:32  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Processor-Power  37: The speed of Hyper-V logical processor 1 is being limited by system firmware. The processor has been in this reduced performance state for 71 seconds since the last report.
System  Warning  7  2017-01-10 19:33:32  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Processor-Power  37: The speed of Hyper-V logical processor 2 is being limited by system firmware. The processor has been in this reduced performance state for 71 seconds since the last report.
System  Warning  7  2017-01-10 19:33:32  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Processor-Power  37: The speed of Hyper-V logical processor 3 is being limited by system firmware. The processor has been in this reduced performance state for 71 seconds since the last report.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-11 07:16:50  LOCAL SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-Time-Service  134: NtpClient was unable to set a manual peer to use as a time source because of DNS resolution error on 'time.windows.com,0x9'. NtpClient will try again in 15 minutes and double the reattempt interval thereafter. The error was: No such host is known. (0x80072AF9)
System  Warning  None  2017-01-11 07:16:50  LOCAL SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-Time-Service  134: NtpClient was unable to set a manual peer to use as a time source because of DNS resolution error on 'time.windows.com,0x9'. NtpClient will try again in 15 minutes and double the reattempt interval thereafter. The error was: No such host is known. (0x80072AF9)
System  Error  None  2017-01-11 07:21:10    Service Control Manager  7023: The CDPUserSvc_1ba579a service terminated with the following error: %%2147500037
System  Error  None  2017-01-11 07:21:19  Deathadder™  DCOM  10010: The server {4AA0A5C4-1B9B-4F2E-99D7-99C6AEC83474} did not register with DCOM within the required timeout.
System  Error  None  2017-01-11 07:21:19  Deathadder™  DCOM  10010: The server {71DCE5D6-4B57-496B-AC21-CD5B54EB93FD} did not register with DCOM within the required timeout.
System  Error  None  2017-01-11 07:21:19  Deathadder™  DCOM  10010: The server {71DCE5D6-4B57-496B-AC21-CD5B54EB93FD} did not register with DCOM within the required timeout.
System  Error  None  2017-01-11 07:21:19  Deathadder™  DCOM  10010: The server {71DCE5D6-4B57-496B-AC21-CD5B54EB93FD} did not register with DCOM within the required timeout.
System  Error  None  2017-01-11 07:21:19  Deathadder™  DCOM  10010: The server {71DCE5D6-4B57-496B-AC21-CD5B54EB93FD} did not register with DCOM within the required timeout.
System  Error  None  2017-01-11 07:21:20    Service Control Manager  7009: A timeout was reached (30000 milliseconds) while waiting for the User Data Storage_1ba579a service to connect.
System  Error  None  2017-01-11 07:21:20  Deathadder™  DCOM  10010: The server {71DCE5D6-4B57-496B-AC21-CD5B54EB93FD} did not register with DCOM within the required timeout.
System  Error  None  2017-01-11 07:21:20  Deathadder™  DCOM  10010: The server {71DCE5D6-4B57-496B-AC21-CD5B54EB93FD} did not register with DCOM within the required timeout.
System  Error  None  2017-01-11 07:21:20  Deathadder™  DCOM  10010: The server {71DCE5D6-4B57-496B-AC21-CD5B54EB93FD} did not register with DCOM within the required timeout.
System  Error  None  2017-01-11 07:26:48    Service Control Manager  7023: The CDPUserSvc_1c0b55b service terminated with the following error: %%2147500037
System  Error  None  2017-01-11 07:31:14  SYSTEM  Ntfs  55: A corruption was discovered in the file system structure on volume D:. The exact nature of the corruption is unknown. The file system structures need to be scanned online.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-11 07:31:14  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Ntfs  98:
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 07:37:39  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name ocos-office365-s2s.msedge.net timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 08:11:55  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name tinhte.vn timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Error  None  2017-01-11 09:33:31  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-11 09:33:45    VMnetDHCP  1: dispatch: Timeout waiting for input data
System  Warning  None  2017-01-11 10:07:24  Deathadder™  User32  1073: The attempt by user RAZER\Deathadder™ to restart/shutdown computer RAZER failed
System  Warning  None  2017-01-11 10:21:12  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Ntfs  98:
System  Warning  None  2017-01-11 10:21:25  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Wininit  11: Custom dynamic link libraries are being loaded for every application. The system administrator should review the list of libraries to ensure they are related to trusted applications. Please visit http://support.microsoft.com/kb/197571 for more information.
System  Error  None  2017-01-11 10:23:22    Service Control Manager  7023: The CDPUserSvc_6db4c service terminated with the following error: %%2147500037
System  Error  None  2017-01-11 10:36:12  SYSTEM  Ntfs  55: A corruption was discovered in the file system structure on volume D:. The exact nature of the corruption is unknown. The file system structures need to be scanned online.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 11:49:29  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name wpad timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Error  None  2017-01-11 11:57:53  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 12:46:31  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name isatap.hff-group.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 12:47:19  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name _ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.WORKGROUP timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 12:47:24  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name isatap.hff-group.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 13:37:20  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name www.tiwtter.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Error  None  2017-01-11 15:05:53  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Error  None  2017-01-11 15:41:42  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 16:28:49  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name https timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  7  2017-01-11 19:17:42  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Processor-Power  37: The speed of Hyper-V logical processor 0 is being limited by system firmware. The processor has been in this reduced performance state for 71 seconds since the last report.
System  Warning  7  2017-01-11 19:17:42  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Processor-Power  37: The speed of Hyper-V logical processor 1 is being limited by system firmware. The processor has been in this reduced performance state for 71 seconds since the last report.
System  Warning  7  2017-01-11 19:17:42  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Processor-Power  37: The speed of Hyper-V logical processor 2 is being limited by system firmware. The processor has been in this reduced performance state for 71 seconds since the last report.
System  Warning  7  2017-01-11 19:17:42  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Processor-Power  37: The speed of Hyper-V logical processor 3 is being limited by system firmware. The processor has been in this reduced performance state for 71 seconds since the last report.
System  Error  None  2017-01-11 19:19:07    Service Control Manager  7023: The CDPUserSvc_14cc0ff service terminated with the following error: %%2147500037
System  Warning  None  2017-01-11 19:19:43    VMnetDHCP  1: dispatch: Timeout waiting for input data
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 19:21:20  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name settings-ssl.xboxlive.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 19:26:59  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name connect.linksys.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 19:27:15  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name accounts.google.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 19:33:06  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name www.google.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 19:34:02  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name kv301-prod.do.dsp.mp.microsoft.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 19:35:45  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name v10.vortex-win.data.microsoft.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 19:35:46  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name client.wns.windows.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 19:37:54  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name ajax.googleapis.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 19:40:35  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name disc301-prod.do.dsp.mp.microsoft.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 19:46:33  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name disc301-prod.do.dsp.mp.microsoft.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-11 19:52:35  LOCAL SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-Time-Service  134: NtpClient was unable to set a manual peer to use as a time source because of DNS resolution error on 'time.windows.com,0x9'. NtpClient will try again in 15 minutes and double the reattempt interval thereafter. The error was: No such host is known. (0x80072AF9)
System  Warning  None  2017-01-11 19:52:36  LOCAL SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-Time-Service  134: NtpClient was unable to set a manual peer to use as a time source because of DNS resolution error on 'time.windows.com,0x9'. NtpClient will try again in 15 minutes and double the reattempt interval thereafter. The error was: No such host is known. (0x80072AF9)
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 19:52:36  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name skyapi.live.net timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-11 20:12:58  LOCAL SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-Time-Service  134: NtpClient was unable to set a manual peer to use as a time source because of DNS resolution error on 'time.windows.com,0x9'. NtpClient will try again in 15 minutes and double the reattempt interval thereafter. The error was: No such host is known. (0x80072AF9)
System  Warning  None  2017-01-11 20:13:12  LOCAL SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-Time-Service  134: NtpClient was unable to set a manual peer to use as a time source because of DNS resolution error on 'time.windows.com,0x9'. NtpClient will try again in 15 minutes and double the reattempt interval thereafter. The error was: No such host is known. (0x80072AF9)
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 20:13:12  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name time.windows.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 20:13:27  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name www.google.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 20:16:44  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name dnl-01.geo.kaspersky.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 20:17:05  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name settings-win.data.microsoft.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-11 20:17:10  LOCAL SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-Time-Service  134: NtpClient was unable to set a manual peer to use as a time source because of DNS resolution error on 'time.windows.com,0x9'. NtpClient will try again in 15 minutes and double the reattempt interval thereafter. The error was: No such host is known. (0x80072AF9)
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 20:17:19  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name beacons4.gvt2.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-11 20:17:22  LOCAL SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-Time-Service  134: NtpClient was unable to set a manual peer to use as a time source because of DNS resolution error on 'time.windows.com,0x9'. NtpClient will try again in 15 minutes and double the reattempt interval thereafter. The error was: No such host is known. (0x80072AF9)
System  Warning  None  2017-01-11 20:17:22  LOCAL SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-Time-Service  134: NtpClient was unable to set a manual peer to use as a time source because of DNS resolution error on 'time.windows.com,0x9'. NtpClient will try again in 15 minutes and double the reattempt interval thereafter. The error was: No such host is known. (0x80072AF9)
System  Warning  None  2017-01-11 20:17:24  LOCAL SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-Time-Service  134: NtpClient was unable to set a manual peer to use as a time source because of DNS resolution error on 'time.windows.com,0x9'. NtpClient will try again in 15 minutes and double the reattempt interval thereafter. The error was: No such host is known. (0x80072AF9)
System  Warning  None  2017-01-11 20:17:52  LOCAL SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-Time-Service  134: NtpClient was unable to set a manual peer to use as a time source because of DNS resolution error on 'time.windows.com,0x9'. NtpClient will try again in 15 minutes and double the reattempt interval thereafter. The error was: No such host is known. (0x80072AF9)
System  Warning  None  2017-01-11 20:17:53  LOCAL SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-Time-Service  134: NtpClient was unable to set a manual peer to use as a time source because of DNS resolution error on 'time.windows.com,0x9'. NtpClient will try again in 15 minutes and double the reattempt interval thereafter. The error was: No such host is known. (0x80072AF9)
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 20:18:08  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name v10.vortex-win.data.microsoft.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-11 20:18:10  LOCAL SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-Time-Service  134: NtpClient was unable to set a manual peer to use as a time source because of DNS resolution error on 'time.windows.com,0x9'. NtpClient will try again in 15 minutes and double the reattempt interval thereafter. The error was: No such host is known. (0x80072AF9)
System  Warning  None  2017-01-11 20:18:22  LOCAL SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-Time-Service  134: NtpClient was unable to set a manual peer to use as a time source because of DNS resolution error on 'time.windows.com,0x9'. NtpClient will try again in 15 minutes and double the reattempt interval thereafter. The error was: No such host is known. (0x80072AF9)
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 20:20:36  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name www.linksys.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-11 20:21:13  LOCAL SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-Time-Service  134: NtpClient was unable to set a manual peer to use as a time source because of DNS resolution error on 'time.windows.com,0x9'. NtpClient will try again in 15 minutes and double the reattempt interval thereafter. The error was: No such host is known. (0x80072AF9)
System  Warning  None  2017-01-11 20:21:14  LOCAL SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-Time-Service  134: NtpClient was unable to set a manual peer to use as a time source because of DNS resolution error on 'time.windows.com,0x9'. NtpClient will try again in 15 minutes and double the reattempt interval thereafter. The error was: No such host is known. (0x80072AF9)
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 20:21:19  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name dnl-09.geo.kaspersky.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-11 20:21:31  LOCAL SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-Time-Service  134: NtpClient was unable to set a manual peer to use as a time source because of DNS resolution error on 'time.windows.com,0x9'. NtpClient will try again in 15 minutes and double the reattempt interval thereafter. The error was: No such host is known. (0x80072AF9)
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 20:21:31  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name time.windows.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 20:23:01  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name clients2.google.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 20:27:04  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name connect.linksys.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 20:31:15  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name accounts.google.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 20:34:49  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name livetileedge.dsx.mp.microsoft.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 20:38:17  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name disc301-prod.do.dsp.mp.microsoft.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 20:39:33  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name disc301-prod.do.dsp.mp.microsoft.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 20:40:03  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name dnl-06.geo.kaspersky.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 20:44:47  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name docs.live.net timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 20:48:37  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name connect.facebook.net timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 20:56:16  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name v10.vortex-win.data.microsoft.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 20:57:51  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name downloads6.kaspersky-labs.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 21:00:17  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name connect.linksys.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 21:02:34  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name dnl-03.geo.kaspersky.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 21:04:59  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name officecdn.microsoft.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 21:10:38  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name client.wns.windows.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 21:23:11  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name officecdn.microsoft.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 21:30:21  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name array303-prod.do.dsp.mp.microsoft.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 21:42:09  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name client.wns.windows.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 21:42:23  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name client.wns.windows.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 21:53:35  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name kv301-prod.do.dsp.mp.microsoft.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 21:54:31  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name vozforums.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 21:55:02  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name disc301-prod.do.dsp.mp.microsoft.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 21:58:12  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name disc301-prod.do.dsp.mp.microsoft.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 22:06:42  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name dnl-02.geo.kaspersky.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 22:09:33  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name ntk.me timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 22:14:26  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name disc301-prod.do.dsp.mp.microsoft.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-11 22:15:05  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name dnl-19.geo.kaspersky.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-12 07:19:03  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Ntfs  98:
System  Warning  None  2017-01-12 07:19:19  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Wininit  11: Custom dynamic link libraries are being loaded for every application. The system administrator should review the list of libraries to ensure they are related to trusted applications. Please visit http://support.microsoft.com/kb/197571 for more information.
System  Error  None  2017-01-12 07:20:24    Service Control Manager  7023: The CDPUserSvc_f9d11 service terminated with the following error: %%2147500037
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-12 07:26:58  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name www.google.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Error  None  2017-01-12 07:34:03  SYSTEM  Ntfs  55: A corruption was discovered in the file system structure on volume D:. The exact nature of the corruption is unknown. The file system structures need to be scanned online.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-12 07:34:57  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name store-images.s-microsoft.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Error  None  2017-01-12 08:20:09  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-12 08:29:11  SYSTEM  Ntfs  130: The file system structure on volume D: has now been repaired.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-12 09:15:13    disk  51: An error was detected on device \Device\Harddisk3\DR5 during a paging operation.
System  Error  None  2017-01-12 09:20:03  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Error  None  2017-01-12 09:27:08  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Error  None  2017-01-12 10:21:06  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Error  None  2017-01-12 10:21:09  Deathadder™  DCOM  10010: The server {9BA05972-F6A8-11CF-A442-00A0C90A8F39} did not register with DCOM within the required timeout.
System  Warning  212  2017-01-12 11:44:53  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-PnP  219: The driver \Driver\WudfRd failed to load for the device SWD\WPDBUSENUM\_??_USBSTOR#Disk&Ven_JetFlash&Prod_Transcend_16GB&Rev_8.07#SLMJ1M50&0#{53f56307-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}.
System  Error  None  2017-01-12 11:45:00    Service Control Manager  7023: The CDPUserSvc_4d41c service terminated with the following error: %%2147500037
System  Warning  None  2017-01-12 11:45:01  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Wininit  11: Custom dynamic link libraries are being loaded for every application. The system administrator should review the list of libraries to ensure they are related to trusted applications. Please visit http://support.microsoft.com/kb/197571 for more information.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-12 11:45:04  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name _ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.WORKGROUP timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-12 11:45:27  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name _ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.WORKGROUP timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Error  None  2017-01-12 11:47:21  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Warning  212  2017-01-12 15:41:19  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-PnP  219: The driver \Driver\WudfRd failed to load for the device SWD\WPDBUSENUM\_??_USBSTOR#Disk&Ven_JetFlash&Prod_Transcend_16GB&Rev_8.07#SLMJ1M50&0#{53f56307-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}.
System  Error  None  2017-01-12 15:41:25    Service Control Manager  7023: The CDPUserSvc_47590 service terminated with the following error: %%2147500037
System  Warning  None  2017-01-12 15:41:27  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Wininit  11: Custom dynamic link libraries are being loaded for every application. The system administrator should review the list of libraries to ensure they are related to trusted applications. Please visit http://support.microsoft.com/kb/197571 for more information.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-12 15:41:28  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name wpad timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-12 15:41:33  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name _ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.WORKGROUP timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Error  None  2017-01-12 15:41:44  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Error  None  2017-01-12 15:41:45  Deathadder™  DCOM  10010: The server App.AppXx4zfy1ffv3wctgdz2vypnybzjkh27jhw.mca did not register with DCOM within the required timeout.
System  Warning  212  2017-01-12 15:43:02  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-PnP  219: The driver \Driver\WudfRd failed to load for the device SWD\WPDBUSENUM\_??_USBSTOR#Disk&Ven_JetFlash&Prod_Transcend_16GB&Rev_8.07#SLMJ1M50&0#{53f56307-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-12 15:43:10  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Wininit  11: Custom dynamic link libraries are being loaded for every application. The system administrator should review the list of libraries to ensure they are related to trusted applications. Please visit http://support.microsoft.com/kb/197571 for more information.
System  Warning  212  2017-01-12 15:44:26  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-PnP  219: The driver \Driver\WudfRd failed to load for the device SWD\WPDBUSENUM\_??_USBSTOR#Disk&Ven_JetFlash&Prod_Transcend_16GB&Rev_8.07#SLMJ1M50&0#{53f56307-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-12 15:44:34  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Wininit  11: Custom dynamic link libraries are being loaded for every application. The system administrator should review the list of libraries to ensure they are related to trusted applications. Please visit http://support.microsoft.com/kb/197571 for more information.
System  Warning  212  2017-01-12 19:12:37  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-PnP  219: The driver \Driver\WudfRd failed to load for the device SWD\WPDBUSENUM\_??_USBSTOR#Disk&Ven_JetFlash&Prod_Transcend_16GB&Rev_8.07#SLMJ1M50&0#{53f56307-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-12 19:12:45  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Wininit  11: Custom dynamic link libraries are being loaded for every application. The system administrator should review the list of libraries to ensure they are related to trusted applications. Please visit http://support.microsoft.com/kb/197571 for more information.
System  Error  None  2017-01-12 19:14:16    Service Control Manager  7023: The CDPUserSvc_831fa service terminated with the following error: %%2147500037
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-12 19:14:45  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name login.live.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Error  None  2017-01-12 19:15:25  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Error  None  2017-01-12 19:15:29  Deathadder™  DCOM  10010: The server {DC4537C3-CA73-4AC7-9E1D-B2CE27C3A7A6} did not register with DCOM within the required timeout.
System  Warning  212  2017-01-12 20:30:00  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-PnP  219: The driver \Driver\WudfRd failed to load for the device SWD\WPDBUSENUM\_??_USBSTOR#Disk&Ven_JetFlash&Prod_Transcend_16GB&Rev_8.07#SLMJ1M50&0#{53f56307-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-12 20:30:08  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Wininit  11: Custom dynamic link libraries are being loaded for every application. The system administrator should review the list of libraries to ensure they are related to trusted applications. Please visit http://support.microsoft.com/kb/197571 for more information.
System  Error  None  2017-01-12 20:30:21    Service Control Manager  7023: The CDPUserSvc_60a1a service terminated with the following error: %%2147500037
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-12 20:33:04  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name geover-prod.do.dsp.mp.microsoft.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-12 20:44:54  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name dnl-00.geo.kaspersky.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-12 20:45:12  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name service.weather.microsoft.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-12 21:00:27  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name nexus.officeapps.live.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-12 21:17:16  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name client.wns.windows.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-12 21:33:45  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name vozforums.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Error  None  2017-01-12 21:39:05  Deathadder™  DCOM  10010: The server App.AppXx4zfy1ffv3wctgdz2vypnybzjkh27jhw.mca did not register with DCOM within the required timeout.
System  Error  None  2017-01-12 21:39:05  Deathadder™  DCOM  10010: The server App.AppXx4zfy1ffv3wctgdz2vypnybzjkh27jhw.mca did not register with DCOM within the required timeout.
System  Error  None  2017-01-12 21:39:05  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Warning  212  2017-01-13 04:34:35  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-PnP  219: The driver \Driver\WudfRd failed to load for the device SWD\WPDBUSENUM\_??_USBSTOR#Disk&Ven_JetFlash&Prod_Transcend_16GB&Rev_8.07#SLMJ1M50&0#{53f56307-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}.
System  Error  None  2017-01-13 04:34:43    Service Control Manager  7023: The CDPUserSvc_4fe46 service terminated with the following error: %%2147500037
System  Warning  None  2017-01-13 04:34:43  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Wininit  11: Custom dynamic link libraries are being loaded for every application. The system administrator should review the list of libraries to ensure they are related to trusted applications. Please visit http://support.microsoft.com/kb/197571 for more information.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-13 04:34:46  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name _ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.WORKGROUP timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Error  None  2017-01-13 04:35:10  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Warning  212  2017-01-13 04:35:34  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-PnP  219: The driver \Driver\WudfRd failed to load for the device SWD\WPDBUSENUM\_??_USBSTOR#Disk&Ven_JetFlash&Prod_Transcend_16GB&Rev_8.07#SLMJ1M50&0#{53f56307-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}.
System  Error  None  2017-01-13 04:35:38    Service Control Manager  7023: The CDPUserSvc_3f283 service terminated with the following error: %%2147500037
System  Warning  None  2017-01-13 04:35:42  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Wininit  11: Custom dynamic link libraries are being loaded for every application. The system administrator should review the list of libraries to ensure they are related to trusted applications. Please visit http://support.microsoft.com/kb/197571 for more information.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-13 04:35:49  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name wpad timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Error  None  2017-01-13 04:36:17  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Warning  212  2017-01-13 04:51:31  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-PnP  219: The driver \Driver\WudfRd failed to load for the device SWD\WPDBUSENUM\_??_USBSTOR#Disk&Ven_JetFlash&Prod_Transcend_16GB&Rev_8.07#SLMJ1M50&0#{53f56307-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}.
System  Error  None  2017-01-13 04:51:38    Service Control Manager  7023: The CDPUserSvc_4a1a7 service terminated with the following error: %%2147500037
System  Warning  None  2017-01-13 04:51:39  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Wininit  11: Custom dynamic link libraries are being loaded for every application. The system administrator should review the list of libraries to ensure they are related to trusted applications. Please visit http://support.microsoft.com/kb/197571 for more information.
System  Error  None  2017-01-13 04:58:05  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-13 04:59:04  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name mqddtxyf timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-13 06:19:35  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name akgouxtcibkg timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Error  None  2017-01-13 06:38:39  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Error  None  2017-01-13 06:38:41  Deathadder™  DCOM  10010: The server {9BA05972-F6A8-11CF-A442-00A0C90A8F39} did not register with DCOM within the required timeout.
System  Warning  212  2017-01-13 07:07:50  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-PnP  219: The driver \Driver\WudfRd failed to load for the device SWD\WPDBUSENUM\_??_USBSTOR#Disk&Ven_JetFlash&Prod_Transcend_16GB&Rev_8.07#SLMJ1M50&0#{53f56307-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}.
System  Error  None  2017-01-13 07:07:56    Service Control Manager  7023: The CDPUserSvc_489df service terminated with the following error: %%2147500037
System  Warning  None  2017-01-13 07:07:58  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Wininit  11: Custom dynamic link libraries are being loaded for every application. The system administrator should review the list of libraries to ensure they are related to trusted applications. Please visit http://support.microsoft.com/kb/197571 for more information.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-13 07:11:47  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Wininit  11: Custom dynamic link libraries are being loaded for every application. The system administrator should review the list of libraries to ensure they are related to trusted applications. Please visit http://support.microsoft.com/kb/197571 for more information.
System  Error  None  2017-01-13 07:11:49    Service Control Manager  7023: The CDPUserSvc_51579 service terminated with the following error: %%2147500037
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-13 07:18:49  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name ecn.dev.virtualearth.net timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Error  None  2017-01-13 07:29:46  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Error  None  2017-01-13 08:59:52  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Error  None  2017-01-13 08:59:57  Deathadder™  DCOM  10010: The server {9BA05972-F6A8-11CF-A442-00A0C90A8F39} did not register with DCOM within the required timeout.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-13 14:12:51  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name kdtour15.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Error  None  2017-01-13 15:26:16  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-13 16:08:08  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name kdtour15.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Error  None  2017-01-13 17:18:28  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-13 19:13:46  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Wininit  11: Custom dynamic link libraries are being loaded for every application. The system administrator should review the list of libraries to ensure they are related to trusted applications. Please visit http://support.microsoft.com/kb/197571 for more information.
System  Error  None  2017-01-13 19:14:04    Service Control Manager  7023: The CDPUserSvc_69cc0 service terminated with the following error: %%2147500037
System  Error  None  2017-01-14 01:04:22  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Error  None  2017-01-14 07:17:12    Service Control Manager  7023: The CDPUserSvc_c42b59 service terminated with the following error: %%2147500037
System  Warning  7  2017-01-14 07:18:14  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Processor-Power  37: The speed of Hyper-V logical processor 3 is being limited by system firmware. The processor has been in this reduced performance state for 71 seconds since the last report.
System  Warning  7  2017-01-14 07:18:14  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Processor-Power  37: The speed of Hyper-V logical processor 0 is being limited by system firmware. The processor has been in this reduced performance state for 71 seconds since the last report.
System  Warning  7  2017-01-14 07:18:14  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Processor-Power  37: The speed of Hyper-V logical processor 1 is being limited by system firmware. The processor has been in this reduced performance state for 71 seconds since the last report.
System  Warning  7  2017-01-14 07:18:14  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Processor-Power  37: The speed of Hyper-V logical processor 2 is being limited by system firmware. The processor has been in this reduced performance state for 71 seconds since the last report.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-14 07:20:27  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name tqrsqtzuozloe timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Error  None  2017-01-14 08:09:00  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-14 09:45:08  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name beacons.gvt2.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Error  None  2017-01-14 11:06:26  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Error  None  2017-01-14 11:56:30  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Error  None  2017-01-14 13:57:55  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Error  None  2017-01-14 14:56:41  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Error  None  2017-01-14 15:59:56  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Error  None  2017-01-14 16:27:01  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Error  None  2017-01-14 16:27:05  Deathadder™  DCOM  10010: The server {9BA05972-F6A8-11CF-A442-00A0C90A8F39} did not register with DCOM within the required timeout.
System  Error  None  2017-01-14 19:28:14    Service Control Manager  7023: The CDPUserSvc_23d854e service terminated with the following error: %%2147500037
System  Error  None  2017-01-14 21:37:36  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Error  None  2017-01-15 10:50:47    Service Control Manager  7023: The CDPUserSvc_29464f6 service terminated with the following error: %%2147500037
System  Error  None  2017-01-15 11:26:06  Deathadder™  DCOM  10010: The server App.AppXy9rh3t8m2jfpvhhxp6y2ksgeq77vymbq.mca did not register with DCOM within the required timeout.
System  Error  None  2017-01-15 19:08:29    EventLog  6008: The previous system shutdown at 2:19:03 PM on ?1/?15/?2017 was unexpected.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-15 19:08:37  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Wininit  11: Custom dynamic link libraries are being loaded for every application. The system administrator should review the list of libraries to ensure they are related to trusted applications. Please visit http://support.microsoft.com/kb/197571 for more information.
System  Error  None  2017-01-15 19:08:41    Server  2505: The server could not bind to the transport \Device\NetBT_Tcpip_{74367705-1080-4F05-9786-7F596D436A07} because another computer on the network has the same name. The server could not start.
System  Error  None  2017-01-15 19:08:41    Server  2505: The server could not bind to the transport \Device\NetBT_Tcpip_{F9D5FEA5-DC0A-47C4-A571-4FF2A198094A} because another computer on the network has the same name. The server could not start.
System  Error  None  2017-01-15 19:08:41    NetBT  4321: The name "RAZER :0" could not be registered on the interface with IP address 192.168.0.106. The computer with the IP address 192.168.0.1 did not allow the name to be claimed by this computer.
System  Error  None  2017-01-15 19:08:41    NetBT  4321: The name "RAZER :20" could not be registered on the interface with IP address 192.168.0.106. The computer with the IP address 192.168.0.1 did not allow the name to be claimed by this computer.
System  Error  None  2017-01-15 19:08:46    Service Control Manager  7023: The CDPUserSvc_62d74 service terminated with the following error: %%2147500037
System  Error  None  2017-01-15 20:06:35  Deathadder™  DCOM  10010: The server App.AppXy9rh3t8m2jfpvhhxp6y2ksgeq77vymbq.mca did not register with DCOM within the required timeout.
System  Error  None  2017-01-16 07:29:15    EventLog  6008: The previous system shutdown at 10:28:29 PM on ?1/?15/?2017 was unexpected.
System  Warning  212  2017-01-16 07:29:15  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-PnP  219: The driver \Driver\WudfRd failed to load for the device SWD\WPDBUSENUM\_??_USBSTOR#Disk&Ven_Kingston&Prod_DataTraveler_3.0&Rev_PMAP#60A44C3FB294B05099680068&0#{53f56307-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}.
System  Warning  None  2017-01-16 07:29:23  SYSTEM  Microsoft-Windows-Wininit  11: Custom dynamic link libraries are being loaded for every application. The system administrator should review the list of libraries to ensure they are related to trusted applications. Please visit http://support.microsoft.com/kb/197571 for more information.
System  Error  None  2017-01-16 07:29:37    Service Control Manager  7023: The CDPUserSvc_6775c service terminated with the following error: %%2147500037
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-16 08:00:55  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name gehcvwznrsj timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Error  None  2017-01-16 08:25:36  SYSTEM  DCOM  10016: The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID {D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160} and APPID {9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276} to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) from address LocalHost (Using LRPC) running in the application container Unavailable SID (Unavailable). This security permission can be modified using the Component Services administrative tool.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-16 08:53:54  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name vozforums.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-16 08:59:02  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name go.trouter.io timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-16 09:00:45  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name s.gateway.messenger.live.com timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.
System  Warning  1014  2017-01-16 09:00:55  NETWORK SERVICE  Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client  1014: Name resolution for the name _ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.WORKGROUP timed out after none of the configured DNS servers responded.


Database Software

 
Database Drivers:
Borland Database Engine  -
Borland InterBase Client  -
Easysoft ODBC-InterBase 6  -
Easysoft ODBC-InterBase 7  -
Firebird Client  -
Jet Engine  4.00.9765.0
MDAC  10.0.14393.0 (rs1_release.160715-1616)
ODBC  10.0.14393.0 (rs1_release.160715-1616)
MySQL Connector/ODBC  -
Oracle Client  -
PsqlODBC  -
Sybase ASE ODBC  -
 
Database Servers:
Borland InterBase Server  -
Firebird Server  -
Microsoft SQL Server  -
Microsoft SQL Server Compact Edition  -
Microsoft SQL Server Express Edition  -
MySQL Server  -
Oracle Server  -
PostgreSQL Server  -
Sybase SQL Server  -


ODBC Drivers

 
Driver Description  File Name  Version  File Extensions Supported
Driver da Microsoft para arquivos texto (*.txt; *.csv)  odbcjt32.dll  10.0.14393.0 (rs1_release.160715-1616)  *.,*.asc,*.csv,*.tab,*.txt,*.csv
Driver do Microsoft Access (*.mdb)  odbcjt32.dll  10.0.14393.0 (rs1_release.160715-1616)  *.mdb
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
Driver do Microsoft Excel(*.xls)  odbcjt32.dll  10.0.14393.0 (rs1_release.160715-1616)  *.xls
Driver do Microsoft Paradox (*.db )  odbcjt32.dll  10.0.14393.0 (rs1_release.160715-1616)  *.db
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
Microsoft Access-Treiber (*.mdb)  odbcjt32.dll  10.0.14393.0 (rs1_release.160715-1616)  *.mdb
Microsoft dBase Driver (*.dbf)  odbcjt32.dll  10.0.14393.0 (rs1_release.160715-1616)  *.dbf,*.ndx,*.mdx
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
Microsoft Excel Driver (*.xls)  odbcjt32.dll  10.0.14393.0 (rs1_release.160715-1616)  *.xls
Microsoft Excel-Treiber (*.xls)  odbcjt32.dll  10.0.14393.0 (rs1_release.160715-1616)  *.xls
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
Microsoft Paradox Driver (*.db )  odbcjt32.dll  10.0.14393.0 (rs1_release.160715-1616)  *.db
Microsoft Paradox-Treiber (*.db )  odbcjt32.dll  10.0.14393.0 (rs1_release.160715-1616)  *.db
[ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  [ TRIAL VERSION ]
Microsoft Text-Treiber (*.txt; *.csv)  odbcjt32.dll  10.0.14393.0 (rs1_release.160715-1616)  *.,*.asc,*.csv,*.tab,*.txt,*.csv
SQL Server  sqlsrv32.dll  10.0.14393.0 (rs1_release.160715-1616)  


ODBC Data Sources

 
Data Source Name  Data Source Description  Type  Driver File Name
dBASE Files  Microsoft Access dBASE Driver (*.dbf, *.ndx, *.mdx)  User  aceodbc.dll
Excel Files  Microsoft Excel Driver (*.xls, *.xlsx, *.xlsm, *.xlsb)  User  aceodbc.dll
MS Access Database  Microsoft Access Driver (*.mdb, *.accdb)  User  aceodbc.dll
Visio Database Samples  Microsoft Access Driver (*.mdb, *.accdb)  User  aceodbc.dll


Memory Read

 
CPU  CPU Clock  Motherboard  Chipset  Memory  CL-RCD-RP-RAS
111548 MB/s
20x Xeon E5-2660 v3 HT  2600 MHz  Supermicro X10DRi  C612  Octal DDR4-1866  13-13-13-31 CR1
76951 MB/s
16x Xeon E5-2670 HT  2600 MHz  Supermicro X9DR6-F  C600  Octal DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
67934 MB/s
32x Opteron 6274  2200 MHz  Supermicro H8DGI-F  SR5690  Octal DDR3-1600R  11-11-11-28 CR1
51953 MB/s
6x Core i7-4930K HT  3400 MHz  Gigabyte GA-X79-UD3  X79  Quad DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
45654 MB/s
6x Core i7-3960X Extreme HT  3300 MHz  Intel DX79SI  X79  Quad DDR3-1600  9-9-9-24 CR2
43968 MB/s
6x Core i7-5820K HT  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-X99-UD4  X99  Quad DDR4-2133  15-15-15-36 CR2
38162 MB/s
8x Xeon X5550 HT  2666 MHz  Supermicro X8DTN+  i5520  Hexa DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
30174 MB/s
4x Core i7-6700K HT  4000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-Z170X-UD3  Z170 Int.  Dual DDR4-2133  14-14-14-35 CR2
26519 MB/s
8x FX-8350  4000 MHz  Asus M5A99X Evo R2.0  AMD990X  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
26454 MB/s
6x FX-6100  3300 MHz  Asus Sabertooth 990FX  AMD990FX  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
26425 MB/s
8x FX-8150  3600 MHz  Asus M5A97  AMD970  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
23862 MB/s
4x Core i7-5775C HT  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-Z97MX-Gaming 5  Z97 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
23664 MB/s
4x Core i7-3770K HT  3500 MHz  MSI Z77A-GD55  Z77 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  9-9-9-24 CR2
23232 MB/s
4x Xeon E3-1245 v3 HT  3400 MHz  Supermicro X10SAE  C226 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
23225 MB/s
4x Core i7-4770 HT  3400 MHz  Intel DZ87KLT-75K  Z87 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  9-9-9-27 CR2
21635 MB/s
8x Atom C2750  2400 MHz  Supermicro A1SAi-2750F  Avoton  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
21535 MB/s
2x Core i5-3317U HT  2400 MHz  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  HM76 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
21411 MB/s
4x A10-5800K  3800 MHz  Asus F2A55-M  A55 Int.  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
21214 MB/s
4x A10-6800K  4100 MHz  Gigabyte GA-F2A85X-UP4  A85X Int.  Dual DDR3-2133  9-11-10-27 CR2
21120 MB/s
4x Core i7-965 Extreme HT  3200 MHz  Asus P6T Deluxe  X58  Triple DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
20959 MB/s
4x A10-7850K  3700 MHz  Gigabyte GA-F2A88XM-D3H  A88X Int.  Dual DDR3-2133  9-11-10-31 CR2
20410 MB/s
6x Core i7-990X Extreme HT  3466 MHz  Intel DX58SO2  X58  Triple DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
19998 MB/s
12x Opteron 2431  2400 MHz  Supermicro H8DI3+-F  SR5690  Unganged Quad DDR2-800R  6-6-6-18 CR1
19188 MB/s
4x Core i7-2600 HT  3400 MHz  Asus P8P67  P67  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
18858 MB/s
8x Opteron 2378  2400 MHz  Tyan Thunder n3600R  nForcePro-3600  Unganged Quad DDR2-800R  6-6-6-18 CR1
17455 MB/s
4x Xeon X3430  2400 MHz  Supermicro X8SIL-F  i3420  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
16600 MB/s
4x A8-3850  2900 MHz  Gigabyte GA-A75M-UD2H  A75 Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
14639 MB/s
6x Phenom II X6 Black 1100T  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-890GPA-UD3H v2  AMD890GX Int.  Unganged Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR2
13474 MB/s
4x Celeron J1900  2000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-J1900N-D3V  BayTrailD Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
12984 MB/s
8x Opteron 2344 HE  1700 MHz  Supermicro H8DME-2  nForcePro-3600  Unganged Quad DDR2-667R  5-5-5-15 CR1
11518 MB/s
4x Opteron 2210 HE  1800 MHz  Tyan Thunder h2000M  BCM5785  Quad DDR2-600R  5-5-5-15 CR1
11089 MB/s
2x Core i5-650 HT  3200 MHz  Supermicro C7SIM-Q  Q57 Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
10701 MB/s
4x Celeron N3150  1600 MHz  ASRock N3150B-ITX  Braswell Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR2
10107 MB/s
4x Phenom II X4 Black 940  3000 MHz  Asus M3N78-EM  GeForce8300 Int.  Ganged Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
9476 MB/s
2x Athlon64 X2 Black 6400+  3200 MHz  MSI K9N SLI Platinum  nForce570SLI  Dual DDR2-800  4-4-4-11 CR1
9034 MB/s
4x Core 2 Extreme QX9650  3000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-EP35C-DS3R  P35  Dual DDR3-1066  8-8-8-20 CR2
8742 MB/s
4x Phenom X4 9500  2200 MHz  Asus M3A  AMD770  Ganged Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
8643 MB/s
4x Athlon 5350  2050 MHz  ASRock AM1B-ITX  Yangtze Int.  DDR3-1600 SDRAM  11-11-11-28 CR2
8092 MB/s
2x Pentium EE 955 HT  3466 MHz  Intel D955XBK  i955X  Dual DDR2-667  4-4-4-11
7984 MB/s
P4EE HT  3733 MHz  Intel SE7230NH1LX  iE7230  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
7694 MB/s
2x Core 2 Extreme X6800  2933 MHz  Abit AB9  P965  Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
7543 MB/s
8x Xeon E5462  2800 MHz  Intel S5400SF  i5400  Quad DDR2-640FB  5-5-5-15
7536 MB/s
2x Athlon64 X2 4000+  2100 MHz  ASRock ALiveNF7G-HDready  nForce7050-630a Int.  Dual DDR2-700  5-5-5-18 CR2
6985 MB/s
2x Core 2 Duo P8400  2266 MHz  MSI MegaBook PR201  GM45 Int.  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
6549 MB/s
4x Core 2 Extreme QX6700  2666 MHz  Intel D975XBX2  i975X  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
6421 MB/s
Nano X2 L4350  1600 MHz  VIA EPIA-M900  VX900H Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  7-7-7-20 CR2
6212 MB/s
2x Pentium D 820  2800 MHz  Abit Fatal1ty F-I90HD  RS600 Int.  Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
6012 MB/s
Athlon64 3200+  2000 MHz  ASRock 939S56-M  SiS756  Dual DDR400  2.5-3-3-8 CR2
5886 MB/s
2x Atom D2500  1866 MHz  Intel D2500CC  NM10 Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  7-7-7-20 CR2
5862 MB/s
2x E-350  1600 MHz  ASRock E350M1  A50M Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  8-8-8-20 CR1
5344 MB/s
Celeron 420  1600 MHz  Intel DQ965GF  Q965 Int.  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
4558 MB/s
2x Xeon HT  3400 MHz  Intel SE7320SP2  iE7320  Dual DDR333R  2.5-3-3-7
3969 MB/s
Celeron D 326  2533 MHz  ASRock 775Twins-HDTV  RC410 Ext.  DDR2-533 SDRAM  4-4-4-11 CR2
3909 MB/s
Opteron 248  2200 MHz  MSI K8T Master1-FAR  K8T800  Dual DDR266R  2-3-3-6 CR1
3672 MB/s
8x Xeon L5320  1866 MHz  Intel S5000VCL  i5000V  Dual DDR2-533FB  4-4-4-12
3623 MB/s
Atom 230 HT  1600 MHz  Intel D945GCLF  i945GC Int.  DDR2-533 SDRAM  4-4-4-12
3365 MB/s
Nano L2200  1600 MHz  VIA VB8001  CN896 Int.  DDR2-667 SDRAM  5-5-5-15 CR2
3322 MB/s
4x Xeon 5140  2333 MHz  Intel S5000VSA  i5000V  Dual DDR2-667FB  5-5-5-15
2919 MB/s
Sempron 2600+  1600 MHz  ASRock K8NF4G-SATA2  GeForce6100 Int.  DDR400 SDRAM  2.5-3-3-8 CR2


Memory Write

 
CPU  CPU Clock  Motherboard  Chipset  Memory  CL-RCD-RP-RAS
93866 MB/s
20x Xeon E5-2660 v3 HT  2600 MHz  Supermicro X10DRi  C612  Octal DDR4-1866  13-13-13-31 CR1
76511 MB/s
16x Xeon E5-2670 HT  2600 MHz  Supermicro X9DR6-F  C600  Octal DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
57663 MB/s
32x Opteron 6274  2200 MHz  Supermicro H8DGI-F  SR5690  Octal DDR3-1600R  11-11-11-28 CR1
52279 MB/s
6x Core i7-4930K HT  3400 MHz  Gigabyte GA-X79-UD3  X79  Quad DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
46548 MB/s
6x Core i7-5820K HT  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-X99-UD4  X99  Quad DDR4-2133  15-15-15-36 CR2
45532 MB/s
6x Core i7-3960X Extreme HT  3300 MHz  Intel DX79SI  X79  Quad DDR3-1600  9-9-9-24 CR2
32887 MB/s
4x Core i7-6700K HT  4000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-Z170X-UD3  Z170 Int.  Dual DDR4-2133  14-14-14-35 CR2
27371 MB/s
8x Xeon X5550 HT  2666 MHz  Supermicro X8DTN+  i5520  Hexa DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
24344 MB/s
2x Core i5-3317U HT  2400 MHz  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  HM76 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
23828 MB/s
4x Core i7-3770K HT  3500 MHz  MSI Z77A-GD55  Z77 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  9-9-9-24 CR2
23717 MB/s
4x Xeon E3-1245 v3 HT  3400 MHz  Supermicro X10SAE  C226 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
23622 MB/s
4x Core i7-5775C HT  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-Z97MX-Gaming 5  Z97 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
23615 MB/s
4x Core i7-4770 HT  3400 MHz  Intel DZ87KLT-75K  Z87 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  9-9-9-27 CR2
19549 MB/s
4x Core i7-2600 HT  3400 MHz  Asus P8P67  P67  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
17677 MB/s
8x FX-8350  4000 MHz  Asus M5A99X Evo R2.0  AMD990X  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
17317 MB/s
8x FX-8150  3600 MHz  Asus M5A97  AMD970  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
16901 MB/s
4x Core i7-965 Extreme HT  3200 MHz  Asus P6T Deluxe  X58  Triple DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
16889 MB/s
6x FX-6100  3300 MHz  Asus Sabertooth 990FX  AMD990FX  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
16680 MB/s
6x Core i7-990X Extreme HT  3466 MHz  Intel DX58SO2  X58  Triple DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
14780 MB/s
4x A8-3850  2900 MHz  Gigabyte GA-A75M-UD2H  A75 Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
14683 MB/s
12x Opteron 2431  2400 MHz  Supermicro H8DI3+-F  SR5690  Unganged Quad DDR2-800R  6-6-6-18 CR1
13197 MB/s
4x Xeon X3430  2400 MHz  Supermicro X8SIL-F  i3420  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
12775 MB/s
8x Opteron 2378  2400 MHz  Tyan Thunder n3600R  nForcePro-3600  Unganged Quad DDR2-800R  6-6-6-18 CR1
12332 MB/s
8x Atom C2750  2400 MHz  Supermicro A1SAi-2750F  Avoton  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
12032 MB/s
4x A10-7850K  3700 MHz  Gigabyte GA-F2A88XM-D3H  A88X Int.  Dual DDR3-2133  9-11-10-31 CR2
10219 MB/s
4x Celeron N3150  1600 MHz  ASRock N3150B-ITX  Braswell Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR2
10132 MB/s
4x Celeron J1900  2000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-J1900N-D3V  BayTrailD Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
9989 MB/s
4x A10-5800K  3800 MHz  Asus F2A55-M  A55 Int.  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
9949 MB/s
2x Core i5-650 HT  3200 MHz  Supermicro C7SIM-Q  Q57 Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
9741 MB/s
4x A10-6800K  4100 MHz  Gigabyte GA-F2A85X-UP4  A85X Int.  Dual DDR3-2133  9-11-10-27 CR2
8868 MB/s
2x Athlon64 X2 Black 6400+  3200 MHz  MSI K9N SLI Platinum  nForce570SLI  Dual DDR2-800  4-4-4-11 CR1
8742 MB/s
8x Opteron 2344 HE  1700 MHz  Supermicro H8DME-2  nForcePro-3600  Unganged Quad DDR2-667R  5-5-5-15 CR1
7917 MB/s
Nano X2 L4350  1600 MHz  VIA EPIA-M900  VX900H Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  7-7-7-20 CR2
7738 MB/s
4x Opteron 2210 HE  1800 MHz  Tyan Thunder h2000M  BCM5785  Quad DDR2-600R  5-5-5-15 CR1
7114 MB/s
4x Phenom II X4 Black 940  3000 MHz  Asus M3N78-EM  GeForce8300 Int.  Ganged Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
7090 MB/s
6x Phenom II X6 Black 1100T  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-890GPA-UD3H v2  AMD890GX Int.  Unganged Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR2
7084 MB/s
4x Core 2 Extreme QX9650  3000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-EP35C-DS3R  P35  Dual DDR3-1066  8-8-8-20 CR2
6719 MB/s
8x Xeon E5462  2800 MHz  Intel S5400SF  i5400  Quad DDR2-640FB  5-5-5-15
5754 MB/s
2x Athlon64 X2 4000+  2100 MHz  ASRock ALiveNF7G-HDready  nForce7050-630a Int.  Dual DDR2-700  5-5-5-18 CR2
5654 MB/s
2x Pentium EE 955 HT  3466 MHz  Intel D955XBK  i955X  Dual DDR2-667  4-4-4-11
5639 MB/s
P4EE HT  3733 MHz  Intel SE7230NH1LX  iE7230  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
5508 MB/s
4x Phenom X4 9500  2200 MHz  Asus M3A  AMD770  Ganged Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
5464 MB/s
2x Core 2 Duo P8400  2266 MHz  MSI MegaBook PR201  GM45 Int.  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
4868 MB/s
2x Core 2 Extreme X6800  2933 MHz  Abit AB9  P965  Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
4830 MB/s
4x Core 2 Extreme QX6700  2666 MHz  Intel D975XBX2  i975X  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
4715 MB/s
2x Atom D2500  1866 MHz  Intel D2500CC  NM10 Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  7-7-7-20 CR2
4702 MB/s
4x Athlon 5350  2050 MHz  ASRock AM1B-ITX  Yangtze Int.  DDR3-1600 SDRAM  11-11-11-28 CR2
4260 MB/s
2x Pentium D 820  2800 MHz  Abit Fatal1ty F-I90HD  RS600 Int.  Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
4219 MB/s
2x Xeon HT  3400 MHz  Intel SE7320SP2  iE7320  Dual DDR333R  2.5-3-3-7
4095 MB/s
Athlon64 3200+  2000 MHz  ASRock 939S56-M  SiS756  Dual DDR400  2.5-3-3-8 CR2
4054 MB/s
2x E-350  1600 MHz  ASRock E350M1  A50M Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  8-8-8-20 CR1
3804 MB/s
Opteron 248  2200 MHz  MSI K8T Master1-FAR  K8T800  Dual DDR266R  2-3-3-6 CR1
3588 MB/s
Celeron 420  1600 MHz  Intel DQ965GF  Q965 Int.  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
3157 MB/s
Nano L2200  1600 MHz  VIA VB8001  CN896 Int.  DDR2-667 SDRAM  5-5-5-15 CR2
2831 MB/s
Atom 230 HT  1600 MHz  Intel D945GCLF  i945GC Int.  DDR2-533 SDRAM  4-4-4-12
2797 MB/s
Celeron D 326  2533 MHz  ASRock 775Twins-HDTV  RC410 Ext.  DDR2-533 SDRAM  4-4-4-11 CR2
2474 MB/s
4x Xeon 5140  2333 MHz  Intel S5000VSA  i5000V  Dual DDR2-667FB  5-5-5-15
2345 MB/s
8x Xeon L5320  1866 MHz  Intel S5000VCL  i5000V  Dual DDR2-533FB  4-4-4-12
2335 MB/s
Sempron 2600+  1600 MHz  ASRock K8NF4G-SATA2  GeForce6100 Int.  DDR400 SDRAM  2.5-3-3-8 CR2


Memory Copy

 
CPU  CPU Clock  Motherboard  Chipset  Memory  CL-RCD-RP-RAS
104455 MB/s
20x Xeon E5-2660 v3 HT  2600 MHz  Supermicro X10DRi  C612  Octal DDR4-1866  13-13-13-31 CR1
68802 MB/s
32x Opteron 6274  2200 MHz  Supermicro H8DGI-F  SR5690  Octal DDR3-1600R  11-11-11-28 CR1
66844 MB/s
16x Xeon E5-2670 HT  2600 MHz  Supermicro X9DR6-F  C600  Octal DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
49929 MB/s
6x Core i7-4930K HT  3400 MHz  Gigabyte GA-X79-UD3  X79  Quad DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
47593 MB/s
6x Core i7-5820K HT  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-X99-UD4  X99  Quad DDR4-2133  15-15-15-36 CR2
42376 MB/s
6x Core i7-3960X Extreme HT  3300 MHz  Intel DX79SI  X79  Quad DDR3-1600  9-9-9-24 CR2
34871 MB/s
8x Xeon X5550 HT  2666 MHz  Supermicro X8DTN+  i5520  Hexa DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
31220 MB/s
4x Core i7-6700K HT  4000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-Z170X-UD3  Z170 Int.  Dual DDR4-2133  14-14-14-35 CR2
25025 MB/s
4x Core i7-5775C HT  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-Z97MX-Gaming 5  Z97 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
24586 MB/s
6x Core i7-990X Extreme HT  3466 MHz  Intel DX58SO2  X58  Triple DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
23675 MB/s
8x FX-8150  3600 MHz  Asus M5A97  AMD970  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
22848 MB/s
8x FX-8350  4000 MHz  Asus M5A99X Evo R2.0  AMD990X  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
22734 MB/s
6x FX-6100  3300 MHz  Asus Sabertooth 990FX  AMD990FX  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
22724 MB/s
4x Core i7-3770K HT  3500 MHz  MSI Z77A-GD55  Z77 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  9-9-9-24 CR2
21525 MB/s
4x Core i7-965 Extreme HT  3200 MHz  Asus P6T Deluxe  X58  Triple DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
21516 MB/s
2x Core i5-3317U HT  2400 MHz  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  HM76 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
21457 MB/s
4x Xeon E3-1245 v3 HT  3400 MHz  Supermicro X10SAE  C226 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
21249 MB/s
4x Core i7-4770 HT  3400 MHz  Intel DZ87KLT-75K  Z87 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  9-9-9-27 CR2
19581 MB/s
4x A10-7850K  3700 MHz  Gigabyte GA-F2A88XM-D3H  A88X Int.  Dual DDR3-2133  9-11-10-31 CR2
18021 MB/s
4x A10-5800K  3800 MHz  Asus F2A55-M  A55 Int.  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
17620 MB/s
4x Core i7-2600 HT  3400 MHz  Asus P8P67  P67  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
17534 MB/s
4x A10-6800K  4100 MHz  Gigabyte GA-F2A85X-UP4  A85X Int.  Dual DDR3-2133  9-11-10-27 CR2
17354 MB/s
8x Opteron 2378  2400 MHz  Tyan Thunder n3600R  nForcePro-3600  Unganged Quad DDR2-800R  6-6-6-18 CR1
17000 MB/s
12x Opteron 2431  2400 MHz  Supermicro H8DI3+-F  SR5690  Unganged Quad DDR2-800R  6-6-6-18 CR1
16721 MB/s
8x Atom C2750  2400 MHz  Supermicro A1SAi-2750F  Avoton  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
15482 MB/s
4x Xeon X3430  2400 MHz  Supermicro X8SIL-F  i3420  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
14003 MB/s
2x Core i5-650 HT  3200 MHz  Supermicro C7SIM-Q  Q57 Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
13992 MB/s
4x A8-3850  2900 MHz  Gigabyte GA-A75M-UD2H  A75 Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
12429 MB/s
6x Phenom II X6 Black 1100T  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-890GPA-UD3H v2  AMD890GX Int.  Unganged Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR2
12151 MB/s
8x Opteron 2344 HE  1700 MHz  Supermicro H8DME-2  nForcePro-3600  Unganged Quad DDR2-667R  5-5-5-15 CR1
11359 MB/s
4x Celeron J1900  2000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-J1900N-D3V  BayTrailD Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
11336 MB/s
4x Celeron N3150  1600 MHz  ASRock N3150B-ITX  Braswell Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR2
9664 MB/s
4x Phenom II X4 Black 940  3000 MHz  Asus M3N78-EM  GeForce8300 Int.  Ganged Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
9454 MB/s
4x Opteron 2210 HE  1800 MHz  Tyan Thunder h2000M  BCM5785  Quad DDR2-600R  5-5-5-15 CR1
8965 MB/s
2x Athlon64 X2 Black 6400+  3200 MHz  MSI K9N SLI Platinum  nForce570SLI  Dual DDR2-800  4-4-4-11 CR1
8208 MB/s
8x Xeon E5462  2800 MHz  Intel S5400SF  i5400  Quad DDR2-640FB  5-5-5-15
7804 MB/s
4x Phenom X4 9500  2200 MHz  Asus M3A  AMD770  Ganged Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
7709 MB/s
4x Athlon 5350  2050 MHz  ASRock AM1B-ITX  Yangtze Int.  DDR3-1600 SDRAM  11-11-11-28 CR2
7409 MB/s
4x Core 2 Extreme QX9650  3000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-EP35C-DS3R  P35  Dual DDR3-1066  8-8-8-20 CR2
6800 MB/s
2x Athlon64 X2 4000+  2100 MHz  ASRock ALiveNF7G-HDready  nForce7050-630a Int.  Dual DDR2-700  5-5-5-18 CR2
6272 MB/s
2x Pentium EE 955 HT  3466 MHz  Intel D955XBK  i955X  Dual DDR2-667  4-4-4-11
6130 MB/s
P4EE HT  3733 MHz  Intel SE7230NH1LX  iE7230  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
5916 MB/s
Nano X2 L4350  1600 MHz  VIA EPIA-M900  VX900H Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  7-7-7-20 CR2
5540 MB/s
2x Core 2 Duo P8400  2266 MHz  MSI MegaBook PR201  GM45 Int.  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
5412 MB/s
2x Core 2 Extreme X6800  2933 MHz  Abit AB9  P965  Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
5304 MB/s
4x Core 2 Extreme QX6700  2666 MHz  Intel D975XBX2  i975X  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
4877 MB/s
2x Pentium D 820  2800 MHz  Abit Fatal1ty F-I90HD  RS600 Int.  Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
4860 MB/s
2x Atom D2500  1866 MHz  Intel D2500CC  NM10 Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  7-7-7-20 CR2
4777 MB/s
2x E-350  1600 MHz  ASRock E350M1  A50M Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  8-8-8-20 CR1
4565 MB/s
Athlon64 3200+  2000 MHz  ASRock 939S56-M  SiS756  Dual DDR400  2.5-3-3-8 CR2
4214 MB/s
2x Xeon HT  3400 MHz  Intel SE7320SP2  iE7320  Dual DDR333R  2.5-3-3-7
4196 MB/s
Celeron 420  1600 MHz  Intel DQ965GF  Q965 Int.  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
3678 MB/s
Opteron 248  2200 MHz  MSI K8T Master1-FAR  K8T800  Dual DDR266R  2-3-3-6 CR1
3319 MB/s
Nano L2200  1600 MHz  VIA VB8001  CN896 Int.  DDR2-667 SDRAM  5-5-5-15 CR2
3128 MB/s
Celeron D 326  2533 MHz  ASRock 775Twins-HDTV  RC410 Ext.  DDR2-533 SDRAM  4-4-4-11 CR2
3054 MB/s
Atom 230 HT  1600 MHz  Intel D945GCLF  i945GC Int.  DDR2-533 SDRAM  4-4-4-12
3006 MB/s
4x Xeon 5140  2333 MHz  Intel S5000VSA  i5000V  Dual DDR2-667FB  5-5-5-15
2984 MB/s
8x Xeon L5320  1866 MHz  Intel S5000VCL  i5000V  Dual DDR2-533FB  4-4-4-12
2578 MB/s
Sempron 2600+  1600 MHz  ASRock K8NF4G-SATA2  GeForce6100 Int.  DDR400 SDRAM  2.5-3-3-8 CR2


Memory Latency

 
CPU  CPU Clock  Motherboard  Chipset  Memory  CL-RCD-RP-RAS
55.2 ns
Athlon64 X2 Black 6400+  3200 MHz  MSI K9N SLI Platinum  nForce570SLI  Dual DDR2-800  4-4-4-11 CR1
57.4 ns
Core i7-3770K  3500 MHz  MSI Z77A-GD55  Z77 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  9-9-9-24 CR2
58.0 ns
Xeon E3-1245 v3  3400 MHz  Supermicro X10SAE  C226 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
58.2 ns
Core i7-4770  3400 MHz  Intel DZ87KLT-75K  Z87 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  9-9-9-27 CR2
59.7 ns
A10-6800K  4100 MHz  Gigabyte GA-F2A85X-UP4  A85X Int.  Dual DDR3-2133  9-11-10-27 CR2
60.4 ns
Core i7-6700K  4000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-Z170X-UD3  Z170 Int.  Dual DDR4-2133  14-14-14-35 CR2
61.3 ns
FX-8350  4000 MHz  Asus M5A99X Evo R2.0  AMD990X  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
61.5 ns
A10-5800K  3800 MHz  Asus F2A55-M  A55 Int.  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
61.7 ns
FX-8150  3600 MHz  Asus M5A97  AMD970  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
61.9 ns
Core i7-4930K  3400 MHz  Gigabyte GA-X79-UD3  X79  Quad DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
64.1 ns
Core i7-5775C  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-Z97MX-Gaming 5  Z97 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
64.2 ns
FX-6100  3300 MHz  Asus Sabertooth 990FX  AMD990FX  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
66.3 ns
Core i7-2600  3400 MHz  Asus P8P67  P67  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
67.1 ns
Core i7-990X Extreme  3466 MHz  Intel DX58SO2  X58  Triple DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
67.5 ns
Core i7-3960X Extreme  3300 MHz  Intel DX79SI  X79  Quad DDR3-1600  9-9-9-24 CR2
69.7 ns
Xeon X3430  2400 MHz  Supermicro X8SIL-F  i3420  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
70.3 ns
Xeon X5550  2666 MHz  Supermicro X8DTN+  i5520  Hexa DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
70.7 ns
Core i7-965 Extreme  3200 MHz  Asus P6T Deluxe  X58  Triple DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
72.0 ns
Core i7-5820K  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-X99-UD4  X99  Quad DDR4-2133  15-15-15-36 CR2
72.5 ns
Athlon64 3200+  2000 MHz  ASRock 939S56-M  SiS756  Dual DDR400  2.5-3-3-8 CR2
74.1 ns
Phenom II X6 Black 1100T  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-890GPA-UD3H v2  AMD890GX Int.  Unganged Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR2
74.3 ns
Phenom II X4 Black 940  3000 MHz  Asus M3N78-EM  GeForce8300 Int.  Ganged Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
76.0 ns
A8-3850  2900 MHz  Gigabyte GA-A75M-UD2H  A75 Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
77.0 ns
Sempron 2600+  1600 MHz  ASRock K8NF4G-SATA2  GeForce6100 Int.  DDR400 SDRAM  2.5-3-3-8 CR2
77.2 ns
Core i5-3317U  2600 MHz  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  HM76 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
77.5 ns
Athlon64 X2 4000+  2100 MHz  ASRock ALiveNF7G-HDready  nForce7050-630a Int.  Dual DDR2-700  5-5-5-18 CR2
78.4 ns
Pentium EE 955  3466 MHz  Intel D955XBK  i955X  Dual DDR2-667  4-4-4-11
79.5 ns
Xeon E5-2670  2600 MHz  Supermicro X9DR6-F  C600  Octal DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
79.9 ns
Core 2 Extreme X6800  2933 MHz  Abit AB9  P965  Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
81.3 ns
Core 2 Extreme QX6700  2666 MHz  Intel D975XBX2  i975X  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
82.5 ns
A10-7850K  3700 MHz  Gigabyte GA-F2A88XM-D3H  A88X Int.  Dual DDR3-2133  9-11-10-31 CR2
82.6 ns
P4EE  3733 MHz  Intel SE7230NH1LX  iE7230  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
84.6 ns
Xeon E5-2660 v3  2600 MHz  Supermicro X10DRi  C612  Octal DDR4-1866  13-13-13-31 CR1
87.6 ns
Opteron 6274  2200 MHz  Supermicro H8DGI-F  SR5690  Octal DDR3-1600R  11-11-11-28 CR1
88.1 ns
Opteron 248  2200 MHz  MSI K8T Master1-FAR  K8T800  Dual DDR266R  2-3-3-6 CR1
89.6 ns
Atom D2500  1866 MHz  Intel D2500CC  NM10 Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  7-7-7-20 CR2
91.2 ns
Core 2 Extreme QX9650  3000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-EP35C-DS3R  P35  Dual DDR3-1066  8-8-8-20 CR2
92.8 ns
Atom C2750  2400 MHz  Supermicro A1SAi-2750F  Avoton  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
93.0 ns
Celeron J1900  2000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-J1900N-D3V  BayTrailD Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
99.4 ns
Opteron 2378  2400 MHz  Tyan Thunder n3600R  nForcePro-3600  Unganged Quad DDR2-800R  6-6-6-18 CR1
100.1 ns
Celeron 420  1600 MHz  Intel DQ965GF  Q965 Int.  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
100.3 ns
Core i5-650  3200 MHz  Supermicro C7SIM-Q  Q57 Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
101.3 ns
Core 2 Duo P8400  2266 MHz  MSI MegaBook PR201  GM45 Int.  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
103.9 ns
Pentium D 820  2800 MHz  Abit Fatal1ty F-I90HD  RS600 Int.  Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
105.5 ns
Atom 230  1600 MHz  Intel D945GCLF  i945GC Int.  DDR2-533 SDRAM  4-4-4-12
108.4 ns
Opteron 2210 HE  1800 MHz  Tyan Thunder h2000M  BCM5785  Quad DDR2-600R  5-5-5-15 CR1
109.7 ns
E-350  1600 MHz  ASRock E350M1  A50M Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  8-8-8-20 CR1
113.3 ns
Xeon 5140  2333 MHz  Intel S5000VSA  i5000V  Dual DDR2-667FB  5-5-5-15
114.5 ns
Xeon E5462  2800 MHz  Intel S5400SF  i5400  Quad DDR2-640FB  5-5-5-15
119.9 ns
Nano X2 L4350  1600 MHz  VIA EPIA-M900  VX900H Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  7-7-7-20 CR2
123.5 ns
Opteron 2431  2400 MHz  Supermicro H8DI3+-F  SR5690  Unganged Quad DDR2-800R  6-6-6-18 CR1
124.8 ns
Xeon  3400 MHz  Intel SE7320SP2  iE7320  Dual DDR333R  2.5-3-3-7
126.8 ns
Celeron N3150  1600 MHz  ASRock N3150B-ITX  Braswell Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR2
127.7 ns
Xeon L5320  1866 MHz  Intel S5000VCL  i5000V  Dual DDR2-533FB  4-4-4-12
128.5 ns
Athlon 5350  2050 MHz  ASRock AM1B-ITX  Yangtze Int.  DDR3-1600 SDRAM  11-11-11-28 CR2
129.5 ns
Phenom X4 9500  2200 MHz  Asus M3A  AMD770  Ganged Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
138.5 ns
Nano L2200  1600 MHz  VIA VB8001  CN896 Int.  DDR2-667 SDRAM  5-5-5-15 CR2
153.7 ns
Celeron D 326  2533 MHz  ASRock 775Twins-HDTV  RC410 Ext.  DDR2-533 SDRAM  4-4-4-11 CR2
159.5 ns
Opteron 2344 HE  1700 MHz  Supermicro H8DME-2  nForcePro-3600  Unganged Quad DDR2-667R  5-5-5-15 CR1


CPU Queen

 
CPU  CPU Clock  Motherboard  Chipset  Memory  CL-RCD-RP-RAS
146300
20x Xeon E5-2660 v3 HT  2600 MHz  Supermicro X10DRi  C612  Octal DDR4-1866  13-13-13-31 CR1
100852
16x Xeon E5-2670 HT  2600 MHz  Supermicro X9DR6-F  C600  Octal DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
62646
6x Core i7-4930K HT  3400 MHz  Gigabyte GA-X79-UD3  X79  Quad DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
62300
6x Core i7-3960X Extreme HT  3300 MHz  Intel DX79SI  X79  Quad DDR3-1600  9-9-9-24 CR2
59955
6x Core i7-5820K HT  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-X99-UD4  X99  Quad DDR4-2133  15-15-15-36 CR2
56869
6x Core i7-990X Extreme HT  3466 MHz  Intel DX58SO2  X58  Triple DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
53516
32x Opteron 6274  2200 MHz  Supermicro H8DGI-F  SR5690  Octal DDR3-1600R  11-11-11-28 CR1
53505
8x Xeon X5550 HT  2666 MHz  Supermicro X8DTN+  i5520  Hexa DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
48774
4x Core i7-6700K HT  4000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-Z170X-UD3  Z170 Int.  Dual DDR4-2133  14-14-14-35 CR2
47278
4x Core i7-4770 HT  3400 MHz  Intel DZ87KLT-75K  Z87 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  9-9-9-27 CR2
46736
4x Core i7-3770K HT  3500 MHz  MSI Z77A-GD55  Z77 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  9-9-9-24 CR2
45958
4x Xeon E3-1245 v3 HT  3400 MHz  Supermicro X10SAE  C226 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
45870
4x Core i7-5775C HT  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-Z97MX-Gaming 5  Z97 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
43886
4x Core i7-2600 HT  3400 MHz  Asus P8P67  P67  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
42517
12x Opteron 2431  2400 MHz  Supermicro H8DI3+-F  SR5690  Unganged Quad DDR2-800R  6-6-6-18 CR1
41726
8x Xeon E5462  2800 MHz  Intel S5400SF  i5400  Quad DDR2-640FB  5-5-5-15
37604
4x Core i7-965 Extreme HT  3200 MHz  Asus P6T Deluxe  X58  Triple DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
36110
8x FX-8350  4000 MHz  Asus M5A99X Evo R2.0  AMD990X  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
33997
8x Atom C2750  2400 MHz  Supermicro A1SAi-2750F  Avoton  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
32345
6x Phenom II X6 Black 1100T  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-890GPA-UD3H v2  AMD890GX Int.  Unganged Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR2
31735
8x FX-8150  3600 MHz  Asus M5A97  AMD970  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
30788
8x Opteron 2378  2400 MHz  Tyan Thunder n3600R  nForcePro-3600  Unganged Quad DDR2-800R  6-6-6-18 CR1
26990
8x Xeon L5320  1866 MHz  Intel S5000VCL  i5000V  Dual DDR2-533FB  4-4-4-12
25526
4x Core 2 Extreme QX9650  3000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-EP35C-DS3R  P35  Dual DDR3-1066  8-8-8-20 CR2
22176
4x A8-3850  2900 MHz  Gigabyte GA-A75M-UD2H  A75 Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
22008
4x Core 2 Extreme QX6700  2666 MHz  Intel D975XBX2  i975X  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
21991
8x Opteron 2344 HE  1700 MHz  Supermicro H8DME-2  nForcePro-3600  Unganged Quad DDR2-667R  5-5-5-15 CR1
21908
4x Phenom II X4 Black 940  3000 MHz  Asus M3N78-EM  GeForce8300 Int.  Ganged Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
21669
4x A10-6800K  4100 MHz  Gigabyte GA-F2A85X-UP4  A85X Int.  Dual DDR3-2133  9-11-10-27 CR2
21431
2x Core i5-650 HT  3200 MHz  Supermicro C7SIM-Q  Q57 Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
21427
6x FX-6100  3300 MHz  Asus Sabertooth 990FX  AMD990FX  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
21222
4x Xeon X3430  2400 MHz  Supermicro X8SIL-F  i3420  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
20155
4x A10-5800K  3800 MHz  Asus F2A55-M  A55 Int.  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
19545
4x A10-7850K  3700 MHz  Gigabyte GA-F2A88XM-D3H  A88X Int.  Dual DDR3-2133  9-11-10-31 CR2
19196
4x Xeon 5140  2333 MHz  Intel S5000VSA  i5000V  Dual DDR2-667FB  5-5-5-15
18012
4x Celeron J1900  2000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-J1900N-D3V  BayTrailD Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
16500
2x Core i5-3317U HT  2400 MHz  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  HM76 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
16081
4x Phenom X4 9500  2200 MHz  Asus M3A  AMD770  Ganged Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
15549
4x Celeron N3150  1600 MHz  ASRock N3150B-ITX  Braswell Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR2
14771
4x Athlon 5350  2050 MHz  ASRock AM1B-ITX  Yangtze Int.  DDR3-1600 SDRAM  11-11-11-28 CR2
12585
4x Opteron 2210 HE  1800 MHz  Tyan Thunder h2000M  BCM5785  Quad DDR2-600R  5-5-5-15 CR1
12148
2x Core 2 Extreme X6800  2933 MHz  Abit AB9  P965  Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
11236
2x Athlon64 X2 Black 6400+  3200 MHz  MSI K9N SLI Platinum  nForce570SLI  Dual DDR2-800  4-4-4-11 CR1
9610
2x Core 2 Duo P8400  2266 MHz  MSI MegaBook PR201  GM45 Int.  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
7464
2x Pentium EE 955 HT  3466 MHz  Intel D955XBK  i955X  Dual DDR2-667  4-4-4-11
7312
2x Xeon HT  3400 MHz  Intel SE7320SP2  iE7320  Dual DDR333R  2.5-3-3-7
7309
2x Athlon64 X2 4000+  2100 MHz  ASRock ALiveNF7G-HDready  nForce7050-630a Int.  Dual DDR2-700  5-5-5-18 CR2
5923
2x Atom D2500  1866 MHz  Intel D2500CC  NM10 Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  7-7-7-20 CR2
5437
Nano X2 L4350  1600 MHz  VIA EPIA-M900  VX900H Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  7-7-7-20 CR2
5163
2x E-350  1600 MHz  ASRock E350M1  A50M Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  8-8-8-20 CR1
4086
2x Pentium D 820  2800 MHz  Abit Fatal1ty F-I90HD  RS600 Int.  Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
4022
P4EE HT  3733 MHz  Intel SE7230NH1LX  iE7230  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
3854
Opteron 248  2200 MHz  MSI K8T Master1-FAR  K8T800  Dual DDR266R  2-3-3-6 CR1
3793
Atom 230 HT  1600 MHz  Intel D945GCLF  i945GC Int.  DDR2-533 SDRAM  4-4-4-12
3514
Athlon64 3200+  2000 MHz  ASRock 939S56-M  SiS756  Dual DDR400  2.5-3-3-8 CR2
3301
Celeron 420  1600 MHz  Intel DQ965GF  Q965 Int.  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
2812
Sempron 2600+  1600 MHz  ASRock K8NF4G-SATA2  GeForce6100 Int.  DDR400 SDRAM  2.5-3-3-8 CR2
2591
Nano L2200  1600 MHz  VIA VB8001  CN896 Int.  DDR2-667 SDRAM  5-5-5-15 CR2
1838
Celeron D 326  2533 MHz  ASRock 775Twins-HDTV  RC410 Ext.  DDR2-533 SDRAM  4-4-4-11 CR2


CPU PhotoWorxx

 
CPU  CPU Clock  Motherboard  Chipset  Memory  CL-RCD-RP-RAS
61883 MPixel/s
20x Xeon E5-2660 v3 HT  2600 MHz  Supermicro X10DRi  C612  Octal DDR4-1866  13-13-13-31 CR1
38616 MPixel/s
16x Xeon E5-2670 HT  2600 MHz  Supermicro X9DR6-F  C600  Octal DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
35397 MPixel/s
32x Opteron 6274  2200 MHz  Supermicro H8DGI-F  SR5690  Octal DDR3-1600R  11-11-11-28 CR1
26590 MPixel/s
6x Core i7-5820K HT  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-X99-UD4  X99  Quad DDR4-2133  15-15-15-36 CR2
23535 MPixel/s
6x Core i7-4930K HT  3400 MHz  Gigabyte GA-X79-UD3  X79  Quad DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
22807 MPixel/s
6x Core i7-3960X Extreme HT  3300 MHz  Intel DX79SI  X79  Quad DDR3-1600  9-9-9-24 CR2
20439 MPixel/s
8x Xeon X5550 HT  2666 MHz  Supermicro X8DTN+  i5520  Hexa DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
20178 MPixel/s
4x Core i7-6700K HT  4000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-Z170X-UD3  Z170 Int.  Dual DDR4-2133  14-14-14-35 CR2
15347 MPixel/s
4x Core i7-5775C HT  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-Z97MX-Gaming 5  Z97 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
14182 MPixel/s
4x Core i7-3770K HT  3500 MHz  MSI Z77A-GD55  Z77 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  9-9-9-24 CR2
14059 MPixel/s
4x Xeon E3-1245 v3 HT  3400 MHz  Supermicro X10SAE  C226 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
13988 MPixel/s
4x Core i7-4770 HT  3400 MHz  Intel DZ87KLT-75K  Z87 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  9-9-9-27 CR2
12968 MPixel/s
6x Core i7-990X Extreme HT  3466 MHz  Intel DX58SO2  X58  Triple DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
12440 MPixel/s
8x FX-8350  4000 MHz  Asus M5A99X Evo R2.0  AMD990X  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
12338 MPixel/s
8x FX-8150  3600 MHz  Asus M5A97  AMD970  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
11919 MPixel/s
6x FX-6100  3300 MHz  Asus Sabertooth 990FX  AMD990FX  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
11786 MPixel/s
4x Core i7-965 Extreme HT  3200 MHz  Asus P6T Deluxe  X58  Triple DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
11407 MPixel/s
12x Opteron 2431  2400 MHz  Supermicro H8DI3+-F  SR5690  Unganged Quad DDR2-800R  6-6-6-18 CR1
11100 MPixel/s
4x Core i7-2600 HT  3400 MHz  Asus P8P67  P67  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
10680 MPixel/s
8x Opteron 2378  2400 MHz  Tyan Thunder n3600R  nForcePro-3600  Unganged Quad DDR2-800R  6-6-6-18 CR1
9564 MPixel/s
4x A10-6800K  4100 MHz  Gigabyte GA-F2A85X-UP4  A85X Int.  Dual DDR3-2133  9-11-10-27 CR2
9064 MPixel/s
4x A10-5800K  3800 MHz  Asus F2A55-M  A55 Int.  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
8898 MPixel/s
4x A10-7850K  3700 MHz  Gigabyte GA-F2A88XM-D3H  A88X Int.  Dual DDR3-2133  9-11-10-31 CR2
8852 MPixel/s
8x Atom C2750  2400 MHz  Supermicro A1SAi-2750F  Avoton  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
8530 MPixel/s
4x Xeon X3430  2400 MHz  Supermicro X8SIL-F  i3420  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
8109 MPixel/s
2x Core i5-3317U HT  2400 MHz  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  HM76 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
8064 MPixel/s
4x A8-3850  2900 MHz  Gigabyte GA-A75M-UD2H  A75 Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
6980 MPixel/s
6x Phenom II X6 Black 1100T  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-890GPA-UD3H v2  AMD890GX Int.  Unganged Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR2
6871 MPixel/s
2x Core i5-650 HT  3200 MHz  Supermicro C7SIM-Q  Q57 Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
6123 MPixel/s
8x Opteron 2344 HE  1700 MHz  Supermicro H8DME-2  nForcePro-3600  Unganged Quad DDR2-667R  5-5-5-15 CR1
5627 MPixel/s
4x Phenom II X4 Black 940  3000 MHz  Asus M3N78-EM  GeForce8300 Int.  Ganged Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
5271 MPixel/s
4x Celeron J1900  2000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-J1900N-D3V  BayTrailD Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
4810 MPixel/s
4x Celeron N3150  1600 MHz  ASRock N3150B-ITX  Braswell Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR2
4727 MPixel/s
8x Xeon E5462  2800 MHz  Intel S5400SF  i5400  Quad DDR2-640FB  5-5-5-15
4214 MPixel/s
4x Core 2 Extreme QX9650  3000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-EP35C-DS3R  P35  Dual DDR3-1066  8-8-8-20 CR2
4180 MPixel/s
4x Athlon 5350  2050 MHz  ASRock AM1B-ITX  Yangtze Int.  DDR3-1600 SDRAM  11-11-11-28 CR2
3817 MPixel/s
4x Phenom X4 9500  2200 MHz  Asus M3A  AMD770  Ganged Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
3715 MPixel/s
4x Opteron 2210 HE  1800 MHz  Tyan Thunder h2000M  BCM5785  Quad DDR2-600R  5-5-5-15 CR1
3461 MPixel/s
2x Core 2 Extreme X6800  2933 MHz  Abit AB9  P965  Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
3043 MPixel/s
2x Core 2 Duo P8400  2266 MHz  MSI MegaBook PR201  GM45 Int.  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
2928 MPixel/s
2x Pentium EE 955 HT  3466 MHz  Intel D955XBK  i955X  Dual DDR2-667  4-4-4-11
2835 MPixel/s
2x Athlon64 X2 Black 6400+  3200 MHz  MSI K9N SLI Platinum  nForce570SLI  Dual DDR2-800  4-4-4-11 CR1
2791 MPixel/s
4x Core 2 Extreme QX6700  2666 MHz  Intel D975XBX2  i975X  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
2537 MPixel/s
Nano X2 L4350  1600 MHz  VIA EPIA-M900  VX900H Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  7-7-7-20 CR2
2370 MPixel/s
2x Athlon64 X2 4000+  2100 MHz  ASRock ALiveNF7G-HDready  nForce7050-630a Int.  Dual DDR2-700  5-5-5-18 CR2
2146 MPixel/s
P4EE HT  3733 MHz  Intel SE7230NH1LX  iE7230  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
1902 MPixel/s
8x Xeon L5320  1866 MHz  Intel S5000VCL  i5000V  Dual DDR2-533FB  4-4-4-12
1897 MPixel/s
2x E-350  1600 MHz  ASRock E350M1  A50M Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  8-8-8-20 CR1
1873 MPixel/s
2x Pentium D 820  2800 MHz  Abit Fatal1ty F-I90HD  RS600 Int.  Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
1863 MPixel/s
4x Xeon 5140  2333 MHz  Intel S5000VSA  i5000V  Dual DDR2-667FB  5-5-5-15
1854 MPixel/s
Celeron 420  1600 MHz  Intel DQ965GF  Q965 Int.  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
1821 MPixel/s
2x Atom D2500  1866 MHz  Intel D2500CC  NM10 Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  7-7-7-20 CR2
1672 MPixel/s
2x Xeon HT  3400 MHz  Intel SE7320SP2  iE7320  Dual DDR333R  2.5-3-3-7
1265 MPixel/s
Nano L2200  1600 MHz  VIA VB8001  CN896 Int.  DDR2-667 SDRAM  5-5-5-15 CR2
1219 MPixel/s
Athlon64 3200+  2000 MHz  ASRock 939S56-M  SiS756  Dual DDR400  2.5-3-3-8 CR2
1094 MPixel/s
Atom 230 HT  1600 MHz  Intel D945GCLF  i945GC Int.  DDR2-533 SDRAM  4-4-4-12
1074 MPixel/s
Opteron 248  2200 MHz  MSI K8T Master1-FAR  K8T800  Dual DDR266R  2-3-3-6 CR1
879 MPixel/s
Celeron D 326  2533 MHz  ASRock 775Twins-HDTV  RC410 Ext.  DDR2-533 SDRAM  4-4-4-11 CR2
827 MPixel/s
Sempron 2600+  1600 MHz  ASRock K8NF4G-SATA2  GeForce6100 Int.  DDR400 SDRAM  2.5-3-3-8 CR2


CPU ZLib

 
CPU  CPU Clock  Motherboard  Chipset  Memory  CL-RCD-RP-RAS
1246.6 MB/s
20x Xeon E5-2660 v3 HT  2600 MHz  Supermicro X10DRi  C612  Octal DDR4-1866  13-13-13-31 CR1
987.4 MB/s
16x Xeon E5-2670 HT  2600 MHz  Supermicro X9DR6-F  C600  Octal DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
670.9 MB/s
32x Opteron 6274  2200 MHz  Supermicro H8DGI-F  SR5690  Octal DDR3-1600R  11-11-11-28 CR1
458.2 MB/s
6x Core i7-4930K HT  3400 MHz  Gigabyte GA-X79-UD3  X79  Quad DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
437.5 MB/s
6x Core i7-3960X Extreme HT  3300 MHz  Intel DX79SI  X79  Quad DDR3-1600  9-9-9-24 CR2
436.1 MB/s
6x Core i7-5820K HT  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-X99-UD4  X99  Quad DDR4-2133  15-15-15-36 CR2
366.3 MB/s
12x Opteron 2431  2400 MHz  Supermicro H8DI3+-F  SR5690  Unganged Quad DDR2-800R  6-6-6-18 CR1
361.2 MB/s
6x Core i7-990X Extreme HT  3466 MHz  Intel DX58SO2  X58  Triple DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
357.6 MB/s
8x Xeon X5550 HT  2666 MHz  Supermicro X8DTN+  i5520  Hexa DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
357.3 MB/s
4x Core i7-6700K HT  4000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-Z170X-UD3  Z170 Int.  Dual DDR4-2133  14-14-14-35 CR2
344.4 MB/s
8x FX-8350  4000 MHz  Asus M5A99X Evo R2.0  AMD990X  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
325.1 MB/s
4x Core i7-5775C HT  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-Z97MX-Gaming 5  Z97 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
315.9 MB/s
4x Core i7-3770K HT  3500 MHz  MSI Z77A-GD55  Z77 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  9-9-9-24 CR2
309.3 MB/s
4x Xeon E3-1245 v3 HT  3400 MHz  Supermicro X10SAE  C226 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
305.8 MB/s
4x Core i7-4770 HT  3400 MHz  Intel DZ87KLT-75K  Z87 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  9-9-9-27 CR2
286.2 MB/s
4x Core i7-2600 HT  3400 MHz  Asus P8P67  P67  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
282.1 MB/s
8x Xeon E5462  2800 MHz  Intel S5400SF  i5400  Quad DDR2-640FB  5-5-5-15
275.1 MB/s
8x FX-8150  3600 MHz  Asus M5A97  AMD970  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
257.3 MB/s
6x Phenom II X6 Black 1100T  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-890GPA-UD3H v2  AMD890GX Int.  Unganged Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR2
244.3 MB/s
8x Opteron 2378  2400 MHz  Tyan Thunder n3600R  nForcePro-3600  Unganged Quad DDR2-800R  6-6-6-18 CR1
221.1 MB/s
4x Core i7-965 Extreme HT  3200 MHz  Asus P6T Deluxe  X58  Triple DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
210.1 MB/s
8x Atom C2750  2400 MHz  Supermicro A1SAi-2750F  Avoton  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
189.4 MB/s
8x Xeon L5320  1866 MHz  Intel S5000VCL  i5000V  Dual DDR2-533FB  4-4-4-12
185.8 MB/s
6x FX-6100  3300 MHz  Asus Sabertooth 990FX  AMD990FX  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
183.8 MB/s
4x A10-6800K  4100 MHz  Gigabyte GA-F2A85X-UP4  A85X Int.  Dual DDR3-2133  9-11-10-27 CR2
175.2 MB/s
4x A10-7850K  3700 MHz  Gigabyte GA-F2A88XM-D3H  A88X Int.  Dual DDR3-2133  9-11-10-31 CR2
174.6 MB/s
8x Opteron 2344 HE  1700 MHz  Supermicro H8DME-2  nForcePro-3600  Unganged Quad DDR2-667R  5-5-5-15 CR1
167.5 MB/s
4x A10-5800K  3800 MHz  Asus F2A55-M  A55 Int.  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
154.8 MB/s
4x Phenom II X4 Black 940  3000 MHz  Asus M3N78-EM  GeForce8300 Int.  Ganged Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
153.2 MB/s
4x Core 2 Extreme QX9650  3000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-EP35C-DS3R  P35  Dual DDR3-1066  8-8-8-20 CR2
152.3 MB/s
4x A8-3850  2900 MHz  Gigabyte GA-A75M-UD2H  A75 Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
136.2 MB/s
4x Core 2 Extreme QX6700  2666 MHz  Intel D975XBX2  i975X  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
117.8 MB/s
4x Xeon 5140  2333 MHz  Intel S5000VSA  i5000V  Dual DDR2-667FB  5-5-5-15
112.6 MB/s
4x Phenom X4 9500  2200 MHz  Asus M3A  AMD770  Ganged Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
108.2 MB/s
4x Xeon X3430  2400 MHz  Supermicro X8SIL-F  i3420  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
105.9 MB/s
2x Core i5-650 HT  3200 MHz  Supermicro C7SIM-Q  Q57 Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
102.9 MB/s
2x Core i5-3317U HT  2400 MHz  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  HM76 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
97.5 MB/s
4x Celeron J1900  2000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-J1900N-D3V  BayTrailD Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
94.0 MB/s
4x Athlon 5350  2050 MHz  ASRock AM1B-ITX  Yangtze Int.  DDR3-1600 SDRAM  11-11-11-28 CR2
84.2 MB/s
4x Celeron N3150  1600 MHz  ASRock N3150B-ITX  Braswell Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR2
82.8 MB/s
4x Opteron 2210 HE  1800 MHz  Tyan Thunder h2000M  BCM5785  Quad DDR2-600R  5-5-5-15 CR1
75.0 MB/s
2x Core 2 Extreme X6800  2933 MHz  Abit AB9  P965  Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
73.7 MB/s
2x Athlon64 X2 Black 6400+  3200 MHz  MSI K9N SLI Platinum  nForce570SLI  Dual DDR2-800  4-4-4-11 CR1
60.4 MB/s
2x Pentium EE 955 HT  3466 MHz  Intel D955XBK  i955X  Dual DDR2-667  4-4-4-11
57.5 MB/s
2x Core 2 Duo P8400  2266 MHz  MSI MegaBook PR201  GM45 Int.  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
57.3 MB/s
2x Xeon HT  3400 MHz  Intel SE7320SP2  iE7320  Dual DDR333R  2.5-3-3-7
47.1 MB/s
2x Athlon64 X2 4000+  2100 MHz  ASRock ALiveNF7G-HDready  nForce7050-630a Int.  Dual DDR2-700  5-5-5-18 CR2
41.5 MB/s
2x Pentium D 820  2800 MHz  Abit Fatal1ty F-I90HD  RS600 Int.  Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
33.4 MB/s
Nano X2 L4350  1600 MHz  VIA EPIA-M900  VX900H Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  7-7-7-20 CR2
32.3 MB/s
P4EE HT  3733 MHz  Intel SE7230NH1LX  iE7230  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
32.3 MB/s
2x E-350  1600 MHz  ASRock E350M1  A50M Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  8-8-8-20 CR1
31.6 MB/s
2x Atom D2500  1866 MHz  Intel D2500CC  NM10 Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  7-7-7-20 CR2
24.3 MB/s
Opteron 248  2200 MHz  MSI K8T Master1-FAR  K8T800  Dual DDR266R  2-3-3-6 CR1
22.9 MB/s
Athlon64 3200+  2000 MHz  ASRock 939S56-M  SiS756  Dual DDR400  2.5-3-3-8 CR2
20.3 MB/s
Celeron 420  1600 MHz  Intel DQ965GF  Q965 Int.  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
18.6 MB/s
Atom 230 HT  1600 MHz  Intel D945GCLF  i945GC Int.  DDR2-533 SDRAM  4-4-4-12
17.3 MB/s
Celeron D 326  2533 MHz  ASRock 775Twins-HDTV  RC410 Ext.  DDR2-533 SDRAM  4-4-4-11 CR2
16.3 MB/s
Sempron 2600+  1600 MHz  ASRock K8NF4G-SATA2  GeForce6100 Int.  DDR400 SDRAM  2.5-3-3-8 CR2
15.5 MB/s
Nano L2200  1600 MHz  VIA VB8001  CN896 Int.  DDR2-667 SDRAM  5-5-5-15 CR2


CPU AES

 
CPU  CPU Clock  Motherboard  Chipset  Memory  CL-RCD-RP-RAS
65831 MB/s
20x Xeon E5-2660 v3 HT  2600 MHz  Supermicro X10DRi  C612  Octal DDR4-1866  13-13-13-31 CR1
46878 MB/s
16x Xeon E5-2670 HT  2600 MHz  Supermicro X9DR6-F  C600  Octal DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
38013 MB/s
32x Opteron 6274  2200 MHz  Supermicro H8DGI-F  SR5690  Octal DDR3-1600R  11-11-11-28 CR1
23202 MB/s
6x Core i7-5820K HT  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-X99-UD4  X99  Quad DDR4-2133  15-15-15-36 CR2
21100 MB/s
6x Core i7-3960X Extreme HT  3300 MHz  Intel DX79SI  X79  Quad DDR3-1600  9-9-9-24 CR2
21094 MB/s
6x Core i7-4930K HT  3400 MHz  Gigabyte GA-X79-UD3  X79  Quad DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
18236 MB/s
4x Core i7-6700K HT  4000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-Z170X-UD3  Z170 Int.  Dual DDR4-2133  14-14-14-35 CR2
17323 MB/s
8x FX-8350  4000 MHz  Asus M5A99X Evo R2.0  AMD990X  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
16794 MB/s
4x Core i7-4770 HT  3400 MHz  Intel DZ87KLT-75K  Z87 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  9-9-9-27 CR2
16364 MB/s
4x Core i7-5775C HT  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-Z97MX-Gaming 5  Z97 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
16321 MB/s
4x Xeon E3-1245 v3 HT  3400 MHz  Supermicro X10SAE  C226 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
15416 MB/s
8x FX-8150  3600 MHz  Asus M5A97  AMD970  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
14452 MB/s
4x Core i7-3770K HT  3500 MHz  MSI Z77A-GD55  Z77 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  9-9-9-24 CR2
13675 MB/s
4x Core i7-2600 HT  3400 MHz  Asus P8P67  P67  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
12241 MB/s
6x Core i7-990X Extreme HT  3466 MHz  Intel DX58SO2  X58  Triple DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
10360 MB/s
6x FX-6100  3300 MHz  Asus Sabertooth 990FX  AMD990FX  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
9143 MB/s
4x A10-6800K  4100 MHz  Gigabyte GA-F2A85X-UP4  A85X Int.  Dual DDR3-2133  9-11-10-27 CR2
8528 MB/s
4x A10-7850K  3700 MHz  Gigabyte GA-F2A88XM-D3H  A88X Int.  Dual DDR3-2133  9-11-10-31 CR2
8435 MB/s
4x A10-5800K  3800 MHz  Asus F2A55-M  A55 Int.  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
6544 MB/s
4x Athlon 5350  2050 MHz  ASRock AM1B-ITX  Yangtze Int.  DDR3-1600 SDRAM  11-11-11-28 CR2
4574 MB/s
2x Core i5-3317U HT  2400 MHz  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  HM76 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
4052 MB/s
8x Atom C2750  2400 MHz  Supermicro A1SAi-2750F  Avoton  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
3780 MB/s
2x Core i5-650 HT  3200 MHz  Supermicro C7SIM-Q  Q57 Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
2908 MB/s
Nano X2 L4350  1600 MHz  VIA EPIA-M900  VX900H Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  7-7-7-20 CR2
1929 MB/s
12x Opteron 2431  2400 MHz  Supermicro H8DI3+-F  SR5690  Unganged Quad DDR2-800R  6-6-6-18 CR1
1617 MB/s
4x Celeron N3150  1600 MHz  ASRock N3150B-ITX  Braswell Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR2
1452 MB/s
Nano L2200  1600 MHz  VIA VB8001  CN896 Int.  DDR2-667 SDRAM  5-5-5-15 CR2
1332 MB/s
6x Phenom II X6 Black 1100T  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-890GPA-UD3H v2  AMD890GX Int.  Unganged Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR2
1286 MB/s
8x Opteron 2378  2400 MHz  Tyan Thunder n3600R  nForcePro-3600  Unganged Quad DDR2-800R  6-6-6-18 CR1
1235 MB/s
8x Xeon E5462  2800 MHz  Intel S5400SF  i5400  Quad DDR2-640FB  5-5-5-15
1152 MB/s
8x Xeon X5550 HT  2666 MHz  Supermicro X8DTN+  i5520  Hexa DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
913 MB/s
8x Opteron 2344 HE  1700 MHz  Supermicro H8DME-2  nForcePro-3600  Unganged Quad DDR2-667R  5-5-5-15 CR1
802 MB/s
4x Phenom II X4 Black 940  3000 MHz  Asus M3N78-EM  GeForce8300 Int.  Ganged Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
791 MB/s
8x Xeon L5320  1866 MHz  Intel S5000VCL  i5000V  Dual DDR2-533FB  4-4-4-12
789 MB/s
4x A8-3850  2900 MHz  Gigabyte GA-A75M-UD2H  A75 Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
717 MB/s
4x Core i7-965 Extreme HT  3200 MHz  Asus P6T Deluxe  X58  Triple DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
663 MB/s
4x Core 2 Extreme QX9650  3000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-EP35C-DS3R  P35  Dual DDR3-1066  8-8-8-20 CR2
587 MB/s
4x Phenom X4 9500  2200 MHz  Asus M3A  AMD770  Ganged Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
566 MB/s
4x Core 2 Extreme QX6700  2666 MHz  Intel D975XBX2  i975X  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
524 MB/s
4x Xeon X3430  2400 MHz  Supermicro X8SIL-F  i3420  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
494 MB/s
4x Xeon 5140  2333 MHz  Intel S5000VSA  i5000V  Dual DDR2-667FB  5-5-5-15
473 MB/s
4x Opteron 2210 HE  1800 MHz  Tyan Thunder h2000M  BCM5785  Quad DDR2-600R  5-5-5-15 CR1
421 MB/s
2x Athlon64 X2 Black 6400+  3200 MHz  MSI K9N SLI Platinum  nForce570SLI  Dual DDR2-800  4-4-4-11 CR1
387 MB/s
4x Celeron J1900  2000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-J1900N-D3V  BayTrailD Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
312 MB/s
2x Core 2 Extreme X6800  2933 MHz  Abit AB9  P965  Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
277 MB/s
2x Pentium EE 955 HT  3466 MHz  Intel D955XBK  i955X  Dual DDR2-667  4-4-4-11
273 MB/s
2x Athlon64 X2 4000+  2100 MHz  ASRock ALiveNF7G-HDready  nForce7050-630a Int.  Dual DDR2-700  5-5-5-18 CR2
269 MB/s
2x Xeon HT  3400 MHz  Intel SE7320SP2  iE7320  Dual DDR333R  2.5-3-3-7
249 MB/s
2x Core 2 Duo P8400  2266 MHz  MSI MegaBook PR201  GM45 Int.  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
242 MB/s
2x Pentium D 820  2800 MHz  Abit Fatal1ty F-I90HD  RS600 Int.  Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
153 MB/s
2x E-350  1600 MHz  ASRock E350M1  A50M Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  8-8-8-20 CR1
148 MB/s
P4EE HT  3733 MHz  Intel SE7230NH1LX  iE7230  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
144 MB/s
Opteron 248  2200 MHz  MSI K8T Master1-FAR  K8T800  Dual DDR266R  2-3-3-6 CR1
131 MB/s
Athlon64 3200+  2000 MHz  ASRock 939S56-M  SiS756  Dual DDR400  2.5-3-3-8 CR2
109 MB/s
Celeron D 326  2533 MHz  ASRock 775Twins-HDTV  RC410 Ext.  DDR2-533 SDRAM  4-4-4-11 CR2
105 MB/s
Sempron 2600+  1600 MHz  ASRock K8NF4G-SATA2  GeForce6100 Int.  DDR400 SDRAM  2.5-3-3-8 CR2
99 MB/s
2x Atom D2500  1866 MHz  Intel D2500CC  NM10 Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  7-7-7-20 CR2
85 MB/s
Celeron 420  1600 MHz  Intel DQ965GF  Q965 Int.  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
44 MB/s
Atom 230 HT  1600 MHz  Intel D945GCLF  i945GC Int.  DDR2-533 SDRAM  4-4-4-12


CPU Hash

 
CPU  CPU Clock  Motherboard  Chipset  Memory  CL-RCD-RP-RAS
14785 MB/s
20x Xeon E5-2660 v3 HT  2600 MHz  Supermicro X10DRi  C612  Octal DDR4-1866  13-13-13-31 CR1
9046 MB/s
32x Opteron 6274  2200 MHz  Supermicro H8DGI-F  SR5690  Octal DDR3-1600R  11-11-11-28 CR1
8720 MB/s
16x Xeon E5-2670 HT  2600 MHz  Supermicro X9DR6-F  C600  Octal DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
5231 MB/s
6x Core i7-5820K HT  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-X99-UD4  X99  Quad DDR4-2133  15-15-15-36 CR2
4784 MB/s
12x Opteron 2431  2400 MHz  Supermicro H8DI3+-F  SR5690  Unganged Quad DDR2-800R  6-6-6-18 CR1
4587 MB/s
4x Core i7-6700K HT  4000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-Z170X-UD3  Z170 Int.  Dual DDR4-2133  14-14-14-35 CR2
4368 MB/s
6x Core i7-4930K HT  3400 MHz  Gigabyte GA-X79-UD3  X79  Quad DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
4103 MB/s
8x FX-8350  4000 MHz  Asus M5A99X Evo R2.0  AMD990X  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
3924 MB/s
6x Core i7-3960X Extreme HT  3300 MHz  Intel DX79SI  X79  Quad DDR3-1600  9-9-9-24 CR2
3911 MB/s
4x Core i7-5775C HT  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-Z97MX-Gaming 5  Z97 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
3790 MB/s
4x Core i7-4770 HT  3400 MHz  Intel DZ87KLT-75K  Z87 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  9-9-9-27 CR2
3682 MB/s
4x Xeon E3-1245 v3 HT  3400 MHz  Supermicro X10SAE  C226 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
3670 MB/s
8x FX-8150  3600 MHz  Asus M5A97  AMD970  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
3605 MB/s
8x Xeon E5462  2800 MHz  Intel S5400SF  i5400  Quad DDR2-640FB  5-5-5-15
3304 MB/s
6x Phenom II X6 Black 1100T  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-890GPA-UD3H v2  AMD890GX Int.  Unganged Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR2
3188 MB/s
8x Opteron 2378  2400 MHz  Tyan Thunder n3600R  nForcePro-3600  Unganged Quad DDR2-800R  6-6-6-18 CR1
3136 MB/s
6x Core i7-990X Extreme HT  3466 MHz  Intel DX58SO2  X58  Triple DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
3095 MB/s
8x Xeon X5550 HT  2666 MHz  Supermicro X8DTN+  i5520  Hexa DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
2992 MB/s
4x Core i7-3770K HT  3500 MHz  MSI Z77A-GD55  Z77 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  9-9-9-24 CR2
2620 MB/s
4x A10-7850K  3700 MHz  Gigabyte GA-F2A88XM-D3H  A88X Int.  Dual DDR3-2133  9-11-10-31 CR2
2544 MB/s
4x Core i7-2600 HT  3400 MHz  Asus P8P67  P67  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
2460 MB/s
6x FX-6100  3300 MHz  Asus Sabertooth 990FX  AMD990FX  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
2345 MB/s
8x Xeon L5320  1866 MHz  Intel S5000VCL  i5000V  Dual DDR2-533FB  4-4-4-12
2243 MB/s
8x Opteron 2344 HE  1700 MHz  Supermicro H8DME-2  nForcePro-3600  Unganged Quad DDR2-667R  5-5-5-15 CR1
2165 MB/s
4x A10-6800K  4100 MHz  Gigabyte GA-F2A85X-UP4  A85X Int.  Dual DDR3-2133  9-11-10-27 CR2
1989 MB/s
4x Phenom II X4 Black 940  3000 MHz  Asus M3N78-EM  GeForce8300 Int.  Ganged Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
1988 MB/s
4x A10-5800K  3800 MHz  Asus F2A55-M  A55 Int.  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
1965 MB/s
8x Atom C2750  2400 MHz  Supermicro A1SAi-2750F  Avoton  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
1943 MB/s
4x Core 2 Extreme QX9650  3000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-EP35C-DS3R  P35  Dual DDR3-1066  8-8-8-20 CR2
1924 MB/s
4x Core i7-965 Extreme HT  3200 MHz  Asus P6T Deluxe  X58  Triple DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
1914 MB/s
4x A8-3850  2900 MHz  Gigabyte GA-A75M-UD2H  A75 Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
1680 MB/s
4x Core 2 Extreme QX6700  2666 MHz  Intel D975XBX2  i975X  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
1656 MB/s
4x Xeon X3430  2400 MHz  Supermicro X8SIL-F  i3420  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
1464 MB/s
4x Xeon 5140  2333 MHz  Intel S5000VSA  i5000V  Dual DDR2-667FB  5-5-5-15
1441 MB/s
4x Phenom X4 9500  2200 MHz  Asus M3A  AMD770  Ganged Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
1101 MB/s
4x Opteron 2210 HE  1800 MHz  Tyan Thunder h2000M  BCM5785  Quad DDR2-600R  5-5-5-15 CR1
999 MB/s
4x Athlon 5350  2050 MHz  ASRock AM1B-ITX  Yangtze Int.  DDR3-1600 SDRAM  11-11-11-28 CR2
980 MB/s
2x Athlon64 X2 Black 6400+  3200 MHz  MSI K9N SLI Platinum  nForce570SLI  Dual DDR2-800  4-4-4-11 CR1
976 MB/s
Nano X2 L4350  1600 MHz  VIA EPIA-M900  VX900H Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  7-7-7-20 CR2
969 MB/s
2x Core i5-650 HT  3200 MHz  Supermicro C7SIM-Q  Q57 Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
952 MB/s
2x Core i5-3317U HT  2400 MHz  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  HM76 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
925 MB/s
2x Core 2 Extreme X6800  2933 MHz  Abit AB9  P965  Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
912 MB/s
4x Celeron J1900  2000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-J1900N-D3V  BayTrailD Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
829 MB/s
2x Pentium EE 955 HT  3466 MHz  Intel D955XBK  i955X  Dual DDR2-667  4-4-4-11
809 MB/s
2x Xeon HT  3400 MHz  Intel SE7320SP2  iE7320  Dual DDR333R  2.5-3-3-7
787 MB/s
4x Celeron N3150  1600 MHz  ASRock N3150B-ITX  Braswell Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR2
730 MB/s
2x Core 2 Duo P8400  2266 MHz  MSI MegaBook PR201  GM45 Int.  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
638 MB/s
2x Athlon64 X2 4000+  2100 MHz  ASRock ALiveNF7G-HDready  nForce7050-630a Int.  Dual DDR2-700  5-5-5-18 CR2
549 MB/s
2x Pentium D 820  2800 MHz  Abit Fatal1ty F-I90HD  RS600 Int.  Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
493 MB/s
Nano L2200  1600 MHz  VIA VB8001  CN896 Int.  DDR2-667 SDRAM  5-5-5-15 CR2
443 MB/s
P4EE HT  3733 MHz  Intel SE7230NH1LX  iE7230  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
351 MB/s
2x Atom D2500  1866 MHz  Intel D2500CC  NM10 Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  7-7-7-20 CR2
335 MB/s
Opteron 248  2200 MHz  MSI K8T Master1-FAR  K8T800  Dual DDR266R  2-3-3-6 CR1
325 MB/s
2x E-350  1600 MHz  ASRock E350M1  A50M Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  8-8-8-20 CR1
306 MB/s
Athlon64 3200+  2000 MHz  ASRock 939S56-M  SiS756  Dual DDR400  2.5-3-3-8 CR2
251 MB/s
Celeron 420  1600 MHz  Intel DQ965GF  Q965 Int.  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
246 MB/s
Celeron D 326  2533 MHz  ASRock 775Twins-HDTV  RC410 Ext.  DDR2-533 SDRAM  4-4-4-11 CR2
245 MB/s
Sempron 2600+  1600 MHz  ASRock K8NF4G-SATA2  GeForce6100 Int.  DDR400 SDRAM  2.5-3-3-8 CR2
162 MB/s
Atom 230 HT  1600 MHz  Intel D945GCLF  i945GC Int.  DDR2-533 SDRAM  4-4-4-12


FPU VP8

 
CPU  CPU Clock  Motherboard  Chipset  Memory  CL-RCD-RP-RAS
7521
4x Core i7-6700K HT  4000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-Z170X-UD3  Z170 Int.  Dual DDR4-2133  14-14-14-35 CR2
6604
20x Xeon E5-2660 v3 HT  2600 MHz  Supermicro X10DRi  C612  Octal DDR4-1866  13-13-13-31 CR1
6551
6x Core i7-4930K HT  3400 MHz  Gigabyte GA-X79-UD3  X79  Quad DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
6436
6x Core i7-5820K HT  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-X99-UD4  X99  Quad DDR4-2133  15-15-15-36 CR2
6360
4x Core i7-5775C HT  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-Z97MX-Gaming 5  Z97 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
6351
4x Core i7-4770 HT  3400 MHz  Intel DZ87KLT-75K  Z87 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  9-9-9-27 CR2
6280
4x Xeon E3-1245 v3 HT  3400 MHz  Supermicro X10SAE  C226 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
6215
6x Core i7-3960X Extreme HT  3300 MHz  Intel DX79SI  X79  Quad DDR3-1600  9-9-9-24 CR2
6128
4x Core i7-3770K HT  3500 MHz  MSI Z77A-GD55  Z77 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  9-9-9-24 CR2
5864
16x Xeon E5-2670 HT  2600 MHz  Supermicro X9DR6-F  C600  Octal DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
5653
4x Core i7-2600 HT  3400 MHz  Asus P8P67  P67  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
5435
6x Core i7-990X Extreme HT  3466 MHz  Intel DX58SO2  X58  Triple DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
5044
8x Xeon E5462  2800 MHz  Intel S5400SF  i5400  Quad DDR2-640FB  5-5-5-15
4730
4x Core i7-965 Extreme HT  3200 MHz  Asus P6T Deluxe  X58  Triple DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
4721
8x FX-8350  4000 MHz  Asus M5A99X Evo R2.0  AMD990X  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
4523
6x Phenom II X6 Black 1100T  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-890GPA-UD3H v2  AMD890GX Int.  Unganged Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR2
4513
8x Xeon X5550 HT  2666 MHz  Supermicro X8DTN+  i5520  Hexa DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
3990
4x Xeon X3430  2400 MHz  Supermicro X8SIL-F  i3420  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
3902
12x Opteron 2431  2400 MHz  Supermicro H8DI3+-F  SR5690  Unganged Quad DDR2-800R  6-6-6-18 CR1
3889
4x A10-7850K  3700 MHz  Gigabyte GA-F2A88XM-D3H  A88X Int.  Dual DDR3-2133  9-11-10-31 CR2
3838
8x FX-8150  3600 MHz  Asus M5A97  AMD970  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
3741
4x Core 2 Extreme QX9650  3000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-EP35C-DS3R  P35  Dual DDR3-1066  8-8-8-20 CR2
3665
8x Opteron 2378  2400 MHz  Tyan Thunder n3600R  nForcePro-3600  Unganged Quad DDR2-800R  6-6-6-18 CR1
3447
4x A10-6800K  4100 MHz  Gigabyte GA-F2A85X-UP4  A85X Int.  Dual DDR3-2133  9-11-10-27 CR2
3344
6x FX-6100  3300 MHz  Asus Sabertooth 990FX  AMD990FX  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
3275
4x A10-5800K  3800 MHz  Asus F2A55-M  A55 Int.  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
3275
4x Phenom II X4 Black 940  3000 MHz  Asus M3N78-EM  GeForce8300 Int.  Ganged Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
3233
2x Core i5-650 HT  3200 MHz  Supermicro C7SIM-Q  Q57 Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
3192
8x Atom C2750  2400 MHz  Supermicro A1SAi-2750F  Avoton  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
3161
4x A8-3850  2900 MHz  Gigabyte GA-A75M-UD2H  A75 Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
3139
32x Opteron 6274  2200 MHz  Supermicro H8DGI-F  SR5690  Octal DDR3-1600R  11-11-11-28 CR1
2703
2x Core i5-3317U HT  2400 MHz  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  HM76 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
2693
4x Core 2 Extreme QX6700  2666 MHz  Intel D975XBX2  i975X  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
2497
8x Xeon L5320  1866 MHz  Intel S5000VCL  i5000V  Dual DDR2-533FB  4-4-4-12
2475
8x Opteron 2344 HE  1700 MHz  Supermicro H8DME-2  nForcePro-3600  Unganged Quad DDR2-667R  5-5-5-15 CR1
2394
4x Phenom X4 9500  2200 MHz  Asus M3A  AMD770  Ganged Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
2348
4x Athlon 5350  2050 MHz  ASRock AM1B-ITX  Yangtze Int.  DDR3-1600 SDRAM  11-11-11-28 CR2
2314
4x Xeon 5140  2333 MHz  Intel S5000VSA  i5000V  Dual DDR2-667FB  5-5-5-15
2015
4x Celeron J1900  2000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-J1900N-D3V  BayTrailD Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
1854
4x Celeron N3150  1600 MHz  ASRock N3150B-ITX  Braswell Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR2
1814
2x Athlon64 X2 Black 6400+  3200 MHz  MSI K9N SLI Platinum  nForce570SLI  Dual DDR2-800  4-4-4-11 CR1
1793
2x Core 2 Extreme X6800  2933 MHz  Abit AB9  P965  Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
1760
2x Core 2 Duo P8400  2266 MHz  MSI MegaBook PR201  GM45 Int.  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
1693
4x Opteron 2210 HE  1800 MHz  Tyan Thunder h2000M  BCM5785  Quad DDR2-600R  5-5-5-15 CR1
1351
2x Athlon64 X2 4000+  2100 MHz  ASRock ALiveNF7G-HDready  nForce7050-630a Int.  Dual DDR2-700  5-5-5-18 CR2
1160
2x Pentium EE 955 HT  3466 MHz  Intel D955XBK  i955X  Dual DDR2-667  4-4-4-11
1135
2x Xeon HT  3400 MHz  Intel SE7320SP2  iE7320  Dual DDR333R  2.5-3-3-7
1125
Nano X2 L4350  1600 MHz  VIA EPIA-M900  VX900H Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  7-7-7-20 CR2
1055
2x Pentium D 820  2800 MHz  Abit Fatal1ty F-I90HD  RS600 Int.  Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
952
P4EE HT  3733 MHz  Intel SE7230NH1LX  iE7230  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
837
2x E-350  1600 MHz  ASRock E350M1  A50M Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  8-8-8-20 CR1
805
Athlon64 3200+  2000 MHz  ASRock 939S56-M  SiS756  Dual DDR400  2.5-3-3-8 CR2
783
2x Atom D2500  1866 MHz  Intel D2500CC  NM10 Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  7-7-7-20 CR2
685
Celeron 420  1600 MHz  Intel DQ965GF  Q965 Int.  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
663
Sempron 2600+  1600 MHz  ASRock K8NF4G-SATA2  GeForce6100 Int.  DDR400 SDRAM  2.5-3-3-8 CR2
617
Opteron 248  2200 MHz  MSI K8T Master1-FAR  K8T800  Dual DDR266R  2-3-3-6 CR1
581
Celeron D 326  2533 MHz  ASRock 775Twins-HDTV  RC410 Ext.  DDR2-533 SDRAM  4-4-4-11 CR2
508
Atom 230 HT  1600 MHz  Intel D945GCLF  i945GC Int.  DDR2-533 SDRAM  4-4-4-12
490
Nano L2200  1600 MHz  VIA VB8001  CN896 Int.  DDR2-667 SDRAM  5-5-5-15 CR2


FPU Julia

 
CPU  CPU Clock  Motherboard  Chipset  Memory  CL-RCD-RP-RAS
111155
20x Xeon E5-2660 v3 HT  2600 MHz  Supermicro X10DRi  C612  Octal DDR4-1866  13-13-13-31 CR1
62494
16x Xeon E5-2670 HT  2600 MHz  Supermicro X9DR6-F  C600  Octal DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
40351
6x Core i7-5820K HT  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-X99-UD4  X99  Quad DDR4-2133  15-15-15-36 CR2
34006
4x Core i7-6700K HT  4000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-Z170X-UD3  Z170 Int.  Dual DDR4-2133  14-14-14-35 CR2
30205
32x Opteron 6274  2200 MHz  Supermicro H8DGI-F  SR5690  Octal DDR3-1600R  11-11-11-28 CR1
28484
6x Core i7-4930K HT  3400 MHz  Gigabyte GA-X79-UD3  X79  Quad DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
26896
6x Core i7-3960X Extreme HT  3300 MHz  Intel DX79SI  X79  Quad DDR3-1600  9-9-9-24 CR2
26854
4x Core i7-4770 HT  3400 MHz  Intel DZ87KLT-75K  Z87 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  9-9-9-27 CR2
26835
4x Xeon E3-1245 v3 HT  3400 MHz  Supermicro X10SAE  C226 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
24776
4x Core i7-5775C HT  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-Z97MX-Gaming 5  Z97 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
19518
4x Core i7-3770K HT  3500 MHz  MSI Z77A-GD55  Z77 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  9-9-9-24 CR2
18483
4x Core i7-2600 HT  3400 MHz  Asus P8P67  P67  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
18309
12x Opteron 2431  2400 MHz  Supermicro H8DI3+-F  SR5690  Unganged Quad DDR2-800R  6-6-6-18 CR1
17996
6x Core i7-990X Extreme HT  3466 MHz  Intel DX58SO2  X58  Triple DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
17672
8x Xeon X5550 HT  2666 MHz  Supermicro X8DTN+  i5520  Hexa DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
15295
8x Xeon E5462  2800 MHz  Intel S5400SF  i5400  Quad DDR2-640FB  5-5-5-15
13502
8x FX-8350  4000 MHz  Asus M5A99X Evo R2.0  AMD990X  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
12636
6x Phenom II X6 Black 1100T  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-890GPA-UD3H v2  AMD890GX Int.  Unganged Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR2
12207
8x Opteron 2378  2400 MHz  Tyan Thunder n3600R  nForcePro-3600  Unganged Quad DDR2-800R  6-6-6-18 CR1
11909
8x FX-8150  3600 MHz  Asus M5A97  AMD970  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
11059
4x Core i7-965 Extreme HT  3200 MHz  Asus P6T Deluxe  X58  Triple DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
8959
8x Xeon L5320  1866 MHz  Intel S5000VCL  i5000V  Dual DDR2-533FB  4-4-4-12
8747
8x Atom C2750  2400 MHz  Supermicro A1SAi-2750F  Avoton  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
8686
8x Opteron 2344 HE  1700 MHz  Supermicro H8DME-2  nForcePro-3600  Unganged Quad DDR2-667R  5-5-5-15 CR1
8202
4x Core 2 Extreme QX9650  3000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-EP35C-DS3R  P35  Dual DDR3-1066  8-8-8-20 CR2
8070
4x Xeon X3430  2400 MHz  Supermicro X8SIL-F  i3420  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
7960
6x FX-6100  3300 MHz  Asus Sabertooth 990FX  AMD990FX  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
7606
4x Phenom II X4 Black 940  3000 MHz  Asus M3N78-EM  GeForce8300 Int.  Ganged Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
7434
4x A8-3850  2900 MHz  Gigabyte GA-A75M-UD2H  A75 Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
7008
4x A10-6800K  4100 MHz  Gigabyte GA-F2A85X-UP4  A85X Int.  Dual DDR3-2133  9-11-10-27 CR2
6466
4x A10-5800K  3800 MHz  Asus F2A55-M  A55 Int.  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
6408
4x Core 2 Extreme QX6700  2666 MHz  Intel D975XBX2  i975X  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
6246
2x Core i5-3317U HT  2400 MHz  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  HM76 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
6224
4x A10-7850K  3700 MHz  Gigabyte GA-F2A88XM-D3H  A88X Int.  Dual DDR3-2133  9-11-10-31 CR2
5589
4x Xeon 5140  2333 MHz  Intel S5000VSA  i5000V  Dual DDR2-667FB  5-5-5-15
5579
4x Phenom X4 9500  2200 MHz  Asus M3A  AMD770  Ganged Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
5551
2x Core i5-650 HT  3200 MHz  Supermicro C7SIM-Q  Q57 Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
5236
4x Athlon 5350  2050 MHz  ASRock AM1B-ITX  Yangtze Int.  DDR3-1600 SDRAM  11-11-11-28 CR2
4058
4x Celeron J1900  2000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-J1900N-D3V  BayTrailD Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
3533
2x Core 2 Extreme X6800  2933 MHz  Abit AB9  P965  Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
3496
4x Celeron N3150  1600 MHz  ASRock N3150B-ITX  Braswell Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR2
3080
2x Core 2 Duo P8400  2266 MHz  MSI MegaBook PR201  GM45 Int.  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
2442
2x Pentium EE 955 HT  3466 MHz  Intel D955XBK  i955X  Dual DDR2-667  4-4-4-11
2392
2x Xeon HT  3400 MHz  Intel SE7320SP2  iE7320  Dual DDR333R  2.5-3-3-7
2308
4x Opteron 2210 HE  1800 MHz  Tyan Thunder h2000M  BCM5785  Quad DDR2-600R  5-5-5-15 CR1
2053
2x Athlon64 X2 Black 6400+  3200 MHz  MSI K9N SLI Platinum  nForce570SLI  Dual DDR2-800  4-4-4-11 CR1
1988
2x Pentium D 820  2800 MHz  Abit Fatal1ty F-I90HD  RS600 Int.  Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
1865
Nano X2 L4350  1600 MHz  VIA EPIA-M900  VX900H Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  7-7-7-20 CR2
1338
2x Athlon64 X2 4000+  2100 MHz  ASRock ALiveNF7G-HDready  nForce7050-630a Int.  Dual DDR2-700  5-5-5-18 CR2
1307
P4EE HT  3733 MHz  Intel SE7230NH1LX  iE7230  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
1118
2x Atom D2500  1866 MHz  Intel D2500CC  NM10 Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  7-7-7-20 CR2
959
Celeron 420  1600 MHz  Intel DQ965GF  Q965 Int.  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
914
2x E-350  1600 MHz  ASRock E350M1  A50M Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  8-8-8-20 CR1
893
Celeron D 326  2533 MHz  ASRock 775Twins-HDTV  RC410 Ext.  DDR2-533 SDRAM  4-4-4-11 CR2
796
Nano L2200  1600 MHz  VIA VB8001  CN896 Int.  DDR2-667 SDRAM  5-5-5-15 CR2
702
Opteron 248  2200 MHz  MSI K8T Master1-FAR  K8T800  Dual DDR266R  2-3-3-6 CR1
641
Athlon64 3200+  2000 MHz  ASRock 939S56-M  SiS756  Dual DDR400  2.5-3-3-8 CR2
589
Atom 230 HT  1600 MHz  Intel D945GCLF  i945GC Int.  DDR2-533 SDRAM  4-4-4-12
513
Sempron 2600+  1600 MHz  ASRock K8NF4G-SATA2  GeForce6100 Int.  DDR400 SDRAM  2.5-3-3-8 CR2


FPU Mandel

 
CPU  CPU Clock  Motherboard  Chipset  Memory  CL-RCD-RP-RAS
54582
20x Xeon E5-2660 v3 HT  2600 MHz  Supermicro X10DRi  C612  Octal DDR4-1866  13-13-13-31 CR1
32982
16x Xeon E5-2670 HT  2600 MHz  Supermicro X9DR6-F  C600  Octal DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
21651
6x Core i7-5820K HT  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-X99-UD4  X99  Quad DDR4-2133  15-15-15-36 CR2
18304
4x Core i7-6700K HT  4000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-Z170X-UD3  Z170 Int.  Dual DDR4-2133  14-14-14-35 CR2
15406
32x Opteron 6274  2200 MHz  Supermicro H8DGI-F  SR5690  Octal DDR3-1600R  11-11-11-28 CR1
15095
6x Core i7-4930K HT  3400 MHz  Gigabyte GA-X79-UD3  X79  Quad DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
14431
4x Core i7-4770 HT  3400 MHz  Intel DZ87KLT-75K  Z87 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  9-9-9-27 CR2
14418
4x Xeon E3-1245 v3 HT  3400 MHz  Supermicro X10SAE  C226 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
14257
6x Core i7-3960X Extreme HT  3300 MHz  Intel DX79SI  X79  Quad DDR3-1600  9-9-9-24 CR2
12509
4x Core i7-5775C HT  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-Z97MX-Gaming 5  Z97 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
10343
4x Core i7-3770K HT  3500 MHz  MSI Z77A-GD55  Z77 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  9-9-9-24 CR2
9788
4x Core i7-2600 HT  3400 MHz  Asus P8P67  P67  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
9319
12x Opteron 2431  2400 MHz  Supermicro H8DI3+-F  SR5690  Unganged Quad DDR2-800R  6-6-6-18 CR1
8672
6x Core i7-990X Extreme HT  3466 MHz  Intel DX58SO2  X58  Triple DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
8613
8x Xeon X5550 HT  2666 MHz  Supermicro X8DTN+  i5520  Hexa DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
8068
8x Xeon E5462  2800 MHz  Intel S5400SF  i5400  Quad DDR2-640FB  5-5-5-15
6910
8x FX-8350  4000 MHz  Asus M5A99X Evo R2.0  AMD990X  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
6434
6x Phenom II X6 Black 1100T  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-890GPA-UD3H v2  AMD890GX Int.  Unganged Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR2
6212
8x Opteron 2378  2400 MHz  Tyan Thunder n3600R  nForcePro-3600  Unganged Quad DDR2-800R  6-6-6-18 CR1
6085
8x FX-8150  3600 MHz  Asus M5A97  AMD970  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
5363
4x Core i7-965 Extreme HT  3200 MHz  Asus P6T Deluxe  X58  Triple DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
4625
8x Xeon L5320  1866 MHz  Intel S5000VCL  i5000V  Dual DDR2-533FB  4-4-4-12
4419
8x Opteron 2344 HE  1700 MHz  Supermicro H8DME-2  nForcePro-3600  Unganged Quad DDR2-667R  5-5-5-15 CR1
4335
4x Core 2 Extreme QX9650  3000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-EP35C-DS3R  P35  Dual DDR3-1066  8-8-8-20 CR2
4180
4x Xeon X3430  2400 MHz  Supermicro X8SIL-F  i3420  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
4072
6x FX-6100  3300 MHz  Asus Sabertooth 990FX  AMD990FX  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
3973
4x A8-3850  2900 MHz  Gigabyte GA-A75M-UD2H  A75 Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
3874
4x Phenom II X4 Black 940  3000 MHz  Asus M3N78-EM  GeForce8300 Int.  Ganged Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
3455
4x A10-6800K  4100 MHz  Gigabyte GA-F2A85X-UP4  A85X Int.  Dual DDR3-2133  9-11-10-27 CR2
3314
4x Core 2 Extreme QX6700  2666 MHz  Intel D975XBX2  i975X  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
3309
2x Core i5-3317U HT  2600 MHz  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  HM76 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
3156
4x A10-7850K  3700 MHz  Gigabyte GA-F2A88XM-D3H  A88X Int.  Dual DDR3-2133  9-11-10-31 CR2
3119
4x A10-5800K  3800 MHz  Asus F2A55-M  A55 Int.  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
2982
8x Atom C2750  2400 MHz  Supermicro A1SAi-2750F  Avoton  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
2889
4x Xeon 5140  2333 MHz  Intel S5000VSA  i5000V  Dual DDR2-667FB  5-5-5-15
2840
4x Phenom X4 9500  2200 MHz  Asus M3A  AMD770  Ganged Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
2675
2x Core i5-650 HT  3200 MHz  Supermicro C7SIM-Q  Q57 Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
2336
4x Athlon 5350  2050 MHz  ASRock AM1B-ITX  Yangtze Int.  DDR3-1600 SDRAM  11-11-11-28 CR2
1823
2x Core 2 Extreme X6800  2933 MHz  Abit AB9  P965  Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
1626
2x Core 2 Duo P8400  2266 MHz  MSI MegaBook PR201  GM45 Int.  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
1482
2x Pentium EE 955 HT  3466 MHz  Intel D955XBK  i955X  Dual DDR2-667  4-4-4-11
1449
2x Xeon HT  3400 MHz  Intel SE7320SP2  iE7320  Dual DDR333R  2.5-3-3-7
1383
4x Celeron J1900  2000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-J1900N-D3V  BayTrailD Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
1192
4x Celeron N3150  1600 MHz  ASRock N3150B-ITX  Braswell Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR2
1182
4x Opteron 2210 HE  1800 MHz  Tyan Thunder h2000M  BCM5785  Quad DDR2-600R  5-5-5-15 CR1
1061
2x Pentium D 820  2800 MHz  Abit Fatal1ty F-I90HD  RS600 Int.  Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
1051
2x Athlon64 X2 Black 6400+  3200 MHz  MSI K9N SLI Platinum  nForce570SLI  Dual DDR2-800  4-4-4-11 CR1
856
Nano X2 L4350  1600 MHz  VIA EPIA-M900  VX900H Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  7-7-7-20 CR2
795
P4EE HT  3733 MHz  Intel SE7230NH1LX  iE7230  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
685
2x Athlon64 X2 4000+  2100 MHz  ASRock ALiveNF7G-HDready  nForce7050-630a Int.  Dual DDR2-700  5-5-5-18 CR2
494
Celeron 420  1600 MHz  Intel DQ965GF  Q965 Int.  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
476
Celeron D 326  2533 MHz  ASRock 775Twins-HDTV  RC410 Ext.  DDR2-533 SDRAM  4-4-4-11 CR2
427
2x E-350  1600 MHz  ASRock E350M1  A50M Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  8-8-8-20 CR1
407
Nano L2200  1600 MHz  VIA VB8001  CN896 Int.  DDR2-667 SDRAM  5-5-5-15 CR2
401
2x Atom D2500  1866 MHz  Intel D2500CC  NM10 Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  7-7-7-20 CR2
360
Opteron 248  2200 MHz  MSI K8T Master1-FAR  K8T800  Dual DDR266R  2-3-3-6 CR1
328
Athlon64 3200+  2000 MHz  ASRock 939S56-M  SiS756  Dual DDR400  2.5-3-3-8 CR2
263
Sempron 2600+  1600 MHz  ASRock K8NF4G-SATA2  GeForce6100 Int.  DDR400 SDRAM  2.5-3-3-8 CR2
193
Atom 230 HT  1600 MHz  Intel D945GCLF  i945GC Int.  DDR2-533 SDRAM  4-4-4-12


FPU SinJulia

 
CPU  CPU Clock  Motherboard  Chipset  Memory  CL-RCD-RP-RAS
18481
20x Xeon E5-2660 v3 HT  2600 MHz  Supermicro X10DRi  C612  Octal DDR4-1866  13-13-13-31 CR1
16035
16x Xeon E5-2670 HT  2600 MHz  Supermicro X9DR6-F  C600  Octal DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
7473
6x Core i7-990X Extreme HT  3466 MHz  Intel DX58SO2  X58  Triple DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
7275
6x Core i7-4930K HT  3400 MHz  Gigabyte GA-X79-UD3  X79  Quad DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
7214
6x Core i7-3960X Extreme HT  3300 MHz  Intel DX79SI  X79  Quad DDR3-1600  9-9-9-24 CR2
6993
8x Xeon X5550 HT  2666 MHz  Supermicro X8DTN+  i5520  Hexa DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
6821
32x Opteron 6274  2200 MHz  Supermicro H8DGI-F  SR5690  Octal DDR3-1600R  11-11-11-28 CR1
6513
6x Core i7-5820K HT  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-X99-UD4  X99  Quad DDR4-2133  15-15-15-36 CR2
4984
4x Core i7-3770K HT  3500 MHz  MSI Z77A-GD55  Z77 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  9-9-9-24 CR2
4825
4x Core i7-6700K HT  4000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-Z170X-UD3  Z170 Int.  Dual DDR4-2133  14-14-14-35 CR2
4720
4x Core i7-4770 HT  3400 MHz  Intel DZ87KLT-75K  Z87 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  9-9-9-27 CR2
4677
4x Core i7-2600 HT  3400 MHz  Asus P8P67  P67  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
4658
12x Opteron 2431  2400 MHz  Supermicro H8DI3+-F  SR5690  Unganged Quad DDR2-800R  6-6-6-18 CR1
4624
4x Core i7-5775C HT  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-Z97MX-Gaming 5  Z97 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
4588
4x Xeon E3-1245 v3 HT  3400 MHz  Supermicro X10SAE  C226 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
4561
4x Core i7-965 Extreme HT  3200 MHz  Asus P6T Deluxe  X58  Triple DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
4138
8x Xeon E5462  2800 MHz  Intel S5400SF  i5400  Quad DDR2-640FB  5-5-5-15
3213
6x Phenom II X6 Black 1100T  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-890GPA-UD3H v2  AMD890GX Int.  Unganged Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR2
3100
8x Opteron 2378  2400 MHz  Tyan Thunder n3600R  nForcePro-3600  Unganged Quad DDR2-800R  6-6-6-18 CR1
2832
8x FX-8350  4000 MHz  Asus M5A99X Evo R2.0  AMD990X  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
2644
8x FX-8150  3600 MHz  Asus M5A97  AMD970  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
2590
8x Xeon L5320  1866 MHz  Intel S5000VCL  i5000V  Dual DDR2-533FB  4-4-4-12
2305
2x Core i5-650 HT  3200 MHz  Supermicro C7SIM-Q  Q57 Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
2266
4x Xeon X3430  2400 MHz  Supermicro X8SIL-F  i3420  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
2222
4x Core 2 Extreme QX9650  3000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-EP35C-DS3R  P35  Dual DDR3-1066  8-8-8-20 CR2
2211
8x Opteron 2344 HE  1700 MHz  Supermicro H8DME-2  nForcePro-3600  Unganged Quad DDR2-667R  5-5-5-15 CR1
2042
8x Atom C2750  2400 MHz  Supermicro A1SAi-2750F  Avoton  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
1934
4x Phenom II X4 Black 940  3000 MHz  Asus M3N78-EM  GeForce8300 Int.  Ganged Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
1872
4x A8-3850  2900 MHz  Gigabyte GA-A75M-UD2H  A75 Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
1856
4x Core 2 Extreme QX6700  2666 MHz  Intel D975XBX2  i975X  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
1740
6x FX-6100  3300 MHz  Asus Sabertooth 990FX  AMD990FX  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
1618
4x Xeon 5140  2333 MHz  Intel S5000VSA  i5000V  Dual DDR2-667FB  5-5-5-15
1581
2x Core i5-3317U HT  2600 MHz  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  HM76 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
1483
4x A10-7850K  3700 MHz  Gigabyte GA-F2A88XM-D3H  A88X Int.  Dual DDR3-2133  9-11-10-31 CR2
1479
4x A10-6800K  4100 MHz  Gigabyte GA-F2A85X-UP4  A85X Int.  Dual DDR3-2133  9-11-10-27 CR2
1421
4x Phenom X4 9500  2200 MHz  Asus M3A  AMD770  Ganged Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
1376
4x A10-5800K  3800 MHz  Asus F2A55-M  A55 Int.  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
1260
4x Athlon 5350  2050 MHz  ASRock AM1B-ITX  Yangtze Int.  DDR3-1600 SDRAM  11-11-11-28 CR2
1178
4x Opteron 2210 HE  1800 MHz  Tyan Thunder h2000M  BCM5785  Quad DDR2-600R  5-5-5-15 CR1
1049
2x Athlon64 X2 Black 6400+  3200 MHz  MSI K9N SLI Platinum  nForce570SLI  Dual DDR2-800  4-4-4-11 CR1
1021
2x Core 2 Extreme X6800  2933 MHz  Abit AB9  P965  Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
959
2x Pentium EE 955 HT  3466 MHz  Intel D955XBK  i955X  Dual DDR2-667  4-4-4-11
948
4x Celeron J1900  2000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-J1900N-D3V  BayTrailD Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
942
2x Xeon HT  3400 MHz  Intel SE7320SP2  iE7320  Dual DDR333R  2.5-3-3-7
834
2x Core 2 Duo P8400  2266 MHz  MSI MegaBook PR201  GM45 Int.  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
812
4x Celeron N3150  1600 MHz  ASRock N3150B-ITX  Braswell Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR2
683
2x Athlon64 X2 4000+  2100 MHz  ASRock ALiveNF7G-HDready  nForce7050-630a Int.  Dual DDR2-700  5-5-5-18 CR2
516
P4EE HT  3733 MHz  Intel SE7230NH1LX  iE7230  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
506
2x E-350  1600 MHz  ASRock E350M1  A50M Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  8-8-8-20 CR1
452
2x Pentium D 820  2800 MHz  Abit Fatal1ty F-I90HD  RS600 Int.  Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
359
Opteron 248  2200 MHz  MSI K8T Master1-FAR  K8T800  Dual DDR266R  2-3-3-6 CR1
327
Athlon64 3200+  2000 MHz  ASRock 939S56-M  SiS756  Dual DDR400  2.5-3-3-8 CR2
285
Nano X2 L4350  1600 MHz  VIA EPIA-M900  VX900H Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  7-7-7-20 CR2
277
Celeron 420  1600 MHz  Intel DQ965GF  Q965 Int.  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
262
Sempron 2600+  1600 MHz  ASRock K8NF4G-SATA2  GeForce6100 Int.  DDR400 SDRAM  2.5-3-3-8 CR2
262
2x Atom D2500  1866 MHz  Intel D2500CC  NM10 Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  7-7-7-20 CR2
205
Atom 230 HT  1600 MHz  Intel D945GCLF  i945GC Int.  DDR2-533 SDRAM  4-4-4-12
203
Celeron D 326  2533 MHz  ASRock 775Twins-HDTV  RC410 Ext.  DDR2-533 SDRAM  4-4-4-11 CR2
132
Nano L2200  1600 MHz  VIA VB8001  CN896 Int.  DDR2-667 SDRAM  5-5-5-15 CR2


FP32 Ray-Trace

 
CPU  CPU Clock  Motherboard  Chipset  Memory  CL-RCD-RP-RAS
18436 KRay/s
20x Xeon E5-2660 v3 HT  2600 MHz  Supermicro X10DRi  C612  Octal DDR4-1866  13-13-13-31 CR1
11357 KRay/s
16x Xeon E5-2670 HT  2600 MHz  Supermicro X9DR6-F  C600  Octal DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
7300 KRay/s
6x Core i7-5820K HT  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-X99-UD4  X99  Quad DDR4-2133  15-15-15-36 CR2
7269 KRay/s
4x Core i7-6700K HT  4000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-Z170X-UD3  Z170 Int.  Dual DDR4-2133  14-14-14-35 CR2
5991 KRay/s
32x Opteron 6274  2200 MHz  Supermicro H8DGI-F  SR5690  Octal DDR3-1600R  11-11-11-28 CR1
5198 KRay/s
6x Core i7-4930K HT  3400 MHz  Gigabyte GA-X79-UD3  X79  Quad DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
4853 KRay/s
4x Core i7-4770 HT  3400 MHz  Intel DZ87KLT-75K  Z87 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  9-9-9-27 CR2
4852 KRay/s
6x Core i7-3960X Extreme HT  3300 MHz  Intel DX79SI  X79  Quad DDR3-1600  9-9-9-24 CR2
4847 KRay/s
4x Xeon E3-1245 v3 HT  3400 MHz  Supermicro X10SAE  C226 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
4803 KRay/s
4x Core i7-5775C HT  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-Z97MX-Gaming 5  Z97 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
3562 KRay/s
4x Core i7-3770K HT  3500 MHz  MSI Z77A-GD55  Z77 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  9-9-9-24 CR2
3361 KRay/s
4x Core i7-2600 HT  3400 MHz  Asus P8P67  P67  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
2868 KRay/s
12x Opteron 2431  2400 MHz  Supermicro H8DI3+-F  SR5690  Unganged Quad DDR2-800R  6-6-6-18 CR1
2654 KRay/s
6x Core i7-990X Extreme HT  3466 MHz  Intel DX58SO2  X58  Triple DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
2580 KRay/s
8x FX-8350  4000 MHz  Asus M5A99X Evo R2.0  AMD990X  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
2558 KRay/s
8x Xeon X5550 HT  2666 MHz  Supermicro X8DTN+  i5520  Hexa DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
2553 KRay/s
8x FX-8150  3600 MHz  Asus M5A97  AMD970  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
2187 KRay/s
8x Xeon E5462  2800 MHz  Intel S5400SF  i5400  Quad DDR2-640FB  5-5-5-15
1982 KRay/s
6x Phenom II X6 Black 1100T  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-890GPA-UD3H v2  AMD890GX Int.  Unganged Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR2
1911 KRay/s
8x Opteron 2378  2400 MHz  Tyan Thunder n3600R  nForcePro-3600  Unganged Quad DDR2-800R  6-6-6-18 CR1
1645 KRay/s
6x FX-6100  3300 MHz  Asus Sabertooth 990FX  AMD990FX  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
1616 KRay/s
4x Core i7-965 Extreme HT  3200 MHz  Asus P6T Deluxe  X58  Triple DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
1377 KRay/s
4x A10-7850K  3700 MHz  Gigabyte GA-F2A88XM-D3H  A88X Int.  Dual DDR3-2133  9-11-10-31 CR2
1362 KRay/s
4x A10-6800K  4100 MHz  Gigabyte GA-F2A85X-UP4  A85X Int.  Dual DDR3-2133  9-11-10-27 CR2
1316 KRay/s
8x Xeon L5320  1866 MHz  Intel S5000VCL  i5000V  Dual DDR2-533FB  4-4-4-12
1230 KRay/s
4x A10-5800K  3800 MHz  Asus F2A55-M  A55 Int.  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
1215 KRay/s
8x Opteron 2344 HE  1700 MHz  Supermicro H8DME-2  nForcePro-3600  Unganged Quad DDR2-667R  5-5-5-15 CR1
1212 KRay/s
8x Atom C2750  2400 MHz  Supermicro A1SAi-2750F  Avoton  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
1179 KRay/s
4x Core 2 Extreme QX9650  3000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-EP35C-DS3R  P35  Dual DDR3-1066  8-8-8-20 CR2
1161 KRay/s
4x Phenom II X4 Black 940  3000 MHz  Asus M3N78-EM  GeForce8300 Int.  Ganged Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
1130 KRay/s
4x Xeon X3430  2400 MHz  Supermicro X8SIL-F  i3420  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
1106 KRay/s
2x Core i5-3317U HT  2400 MHz  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  HM76 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
1105 KRay/s
4x A8-3850  2900 MHz  Gigabyte GA-A75M-UD2H  A75 Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
977 KRay/s
4x Core 2 Extreme QX6700  2666 MHz  Intel D975XBX2  i975X  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
851 KRay/s
4x Xeon 5140  2333 MHz  Intel S5000VSA  i5000V  Dual DDR2-667FB  5-5-5-15
801 KRay/s
2x Core i5-650 HT  3200 MHz  Supermicro C7SIM-Q  Q57 Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
788 KRay/s
4x Phenom X4 9500  2200 MHz  Asus M3A  AMD770  Ganged Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
771 KRay/s
4x Athlon 5350  2050 MHz  ASRock AM1B-ITX  Yangtze Int.  DDR3-1600 SDRAM  11-11-11-28 CR2
573 KRay/s
4x Celeron J1900  2000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-J1900N-D3V  BayTrailD Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
526 KRay/s
2x Core 2 Extreme X6800  2933 MHz  Abit AB9  P965  Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
524 KRay/s
4x Celeron N3150  1600 MHz  ASRock N3150B-ITX  Braswell Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR2
452 KRay/s
2x Core 2 Duo P8400  2266 MHz  MSI MegaBook PR201  GM45 Int.  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
371 KRay/s
2x Pentium EE 955 HT  3466 MHz  Intel D955XBK  i955X  Dual DDR2-667  4-4-4-11
355 KRay/s
2x Xeon HT  3400 MHz  Intel SE7320SP2  iE7320  Dual DDR333R  2.5-3-3-7
319 KRay/s
4x Opteron 2210 HE  1800 MHz  Tyan Thunder h2000M  BCM5785  Quad DDR2-600R  5-5-5-15 CR1
299 KRay/s
2x Athlon64 X2 Black 6400+  3200 MHz  MSI K9N SLI Platinum  nForce570SLI  Dual DDR2-800  4-4-4-11 CR1
272 KRay/s
2x Pentium D 820  2800 MHz  Abit Fatal1ty F-I90HD  RS600 Int.  Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
268 KRay/s
Nano X2 L4350  1600 MHz  VIA EPIA-M900  VX900H Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  7-7-7-20 CR2
203 KRay/s
P4EE HT  3733 MHz  Intel SE7230NH1LX  iE7230  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
195 KRay/s
2x Athlon64 X2 4000+  2100 MHz  ASRock ALiveNF7G-HDready  nForce7050-630a Int.  Dual DDR2-700  5-5-5-18 CR2
165 KRay/s
2x Atom D2500  1866 MHz  Intel D2500CC  NM10 Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  7-7-7-20 CR2
144 KRay/s
Celeron 420  1600 MHz  Intel DQ965GF  Q965 Int.  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
130 KRay/s
2x E-350  1600 MHz  ASRock E350M1  A50M Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  8-8-8-20 CR1
123 KRay/s
Celeron D 326  2533 MHz  ASRock 775Twins-HDTV  RC410 Ext.  DDR2-533 SDRAM  4-4-4-11 CR2
117 KRay/s
Nano L2200  1600 MHz  VIA VB8001  CN896 Int.  DDR2-667 SDRAM  5-5-5-15 CR2
105 KRay/s
Opteron 248  2200 MHz  MSI K8T Master1-FAR  K8T800  Dual DDR266R  2-3-3-6 CR1
95 KRay/s
Atom 230 HT  1600 MHz  Intel D945GCLF  i945GC Int.  DDR2-533 SDRAM  4-4-4-12
92 KRay/s
Athlon64 3200+  2000 MHz  ASRock 939S56-M  SiS756  Dual DDR400  2.5-3-3-8 CR2
70 KRay/s
Sempron 2600+  1600 MHz  ASRock K8NF4G-SATA2  GeForce6100 Int.  DDR400 SDRAM  2.5-3-3-8 CR2


FP64 Ray-Trace

 
CPU  CPU Clock  Motherboard  Chipset  Memory  CL-RCD-RP-RAS
9946 KRay/s
20x Xeon E5-2660 v3 HT  2600 MHz  Supermicro X10DRi  C612  Octal DDR4-1866  13-13-13-31 CR1
5974 KRay/s
16x Xeon E5-2670 HT  2600 MHz  Supermicro X9DR6-F  C600  Octal DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
4067 KRay/s
6x Core i7-5820K HT  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-X99-UD4  X99  Quad DDR4-2133  15-15-15-36 CR2
4026 KRay/s
4x Core i7-6700K HT  4000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-Z170X-UD3  Z170 Int.  Dual DDR4-2133  14-14-14-35 CR2
3252 KRay/s
32x Opteron 6274  2200 MHz  Supermicro H8DGI-F  SR5690  Octal DDR3-1600R  11-11-11-28 CR1
2804 KRay/s
6x Core i7-4930K HT  3400 MHz  Gigabyte GA-X79-UD3  X79  Quad DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
2706 KRay/s
4x Core i7-4770 HT  3400 MHz  Intel DZ87KLT-75K  Z87 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  9-9-9-27 CR2
2704 KRay/s
4x Xeon E3-1245 v3 HT  3400 MHz  Supermicro X10SAE  C226 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
2636 KRay/s
6x Core i7-3960X Extreme HT  3300 MHz  Intel DX79SI  X79  Quad DDR3-1600  9-9-9-24 CR2
2627 KRay/s
4x Core i7-5775C HT  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-Z97MX-Gaming 5  Z97 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
1916 KRay/s
4x Core i7-3770K HT  3500 MHz  MSI Z77A-GD55  Z77 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  9-9-9-24 CR2
1815 KRay/s
4x Core i7-2600 HT  3400 MHz  Asus P8P67  P67  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
1560 KRay/s
12x Opteron 2431  2400 MHz  Supermicro H8DI3+-F  SR5690  Unganged Quad DDR2-800R  6-6-6-18 CR1
1457 KRay/s
6x Core i7-990X Extreme HT  3466 MHz  Intel DX58SO2  X58  Triple DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
1393 KRay/s
8x FX-8350  4000 MHz  Asus M5A99X Evo R2.0  AMD990X  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
1378 KRay/s
8x Xeon X5550 HT  2666 MHz  Supermicro X8DTN+  i5520  Hexa DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
1312 KRay/s
8x FX-8150  3600 MHz  Asus M5A97  AMD970  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
1157 KRay/s
8x Xeon E5462  2800 MHz  Intel S5400SF  i5400  Quad DDR2-640FB  5-5-5-15
1040 KRay/s
8x Opteron 2378  2400 MHz  Tyan Thunder n3600R  nForcePro-3600  Unganged Quad DDR2-800R  6-6-6-18 CR1
1038 KRay/s
6x Phenom II X6 Black 1100T  3300 MHz  Gigabyte GA-890GPA-UD3H v2  AMD890GX Int.  Unganged Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR2
893 KRay/s
4x Core i7-965 Extreme HT  3200 MHz  Asus P6T Deluxe  X58  Triple DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
874 KRay/s
6x FX-6100  3300 MHz  Asus Sabertooth 990FX  AMD990FX  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
736 KRay/s
4x A10-6800K  4100 MHz  Gigabyte GA-F2A85X-UP4  A85X Int.  Dual DDR3-2133  9-11-10-27 CR2
715 KRay/s
8x Xeon L5320  1866 MHz  Intel S5000VCL  i5000V  Dual DDR2-533FB  4-4-4-12
712 KRay/s
4x A10-7850K  3700 MHz  Gigabyte GA-F2A88XM-D3H  A88X Int.  Dual DDR3-2133  9-11-10-31 CR2
670 KRay/s
8x Opteron 2344 HE  1700 MHz  Supermicro H8DME-2  nForcePro-3600  Unganged Quad DDR2-667R  5-5-5-15 CR1
667 KRay/s
4x A10-5800K  3800 MHz  Asus F2A55-M  A55 Int.  Dual DDR3-1866  9-10-9-27 CR2
626 KRay/s
4x Phenom II X4 Black 940  3000 MHz  Asus M3N78-EM  GeForce8300 Int.  Ganged Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
624 KRay/s
4x A8-3850  2900 MHz  Gigabyte GA-A75M-UD2H  A75 Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
623 KRay/s
4x Xeon X3430  2400 MHz  Supermicro X8SIL-F  i3420  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
615 KRay/s
4x Core 2 Extreme QX9650  3000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-EP35C-DS3R  P35  Dual DDR3-1066  8-8-8-20 CR2
597 KRay/s
2x Core i5-3317U HT  2400 MHz  [ TRIAL VERSION ]  HM76 Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
535 KRay/s
4x Core 2 Extreme QX6700  2666 MHz  Intel D975XBX2  i975X  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
466 KRay/s
4x Xeon 5140  2333 MHz  Intel S5000VSA  i5000V  Dual DDR2-667FB  5-5-5-15
459 KRay/s
8x Atom C2750  2400 MHz  Supermicro A1SAi-2750F  Avoton  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR1
452 KRay/s
4x Phenom X4 9500  2200 MHz  Asus M3A  AMD770  Ganged Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
443 KRay/s
2x Core i5-650 HT  3200 MHz  Supermicro C7SIM-Q  Q57 Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
433 KRay/s
4x Athlon 5350  2050 MHz  ASRock AM1B-ITX  Yangtze Int.  DDR3-1600 SDRAM  11-11-11-28 CR2
288 KRay/s
2x Core 2 Extreme X6800  2933 MHz  Abit AB9  P965  Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
236 KRay/s
2x Core 2 Duo P8400  2266 MHz  MSI MegaBook PR201  GM45 Int.  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
211 KRay/s
4x Celeron J1900  2000 MHz  Gigabyte GA-J1900N-D3V  BayTrailD Int.  Dual DDR3-1333  9-9-9-24 CR1
205 KRay/s
2x Pentium EE 955 HT  3466 MHz  Intel D955XBK  i955X  Dual DDR2-667  4-4-4-11
198 KRay/s
2x Xeon HT  3400 MHz  Intel SE7320SP2  iE7320  Dual DDR333R  2.5-3-3-7
193 KRay/s
4x Opteron 2210 HE  1800 MHz  Tyan Thunder h2000M  BCM5785  Quad DDR2-600R  5-5-5-15 CR1
185 KRay/s
4x Celeron N3150  1600 MHz  ASRock N3150B-ITX  Braswell Int.  Dual DDR3-1600  11-11-11-28 CR2
176 KRay/s
2x Athlon64 X2 Black 6400+  3200 MHz  MSI K9N SLI Platinum  nForce570SLI  Dual DDR2-800  4-4-4-11 CR1
138 KRay/s
2x Pentium D 820  2800 MHz  Abit Fatal1ty F-I90HD  RS600 Int.  Dual DDR2-800  5-5-5-18 CR2
120 KRay/s
Nano X2 L4350  1600 MHz  VIA EPIA-M900  VX900H Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  7-7-7-20 CR2
112 KRay/s
2x Athlon64 X2 4000+  2100 MHz  ASRock ALiveNF7G-HDready  nForce7050-630a Int.  Dual DDR2-700  5-5-5-18 CR2
109 KRay/s
P4EE HT  3733 MHz  Intel SE7230NH1LX  iE7230  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
80 KRay/s
2x E-350  1600 MHz  ASRock E350M1  A50M Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  8-8-8-20 CR1
73 KRay/s
Celeron 420  1600 MHz  Intel DQ965GF  Q965 Int.  Dual DDR2-667  5-5-5-15
62 KRay/s
Celeron D 326  2533 MHz  ASRock 775Twins-HDTV  RC410 Ext.  DDR2-533 SDRAM  4-4-4-11 CR2
59 KRay/s
Opteron 248  2200 MHz  MSI K8T Master1-FAR  K8T800  Dual DDR266R  2-3-3-6 CR1
56 KRay/s
Nano L2200  1600 MHz  VIA VB8001  CN896 Int.  DDR2-667 SDRAM  5-5-5-15 CR2
54 KRay/s
Athlon64 3200+  2000 MHz  ASRock 939S56-M  SiS756  Dual DDR400  2.5-3-3-8 CR2
46 KRay/s
2x Atom D2500  1866 MHz  Intel D2500CC  NM10 Int.  DDR3-1066 SDRAM  7-7-7-20 CR2
43 KRay/s
Sempron 2600+  1600 MHz  ASRock K8NF4G-SATA2  GeForce6100 Int.  DDR400 SDRAM  2.5-3-3-8 CR2
28 KRay/s
Atom 230 HT  1600 MHz  Intel D945GCLF  i945GC Int.  DDR2-533 SDRAM  4-4-4-12


Debug - PCI

 
B00 D00 F00:  Intel Ivy Bridge-MB - Host Bridge/DRAM Controller
  
Offset 000:  86 80 54 01 06 00 90 20 09 00 00 06 00 00 00 00
Offset 010:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 020:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 43 10 0D 10
Offset 030:  00 00 00 00 E0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 040:  01 90 D1 FE 00 00 00 00 01 00 D1 FE 00 00 00 00
Offset 050:  11 02 00 00 99 00 00 00 07 00 D0 CF 01 00 00 CB
Offset 060:  05 00 00 F8 00 00 00 00 01 80 D1 FE 00 00 00 00
Offset 070:  00 00 00 FF 01 00 00 00 00 0C 00 FF 7F 00 00 00
Offset 080:  10 00 00 00 00 11 11 00 1A 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 090:  01 00 00 FF 01 00 00 00 01 00 10 2F 02 00 00 00
Offset 0A0:  01 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 01 00 20 2F 02 00 00 00
Offset 0B0:  01 00 E0 CB 01 00 C0 CB 01 00 00 CB 01 00 E0 CF
Offset 0C0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0D0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0E0:  09 00 0C 01 9B 61 00 E2 D0 00 F8 14 00 00 00 00
Offset 0F0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 C8 0F 09 00 00 00 00 00
 
B00 D01 F00:  Intel Ivy Bridge - PCI Express Controller
  
Offset 000:  86 80 51 01 07 04 10 00 09 00 04 06 10 00 81 00
Offset 010:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 01 00 E0 E0 00 00
Offset 020:  00 F6 00 F7 01 E0 F1 F1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 030:  00 00 00 00 88 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 FF 01 18 00
Offset 040:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 050:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 060:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 070:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0A
Offset 080:  01 90 03 C8 08 00 00 00 0D 80 00 00 43 10 0D 10
Offset 090:  05 A0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0A0:  10 00 42 01 01 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 AD 61 02
Offset 0B0:  53 00 01 51 80 25 0C 00 00 00 48 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0C0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 00 00 00
Offset 0D0:  42 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0E0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0F0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 10 00
 
B00 D02 F00:  Intel Ivy Bridge-MB - Integrated Graphics Controller (MB GT2)
  
Offset 000:  86 80 66 01 07 04 90 00 09 00 00 03 00 00 00 00
Offset 010:  04 00 40 F7 00 00 00 00 0C 00 00 D0 00 00 00 00
Offset 020:  01 F0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 43 10 0D 10
Offset 030:  00 00 00 00 90 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00
Offset 040:  09 00 0C 01 9B 61 00 E2 D0 00 F8 14 00 00 00 00
Offset 050:  11 02 00 00 99 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 E0 CB
Offset 060:  00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 070:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 080:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 090:  05 D0 01 00 0C F0 E0 FE 61 49 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0A0:  00 00 00 00 13 00 06 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0B0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0C0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0D0:  01 A4 22 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0E0:  00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 80 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0F0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 09 00 18 A0 87 CA
 
B00 D04 F00:  Intel Ivy Bridge - Thermal Management Controller
  
Offset 000:  86 80 53 01 06 00 90 00 09 00 80 11 00 00 00 00
Offset 010:  04 80 AF FE 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 020:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 43 10 0D 10
Offset 030:  00 00 00 00 90 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 01 00 00
Offset 040:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 050:  00 00 00 00 99 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 060:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 070:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 080:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 090:  05 D0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0A0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0B0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0C0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0D0:  01 E0 03 00 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0E0:  09 00 0C 01 9B 61 00 E2 D0 00 F8 14 00 00 00 00
Offset 0F0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 
B00 D14 F00:  Intel Panther Point PCH - USB 3.0 xHCI Controller [C-1]
  
Offset 000:  86 80 31 1E 06 04 90 02 04 30 03 0C 00 00 00 00
Offset 010:  04 00 A0 F7 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 020:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 43 10 0D 10
Offset 030:  00 00 00 00 70 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00
Offset 040:  FD 07 0E 80 39 C2 03 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 050:  17 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 060:  30 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 070:  01 80 C2 C1 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 080:  05 00 87 00 0C F0 E0 FE 00 00 00 00 B2 49 00 00
Offset 090:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0A0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0B0:  8F 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0C0:  03 0C 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0D0:  09 00 00 00 0F 00 00 00 09 00 00 00 0F 00 00 00
Offset 0E0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0F0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 87 0F 04 08 00 00 00 00
 
B00 D16 F00:  Intel Panther Point PCH - Host Embedded Controller Interface 1 (HECI1) [C-1]
  
Offset 000:  86 80 3A 1E 06 04 10 00 04 00 80 07 00 00 80 00
Offset 010:  04 20 A2 F7 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 020:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 43 10 0D 10
Offset 030:  00 00 00 00 50 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00
Offset 040:  55 02 00 1E 10 00 01 80 06 01 00 66 F0 1F 00 10
Offset 050:  01 8C 03 C8 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 060:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 070:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 080:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 05 00 81 00
Offset 090:  0C F0 E0 FE 00 00 00 00 A2 49 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0A0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0B0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 C0
Offset 0C0:  6D 08 C5 89 D6 68 5C 98 B4 25 77 81 1C 6D E9 6C
Offset 0D0:  AE 8B 96 2F B5 7E D7 63 92 9A 9B BD 04 FD 0F 92
Offset 0E0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0F0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 
B00 D1A F00:  Intel Panther Point PCH - USB 2.0 EHCI Controller #2 [C-1]
  
Offset 000:  86 80 2D 1E 06 00 90 02 04 20 03 0C 00 00 00 00
Offset 010:  00 00 A2 F7 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 020:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 43 10 0D 10
Offset 030:  00 00 00 00 50 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 01 00 00
Offset 040:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 050:  01 58 C2 C9 00 00 00 00 0A 98 A0 20 00 00 00 00
Offset 060:  20 20 FF 07 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 01 00 20 00 00
Offset 070:  00 00 DF 3F 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 080:  00 00 80 00 11 88 0C 93 30 0D 00 24 00 00 00 00
Offset 090:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 13 00 06 03 00 00 00 00
Offset 0A0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0B0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0C0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0D0:  00 00 00 00 00 AA FF 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0E0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 90 AD CA
Offset 0F0:  00 00 00 00 88 85 80 00 87 0F 04 08 08 17 5B 20
 
B00 D1B F00:  Intel Panther Point PCH - High Definition Audio Controller [C-1]
  
Offset 000:  86 80 20 1E 06 00 10 00 04 00 03 04 10 00 00 00
Offset 010:  04 80 A1 F7 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 020:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 43 10 0D 10
Offset 030:  00 00 00 00 50 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 16 01 00 00
Offset 040:  01 00 00 45 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 050:  01 60 42 C8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 060:  05 70 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 070:  10 00 91 00 00 00 00 10 00 08 10 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 080:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 090:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0A0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0B0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0C0:  00 04 02 01 02 24 00 40 00 0C A3 82 10 00 33 02
Offset 0D0:  00 0C A3 02 10 00 33 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0E0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0F0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 87 0F 04 08 00 00 00 00
 
B00 D1C F00:  Intel Panther Point PCH - PCI Express Port 1
  
Offset 000:  86 80 10 1E 04 04 10 00 C4 00 04 06 10 00 81 00
Offset 010:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 02 00 F0 00 00 20
Offset 020:  F0 FF 00 00 F1 FF 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 030:  00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 FF 01 00 00
Offset 040:  10 80 42 01 00 80 00 00 00 00 10 00 12 4C 12 01
Offset 050:  03 00 01 10 00 B2 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 060:  00 00 00 00 16 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 070:  02 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 080:  05 90 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 090:  0D A0 00 00 43 10 0D 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0A0:  01 00 02 C8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0B0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0C0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0D0:  00 00 00 01 02 0B 00 00 80 80 11 81 00 00 00 00
Offset 0E0:  00 3F 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0F0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 87 0F 04 08 00 00 00 00
 
B00 D1C F01:  Intel Panther Point PCH - PCI Express Port 2
  
Offset 000:  86 80 12 1E 06 04 10 00 C4 00 04 06 10 00 81 00
Offset 010:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 03 00 F0 00 00 00
Offset 020:  90 F7 90 F7 F1 FF 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 030:  00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 FF 02 00 00
Offset 040:  10 80 42 01 00 80 00 00 00 00 10 00 12 3C 12 02
Offset 050:  42 00 11 70 00 B2 0C 00 00 00 40 01 00 00 00 00
Offset 060:  00 00 00 00 16 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 070:  02 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 080:  05 90 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 090:  0D A0 00 00 43 10 0D 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0A0:  01 00 02 C8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0B0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0C0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0D0:  00 00 00 01 02 0B 00 00 80 80 11 81 00 00 00 00
Offset 0E0:  00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0F0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 87 0F 04 08 00 00 00 00
 
B00 D1C F03:  Intel Panther Point PCH - PCI Express Port 4
  
Offset 000:  86 80 16 1E 07 04 10 00 C4 00 04 06 10 00 81 00
Offset 010:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 04 00 D0 D0 00 20
Offset 020:  80 F7 80 F7 11 F2 11 F2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 030:  00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 FF 04 00 00
Offset 040:  10 80 42 01 00 80 00 00 00 00 10 00 12 3C 12 04
Offset 050:  43 00 11 70 00 B2 1C 00 00 00 40 01 00 00 00 00
Offset 060:  00 00 00 00 16 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 070:  02 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 080:  05 90 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 090:  0D A0 00 00 43 10 0D 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0A0:  01 00 02 C8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0B0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0C0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0D0:  00 00 00 01 02 0B 00 00 80 80 11 81 00 00 00 00
Offset 0E0:  00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0F0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 87 0F 04 08 00 00 00 00
 
B00 D1D F00:  Intel Panther Point PCH - USB 2.0 EHCI Controller #1 [C-1]
  
Offset 000:  86 80 26 1E 06 00 90 02 04 20 03 0C FF FF FF FF
Offset 010:  00 F0 A1 F7 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 020:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 43 10 0D 10
Offset 030:  00 00 00 00 50 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 17 01 00 00
Offset 040:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 050:  01 58 C2 C9 00 00 00 00 0A 98 A0 20 00 00 00 00
Offset 060:  20 20 FF 07 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 01 00 20 00 00
Offset 070:  00 00 DF 3F 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 080:  00 00 80 00 11 88 0C 93 30 0D 00 24 00 00 00 00
Offset 090:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 13 00 06 03 00 00 00 00
Offset 0A0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0B0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0C0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0D0:  00 00 00 00 00 AA FF 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0E0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 84 30 DF C8
Offset 0F0:  00 00 00 00 88 85 80 00 87 0F 04 08 08 17 5B 20
 
B00 D1F F00:  Intel HM76 Chipset - LPC Interface Controller [C-1]
  
Offset 000:  86 80 59 1E 07 00 10 02 04 00 01 06 00 00 80 00
Offset 010:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 020:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 43 10 0D 10
Offset 030:  00 00 00 00 E0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 040:  01 04 00 00 80 00 00 00 01 05 00 00 10 00 00 00
Offset 050:  F8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 060:  80 80 80 80 D0 00 00 00 80 80 80 80 F8 F0 00 00
Offset 070:  78 F0 78 F0 78 F0 78 F0 78 F0 78 F0 78 F0 78 F0
Offset 080:  10 00 0F 3C 41 02 3C 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 090:  00 00 00 00 00 0F 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0A0:  14 0E A0 00 41 38 06 00 00 47 00 00 00 00 01 00
Offset 0B0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 84 00 08 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0C0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0D0:  33 22 11 00 67 45 00 00 CF FF 00 00 08 00 00 00
Offset 0E0:  09 00 0C 10 00 00 00 00 13 06 64 06 00 00 00 00
Offset 0F0:  01 C0 D1 FE 00 00 00 00 87 0F 04 08 00 00 00 00
 
B00 D1F F02:  Intel Panther Point-M PCH - SATA AHCI Controller [C-1]
  
Offset 000:  86 80 03 1E 07 04 B0 02 04 01 06 01 00 00 00 00
Offset 010:  B1 F0 00 00 A1 F0 00 00 91 F0 00 00 81 F0 00 00
Offset 020:  61 F0 00 00 00 E0 A1 F7 00 00 00 00 43 10 0D 10
Offset 030:  00 00 00 00 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 00
Offset 040:  00 80 00 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 050:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 060:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 070:  01 A8 03 40 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 080:  05 70 01 00 0C F0 E0 FE 50 49 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 090:  60 38 07 87 83 01 00 38 08 42 5C 01 00 00 00 00
Offset 0A0:  E0 00 00 00 39 00 39 0F 12 B0 10 00 48 00 00 00
Offset 0B0:  13 00 06 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0C0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0D0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0E0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0F0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 87 0F 04 08 00 00 00 00
 
B00 D1F F03:  Intel Panther Point PCH - SMBus Controller [C-1]
  
Offset 000:  86 80 22 1E 03 00 80 02 04 00 05 0C 00 00 00 00
Offset 010:  04 D0 A1 F7 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 020:  41 F0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 43 10 0D 10
Offset 030:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 FF 03 00 00
Offset 040:  01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 050:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 060:  03 04 04 00 00 00 08 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 070:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 080:  04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 090:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0A0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0B0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0C0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0D0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0E0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0F0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 87 0F 04 08 00 00 00 00
 
B00 D1F F06:  Intel Panther Point PCH - Thermal Management Controller [C-1]
  
Offset 000:  86 80 24 1E 00 00 10 00 04 00 80 11 00 00 00 00
Offset 010:  04 C0 A1 F7 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 020:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 43 10 0D 10
Offset 030:  00 00 00 00 50 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 FF 03 00 00
Offset 040:  05 00 E0 CF 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 050:  01 00 23 00 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 060:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 070:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 080:  05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 090:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0A0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0B0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0C0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0D0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0E0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0F0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 87 0F 04 08 00 00 00 00
 
B03 D00 F00:  Atheros AR9285 802.11b/g/n Wireless Network Adapter
  
Offset 000:  8C 16 2B 00 46 01 10 00 01 00 80 02 10 00 00 00
Offset 010:  04 00 90 F7 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 020:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 5B 10 17 E0
Offset 030:  00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 11 01 00 00
Offset 040:  01 50 C3 DB 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 050:  05 60 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 060:  10 00 12 00 C0 8C 90 05 10 20 19 00 11 3C 03 00
Offset 070:  42 00 11 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 080:  00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 090:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0A0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0B0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0C0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0D0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0E0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0F0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 
B04 D00 F00:  Realtek RTS5289 PCI-E Card Reader
  
Offset 000:  EC 10 89 52 06 04 10 00 01 00 00 FF 10 00 80 00
Offset 010:  00 00 80 F7 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 020:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 43 10 2F 20
Offset 030:  00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 00
Offset 040:  01 50 C3 F7 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 050:  05 70 81 00 0C F0 E0 FE 00 00 00 00 91 49 00 00
Offset 060:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 070:  10 B0 02 00 C0 8C 90 05 10 20 19 00 11 7C 07 00
Offset 080:  03 01 11 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 090:  00 00 00 00 1F 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0A0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0B0:  11 D0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0C0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0D0:  03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0E0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0F0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 
B04 D00 F02:  Realtek RTL8168/8111 PCI-E Gigabit Ethernet Adapter
  
Offset 000:  EC 10 68 81 07 04 10 00 0A 00 00 02 10 00 80 00
Offset 010:  01 D0 00 00 00 00 00 00 0C 40 10 F2 00 00 00 00
Offset 020:  0C 00 10 F2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 43 10 0F 20
Offset 030:  00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00
Offset 040:  01 50 C3 FF 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 050:  05 70 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 060:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 070:  10 B0 02 02 C0 8C 90 05 10 50 19 00 11 7C 07 00
Offset 080:  40 00 11 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 090:  00 00 00 00 1F 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0A0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0B0:  11 D0 03 80 04 00 00 00 04 08 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0C0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0D0:  03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0E0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 0F0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 
PCI-8086-0154:  Intel SNB/IVB/HSW/CRW/BDW/SKL/KBL MCHBAR @ FED10000h
  
Offset 4000:  BB 8B 1C 00 65 64 18 0C 20 22 04 0A B4 58 00 00
Offset 4010:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00
Offset 4020:  05 00 10 00 27 27 20 20 22 00 0E 00 00 00 00 00
 
PCI-8086-0154:  Intel SNB/IVB/HSW/CRW/BDW/SKL/KBL MCHBAR @ FED10000h
  
Offset 4200:  02 00 06 00 00 04 06 00 20 03 00 01 00 04 06 01
Offset 4210:  00 00 00 00 88 02 00 00 42 02 00 00 40 02 00 00
Offset 4220:  07 00 00 00 03 F0 01 00 05 F1 01 00 02 F0 01 00
Offset 4230:  01 10 0F 00 01 10 90 01 64 10 28 04 01 0C 28 00
Offset 4240:  00 00 00 00 E3 07 04 00 E3 07 04 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 4250:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 4260:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 4270:  C6 19 51 3F F5 4E 0D 54 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 4280:  00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 44 00 00 00
Offset 4290:  80 40 00 00 FF 98 00 00 60 18 80 6C 58 02 00 00
Offset 42A0:  03 10 00 00 00 82 F8 41 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 
PCI-8086-0154:  Intel SNB/IVB/HSW/CRW/BDW/SKL/KBL MCHBAR @ FED10000h
  
Offset 4400:  BB 8B 1C 00 65 64 18 0C 20 22 04 0A B4 58 00 00
Offset 4410:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00
Offset 4420:  05 00 10 00 28 28 20 20 33 00 0E 00 00 00 00 00
 
PCI-8086-0154:  Intel SNB/IVB/HSW/CRW/BDW/SKL/KBL MCHBAR @ FED10000h
  
Offset 4600:  02 00 06 00 00 04 06 00 20 03 00 01 00 04 06 01
Offset 4610:  00 00 00 00 88 02 00 00 42 02 00 00 40 02 00 00
Offset 4620:  07 00 00 00 03 F0 01 00 05 F1 01 00 02 F0 01 00
Offset 4630:  01 10 0F 00 01 10 90 01 64 10 28 04 01 0C 28 00
Offset 4640:  00 00 00 00 E3 07 04 00 E3 07 04 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 4650:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 4660:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 4670:  A8 FE 25 16 C1 64 A2 C7 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 4680:  00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 44 00 00 00
Offset 4690:  80 40 00 00 FF 98 00 00 60 18 80 6C 18 02 00 00
Offset 46A0:  03 10 00 00 00 82 F8 41 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 
PCI-8086-0154:  Intel SNB/IVB/HSW/CRW/BDW/SKL/KBL MCHBAR @ FED10000h
  
Offset 4800:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 4810:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 
PCI-8086-0154:  Intel SNB/IVB/HSW/CRW/BDW/SKL/KBL MCHBAR @ FED10000h
  
Offset 4A80:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 4A90:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 
PCI-8086-0154:  Intel SNB/IVB/HSW/CRW/BDW/SKL/KBL MCHBAR @ FED10000h
  
Offset 5000:  24 00 00 00 10 00 62 00 10 00 62 00 00 00 60 00
Offset 5010:  00 00 00 00 00 00 20 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 
PCI-8086-0154:  Intel SNB/IVB/HSW/CRW/BDW/SKL/KBL MCHBAR @ FED10000h
  
Offset 5880:  E7 71 91 CA 00 00 00 00 8A DA E4 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 5890:  5F 93 1A 09 C8 DD 19 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 58A0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 58B0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 58C0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 58D0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 58E0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 58F0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 5900:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 5910:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 5920:  00 00 00 00 18 00 00 00 32 E1 17 4C E7 FC 7B 02
Offset 5930:  88 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 10 0A 00 38 A4 FD 84
Offset 5940:  F2 61 82 1F 01 4A 0C 01 00 07 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 5950:  00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 11 01 E0 03 08 08 00
Offset 5960:  54 A7 C2 63 96 6C 87 D9 7C 64 87 D9 7D 6E 7F 19
Offset 5970:  0A 92 49 F4 08 92 49 F4 3E 00 00 00 3E 00 00 00
Offset 5980:  3D 00 00 00 E4 5C 33 49 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 5990:  FF 00 00 00 FF 00 00 00 15 07 07 00 00 12 69 0D
Offset 59A0:  88 80 DC 00 B0 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 59B0:  80 03 00 80 94 14 14 18 70 01 00 80 94 14 14 18
Offset 59C0:  00 08 2C 88 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 
PCI-8086-0154:  Intel SNB/IVB/HSW/CRW/BDW/SKL/KBL MCHBAR @ FED10000h
  
Offset 5E00:  06 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 5E10:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 
PCI-8086-1E24:  Intel 5/6/7-series PCH TBAR @ F7A1C000h
  
Offset 00:  FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
Offset 10:  FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
Offset 20:  FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
Offset 30:  FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
Offset 40:  FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
Offset 50:  FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
Offset 60:  FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
Offset 70:  FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
Offset 80:  FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
Offset 90:  FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
Offset A0:  FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
Offset B0:  FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
Offset C0:  FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
Offset D0:  FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
 
PCI-8086-1E24:  Intel 5/6/7-series PCH TBARB @ CFE00000h
  
Offset 00:  00 BA 00 E6 2B 3A 4C 42 89 04 43 00 00 99 40 00
Offset 10:  00 00 40 1A 87 DE 8C 80 00 00 E0 10 00 00 00 00
Offset 20:  00 00 55 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 30:  00 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80
Offset 40:  00 02 00 FF 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 50:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 60:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 1F 1A 15 05
Offset 70:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 80:  00 00 00 00 67 67 00 FF 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset 90:  D5 C7 20 62 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset A0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset B0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset C0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 FF 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Offset D0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 3A 00 B7 00


Debug - Video BIOS

 
C000:0000  ................................................................
C000:0040  ................................................................
C000:0080  ................................................................
C000:00C0  ................................................................
C000:0100  ................................................................
C000:0140  ................................................................
C000:0180  ................................................................
C000:01C0  ................................................................
C000:0200  ................................................................
C000:0240  ................................................................
C000:0280  ................................................................
C000:02C0  ................................................................
C000:0300  ................................................................
C000:0340  ................................................................
C000:0380  ................................................................
C000:03C0  ................................................................


Debug - Unknown

 
HDD  KINGSTON SMSR150S3256G
SSD  KINGSTON SMSR150S3256G




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